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PREFACE 
This started innocently enough! 
The contents of my office at Boston University needed win-
nowing. There had been a good start a year before when I gave a 
substantial collection of Aficana to another university. But 
more needed to be done in anticipation of the day when my need 
for an off ice would have expired, and someone would need to 
remove my belongings and make the room available to another oc-
cupant. 
In starting the chore, I noticed several files of talks, 
more formal speeches and such, that had accumulated over the 
years. Yellowed pages and frayed edges looked a bit ragged and 
tired; so the thought of putting them on computer discs for com-
pact storage and convenient review in case I ever wanted to do 
anything with them probably arose more from my obsessive desire 
for neat order than anything more pretentious. 
From such modest, indeed trivial, beginnings this project 
arose. Later the thought occurred that if the talks were in the 
computer, I might print them out for any in the family who might 
be interested. At this stage, however, significant doubt began 
to intrude. Who might have any interest in reading what I had 
once said, and what justification could I provide for offering 
what might well be regarded as imposing only a burdensome obli-
gation to read? Doubt almost prevailed, and the project came 
close to storage in that secret cupboard that holds the remnants 
of ideas whose time will never come. 
Since the project has survived and may in time result in 
the gift of a little book to family members and a few friends, I 
think it obligatory that I provide, as honestly as possible, a 
statement of the reasons that conquered the earlier doubt. I ac-
cept it as part of the human condition that we cherish a hope of 
being remembered, at least for a while, within some small cir-
cle. And, while memory lasts with others, there is the probably 
immodest hope that it will coincide with the self-image, will 
direct attention to matters that were important, sometimes 
profoundly so, to the one who survives only in the recollections 
of living loved ones. Several years ago, in a brief memorial es-
say for a friend, I recalled a play in which the stage was the 
world occupied by the living, while heaven was an upper room, 
illuminated and seen by the audience only when the living remem-
bered those who had slipped into the shadows. This is about as 
firm a concept of immortality as, hope aside, I can grasp. So if 
one indulges both the hope of remembrance and the immodest 
desire that the memory will coincide with one's own image of 
reality, the search for aids to fulfilling hope and achieving 
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desire continues. 
I have no doubt that most, and, by far the most important 
part, of the substance of recollectlon is the result of intimate 
personal contact when love led to commitment, when children came 
to provide opportunity for stories told, songs sung, and games 
played, when the companionship of friends and the support of 
colleagues in shared enterprises formed lasting bonds. I can do 
nothing at this time to alter these sources of recollection. 
What I may be able to do, and in this venture will attempt, is 
to add a dimension often revealed little if at all in these in-
timdate ~elationshtipbs. 1~nd, tinh tloothkingfover the file~ otf tatlks .\ ma e, I ve come o e ieve a ey ocus on some in eres s, I 
concerns, and commitments rather better than most of the writing. 
one had done for publication in books or professional journals.JJ 
During the years in which the contents of this collection 
came into being, if I were giving a brief, informal talk, for 
example, a luncheon talk to the Rotary Club, I always spoke from 
notes and preserved no record of what I had said--ephemera to 
both speaker and listeners. On rare occasions when the speech 
was more substantial but preparation time limited, I also spoke .
1 from notes, but in those circumstances I often dictated from the 
notes when time allowed to preserve a written version. Particu-
larly in the politically tense years when I was at Indiana 
University, I followed this practice, since it seemed prudent to I 
be able to correct any ascriptions, inadvertent or intentional, 
that departed from what I had said. In general, however, if the 
occasion called for a speech of greater length and, one hoped, 
more substance, I prepared a full written version which I didn't 
read but followed closely. This pattern led to the preservation 
of a large number of speeches in my files and, therefore, when I 
began this project I faced the need for sifting and selecting. 
In most instances the decision on inclusion here or 
reburial in a file was easy. For example, I could think of no 
reason for imposing on anyone today the hour-long talk I gave to 
several hundred lawyers on the complexities and absurdities of 
the parole evidence rule . .21 I also excluded a number of items of 
transient interest at best, such as presentations to Round 
1. In Appendix I, I have included a bibliography. I acknow-\ 
ledge, however, a strong suspicion that few, if any, read most 
professional writing and that the shelf life of most publica-
tions is minimal. To the extent that I'm wrong on this, the bib-
liography may be a convenience. 
2. The talk was surprisingly well received and the editor of 
the Michigan State Bar Journal asked for it. It appears as Item 
4 in the bibliography, Appendix I. 
I 
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Tables at annual meetings of the Association of American Law 
Schools. One exclusion I rather regret was a speech I gave in 
1960 in the Law School of Boston Colleg~ at an institute for 
college pre-law directors. Bob Drinan ;J./ had invited me in my 
then capacity of Chairman of the A.A.L.S. Committee on Pre-Legal 
Education to lead off the conference with a talk on "Current 
Thinking on Pre-Legal Education." What I said on that occasion 
surely wasn't memorable. In fact, at the beginning of the talk I 
made this confession: 
"When I learned of the subject assigned to me, it sounded 
as if I were expected to report on a ferment of thought, a spate 
of new ideas, throughout the country. This raised in my mind a 
number of questions: first, whether there is, in fact, any new 
thinking on this problem. I hope so, but I can't be sure. Sec-
ond, and more important, if there is any 'current thinking on 
pre-legal education,' do I have any special competence to report 
on it or criticize it. I regret to say that I could think of 
none." 
I recall this occasion at Boston College, not because of 
any memorable content of my talk, but because I had determined 
to overcome an inhibition I found annoying. I had never had the 
courage to use any humorous anecdote, however easy I might think 
it would be to make it seem relevant, not dragged in by the 
heels. Two fantasies constrained me. Easily I could imagine 
forgetting the punch line or so mangling it that the humor was 
lost. Or, perhaps worse, I imagined anticipating the punch line 
myself and becoming so overcome that I could hardly get a word 
out, while my audience sat in stony wonder about what I found so 
amusing. Appreciating the value of a touch of humor, I was 
resolved to conquer my inhibition. So I dredged up a couple of 
stories that, without too much violence, I could relate to the 
subject of my talk. I don't exaggerate in reporting the rattle 
of my knees behind the lectern as I told the first story. To my 
amazed delight, I neither forgot the punch line nor laughed 
prematurely--and the audience rewarded me with a good chuckle. 
Such success went to my head, I lost my nerve completely and 
abandoned the second joke untold. But thereafter the inhibition 
was gone. 
3. Bob, a Jesuit priest, was then Dean of the Law School of 
Boston College. Later he was elected to Congress from the Sixth 
District of Massachusetts and served there until he and other 
clerics were directed by the Pope not to serve in public of-
f ices. Since leaving Congress he has been a Professor at 
Georgetown University. 
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Perhaps I should add that probably in many of the talks in-
cluded here, I began with some light, possibly humorous, 
remarks, before turning to the substance. Of these preliminaries 
I have kept no record and, even if I had done so, I would have 
omitted them here. 
The speeches included here pursue a small number of themes, 
and the organization is in large measure thematic. Within each 
thematic group, the organization is usually chronological. This 
latter feature seems important in light of the possibility of my 
clarifying, deepening, or correcting something I had said ear-
lier. Most of the speeches were made in the 1960s and later. I 
have little recollection and few records of talks I gave ear-
lier~ ~probably because invitations to young assistant profes-
sors!l/ to make speeches are fairly rare. The first group of talks 
4. I resigned from the Washington firm of Hogan and Hartson 
in 1951 to become Assistant Professor in the University of \' 
Michigan Law School. I had always known that a move to the 1 
academic side of the profession was a distinct possibility, 
since I had done some teaching during my college years, in my 
period in the Navy, and while I was in law school. During the 
slightly over two years I was at Hogan and Hartson, Michigan was 
the fifth school that had approached me about a faculty appoint-
ment. In each case declining was easy: I felt I would benefit 
greatly from more practice and I was confident that an offer 
would come from Michigan in a year or so. 
When the Michigan offer came, I had no doubt that I would 
accept it, but asking for some time for consideration seemed the 
appropriate thing to do. From a starting point of complete 
certainty on what my decision would be, I moved steadily during 
the two-weeks for decision I had asked for to such uncertainty 
that at the end I could have tilted either way. That I accepted 
the Michigan invitation was probably the result of the firm's 
attitude, expressed largely by Nelson Hartson, the senior part-
ner. Although I worked relatively little directly with Mr. Hart-
son, he clearly liked me and I liked him; at least once a month 
he would invite me to lunch with him at the Metropolitan or 
Cosmos Club. our relationship was warm and relaxed. When I 
talked with Hartson about the Michigan offer, he indicated that 
the firm wanted me to stay and asked what kind of compensation 
and other terms I wanted. I responded that I preferred not to 
make the decision on the basis of income, having no doubt that 
the firm could easily outbid any University. He understood that 
and adjusted my salary so that I would have no immediate income 
loss if I stayed. He then said, "If you feel attracted to teach-
ing, try it. If it doesn't prove satisfactory for you, you can 
certainly come back." With that generous assurance, I accepted 
the Michigan offer and returned to Ann Arbor in August 1951. 
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explores the concept of the "Rule of Law," which was being in-
voked in this period with increasing frequency by such leading 
exponents of fidelity to law as Richard M. Nixon. I found dis-
quieting the repetition of the Rule~of Law mantra as a surrogate 
for thought. Perhaps the principal reason for the focus here on 
the Rule of Law talks, however, lies in the fact that they pro-
vided an opportunity for me to begin a fairly systematic state-
ment of my own legal philosophy. 
The decade of the sixties was the time of my own immersion 
in Africa. The educational and political issues I had to deal 
with in this period provided one of the most fascinating, crea-
tive, and ultimately disappointing experiences I have ever had. 
Most of what I have thought it useful to say out of the African 
experience is in readily available publications for the use of 
anyone with a shred of interest. I have included the entirety of 
or excerpts from a few talks out of the African experience, how-
ever, because the challenge of African development played such a 
prominent role in my professional life that it cannot be entire-
ly ignored. During the period of work in Africa, some of my 
basic views on education, as well as on the nature and function 
of universities, came more sharply into focus; these were given 
fuller expression in talks I have organized in the third group. 
The third thematic group reflects the central concerns 
during the turbulent sixties for those of us who worked in 
universities and had to deal with the protests of young people 
against the war in Vietnam and the various forms of injustice 
that students saw as intimately connected with that conflict. As 
I have reviewed the various talks I gave in this period, I have 
been struck by the extent to which the views I had developed 
concerning law, educational goals, the nature of a university, 
and the obligations of lawyers, became intertwined in a Gestalt 
that found expression in virtually every speech I made. 
Before each speech included here, I have provided a brief 
statement of its provenance. In one or two instances, however, 
although I recall clearly preparing the speech, I simply have no 
recollection of the setting or the audience. I strongly suspect 
that the memories of those in my audience are no better than my 
own. 
The thematic organization with its attention to the chal-
lenges of working in post-colonial Africa, as well as to the 
rebellion of the young during the sixties and early seventies, 
(footnote continued): 
I was promoted to Associate Professor with tenure in 1954 
and to Professor in 1957. 
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suggests perhaps the possibility of an interest in this project 
beyond family and a few friends. As I write this, I remain un-
sure whether I will make any effort,.to explore publication. I 
feel only doubt that sales would suffice to interest any pub-
lisher, and any anticipated royalties probably would be minus-
cule. In this connection, I recall the musings of Sir John Col-
ville as he considered reasons for writing a collection of 
charming essays on people and events he had experienced over a 
distinguished career: 
Should I in the sacred cause of truth and in 
the interest of historical research, pursue my theme? 
I remembered a Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge, an 
American of polished culture and agreeable hospitality, 
whose contribution to learning was the history of the 
County Palatine of Durham during a few mediaeval years. 
This vast tome sold, I believe, three copies and is 
never likely to be superseded, If I went ahead I might, 
assuming I could find a publisher, aspire to be his 
equal, for it is said that those good-natured institu-
tions, the British Museum, the Bodleian and the Cam-
bridge University Library acquire every book published 
in the United Kingdom, although they expect to receive 
their copy free.!V 
I thought this a useful reminder that I would have to find the 
justifying rationale for my modest project somewhere other than 
in the crasser gains of authorship. 
I therefore conclude this preface and its attempted 
justification with a brief passage from Margaret Yourcenar's 
MEMOIRS OF HADRIAN, words she put into the pen of the Emperor as 
he wrote of his past to the youthful Marcus Aurelius: 
"I have formed a project for telling you about my life. To 
be sure, last year I composed an official summary of my 
career .... I told as few lies therein as possible; regard for 
public interest and decency nevertheless forced me to modify 
certain facts. The truth which I intend to set forth here is not 
particularly scandalous, or is so only to the degree that any 
truth creates a scandal .... I offer you here ... a recital 
stripped of preconceived ideas and of mere abstract principles; 
it is drawn wholly from the experience of one man who is myself. 
I am entrusting to this examination of facts to give me some 
definition of myself, and to judge myself, perhaps, or at the 
very least to know myself better before I die." 
5. J. Colville, FOOTPRINTS IN TIME, (Collins 1976), p. 12. 
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In selecting talks for inclusion here, I recognize that 
even selectivity can be a form of lying--and of self-
justification. Whatever opportunities as I now have for such in-
dulgences, however, are limited somewhat by the fact that most 
of what I off er is simply a record of what I thought and said 
publicly many years ago. To that, I have added notes and one or 
two longer comments in an effort to place the talks into their 
context. Those who shared that context with me will have to 
decide on the accuracy of my recollection. Finally, although I 
offer this selection in the hope that it will enable my family 
and some friends to know me better, I share with Hadrian another 
objective, "to give me some definition of myself, and to judge 
myself, perhaps, or at the least to know myself better before I 
die." 
To whatever value this project may have, many people--
teachers, colleagues and friends-- have contributed; their num-
ber defies listing and appreciative acknowledgment of my in-
debtedness. A necessary exception must be Marilou. Over more 
than fifty years of marriage, she, a non-lawyer, has had to 
endure "lawyer speak" and lawyer's work in many parts of the 
world. With good cheer and grace she has participated in treks 
to some places her own preferences would not have suggested; she 
has endured bar association meetings and vast amounts of the 
duty-entertaining that afflicts most teachers and all deans; and 
she not only had to hear virtually all of the talks included in 
this little book, but usually to read and critique them before 
they saw the light of day. For me to speak simply of gratitude 
would be grossly inadequate. But I can do little more; I wish I 
could. 
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PART ONE 
REFLECTIONS OH THE RULE OF LAW 
THE RULE OF LAW IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
[In the summer of 1960 the University of Michigan Law 
School held a Special Summer School for Lawyers, attended by a 
number of lawyers from the United states and other countries. 
The program included courses for "up-dating" participants on 
recent developments in various areas of the law. It also in-
cluded a series of lectures on the theme "Post-War Thinking 
About the Rule of Law," intended in the words of the Director of 
the program to "enrich the study program and to direct attention 
away from 'bread and butter' thoughts to broader problems." I 
was invited to deliver the first and last of these lectures and 
did so on June 20 and 29, 1960. Later the lectures were pub-
lished, as they appear, in volume 59 of the Michigan Law Review. 
Reaction to the lectures was favorable though not entirely 
free of criticism. A note to me from Charlie Rhyne, a Washington 
lawyer who was a recent President of the American Bar Associa-
tion, whom I had quoted in the first lecture was complimentary, 
though Charlie indicated that I certainly had misinterpreted his 
view. I continue to believe that the Natural Law outlook I as-
cribed (and criticized) was indeed his. The compliment I most 
enjoyed though came from a lawyer in Baltimore who, I believe, 
had not heard the lectures but only read them. He indicated that 
mine were the only discussion of "jurisprudence" he had ever un-
derstood. 
In preparing the lectures for publication I added a limited 
number of footnotes to identify some of my references. I have 
eliminated them here to avoid the usual impedimenta of scholarly 
writing and to preserve the character of the talks as I had 
prepared and delivered them. Also, I have edited the lectures, 
particularly the second, slightly to avoid some repetition that 
seemed needed originally because the lectures were delivered a 
week apart. ] 
Events of the past two decades have made imperative a 
fundamental re-examination of the basis of government and the 
legal order. The gross inhumanities of the German and Japanese 
regimes during the Second World War are fresh in our memories. 
In many areas of the world today, the force of law is being used 
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for the systematic suppression of claims to freedom and human 
dignity. The revolutionary ferment of the post-war years has 
brought into existence new governments with the task of 
determining their fundamental orientation and the direction of 
their legal orders. 
In such times the basic problems of government and law 
demand re-examination. Older societies, contemplating the bar-
barities of their own governments or of those they have defeated 
with the incalculable cost of war, press the question - what 
safeguards can and should be erected to restrain within decent 
bounds the acts of public officials. The emerging societies and 
older ones as well challenge traditional concepts of government 
and law with insistent demands for positive action on broader 
fronts to provide a better life for the people. 
In discussion of these problems the phrase, "the Rule of 
Law" recurs. In recent years two great international con-
ferences, reflecting the principal political division of the 
world, have met in Chicago and Warsaw to examine the Rule of Law 
in the West and in the East. The American Bar Association, under 
the leadership of its recent president Charles Rhyne and with 
the imprimatur of the President of the United States, has in-
augurated an annual "Law Day" to memorialize our devotion to the 
Rule of Law. A distinguished university.§/ has established a 
"World Rule of Law Center" to further the study of this concept 
in international affairs. 
All this is probably worthwhile, but what do we mean by the 
Rule of Law? Are we using a notion of determinate content to il-
luminate the dark corners of government and law, or are we tilt-
ing with Leviathan with only the emotive force of a cliche? It 
seems especially appropriate in a gathering of this kind to turn 
our attention at least briefly from the technical knowledge and 
skills of our profession to a consideration of the meaning and 
function of this concept and, hopefully, to the fundamentals of 
the legal order. 
It would be a digression today to speculate on the origins 
of government and law in small, primitive kinship groups. It is 
enough to note that man's life in society has seen an inexorable 
movement toward larger governmental units and toward ever widen-
ing areas of official power. This development had not progressed 
beyond the city states of ancient Greece, however, when the 
philosophers raised the basic questions which still perplex 
men's minds: Whence comes the authority of the State? What title 
to respect and observance has the law? And, ever recurring in 
different contexts, the agonizing dilemma of Antigone whose con-
6. Duke University 
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science and sense of justice demanded that she perform the 
customary burial rites for her brother, though Creon, Regent of 
Thebes, had decreed that he should remain unburied as punishment 
for his treason. This apparent conflict between law and justice 
is still a part of our daily lives. 
Greek thought, funneled into the main stream of Western 
ideas about government and law primarily by the Roman Stoics, 
postulated a view of the universe, of man, and of law which 
retains its vitality today. Cicero stated: 
True law is right reason in agreement with nature; 
it is of universal application, unchanging and everlas-
ting; it summons to duty by its commands, and averts 
from wrongdoing by its prohibitions •••• We cannot be 
freed from its obligations by senate or people, and we 
need not look outside ourselves for an expounder or in-
terpreter of it. And there will not be different laws 
at Rome and at Athens, or different laws now and in the 
future, but one eternal and unchangeable law will be 
valid for all nations and all times, and there will be 
one master and ruler, that is, God, over us all, for he 
is the author of this law, its promulgator, and its en-
forcing judge •••• 
Christian thought built on these foundations and provided a 
theory of government and law which appeared to reconcile author-
ity and justice. The cosmic order, emanating from the mind of 
God, according to St. Thomas Aquinas, to some extent is percep-
tible to man's rational faculties and, as Natural Law, provides 
a universal standard for the formulation and administration of 
human law by those invested with the care of the community. The 
objective of government and law is thus the common good. While 
some deference even to unjust law may be warranted by the gain 
of civil peace, the commands of reason are ever present to guide 
the lawmaker, to inform and support the governed, and in the ex-
treme case to justify a rejection of the demands made by human 
law. 
The Reformation ended the harmony of medieval thought which 
was based on this view. The unity of the Church was destroyed --
with a consequent undermining of confidence in a universal and 
cognizable standard of justice. Concurrently the emerging spirit 
of nationalism produced increasingly powerful states whose 
diverse enactments rendered untenable the earlier justification 
and validation of positive law as the enactment of universal 
justice. To explain and justify the law-making and -enforcing 
aspirations of the new national states, the theory of terri-
torial sovereignty was developed. While not the earliest, 
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certainly one of the most powerful formulations of this theory 
was presented by Thomas Hobbes in 1651. Starting from the postu-
late of a pre-governmental condition of man, which was a war of 
all against all and in which the llfe of man was "solitary, 
poor, nasty, brutish and short," Hobbes attributed the institu-
tion of civil government to a compact granting unlimited author-
ity to the sovereign. To Hobbes, the meaning and content of 
justice were determined by the sovereign's enactments of posi-
tive law. The only consolation he offered to men ground under 
the heel of Leviathan, the mortal God, was the contemplation of 
their far worse condition in the absence of civil government. 
Building on the foundations provided by Hobbes, John Austin 
in the early 19th century defined law as sovereign command, 
deriving its peculiar character from the naked fact that the 
manifestation of the sovereign's desire is coupled with a sanc-
tion, the threat of an evil, to assure compliance. It would in-
deed be unfair to Austin and many other positivists to suggest 
they ignored or were insensitive to the problem of evaluative 
standards for the positive legal order. Austin expressed his 
belief in a law of nature and suggested that the principle of 
utility was man's best index to this standard. But evaluative 1 
standards were carefully delimited from law and from the proper \ 
province of jurisprudence. It is not surprising, therefore, that 
the developed positivistic tradition, whether derived from 
Austin or his modern continental counterpart, Hans Kelsen, has 
accepted the postulate of a going legal order, based on the 
sovereign monopoly of force, and has insisted that the primary, 
even exclusive, task of jurisprudence is to analyze and under-
stand that order. Judgment or evaluation is someone else's func-
tion. 
The significance of these philosophical developments, 
divorcing law from evaluation, is brought into sharp focus by 
technological, economic, and sociological developments of the 
last century and a half. The Industrial Revolution inundated 
the simple economy of household craft and stimulated the growth 
of great urban centers. The production and distribution of goods 
have become increasingly complex. Channels of commerce have 
lengthened to the far corners of the world and the significant 
forms of wealth have been fundamentally altered. 
It was, of course, inevitable that such revolutionary 
developments in socio-economic conditions should have affected 
deeply the nature and function of government and law. Demands 
have been insistent that government act to correct social and 
economic maladjustments and to provide public services. In 
meeting these demands the apparatus of government has grown 
phenomenally, with the result that official interest and regula-
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tion range broadly over the most significant aspects of men's 
lives. 
Against the background of a pdsitivistic theory of law, 
can we fail to be concerned by this development of the modern 
state? With its reserved monopoly of force, its economic power, 
its overpowering resources of information to be disseminated, or 
withheld, or spread in partial or distorted forms, with its fan-
tastic proliferation of legislation and decision, how can we 
cope with it, whether as an individual, a minority group, or 
the broad mass of the population? Lord Acton's famous aphorism 
that power tends to corrupt and absolute power to corrupt ab-
solutely focuses historic experience on our dilemma. In a 
demanding, complex society like that in which we live, it is 
unthinkable that governmental authority and the administration 
of justice should be reduced to the elemental level of preserv-
ing the public peace. Yet how can we reconcile such great and 
pervasive power with the preservation of those values we cherish 
most highly? 
It is, then, with this problem in view that we turn to an 
analysis of the Rule of Law. One common meaning of the term may 
be mentioned briefly and immediately put aside as not signif i-
cantly responsive to the present interest. This meaning equates 
the Rule of Law merely with the existence of public order main-
tained through the systemized application or threat of force by 
a modern state. In this sense, the Rule of Law exists in every 
developed state, is not dependent upon any particular ideology, 
and applies no restraint on official action in relation to in-
dividuals or groups. On this basis, it is plausibly arguable 
that the Rule of Law is furthered as the scope of legal regula-
tion is extended into the lives of citizens. In fact, this argu-
ment was made by the apologists of the late Nazi and Fascist 
regimes. 
It is obvious that more than this notion is involved in the 
thought of those who off er the Rule of Law as a bridle for 
Leviathan. In their views, may I identify very briefly three 
basic meanings of the Rule of Law and suggest some criticisms 
of each concept. 
The first of these, while in no sense prior in point of 
time, perhaps deserves first mention because of its association 
with Professor A. v. Dicey, who popularized the term, the Rule 
of Law. In his well-known work on The Law of the Constitution 
which first appeared in 1885, Dicey declared that since the 
Norman Conquest two features had characterized English political 
institutions. The first of these was the supremacy of the cen-
tral government, and specifically in modern development, the 
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supremacy of Parliament: the second was the Rule of Law. To 
Dicey this second feature had three distinct facets: first, 
"that no man is punishable or can be lawfully made to suffer in 
body or goods except for a distinct breach of law established 
in the ordinary legal manner before the ordinary courts of the 
land." Therefore, the Rule of Law, according to Dicey, is "con-
trasted with every system of government based on the exercise 
by persons in authority of wide, arbitrary, or discretionary 
powers of constraint." Second, the Rule of Law meant that 
every man was subject to the ordinary law of the land and came 
within the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts; therefore, Dicey 
vigorously rejected the idea of a separate body of administra-
tive law applied by special tribunals to the conduct of offi-
cials, best exemplified in the French conseil d'Etat. Third, 
according to Dicey, the principles of English constitutional 
law, and specifically the rights of individuals, were derived 
from judicial decisions and not from written constitutions. 
Before commenting further on Dicey's classic formulation, a 
word might be said about the extreme theory of one of Dicey's 
modern disciples, the Austrian economist, Friedrich Hayek. In 
his widely read book, The Road to Serfdom, Hayek asserts that 
the Rule of Law, stripped of all technicalities, means "that 
government in all its actions is bound by rules fixed and an-
nounced beforehand -- rules which make it possible to foresee 
with fair certainty how the authority will use its coercive 
powers in given circumstances and to plan one's individual af-
fairs on the basis of this knowledge." Thus, the Rule of Law, 
according to Hayek, is antithetical to state planning, for plan-
ning necessitates the exercise of official discretion in regu-
lating the affairs of determinate people. 
Much criticism might be leveled against the theories of 
Dicey and Hayek. The former purported to describe the operative 
constitutional principles of late 19th-century Britain: yet 
even at this level his view was partial and hence distorted. He 
ignored the many privileges, powers, and immunities of the crown 
which then existed and produced essentially different treatment 
of official and private conduct. He ignored the developing ad-
ministrative agencies in Britain and grievously misunderstood 
the nature of administrative justice on the continent which has 
succeeded far better in developing meaningful review of adminis-
trative action and curbs on abuses than have been achieved, even 
today, in England. 
Basic in the thinking of both Dicey and Hayek is a sharp 
distinction between law and administration. Law was conceived by 
them as a body of rather specific rules applied by the ordinary 
courts, while administration meant discretion and official arbi-
' 
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trariness. Yet such a sharp distinction was not descriptive even 
in Dicey's day and is even less realistic in the middle years 
of the twentieth century to which Hayek speaks. Surely no one 
beyond his first year in law school conceives of law as direc-
tions printed in heavy black type, susceptible of literal and 
mechanical application by the courts. Discretion in the ad-
ministration of the law by the courts is inevitable. It appears 
when a judge scales punishment to fit the criminal and not the 
crime: it is invoked by the application of such concepts or 
standards as reasonableness, bona fides or the jurisdictional 
test in equity of the inadequacy of the remedy at law. The cru-
cial point, perhaps, to the theories of Dicey and Hayek, is who 
exercises the discretion. As Sir Ivor Jennings has pointed out, 
Dicey's asserted goal of "rule by the law alone" comes close to 
meaning "rule by the judges alone. 
Finally, insofar as Dicey proposed the Rule of Law as a 
substantive safeguard of individual rights against the ravages 
of government, he is caught in an irreducible contradiction. 
His entire catalog of the ancient rights of Englishmen, develop-
ed and protected by the ordinary courts, stands under the deep 
shadow of the initial characteristic of English constitutional 
law -- the supremacy of Parliament. Ultimately it would seem, 
therefore, that the preservation of individual liberties is less 
dependent upon the Rule of Law, as conceived by Dicey, than upon 
the threat of political action should the acceptable bounds for 
official action be exceeded. 
Thus, this first concept of the Rule of Law purports to 
reflect certain constitutional principles of 19th-century 
Britain. On analysis, it seems more accurately reflective of the 
political ideology of a late 19th-century Whig valiantly fight-
ing a rear guard action against the inevitable governmental 
developments arising from an increasingly complex, technological 
society. In terms of the allocation of governmental powers es-
sential to an adjustment of the legal order to the life of 
society, the theory implicitly prefers the dominance of the 
judicial branch. Its political thrust is inherently conserva-
tive. 
The second basic meaning of the Rule of Law is essentially 
procedural. The following succinct statement by Professor Harry 
Jones of the Columbia University Law School provides a highly 
satisfactory summary: 
For want of a commonly understood American version 
of the rule of law, I will hazard my own understanding 
of the term's connotation in the American legal order. 
The rule of law is a tradition of decision, a tradition 
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embodying at least three indispensable elements: first, 
that every person whose interests will be affected by a 
judicial or administrative decision has the right to a 
meaningful 'day in court'; second, that deciding offic-
ers shall be independent in the full sense, free from 
external direction by political and administrative super-
iors in the disposition of individual cases and inwardly 
free from the influence of personal gain and partisan or 
popular bias; and third, that day-to-day decisions shall 
be reasoned, rationally justified, in terms that take due 
account both of the demands of general principle and the 
demands of the particular situation. This enumeration 
does not purport to exhaust the meaning of the 'rule of 
law'; doubtless there are other essential attributes to 
be included in the term's full intention. Rut any Amer-
ican lawyer would say, I think, that the three features 
just given characterize the best of our legal institu-
tions -- for example, our criminal litigation when prop-
erly conducted -- and make up the adjudicative ideal of 
our legal tradition. 
This concept, usually referred to in this country as "due proc-
ess of law," surely is part of the conditions of responsible 
and respectable government. Yet if the Rule of Law purports to 
encompass all significant aspects of the individual's relation 
to his government, this procedural perspective can be only a 
partial view. In the Anglo-American common law tradition, it is 
not surprising that regulative ideas germane to the judicial 
process should claim the center of the stage. Yet these ideas 
speak indirectly, if at all, to the innumerable impacts between 
government and citizen which do not result in litigation either 
in the ordinary courts or in the new administrative agencies ex-
ercising quasi-judicial powers. 
Perhaps the gravest inadequacy of this primarily procedural 
view of the Rule of Law is its lack of relevance to the legis-
lative process and its unresponsiveness to felt demands that the 
legislative power be subjected to substantive curbs. One poig-
nant illustration of this point comes from the Union of South J 
Africa. 
In the pre-dawn hours of December 6, 1956, one hundred and 
fifty-six persons were arrested in various parts of the Union 
and flown by military aircraft to Johannesburg. There they were 
charged with high treason and other serious crimes. This miscel-
laneous group was made up of Europeans and Africans, of laborers 
and professors, of militants and pacifists, of Christians and 
pagans. They shared only one obvious characteristic -- an avowed 
opposition to apartheid, the South African version of white 
supremacy. 
' 
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The crimes charged merit some explanation. The first was 
high treason. In South Africa, this is a Roman-Dutch common law 
offense of exceedingly broad inclus~on, punishable by death. For 
example, one commentator suggests that it apparently may be com-
mitted merely by suppressing information. The accused were also 
charged under the Riotous Assemblies Act which makes criminal a 
wide variety of acts "calculated to engender feelings of hostil-
ity between the European inhabitants of the Union on the one 
hand and any other section of the inhabitants of the Union on 
the other hand •••• " Why the actions of the government in im-
plementing its policy of apartheid are not in direct contra-
vention of this Act is somewhat difficult to discern. The 
government, however, charged that the activities of the accused 
in opposing that policy were in violation of the statute. The 
third basis of charge was found in the Suppression of Communism 
Act which defines "Communism" broadly enough to include any 
scheme or doctrine "(b) which aims at bringing about any polit-
ical, industrial, social or economic change within the Union by 
the promotion of disturbance or disorder, by unlawful acts or 
omissions or by the threat of such acts or omissions or by means 
which include the promotion of disturbance or disorder ••• " or 
"(d) which aims at the encouragement of feelings of hostility 
between the European and non-European races of the Union the 
consequences of which are calculated to further the achieve-
ment of any object referred to in paragraph (b)." Again the 
apartheid government seemed to be exempt from accusations of 
this broadly-defined "Communism," while those in opposition, 
even Christian moderates like Chief Albert Lithuli, head of the 
African National Congress, are "Communists" to be suppressed. 
We cannot take time to follow the trial through its various 
proceedings in the tedious months and years which followed the 
arrests. My point can be made much more simply. The judges as-
sembled to try the accused were steeped in the Roman-Dutch law, 
which has a tradition of judicial fairness comparable to our 
own. The proceedings have been orderly and full opportunity has 
been given to the defendants to be represented by counsel and 
fully heard. Thus, there were procedural protections in full 
measure. But does all this make it possible to say that the Rule 
of Law prevails in South Africa? 
Commenting on the South African Treason Trial, Dean Erwin 
Griswold of the Harvard Law School has stated succinctly the 
problem confronted by one who measures the Rule of Law primarily 
or exclusively by the conditions of a fair trial. He said: 
No question can be raised about the competency or the 
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capacity of the court. Each of the judges named is a mem-
ber of the Supreme court of south Africa for one of the 
Provincial Divisions. South Africa has long had excellent 
courts maintaining high standards of fairness and justice: 
and this court will, of course, fit into the South African 
judicial tradition. Nevertheless, no matter how fair and 
competent a court may be, if the underlying legal situation 
is deeply unsound the Court may, simply because it must act 
according to law, be compelled to unsound results. 
It seems clear, therefore, that if the Rule of Law is to define 
adequately the relations of men to civil government, it cannot 
focus entirely on one manifestation of governmental power. It 
must comprehend the legislature and the executive, as well as 
the courts. 
The third basic meaning of the Rule of Law, to be discussed 
here, is the most ancient. Like many of our ideas it was ex-
pressed in the thought of ancient Greece. Aristotle, you will 
recall, observed in the Politics: 
He who commands that law should rule may thus be re-
garded as commanding that God and reason alone should rule: 
he who commands that a man should rule adds the character 
of the beast. Appetite has that character: and high spirit, 
too, perverts the holders of office, even when they are 
the best of men. Law [as the pure voice of God and reason] 
may thus be defined as 'Reason free from all passion.' 
Thts same view appeared in the earlier quotation from Cicero's 
De Re Publica. Many other exponents of this view of the Rule of 
Law, ancient and modern, might be cited, but I prefer to use as 
illustration the views of a contemporary American, far removed 
from sheltered academic halls. 
During his year in the presidency of the American Bar Asso-
ciation, Charles s. Rhyne, expressed on a number of occasions 
his view of the Rule of Law. At the dedication of the Associa-
tion's memorial to Magna Carta at Runnymede, Mr. Rhyne declared: 
"What do we mean by freedom under law? We mean a great deal 
more, surely, than mere obedience to written laws. We mean 
acknowledgement of the fact that there are moral limitations on 
civil power. We mean that human beings have rights, as human 
beings, which are superior to what may be thought to be the 
rights of the state or of society." Though spelled out more 
fully in later statements the essentials of Mr. Rhyne's view 
appear here: there is an order, a moral order, in the universe 
which is perceptible to man through his rational faculties. This 
order ascribes to the individual a status, a dignity, and cer-
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tain fundamental rights. These rights antedate civil government 
and hence serve as morally, perhaps even legally, valid limita-
tions on the power of government which primarily exists to safe-
guard those rights. 
So stated, this view is a familiar one. It expresses the 
ancient belief in a law of Nature and of Reason. But unlike the 
classic view of Aquinas which postulated the Law of Nature as a 
criterion for human law to provide for the common good of the 
community, for Rhyne the central datum appears to be the in-
dividual with inalienable rights. Thus, Rhyne echoes the lan-
guage of John Locke and the Declaration of Rights of 1688, of 
the American Declaration of Independence and the Bill of Rights-
and of the Supreme Court of the United States in the period when 
it invalidated social legislation under the banner of the in-
violable rights of liberty and property. 
A fair appraisal of Natural Law thought is exceedingly 
difficult and requires far more time than is available today. 
Within the main stream are varying cross-currents, forming ed-
dies of profound significance. They cannot be explored in full. 
We know that a belief in Natural Law has often been a rallying 
cry, enlisting men in the fight for human dignity and a fuller, 
richer life. Yet this same belief has at times served as a 
shield and buckler for those who resisted the felt needs of 
their times in blindness to the vision of a better tomorrow. 
I would make only two specific comments on the utility of a 
belief in Natural Law as the basis for a theory of the Rule of 
Law .• First, despite a widely shared confidence in man's rational 
faculties and in his capacity to perceive supra-mundane norms, 
history has not shown stable agreement on the substantive con-
tent of those norms. When Natural Law thinkers have seriously 
attempted to reconcile universally valid norms with the fluid 
needs of society in time and space, they have formulated the 
principles of Natural Law at such levels of generalization that 
the norms become purely formal, providing no significant guid-
ance in solving the complex and harrying problems of the legal 
order. At the other extreme are those philosophers who, in at-
tempting to delineate a substantive code of Natural Law, show a 
remarkable tendency to up-grade the positive legal system with 
which they are familiar to the level of cosmic norm. A central 
difficulty with Natural Law theory, then, is epistemological --
how can we know it and how can we test the validity of the in-
sights of those who offer precepts as the Law of Reason, of Na-
ture, or of God? 
The cardinal merit of Natural Law thought suggests at the 
same time its second basic inadequacy, even danger. The Natural 
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Law exponent has always stood ready to remind the positive legal 
order that it is not the ultimate criterion of justice, that the 
positive law is subject to evaluation, and perhaps, invalida-
tion, by reference to a higher standard. It is, of course, 
entirely appropriate to remind those exercising civil power that 
theirs is a derivative and not ultimate authority, that it must 
be either justified and supported or condemned and displaced, by 
reference to a test of purpose -- a purpose defined by an ex-
trinsic set of values. 
In subjecting the positive law to such a continuing criti-
que, much Natural Law thought has insisted that basic harmony 
with supra-positive standards is of the very nature of "law." 
Thus, the distinguished German philosopher, Gustav Radbruch, 
late in life and after the tragic experience of Nazi tyranny, 
appears to have concluded that certain moral restraints were 
implicit in the idea of law itself and that official action 
transgressing those restraints is not law, no matter how duly 
enacted, adjudged, or executed. 
One can sympathize with this insistence on the intimacy of 
law and morals and appreciate its utility in resisting the ty-
rant, while at the same time recognizing the danger in it. 
Briefly stated, the danger is this. It is a regrettably short 
step from insistence that nothing is law unless it is right, to 
the conclusion that whatever is law, in terms of legal enactment 
or declaration, is therefore right. From this perspective can 
be seen the significance of the Nazi slogan -- Gesetz ist 
Gesetz, Law is Law. This is, of course, an extreme manifesta-
tion of the recurrently conservative impact of Natural Law 
thought -- a tendency to take the old, the familiar, the exist-
ent, the legally-enacted, and defend it from attack on the 
ground that it represents the natural order of things. Implicit 
therefore in Natural Law philosophy is the danger that it will 
devour itself, that instead of providing a significant basis 
for evaluating the positive law, it rather will substantially 
immunize the positive law from criticism and evaluation. 
In brief summary, three basic meanings of the concept of 
the Rule of Law have been pointed out. The first is identified 
with certain assumed constitutional principles of 19th century 
Britain; the second emphasizes the conditions of a fair trial, 
subsuming much the same specifics as the more typically American 
concept of due process of law; the third represents a more per-
vasive effort to subject government and law to the restraints 
of an axiology deriving its validity from human reason, nature, 
or God. Each seems to me a partial view, susceptible of distor-
tion. 
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Those who are familiar with the work of the International 
commission of Jurists may question why nothing has been said of 
its developing concept of the Rule of Law. The omission at this 
point is intentional. I have tried'; to suggest certain basic 
emphases in Rule of Law thinking. The work of the International 
Commission of Jurists builds on these earlier formulations but 
is eclectic and much more broadly responsive to current needs. 
More will be said about the views developing in the Commission 
in my next lecture. 
THE CHALLENGE OF THE RULE OF LAW 
[In the first lecture, I identified three basic concepts of 
the Rule of Law, beyond its highly restricted connotation of 
public order maintained by the force of politically organized 
society: first, certain constitutional principles, particularly 
those ascribed by Dicey to 19th century Britain; second, 
certain valuable procedural safeguards of a fair trial; and 
third, those asserted universal and perhaps immutable prin-
ciples, derived from God or Nature by the rational faculties of 
humans, available to guide and, in some views, to invalidate 
positive legal action. Without denying the significance of any 
of these emphases, I suggested certain criticisms, insofar as 
any one emphasis is advanced as the sole definition of the 
Rule of Law, and that concept, in turn, is offered as a 
general safeguard against abuses of the power of the modern 
state.] 
[I turn now to an further analysis of the Rule of Law], but 
from a somewhat different perspective. I hope to come somewhat 
closer to the heart of the problem that underlies thought and 
discussion of the Rule of Law and then, proceeding function-
ally, to synthesize a concept somewhat more responsive to the 
needs of that basic problem. 
Initially, it seems essential to consider what is meant by 
law, if the "Rule" thereof is to mean anything. This necessity 
is regrettable, for the literature overflows with much good ink 
spilled over this question. The discussion of the meaning of 
"law" has often been acrimonious and frequently arid. Why then 
must it be prolonged? Cannot this definitional problem be set 
aside so that we can get on with our chores? 
In Shakespeare's Verona, Juliet inquires of Romeo, "What's 
in a name? That which we call a rose -- By any other name would 
smell as sweet." The obvious good sense which underlies the 
question and comment is very appealing. Why not conclude that 
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definition may properly be stipulative, and, if anyone questions 
what we mean by "a rose," solve the problem demonstratively by 
pointing out -- "This thing, this complex of stem, petals and 
fragrance, is what I refer to by the verbal symbol 'rose.' You 
may call it by a different name if you choose." In these cir-
cumstances, surely misunderstanding should disappear even if the 
questioner would have chosen to ref er to the same physical 
phenomenon by another verbal symbol. 
When we come to the term "law," the definitional problem is 
complicated by two facts of profound significance. The first of 
these is that our term, our definiendum, does not have a physi-
cal counterpart or referent which exhausts its meaning. No one 
can point to a thing and say, "That's what I mean by 'law'." We 
might say that the term "law" is an incomplete symbol -- only in 
part is its referent a physical thing or act; in large part the 
referent is an abstraction or generalization from immediate ex-
perience. Thus, the referent of the symbol "law" is an in-
tellectual construction, and hence it is vastly more difficult 
to achieve clear understanding by a stipulative definition. The 
second complicating fact is that the verbal symbol "law" is an 
old one and has acquired a meaning or set of meanings prior to 
any stipulative definition now proposed. A lexical approach to 
definition is, therefore, feasible, and, if this approach is 
ignored in proposing a stipulation, the chances of misunder-
standing and real communication failure are much increased. 
Several discrete meanings of the term "law" are identif i-
able, some of which were referred to in the previous lecture. 
The most important of these follow in capsule form. To be men-
tioned and put aside immediately is the meaning of "law" in the 
natural sciences. In that context a "law" is only a descriptive 
generalization. It summarizes observed experience and suggests, 
subject always to the improvement of observation and measure-
ment, that in the future similar phenomena under similarly con-
trolled conditions will behave in the same way. Implicit in 
such a "law" is nothing of an "ought" quality, except perhaps 
in the colloquial sense in which "ought" is the language of 
prediction -- for example, in the seasonal statement: "Mickey 
Mantle ought to hit well over .300 this year." 
Throughout those meanings of the term "law" now under con-
sideration, there is ordinarily, if not always, present, ex-
pressly or implicitly, a quality of "ought," a sense of imposed 
guidance for volitional creatures able to act contrary to the 
"ought." 
By and large, then, the various discernible meanings of 
"law," relevant here, are based upon its normative or "ought" 
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quality and differ primarily with respect to the source and 
validity of the "ought." Thus the extreme exponents of Natural 
Law insist that nothing can be law unless it is in accord with 
universal norms deriving their "ou~htness" from Nature, Reason, 
or God. The positivist, on the other hand, finds the "ought-
ness" in the threat of a sanction applied by a political supe-
rior. Therefore, he defines law as the "command of the 
sovereign" (John Austin) or an officially formulated hypotheti-
cal judgment linking a conditioning circumstance with a condi-
tioned consequence (Hans Kelsen). Others, like the Austrian 
jurist, Ehrlich, and the anthropologist, Malinowski, find "law" 
in the inner ordering of society, deriving its sanction and 
validity from unofficial, social processes. 
But enough of such a review of meanings, which are offered 
only to suggest the lexical possibilities. I would suggest for 
use here a meaning of the term "law," coterminous with none of 
those suggested earlier and radically different from some. Ad-
hering firmly to the positivistic tradition, I would define law 
as a specific technique of social ordering, deriving its es-
sential character from its reliance upon the prestige, author-
ity, and ultimately the reserved monopoly of force of political-
ly organized society. This definition excludes from the concept 
of law such patterns of social organization in the quest for 
and distribution of goods as Malinowski observed among the 
Trobriand Islanders, interesting and important though they are. 
At the same time, this definition rejects the hypothesis of 
Natural Law that nothing is law unless it conforms to a certain 
order of values. Falling outside the scope of this definition 
al~o are the views of those positivists who survey the legal or-
der and define law exclusively from the perspective either of a 
sovereign legislature or of the courts. Under the definition 
proposed, the constitution, a statute, the judgment of a court, 
the order of an administrative agency, and the action of the cop 
on the beat are all examples of law, for each brings to bear 
systematically the politically organized force of society to or-
der human conduct. 
Some may protest that under this definition the racist 
enactments of Nazi Germany or the suppressive regulations of 
The Union of South Africa are just as much law as the American 
Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959. This is 
true. Law, as here defined, has no moral or ethical coloration. 
Law, qua law, is simply amoral. Does this proposed definition of 
"law" leave available then any meaning for the Rule of Law 
other than that of public order preserved by state force? A 
consistent use of terms would seem to suggest a negative answer 
to this question. Therefore, I would prefer to consign to limbo 
the term "Rule of Law" and seek a useful conceptual framework 
for evaluating and criticizing the legal order. 
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Having postulated an essentially positivistic conception 
of law, I would, however, immediately abandon traditional posi-
tivism. To analyze and rationalize::the linguistic and con-
ceptual machinery of the positive legal order is an important 
task for the legal philosopher. It is, however, only one part 
of the job and today the less important part. The most pressing 
task which confronts jurisprudence today is the development of 
a viable basis for criticizing, evaluating, guiding, using, ac-
cepting, or ultimately rejecting the positive law. 
If law be viewed from this perspective, what bases for 
evaluating it are available? Three such bases or modes of 
evaluation are worth brief consideration. 
First, law may be evaluated by reference to the standard of 
utility. "Utility" for this purpose should not be equated with a 
Benthamite calculus of pleasure and pain. "Expediency" might be 
substituted for "utility," if it could be drained of its 
Machiavellian overtones. The Germans have the best word, Zweck-
maessigkeit," the appropriateness of means to ends, but it 
doesn't translate economically. A simple illustration may serve 
to clarify this point. Assume we have a saw which we want to 
evaluate by the first suggested standard. Relevant questions 
would deal with the appropriateness of its weight, length, pitch 
of the teeth, and keenness to its purpose as a hand-held cutting 
tool. On this basis, it might be called a good saw or a bad 
saw. This evaluation would ignore the use to which such a saw 
might be put, whether by a skilled surgeon amputating a 
gangrenous limb or a sadistic murderer disposing of his victim. 
Similarly, law is a tool, a technique. It can be deemed good 
or bad by this amoral test of utility, or appropriateness to 
whatever end may be postulated, to which the law is merely a 
means. 
It is worth observing at this point that evaluation by the 
standard of utility has some distinct advantages, or perhaps 
presents fewer difficulties than some other types of evaluation. 
In the language of philosophy, utility poses a problem of 
"mediate" rather than "immediate" or ultimate values. The prob-
lem assumes or postulates a certain end or objective and merely 
inquires what is the most useful means of achieving that end. 
Two persons may appear to be sharply divided on an evaluative 
problem but, if preliminarily they can agree on a common objec-
tive envisioned, an ultimate value shared, they may have reduced 
their difference to much more manageable proportions. At such a 
point, scientific investigation may be undertaken and rational 
discourse employed in seeking agreement on the best means of 
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achieving the postulated objective. Such approaches to the 
resolution of dispute are not available, however, if the con-
troversy relates to a choice of ultimate values. A great many 
of the divisive axiological problems in the legal order can be 
reduced effectively to this mediate level and thus made trac-
table. Thus this first standard is, I believe, a significant 
one. 
In the second place, "law" can be evaluated by the standard 
of legality or, perhaps more accurately, of consistency. Hans 
Kelsen has taught us that the legal order is hierarchical and 
that pyramiding from the basic or grundnorm are other norms 
representing various stages of progressive concretization. Any 
subordinate norm is law, according to Kelsen, if made in accord-
ance with the superior norms in the hierarchy. While helpful, 
the picture Kelsen paints of the legal order is too symmetri-
cal, too internally consistent, to account for all significant 
experience which for me is encompassed by law. Modifying Kel-
sen's "Pure Theory," I would therefore suggest that many 
things are "law," which are not authorized by the higher norms. 
An illustration may be found in the recent study of the ad-
ministration of criminal justice in the United States, con-
ducted by the American Bar Foundation. The study showed that in 
a certain precinct of a large city, police officers systemati-
cally conduct unprovoked searches of persons on the streets. To 
me, this police conduct is "law," since it is a technique of 
ordering or controlling human conduct used by persons who have 
or appear to have official force behind them. Yet unques-
tionably most of these searches are illegal under the guarantees 
of the state and federal constitutions. In appropriate in-
stances, the "law" as represented by this police conduct may be 
evaluated in relation to higher governing norms with the conclu-
sion that the former is "illegal" or "inconsistent." This may 
be a significant evaluation. The hierarchy of norms which 
permits it usually reflects important judgments as to how the 
state force shall be distributed, channeled, and controlled. 
It is worth noting, however, that this evaluation is not ex-
haustive, and further assumptions are needed if "legal" or 
"consistent" is to be equated with "good," and "illegal" or 
"inconsistent" with "bad." 
Third, and finally, is that sort of evaluation we may 
call "ethical." At this level, the adjectives "good" and "bad," 
"right" and "wrong" may be employed most significantly. It is 
this type of evaluation that is today of paramount importance 
in the perplexities of determining what the Rule of Law means. 
The fundamental difficulty here is to identify and deline-
ate what ultimate values we accept in making an ethical evalua-
tion of law. In determining those values, scientific processes 
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and reflective thought can make a significant contribution. They 
can spell out the logical consequences of various value postu-
lates and identify the value postu~ates implicit in different 
courses of legal action. Value acceptances can be dealt with as 
facts. Through careful empirical investigation we can determine 
what values are, in fact, accepted and the extent of their ac-
ceptance in any particular society at a given time. But the 
purest scientific method cannot make ultimate value choices for 
any person or group, nor can it provide verification of the 
choices actually made. In the final analysis these choices 
depend on the individual's own Weltanschauung, his belief as to 
the nature of man, his place in the universe and in society. 
Each individual makes these value acceptances in the light of 
his religious convictions, his education, and his experience in 
society. Ultimately, however, each one must recognize that at 
this level he stands on faith and not on knowledge in any 
verifiable or transmissible sense. 
This view of the nature of ultimate value choices is not 
offered in any sense of futility. I believe that in the Judeo-
Christian tradition of the West there are broad areas of sig-
nificant agreement on ultimate values. Obviously such an a 
postiori approach does not serve to prove or to verify the 
values agreed upon, but such agreement in fact has great prac-
tical significance for the legal order. 
An exhaustive catalog of these common value acceptances is 
not necessary here. A few, however, should be mentioned. First, 
is the value of man himself, of the individual as a creature of 
dignity and essential worth. Corollary to this are the values of 
liberty and equality which are nonetheless significant because 
it is difficult to define them with precision or to determine 
their specific scope. Also basic to this value structure is some 
degree of assurance of the material requisites of a decent life. 
Finally, but not last among these fundamental values in the 
Judeo-Christian tradition, is the opportunity for people to 
participate significantly in the control of their government. 
In considering the means whereby the awesome power of the 
modern state may be channeled and controlled, I believe our 
primary attention should be on the ultimate values we, the 
inheritors of the Judeo-Christian tradition, accept and intend 
to preserve. All else may be considered then as mediate values, 
as means to secure desired ends. To be sure, the various con-
cepts of the Rule of Law suggested [in the first lecture] are in 
a sense value-oriented. But too often value postulates were 
submerged. Each concept thus presented the risk of attributing 
ultimate importance to certain techniques which are often useful 
( 
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to preserve essential values, but are also usable in a legal or-
der which casts the dark shadow of tyranny. Instead, therefore, 
of any one of these concepts of a Rule of Law, I would posit 
the Ideal of Just Law, using "just" in its broadest inclusion 
to comprehend a viable balance of our fundamental value accep-
tances. 
In the light of our shared agreement on basic values and 
our centuries of experience with government, is it not possible 
to be more specific and to suggest certain techniques which 
may maximize our chances of securing and maintaining this Ideal 
of Just Law? I believe we can and that these techniques should 
include the following: 
First, a written constitution postulating certain fundamen-
tal rights of men. Certainly such a device is not essential to 
the attainment or preservation of the Ideal of Just Law, but 
there appears to be a widening perception of its utility to 
that end. For example, in addition to the 18th-century American 
Bill of Rights, the 20th century has seen the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights and new constitutions like that of the 
Federation of Nigeria. 
Second, there is the device which, among the followers of 
Montesquieu, is called a system of checks and balances. To be 
sure, the necessities of modern government preclude the complete 
compartmentalization and separation of the three basic powers. 
Probably this has always been true. As my colleague, 
Hessel Yntema, has recently observed, "Montesquieu's conception 
was more realistic, namely, that there should be no such com-
bination of power in one political organ, a total merger of the 
judicial with the executive or legislative functions for ex-
ample, as to imperil political liberty." 
Implicit in any viable system of checks and balances is 
the idea that the actions of individual officials and governmen-
tal organs are to be judged by reference to legal norms which 
have been articulated and promulgated with reasonable clarity. 
Insofar as Dicey and Hayek, in their discussion of the Rule of 
Law, emphasized the importance of formal definitions of 
governmental function and clear-cut allocations of power, we 
can endorse their views. To be sure, the requirement that 
governmental interference be supported by law imposes in itself 
no substantive restraints on government, nor does it determine 
how power and function will be allocated among the facilities 
of government. It is, nevertheless, of profound significance 
for two reasons: first, it provides a basis on which the ac-
tion of one agency can be reviewed and checked, and second, it 
opens up to popular inspection and political response many of 
the most critical decisions affecting the incidence of public 
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force. 
The third technique, critical to the maintenance of the 
Ideal of Just Law, comprehends those devices for regularized 
and reliable modification of official action by the assertion 
of individual grievances and popular demand. The unifying idea 
here is the ultimate responsibility of government to its 
citizenry, but this is manifested at two distinct levels. The 
first level involves ordinarily assertions of the interests of 
individuals and subgroups as defined by the prevailing general 
law. The technique or device which experience has proved essen-
tial to protect these interests is a full and fair hearing 
before an impartial and competent tribunal. In a sense, the ex-
istence and function of such a tribunal might be subsumed under 
the principle of checks and balances. That principle, however, 
normally suggests only intra-governmental restraints. The im-
portant point here is that the tribunal checks and balances 
other centers of official power on the initiative of private 
citizens who feel aggrieved. It should be clear that my emphasis 
is not on the importance of an independent judiciary for the 
settlement of private disputes. Rather, it is on the existence 
of tribunals to review official action. Such tribunals may be 
the ordinary courts extolled by Dicey, but they may just as ap-
propriately be specialized administrative courts like the Con-
seil d'Etat in France. 
The second, but by no means lower, level of governmental 
responsibility to its citizenry involves those orderly and con-
ventionalized processes by which officials are replaced and 
l~ws changed to reflect changing patterns of social interests, 
values, and needs. It is not exaggeration to assert that the 
Ideal of Just Law cannot be maintained over extended periods 
if governmental response to changes in the dominant values and 
interests of the community either depends on paternalistic 
voluntarism, or can be secured only by violent revolution in the 
face of the enormous power advantages of the modern state. 
So far I have spoken only of devices or processes available 
for making government responsive to the people. It remains 
tragically true that these devices lose their significance and 
may ultimately disappear or be seriously distorted, if they are 
not cherished and used by a concerned and informed citizenry. 
In the final analysis, the preservation of our fundamental 
values depends on the devotion of the people, of you and of me. 
No matter how balanced and ordered the formal structure of 
government, how competent and impartial the courts, how open 
and uncoerced the polling places, the Ideal of Just Law is 
beyond the grasp of a society that is unwilling to seek it with 
a full share of its creative energy and devotion. 
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It is evident, I am sure, that most of the discussion thus 
far has been negative in thrust, negative in the sense of being 
concerned to limit, to restrict, the exercise of official power. 
This negativism is characteristic of most thinking about the 
Rule of Law or of government under law. It is clearly revealed 
by Professor Harry Jones of Columbia University when he lauds 
"the healthy suspicion with which the sturdy citizen of a free 
society should regard officialdom and all its works." This 
suspicion and the safeguards it may bring into being are im-
portant. I believe, however, they are only a part of what is 
needed. 
An affirmative aspect of the Rule of Law or, preferably, 
of the Ideal of Just Law exists side-by-side with the negative 
aspect. Professor Henry Hart, speaking at the bicentennial 
celebrations of the birth of Chief Justice John Marshall, stated 
the thesis well. He said: 
The political problem is not simply negative. It is 
a delusion to suppose, as so many people have, that if 
only you can prevent the abuse of governmental power 
everything else will be all right. The political prob-
lem is a problem also of eliciting from government 
officials, and from the members of the society gener-
ally, the affirmative, creative performances upon 
which the well-being of the society depends. 
I do not mean to suggest that governmental intervention, offi-
cial management, is a panacea for all our ills. I do mean to say 
that in our complex technological society we will encounter 
problems which demand for solution more vision, more resources, 
more discipline, and sometimes more altruism than can be ex-
pected from individuals or voluntary associations. When such 
problems are encountered, I do not believe we should be deterred 
by any of the usual scare labels from using the resources of 
government and the instrumentality of law as a means to social 
progress. The result of such use may be a Cocoa Marketing Board 
to provide for the orderly disposition in international commerce 
of Ghana's principal export commodity. It may be a Tennessee 
Valley Authority to facilitate the economic development of a 
vast region. Particularly in the less developed areas of the 
world, such an affirmative response of government to pressing 
human needs seems to provide the only hope of bringing together 
sufficient capital resources to remove, through economic 
development, the grinding heel of poverty from the majority of 
the world's people. 
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In my previous lecture, I referred briefly to the concept 
of the Rule of Law developing under the leadership of the Inter-
national Commission of Jurists. In general, it corresponds to 
the ideas I have advanced. If you ':have not already studied 
them, I commend to you the Commission's Declaration of Delhi and 
the supporting resolutions of the study committees. In brief, 
the Rule of Law is viewed there as a complex of value accep-
tances and of practical institutions and procedures which "ex-
perience and tradition in the different countries of the world, 
often having themselves varying political structures and 
economic backgrounds, have shown to be essential to protect the 
individual from arbitrary government and to enable him to enjoy 
the dignity of man." It is worth noting that while safeguards 
against official abuses are emphasized, the affirmative 
responsibility of government to secure conditions in which men 
can, in dignity, work out their destinies is also recognized. 
In this brief series of lectures, an effort has been made 
to indicate the nature of the present challenge to law and 
responsible government and to suggest lines of fruitful response 
to that challenge. The response is needed from all people every-
where, but I believe the legal profession has a special respon-
sibility toward fulfilling the Ideal of Just Law. We in the 
teaching branch of that profession must respond with programs 
contributing to a broader perception of professional responsi-
bility and to a deeper awareness that the legal order must 
justify itself in terms of the uniting values in our society. 
Whether we lawyers, practitioners and teachers, will respond, 
or how, I cannot know. The tasks are awesome, and in many 
respects we are called by confusing voices across uncharted 
seas. I only hope we will answer that call in the spirit of the 
aged Ulysses, who could not rest content with victories already 
won but was impelled to exhaust his energies, even his life, in 
new probing of the Unknown. Thus I conclude with his words as 
he addressed his mariners before departing: 
Come, my friends, 
'Tis not too late to seek a newer world. 
Push off, and sitting well in order smite 
The sounding furrows; for my purpose holds 
To sail beyond the sunset, and the baths 
Of all the Western stars, until I die. 
It may be that the gulfs will wash us down; 
It may be we shall touch the Happy Isles, 
And see the great Achilles, whom we knew. 
Tho' much is taken, much abides; and tho' 
We are not now that strength which in old days 
Moved earth and heaven, that which we are, we are 
One equal temper of heroic hearts, 
l 
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Made weak by time and fate, but strong in will 
To strive, to seek, to find, and not to yield. 
THE RULE OF JUST LAW 
[In the spring of 1966 I resigned from the Michigan Faculty 
to accept appointment as Professor of Law and Political Science 
and Dean of the School of Law of Indiana University, beginning 
with the academic year 1966-67. The following talk was the first 
I gave in my new capacity. The remarks were made at the Law Day 
Observance of the School of Law on April 30, 1966. They were 
later published in 41 Indiana Law Journal 341 (1966). The talk 
made a somewhat surprising reappearance on the "Op-Ed" page of 
the st. Louis Post Dispatch which published a substantial ex-
cerpt without asking for or receiving any permission from me. 
Possibly the Law Review gave its permission, though I never in-
quired.] 
By a joint resolution of the United States Congress and 
annual proclamations of the President, the first day of May in 
each year is designated Law Day, U.S.A. The President's most 
recent proclamation reminds us that "the great individual rights 
we value so highly carry with them corresponding obligations of 
citizenship: to obey the law -- recognize the rights of others 
-- resolve grievances by lawful means -- support law enforcement 
agencies --encourage law obedience by others -- practice and 
teach patriotism --and defend our country." It also emphasizes 
"the fundamental truth that our liberty, our rights to pursue 
our individual destinies,and our very lives are dependent upon 
our system of law and independent courts. Only under the rule 
of law, and obedience thereto, can we rightfully claim our 
heritage of individual freedom." 
A principal purpose of our gathering and fellowship this 
evening is to participate in this national observance and thus, 
in the words of the President, "strengthen our national commit-
ment to the rule of law." It is especially fitting, I think, 
that such a celebration be held in the law school of a great 
university. For here, the pervasive spirit of inquiry may 
temper the rhetoric of formally honored ideals with searching 
questions and dispassionate assessments. What do we, on this 
occasion, celebrate? And do our professional work and daily 
lives during the rest of the year keep faith with the great 
ideals of Law Day? 
On this day we are asked to re-affirm and renew our commit-
ment to certain fundamental values that have, in the main, 
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guided the development of this nation during the past 190 years, 
values whose roots lie deep in the ancient soil of Judeo-
Christian civilization. Thus, we value the individual human per-
sonality and its claim to liberty and equality in which to 
develop and express its full potential. But we value also the 
society whose richly-diverse texture and complex demands are es-
sential conditions for full individual growth and development. 
The implementation and reconciliation of these values have 
produced the remarkable variety of our institutions, including 
prominently those of the law. These institutions that implement 
and protect the basic values we cherish include clearly articu-
lated legal norms to channel and control private conduct, and to 
provide both the guidelines for official action and the stand-
ards by which the legitimacy of applications of official power 
is determined. These institutions include independent and com-
petent tribunals to determine the fact and apply the law to the 
vindication of private right, the protection of public inter-
ests, and the assurance that the application of public force 
finds warrant in the law. These same institutions include, as 
well, a legal profession learned in the law, faithful to its 
ideals of service, and always ready to counsel and to guide to 
peaceful resolution the inevitable conflicts of social life. 
On occasions such as this, these institutions of the law 
are frequent and proper objects of our praise. They are essen-
tial to that system of wise restraints which is the in-
dispensable support of ordered liberty. Equally essential, how-
ever, are legislative bodies deeply sensitive to our tradition 
and responsive, not only to the clangor of organized interest 
but. also to the often amorphous aspirations of our people for 
social justice within the entire community. Finally, this sur-
vey of institutions critical to a regime of government under law 
must not omit an executive establishment vigorous in its execu-
tion of the law of the land, imaginative and humane in recom-
mending and guiding changes in the law, and ever aware, as it 
perceives the enormous reservoir of power at its disposal, that 
no aspect of power is more impressive than its restraint. 
Particularly in the years since the Second World War, we 
have come to express our devotion to these fundamental values 
and institutions in terms like those used by the President in 
his proclamation of Law Day, 1966, when he spoke of "our nation-
al commitment to the rule of law." I trust no one will think me 
cynical or captious if, on this occasion of solemn and proud af-
firmation of our legal heritage, I should express certain 
serious misgivings. These misgivings, I must emphasize, do not 
relate to our legal institutions themselves. Like all human 
creations,these make no claim to perfection: yet in the main the 
legal heritage of this richly-blessed land reflects much of the 
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noblest striving and accomplishment of the human spirit. My 
misgivings go, rather, to the way we speak of this heritage and 
to some of the possible implications of the phrase "the rule of 
law." .·• 
The first of my misgivings may be stated in the form of a 
question: when we speak of the "rule of law" or advocate 
"government under law," what implicit qualifications of "law" do 
we have in view? Must positive enactment, judicial decision or 
executive decree reflect the basic humane values of Western civ-
ilization in order to qualify as "law" within the meaning of the 
phrase? Many thoughtful people, adhering to a natural law view, 
have answered this question affirmatively. I confess my own in-
ability to accept this semantic escape from a persistent and 
perplexing problem. Consequently, I am compelled to ask: when 
we venerate "the rule of law," does not this phrase claim some-
thing of our respect, something of our allegiance and sense of 
obligation, even for the grievously unjust law, for applications 
of the official monopoly of force that may do violence to the 
most compelling claims of the individual personality and of so-
cial life? 
I realize that I am raising one of the most perplexing 
problems of legal philosophy. It is an ancient question. St. 
Thomas Aquinas raised it when he asked in the Summa Theologica 
whether law binds in conscience. Yet no problem is more con-
temporary: Martin Luther King asked it in his letter to certain 
clergymen written from a Birmingham jail. While I want to raise 
the question, this occasion does not permit an attempted answer. 
My purpose now is far more modest. It is merely to suggest the 
fear that when we extol "the rule of law," we may be tempted to 
gloss over the fact that not all law is "just law" or "good 
law." We need not reach back for examples to the Nazi 
brutalities implemented by law. Positive legal enactment today 
denies fundamental decencies of human existence to the majority 
of the people of the Republic of South Africa. In our own coun-
try, much state law, if unaffected by the noble demands of the 
Constitution, would do the same. I therefore fear that praise 
of "the rule of law" may lead us to accept mere positive enact-
ment or judicial pronouncement, the mere status of a rule as 
law, as a sufficient moral imprimatur. If we do, necessary and 
desirable moral criticism of law will in some measure be 
stilled. 
My second misgiving about the phrase "the rule of law" is 
more subtle, for it depends upon that often unnoticed reflection 
of attitude that can be revealed by a study of ordinary lan-
guage. Without extended and tedious analysis, let me merely 
suggest that I find in the phrase something disturbing. It sug-
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gests to me that the power to decide, to choose and to govern 
has been moved out of ourselves and the society in which we 
live, that this power has been ascribed to an external, 
materialized entity with an independent existence -- the law. 
If I am right in seeing this attitude reflected in the phrase, 
and if the use of the phrase carries any danger that it will 
nurture that attitude, then I feel entitled to indict the phrase 
itself as a mischievous distortion of the relation between law 
and society. 
Perhaps I can make my point clearer by an analogy. Con-
sider that remarkable instrument that has become almost the sym-
bol of our advanced technological society -- the electronic com-
puter. Capable of absorbing almost unthinkable masses of data, 
and, on request, organizing, correlating and returning those 
data for use, the computer has an enormous potential for sup-
plementing human energies and expanding man's capability to use 
fully and rationally his accumulation of knowledge. So im-
pressive is this product of modern technology, that some, at 
least, of its votaries sometimes speak as if the computer might 
render mere mortals redundant in all their functions, including 
the making of value choices and policy decisions. To such per-
sons, a solemn occasion for declaring their commitment to "the 
rule of the computer" probably would seem entirely appropriate. 
I take it to be clear, however, that, whatever its useful-
ness, the computer is incapable of producing anything that has 
not been put into it. It must be programmed, and that program 
must be designed and given content, either proximately or 
remotely, by human hands and minds, by those who intend to util-
ize it to perform tasks important to them. A legal order is, I 
would suggest, in some important respects like a computer. A 
good legal order can expand vastly human capability, by organiz-
ing and releasing through desired channels the knowledge, 
energies, and creativity of men in society. But like a com-
puter, a legal order must be programmed and, at least in a demo-
cratic society, that program is designed, shaped, and colored by 
the social group, by you and me, as we express our value choices 
in our individual and communal life. 
This viewpoint is not novel -- Holmes expressed it when he 
said that "the law is the witness and external deposit of our 
moral life. Its history is the history of the moral development 
of the race." But the view needs constant emphasis. Such 
emphasis may help to obviate the danger I see in the phrase "the 
rule of law." This is the danger that we will shirk our moral 
responsibility for the moral content of the law. This is the 
danger that we will depend unduly on official agencies -- legis-
lators, executives, and judges -- to eliminate racial dis-
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crimination, further social justice, and protect the legitimate 
claims and aspirations of individuals. To achieve these ends, 
sound legal institutions are necessary but not sufficient. It 
was, I believe, to stress this view: that one of the most dis-
tinguished American judges, the late Judge Learned Hand, once 
said: 
"that a society so riven that the spirit of moderation 
is gone, no court can save; that a society where that 
spirit flourishes, no court need save; that in a society 
which evades its responsibility by thrusting upon the 
courts the nurture of that spirit, that spirit in the end 
will perish." 
Judge Hand's insistence on a broader, social responsibility 
for nurturing and protecting our basic values, in which I fully 
concur, does not discount unduly the critical role of our legal 
institutions. It provides, however, a needed caution against 
the externalization of that responsibility in "a rule of law" or 
a "rule of the courts." If we fail, in this rich and beautiful 
land, to create or preserve a free and just society, the fault 
is ours -- yours and mine -- ours alone. 
I am grateful for the opportunity to share this occasion 
with you in the School of Law with which I soon will have the 
honor to be associated. It is, I think, especially appropriate 
that in the law schools we should celebrate Law Day by reflect-
ing on our common enterprise. If I may again invoke the com-
puter analogy, I might suggest that it is the graduates of the 
law schools who bear a special responsibility to assure that the 
circuits of our delicate instrument are properly wired and that 
the program is well followed. But important as is this 
craftsmanship of our profession, the provision of technical 
skills is only a part of its role. As a result of historical 
causes far too complex for exploration here, the legal profes-
sion has acquired in our society a special responsibility for 
leadership. As the searching light of moral criticism is 
directed at our legal institutions, the community looks to the 
legal profession for directions on the way toward improvements. 
As that responsibility is met, we will move toward a broader and 
more reliable coincidence of "the rule of law" with "the rule of 
just law." But the role of the lawyer as legislator, executive, 
judge, counselor or advocate does not exhaust his functions. As 
a leader of his community, whose education and experience make 
him a special guardian of those great organizing values that 
give coherence and dignity to our society, the lawyer can and 
must make ever clear that official agencies alone cannot assure 
that those values will survive. And he must stand ready to warn 
and to admonish when those values are threatened by public or 
private action. 
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The faculty of this law school, my colleagues to be, and 
you, the students in this school, share a noble enterprise --the 
education of the lawyers of tomorrow. I look forward with 
pleasure to joining the enterprise here. In this community of 
mind, of spirit, and of common devotion to the great humane 
values to which we commit ourselves on Law Day, I know I will 
find, with all of you, work worthy of a man's dignity and of the 
respect of his society. 
LAW DAY REMARKS-SUPREME COURT OF IlfDIARA, MAY 1, 1967 
[Each year the Supreme Court of Indiana sponsored a Law Day 
celebration, an occasion often used for honoring academically 
outstanding seniors in the secondary schools of the State. In 
1967, I was invited to speak on such an occasion. The following 
talk was delivered on May 1, 1967.] 
We have met today to celebrate Law Day 1967, the tenth an-
niversary of this solemn occasion. In his customary Proclama-
tion, the President of the United States has adopted the words 
of Theodore Roosevelt: "No man is above the law and no man is 
below it." The President goes on to say--
All who cherish freedom should also cherish 
law. Liberty and law abide together. In that 
bond is the foundation of our liberties. 
I ask every American to take law into his heart= 
not into his hands. I ask not blind obedience, but 
enlightened obedience. I ask patience too, for the 
law, like our times, will and must change. But Amer-
ica's fidelity to law must be eternal. 
It is especially appropriate that we meet today under the 
auspices of the highest Court of this State, In the protection 
of those values of individual and social life that we cherish 
most highly, no institutions play a more significant, role than 
our courts. Whether our concern is with the settlement of 
private disputes between citizens or with the protection of the 
citizen from the overreaching arm of government, it is ultimate-
ly to our courts that we must resort for the calm, dispassionate 
and orderly resolution of conflict, Legislative and executive 
organs have increasingly varied contributions to make to the 
maintenance of vigorous, responsible and responsive government, 
but the historic central position of the courts is assured as we 
reaffirm our commitment to the Rule of Law on Law Day, 1967. 
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Law Day is an occasion for extolling our legal institu-
tions, for acknowledging the blessings of ordered liberty under 
law that have been ours, and for rededicating ourselves to their 
preservation. On Law Day, 1967, however, we are called upon 
especially, in my judgment, to couple our praise and thanksgiv-
ing with a thoughtful reappraisal of the relation of our legal 
heritage to the pressing concerns within our society. 
The United States has been and is a nation blest; clearly 
it is not today a nation content. Much of the disquiet among our 
fellow citizens is intimately related, I believe, to concern 
over the structure and functions of the agencies of government, 
over the rules of law under which we live, and over the social 
ills for which remedies in law are being demanded with growing 
insistence. Consider only a few of the more obvious examples of 
divisive public issues that relate directly to the legal order: 
What is the proper and acceptable responsibility of the 
President and of the Congress with respect to the decisions on 
the commitment of lives and resources to a war that weighs 
heavily on the consciences of a large segment of the American 
people? 
What is the proper and acceptable role of the federal 
judiciary in stimulating and directing a move toward more repre-
sentative government at the state level and in the Congress? 
What is the proper allocation of functions among the legis-
lative, executive and judicial branches in eliminating the bar-
barity of racial distinctions from our law and our society? 
What is the proper balance between the individual rights of 
an accused and the right of society to protection from dangerous 
and disruptive conduct, and between the right of an accused to a 
fair trial and the social interest in a free press? 
These are issues that press for attention. Their demand for our 
careful and creative thought and for the adaptation of the legal 
order must dispel any aura of complacency that might surround a 
celebration, such as today's, of the grandeur and worth of our 
legal institutions. 
It is not novel or surprising that our legal institutions 
are involved intimately with issues of pressing social concern. 
For law deals, and must deal, with the fundamentals of man's na-
ture and personality and of his life in society. Nor is it sur-
prising or novel that protest and demand for change should be 
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directed toward the legal order. This is, indeed, a health state 
of affairs, for law is or should be a primary tool for meeting 
and satisfying the needs of man in society. Such needs change 
and law itself must change, as the~President has reminded us in 
his Law Day Proclamation. 
One of the most troublesome problems today, however, does 
not arise from the fact that the legal order is in a variety of 
ways an object of protest, but from the fact that violation of 
law has become a major technique of protest. Understandably, 
many of us are deeply troubled by the use of that technique, and 
in our dismay we often do not distinguish, as we should, among 
the occasions on which violation of law as a technique of 
protest may be used. Let us think together for a few moments 
about four examples. 
Consider first a state statute or city ordinance that 
restricts the use of facilities provided by the public on the 
basis of racial criteria. Though not the only avenue of protest 
against such an enactment, a common technique in recent years 
has been the attempt to use the facilities in violation of the 
enactment, in the hope that in an ensuing prosecution the in-
validity of the enactment under constitutional guarantees of 
human rights could be established. Most of us would, I suspect, 
support this form of protest, as the Supreme Court of the United 
States has done. Our constitutional system would permit us to 
say, in fact, that no violation of law is involved, since the 
state or local enactment that transgresses the great guarantees 
of the Constitution is not law. 
Consider next the enactment of a legislative body, acting 
within the unquestionable scope of its legal power, which com-
mands the performance of acts that are repulsive to the con-
science of some members of the community. What view should we 
take of their knowing refusal to obey the law in order to meet 
their own moral and ethical standards and to make a protest in 
order to awaken the consciences of their fellow citizens? The 
question raises complex and agonizing problems, and I have no 
easy solution for them. More than two decades ago, however, our 
Government gave its answer to the question, declaring in effect 
that the requirements of law may be so heinous that violation 
becomes not a privilege but a duty. On that basis a court sat in 
solemn judgment in Nuremberg and exacted from some of the ac-
cused the ultimate penalty for their failure to reject the 
mandates of their law. 
Consider now the action of persons who may be deeply and 
legitimately concerned about a social problem, who want to 
dramatize that concern so that others in the society will share 
l 
l 
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it and join in the efforts to solve the problem. With increasing 
frequency today we see employed the technique of violating a law 
that is unobjectionable within itself, simply as a means of 
dramatic protest. Thus, a highway or railroad may be blocked to 
traffic to protest an unpopular and cruel war or an unreasonably 
low price for milk. Or in knowing violation of the law, payment 
or all or some part of a tax may be withheld to protest a 
government policy. 
Consider finally the violation of law that grows, not out of 
particularized protest to limited aspects of governmental 
policy, but out of an alienation of the violators from the 
society that has imposed the law and seeks protection from it. 
This is the protest of total rejection; it seeks to destroy 
since it has no hope of sharing. It is a protest bred of 
frustration and nurtured on the perception that orderly channels 
toward economic opportunity and social acceptance are in large 
measure blocked. It is the protest of the Watts District in Los 
Angeles and of the Hough District of Cleveland. 
As we ponder today the President's call for fidelity to 
law, I would suggest that we consider these examples of viola-
tion of law, their similarities and their differences. I suggest 
that we consider them, not to develop some facile rationaliza-
tion for violation of law, but in order that we may, through un-
derstanding the well-springs of civil disobedience, progress to 
a better assured regime of fidelity to law. 
We posit an incomplete ideal if we call for fidelity to law 
without calling as well for just law. Unless we take steps to 
assure that the rules and institutions of law change to meet the 
changing needs of human beings in society, unless we insist that 
avenues toward peaceful change in the legal and social order be 
kept open to all citizens, unless we demand that justice be ad-
ministered with even hands to all, unless we use the in-
strumentalities of law to open the gates of opportunity to all 
without discrimination of race or creed, unless we abjure in our 
legal and governmental system all repression of the freedom of 
the human mind and of the dignity of the human personality, we 
are not entitled to call for or to expect fidelity to law. 
In this gathering of judges and lawyers, held under the 
auspices of this high Court, a reminder that law may be unjust 
and may thereby forfeit same part of its claim to respect is 
especially appropriate. For no segment of our society carries a 
responsibility equal to the lawyers' for assuring that fidelity 
to law is deserved and that the Rule of Law does not became 
merely the Rule of Dominant Force. In every aspect of our 
professional lives we strengthen the Rule of Law and further the 
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ideal of fidelity to law or we deny them. It is therefore to us, 
the members of the legal profession, that I would issue the 
principal Law Day appeal--
To the private practitioner, that he represent his client 
with vigor and a high sense of responsibility, and that he give 
of his time and talents to assure representation of the in-
digent: 
To the lawyers in legislative bodies and executive agen-
cies, that they be ever mindful that the function of law and 
government is to serve the interests of all in an inclusive 
society, not solely its privileged segments: 
To the judge, that he administer prompt justice under law 
without fear or favor: 
To the teacher of law, that he instill in his students 
not only the knowledge and skills of the profession but also 
an appreciation of the lawyer's high calling to serve in the 
public interest. 
If this appeal is heeded by the legal profession itself, I 
have complete faith that through periods of protest, social 
transition, and change in the legal order, the ideals of the 
Rule of Just Law and of fidelity to law will remain strong and 
vital. 
THE UlfIVERSITY I THE COMllURITY I AND THE LAW 
[In 1969, the stresses within the universities created by 
student protests against the Vietnam War and other social ills 
that students thought associated in various ways with that con-
flict were at or very near their peak. These protests con-
tributed to traditional "town-gown" tensions, as the communities 
that surrounded and in many instances funded the universities 
looked with increasing concern on protests frequently charac-
terized by extreme demands, disruptive and destructive behavior, 
and sometimes serious criminal conduct. As police were frequent-
ly called in to deal with protest activity, serious questions 
inevitably arose as to the proper role of the general com-
munity's law-making and law-enforcing institutions. 
In this context, I was invited to address the Law Day Din-
ner of the Knox County Bar Association in Vincennes, Indiana on 
May 1, 1969. The tenor of the times and the malaise that in-
fected the universities and ambient communities were well il-
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lustrated by a telephone call I received in Vincennes in the 
afternoon before the dinner informing me that during a huge stu-
dent demonstration in the playing fields near the general 
university library, a substantial part of the library had gone 
up in flames. An assumption was easily made that the fire was 
part of the student protest, though that assumption ultimately 
was not sustained. 
The following talk which I made to the Law Day Dinner was 
heard courteously but, I sensed without being told, with limited 
agreement and some discomfort. I believe this was the last Law 
Day occasion on which I spoke. There was some satisfaction, how-
ever, from the fact that, for whatever effect they might have, 
my views did reach an audience beyond the immediate listeners in 
Vincennes. The speech was published in Res Gestae Magazine, a 
publication of the Indiana State Bar Association and in Indiana 
University's Alumni Magazine (Item 31 in Appendix I). The Amer-
ican Bar Association awarded it the "Judge Edward R. Finch Law 
Day U.S.A Speech Award" for 1969.] 
Law Day is, in the words of President Nixon, "an occasion 
for rededication to the ideals of equality and justice under 
law." The President, in his 1969 Law Day Proclamation, con-
tinues, 
There was never a greater need for such rededication. 
Events of recent years -- rising crime rates, urban 
rioting, and violent campus protests -- have impeded 
rather than advanced social justice. 
The President's reference to recent events on the campuses 
of many colleges and universities prompts me to use this Law 
Day occasion to share with you some reflections on three insti-
tutions in which I know we have a common interest -- the univer-
sity, the community, and the law. 
I have spent most of my life in a university. I feel a deep 
commitment to its essential values anal purposes, but I shall 
not dwell on these. With recognition of incompleteness and of 
the consequent risk of distortion, I want to reflect briefly 
with you on some features of the modern university that are 
related most directly to the ferment on many campuses today. I 
shall do this by trying to sketch in rough profile the student 
activist who sees most clearly, not the historic strengths 
and contributions of the university, but its current in-
adequacies and weaknesses. 
The student activist is an idealist. He expresses his 
ideals in deep concerns over his society, his university, and 
his relation to each. Among those concerns there are, I be-
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lieve, four predominant factors, each of which raises its own 
insistent issues -- war, race, poverty, and self. The activist 
sees American and Asian blood being spilled and resource con-
sumed in a war which fills him with moral indignation and revul-
sion. I do not believe, however, that his concern over war is 
confined to the rice paddies of Vietnam. Rather, he rejects 
the belief that resort to violence in pursuit of national in-
terests can lead to the decent society he seeks. The student 
activist rejects the age-old fetish of race and reacts with 
growing anger and frustration to those aspects of our society 
which led a recent Presidential Commission to declare that it 
is a racist society. The student activist is not unaware of 
the general affluence of our society. Indeed, the typical 
white student activist has come from an upper middle class 
background. But he sees clearly that intransigent stratum of 
brutal and despairing need that underlies the general affluence. 
Finally, the student activist is deeply concerned with his 
own personal identity in a mass society characterized more 
frequently by the computerized grade report or credit card, by 
polluted streams and foul air, than by an awareness that the 
fullness of man's life is in his individual awareness and ex-
pression and in the love and compassion he directs toward 
others. 
While I have stated these as separate concerns of the stu-
dent activist, he sees them as profoundly connected. He is ful- ' 
ly aware of the fact that the war in Southeast Asia pits the 
forces of the richest nation of the world, which is predominant-
ly white, against a tiny, impoverished, and colored nation. He / 
sees, as well, that the draft calls, the agonies, and the deaths 
in Vietnam have fallen especially heavily on Black Americans. 
He is keenly aware that the flow of national resources into the 
military budget makes it appear difficult to commit adequate 
funds to programs designed to alter historic patterns of racial 
disadvantage, to eliminate the cancerous blight of our cities, 
or to move vigorously to end the pollution of our environment. 
And all these factors, which the student activist regards as 
dehumanizing, bring into sharp focus his alienation, his dif-
ficulty in identifying himself with a society he regards as 
excessively materialistic, hypocritical, and insensitive to 
the basic needs and values of the human personality. 
You may reasonably observe that these concerns go to gen-
eral features of the society. Why then does the activist 
direct his angry protest toward the university? It is unduly 
simplistic to reply that he attacks the university because he is 
there and the university is the readiest object of his frustra-
tions, his moral indignation, and his demand for change. Surely 
this reply is an appropriate part of the answer. The larger 
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part, however, is that the activist sees the university, the 
faculty, and many of the students as compliant uncritical 
supporters of government policy and social practice he sees 
as corrupt and oppressive. 
In sketching this profile of the student activist, my pur-
pose has been to describe -- not to justify. I have stressed 
the student's deep concern over the world he confronts. I 
believe this stress is justified and that the concern projects 
a truly operative idealism. To complete this rough profile of 
the student activist, however, I should mention other character-
istics. That the student activist is impatient is not surpris-
ing; if patience is a virtue, it is one to which few of the 
young people of any generation have been able to make a strong 
claim. But simple impatience is too often converted by our 
current students into a pervasive, simplistic demand for in-
stant solutions to complex social problems. Among other 
characteristics, I should mention the moral arrogance, the in-
tolerance of viewpoints different from his own, and the thinly 
disguised core of authoritarianism which are so easily detected 
in many of the student activists. Finally, I should mention 
the widespread disillusionment with rationality as a path toward 
solution of human problems and the apparently growing belief 
that freely expressed emotion is an adequate substitute. 
In sketching this profile of the student activist, I 
recognize the risk of over-generalization. I know that student 
activists do not spring from a common mold. Their sharing in 
marked degree the characteristics I have suggested may justify, 
however, this projection of a single profile. 
Since I have attempted to describe only the student ac-
tivist, you may ask "Where stands the silent majority of our 
students?" I wish I could feel greater assurance in trying to 
answer that question. I can only speculate. I suspect, however, 
that, while the great majority of our students feel repelled in 
varying degrees by the tactics of activist groups, they share in 
very large measure the concerns and the ideals of the ac-
tivists. The differences are less in kind than in degree of com-
mitment, but there are surely important differences in accepted 
tactics. Yet when the so-called moderate students have reason to 
believe that the activists have been dealt with unduly harshly, 
they are more likely to identify, I believe, with the activists 
whose goals they approve and whose courage they respect than 
with that authority which appears harsh, repressive, and in-
transigent. 
As a man of the university, I have tried to describe some 
of our students. Now as a man of the community, I want to speak 
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briefly of the developing attitudes there. Despite my long-
standing commitment to the university, I reflect, as do you, 
many of the attitudes of a broader community. Like most of you, 
I have passed the fateful age of thirty and thereby have become 
suspect. Like you, I pay my taxes to support the schools and 
universities, which are so frequently challenged today, and 
have already sent my own children to study in them. Like you, I 
recall clearly the barbarities we fought against in the Second 
World War and therefore I have difficulty in accepting a view 
that would commit us to impotence in the face of international 
aggression. And also, like you I am sure, I recognize that 
viable solutions to complex social problems are not produced in-
stantaneously even by people of the best of wills. 
While I identify myself with much of the perplexity with 
which the broader community views protest and disturbance on J 
university and college campuses, I also feel a deep concern 
over some of the attitudes I see developing in the community. 
These attitudes, it seems to me, too frequently and easily re- I ject the possibility of a useful and creative student voice in 
the making of decisions, within the university and outside it, 
which affect vitally the lives of young people. They seem too 
frequently to indulge the assumption that the best response to 
campus protest is vigorous repression, rather than an effort to 
understand the causes and a concerned commitment to curing 
basic social ills. Before we yield to any temptation to deny I 
these ills and to assert that all is well, let us honestly ask 
ourselves some questions. Are we convinced that our involve-
ment, with the loss of life and the expenditure of resources, in I 
Vietnam is justifiable? Are we satisfied that our lives could 
not be enriched by a reaffirmation of belief that in a profound 
sense we are our brother's keeper and therefore must extend to 
him more readily the hand of compassion and love? 
I have spoken of the university and of the community. 
May I turn now to the law whose profession binds us together. 
I need not emphasize to you the intimate connections which 
tie the institutions of the law to the university, to its ac-
tivist students, and to the community. our legal institutions 
structure and provide much of the support for higher education. 
But our legal institutions also demand from young people their 
service, perhaps even their lives, in a war they detest. Our 
legal institutions serve far more responsively the needs of an 
affluent corporate and middle-class society than those of the 
disadvantaged. We delude ourselves if we fail to recognize that 
the view of the law, of lawyers, of courts, and of police of-
ficers is totally different in the urban ghetto and on many 
campuses from what it is in the comfortable suburb. In the con-
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text of our discussion here, we must recognize that it is the 
agencies of the law to which the community seems increasingly 
inclined to turn to deal with protest on the campuses. 
If we appreciate these interconnections, what view ought we 
to take of campus unrest and of the university's and the com-
munity's response to it? What counsel can we, as lawyers and 
therefore peculiarly the custodians of a long human tradition, 
offer to universities and their students, to our fellow 
citizens, and, indeed, to ourselves. In conclusion, may I offer 
some suggestions? 
To the disruptive student activists, I would say: "You 
threaten, perhaps unwittingly, the underpinning of law itself. 
The basis of the legal order is the monopoly of legitimate 
force reserved to those who act for the commonwealth. When 
private individuals or groups claim entitlement to use force to 
sanction their own demands, however noble they conceive their 
aims to be, the basic principle of law and public order is 
challenged. Without that order, without the civilizing 
restraints of law the lot of man today would be no less 
'solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short' than when Thomas 
Hobbes first used these words to demonstrate the necessity of 
civil government." 
To the student activist, I would offer, as well, the 
counsel of tolerance and moderation. I would not say, "Com-
promise or abandon your ideals," for from the driving power of 
these ideals can come a nobler society and a richer individual 
life. But those ends are in fact repudiated by any individual 
or group which claims the right to enforce on others its own 
orthodoxy. If life in America is to retain or recapture its 
richness and diversity, if the dehumanization of enforced con-
formity is to be avoided, a measure of tolerance, indeed of 
respect, must be extended not merely to those of like per-
suasion but also to those with whom we profoundly disagree. 
Judge Learned Hand described this spirit of moderation in 
these words: 
It is the temper which does not press a partisan 
advantage to its bitter end, which can understand 
and will respect the other side, which feels a unity 
between all citizens--real and not the factitious pro-
duct of propaganda--which recognizes their common 
fate and their common aspirations--in a word, which 
has faith in the sacredness of the individual. 
To the student activist, therefore, I would not urge the 
compromise of ideals or the suppression of protest. I would 
urge, however, rejection of violence and recommitment to this 
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spirit of moderation. 
To my colleagues in the universities I would offer these 
words of counsel. We need to rededicate ourselves to the 
basic functions of a university -- to the unswerving search for 
truth and to instilling in our students an unquenchable thirst 
for it. If we serve those functions well, the university will 
not be -- today or at any time -- an uncritical service station 
to a complacent society. It will probe objectively and critical-
ly in its research and teaching the unknown outreaches of the 
physical world and the dark recesses of our society in which 
lurk prejudice, ignorance, oppression and injustice. If the uni-· 
versity does that in proper measure, its relation to the com-
munity will often be uneasy for the critique of truth is often 
disturbing. 
To my associates in the university, I would also say that 
if we maintain a true university, it must be a community which 
invites and assures real participation to all its members. Mem- ( 
bership in that community must include all who share its pur-
poses students, faculty, and administrators. We must, 
therefore, seek new ways to permit all members of the community 
to make their creative contributions to its governance and its 1 
functions. 
Finally, to the university community, I would say that it 
is not a privileged enclave in which reliance on reasoned per-
suasion can be abandoned and the rule of force tolerated with 
any less tragic consequences than in the general society. I 
believe, therefore, that the time has come, indeed has passed, 
when the university must make clear beyond question that 
violence and intimidation will not be tolerated, however worthy 
the cause in which they are invoked. As a university teacher and 
administrator, I am prepared to say with President Kennedy, "We 
will not fear to negotiate, but we will never negotiate from 
fear." I know no surer way for the university to lose its soul 
than for it to capitulate to the rule of force -- from outside 
the university or inside it. 
And now to you, as members of the larger community, but 
particularly as men and women of the law, I would offer this 
counsel. A demand that university students abjure violence 
cannot be fully sustained by a society that is itself committed 
to violence, whether that violence is reflected in international 
belligerence or in less obvious and more subtle ways -- by that 
pernicious violence to the human spirit that arises out of ra-
cial prejudice, by insensitivity to the needs of those who are 
ground under the heel of poverty, by unequal protection of the 
l 
l 
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law and grossly differential applications of police power, by 
violation of the physical environment with which a generous 
Providence has endowed us, or by the enforced submergence of 
every claim to individual identity and worth in a nameless, 
faceless, materialistic society. The age-old reign of violence 
over the bodies and spirits of men must be ended. If we of an 
older generation are to assert effectively to our university 
students the claims of peaceful resolution of conflict, of order 
and rationality, we cannot respond to their disruption with ir-
rationality and repression. If we actually believe in the values 
of order, reason, and tolerance, we must live by them. That 
course surely requires that we, along with the young people 
in the universities, examine critically our society, and its in-
stitutions and act to adapt them to meet human needs. If we 
can do that, I believe we are entitled to hope that out of 
today's ferment will come not only better colleges and univer-
sities but a more just and decent society. 
Law Day can become too easily an occasion for uncritical 
praise of our revered institutions, a mere validation of the 
status quo. We lawyers must always be mindful that law can 
become obsolete; it can be oppressive and unjust. We need to 
take note that on this day President Nixon has not asked 
simply for our commitment to law, but for a "rededication to 
the ideals of equality and justice under law." I believe such a 
rededication, if made, could become a magnificent arching 
bridge over the gap that separates the larger community and 
the law from many of our university students today. 
PART TWO 
'1'BE AFRICAN EXPERIENCE 
BOW FIRM A FOUHDATIOH 
[The following item is one of only two selected for inclu-
sion here that was not delivered as a speech; it was in fact a 
book review, published in the University of California Law 
Review 1/. I have included it for two reasons: it reveals much 
about my thinking on African constitutional development and, 
perhaps more relevantly, it elaborates the critique of Natural 
7. 49 University of California Law Review 1001 (1961). 
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Law thought which I discussed briefly in the first Rule of Law 
lecture, supra, p. It may serve usefully, I hope, as a bridge 
or transition piece between Parts I and II.] 
on being invited to review Denis Cowen's new book The 
Foundations of Freedoa, I assumed my qualification, if any, lay 
in a long standing interest in African legal institutions, par-
ticularly those of the so-called "emergent" societies. Regret-
tably. this does not suffice. One needs the competences and in-
sights of a keen student of contemporary political events in 
Southern Africa, of constitutional law on a broadly comparative 
basic, and of legal and political theory in order to deal ade-
quately with this provocative little volume. 
Professor Cowen is already widely known in this country. 
His academic attainments as Professor of Law in the University 
of Cape Town need not be recounted. It suffices to mention his 
wide ranging, humane scholarship of which this book provides 
ample evidence. Perhaps more because of his service as constitu-
tional adviser to the Basuto people in the reforms of the 
fundamental law of Basutoland and his participation on the side 
of the colored voters in the great constitutional struggle over 
the franchise in South Africa, one turns to this book with great 
expectation of deep insight into the present and future of that 
troubled and tragic land. 
Broadly classified, Professor Cowen's discussion may be 
considered under three headings: 1) an analysis of the evolution 
of racial policy and law in the Union with an assessment of its 
present impact and accomplishments; 2) a consideration of 
certain constitutional devices which the author argues would 
better the situation and 3) the presentation of a philosophical 
position which Cowen believes is the only reliable underpinning 
for viable reforms. 
From the historic practice of racial segregation in the 
Union Professor Cowen traces the development of the present 
policy of apartheid or separation. Apologists for the system 
tend to stress its affirmative aspects and speak not merely of 
separation but of separate development. The unreality and utter 
futility of the proposed Bantustans as effective devices for 
separation are here clearly revealed. Cowen demonstrates also 
what is too frequently overlooked--that the repressions involved 
in efforts to implement apartheid taint the whole society; they 
impinge not merely on the black and colored but on the white as 
well* The ruthless attack of the Nationalist government on the 
constitutional safeguards of minimal political participation by 
colored voters has undermined general confidence in basic in-
stitutions and left gnawing doubts and troubled consciences even 
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among the dominant white minority. Cowen do not, of course, at-
tribute the division in South African society solely to govern-
mental policy and legal devices. The divisions, the hostilities, 
the fears are embedded in the society itself, deriving not mere-
ly from ethnic differences but from tremendous cultural dis-
parities as well. Nevertheless, Cowen believes that certain 
unifying forces remain strong---the raw fact of economic inter-
dependence, the tenets of Christianity at least professed by the 
whites, the persistent urge of Western civilization to an ever 
greater inclusiveness, and the love of their land shared by 
South Africans of all colors. 
While insisting that education can contribute by exploding 
some of the myths, like that of racial inferiority, on which 
apartheid rests, Professor Cowen would expect to find the real 
catalyst to change in an overarching counter-fear--the fear of 
the ultimate consequences of apartheid. Change thus induced 
would hopefully lead to a true non-racial democracy in South 
Africa. Extensive legislative reform would, of course, be essen-
tial to wipe out the expressions of both racial segregation and 
separation. Cowen's primary attention is not on the details of 
legislation, however, but on the processes and devices of a 
reformed constitution. 
We need not concern ourselves here with the technical prob-
lem of how a sovereign legislature brings into existence a con-
stitution significantly limiting its powers. I see no reason to 
question Professor Cowen's analysis and conclusion that this is 
entirely feasible. It suffices to say that Cowen argues for a 
rigid constitution, that is, one exceedingly difficult of amend-
ment with substantial limitations on legislative powers. Among 
these limitations should be safeguards of universal adult suf-
frage and other fundamental human rights. The latter include 
"personal liberty and the right to a fair trial; freedom of as-
sociation and of assembly; freedom of religion; freedom of the 
press and freedom of speech." Also included should be non-dis-
crimination and equal protection of the law guarantees. Cowen 
reviews the arguments for and against the power of judicial 
review and concludes that it provides by far the most effective 
protection of such constitutional rights. To an American his 
arguments and conclusions are perfectly palatable and may appear 
fairly obvious. They take on added significance, however, 
against the background of English suspicion of written constitu-
tion and court-guarded constitutional rights. 
In addition to a judicially enforced, constitutionally en-
trenched Bill of Rights, Professor Cowen proposes certain other 
constitutional devices for South Africa. Power is safest when 
divided, and he thus argue for federalism rather than unitary 
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government. He also would favor a second legislative chamber or 
Senate, elected on the basis of a system of proportional repre-
sentation and having as one of its principal functions the 
guarding of the constitution and its Bill of Rights against 
precipitate amendment. Professor Cowen is rather unenthusiastic 
about the relatively new-fangled councils of state, but favors 
the use of Special Commissions to investigate complaints of dis-
crimination, attempt reconciliation and, this failing initiate 
court proceedings. It bears emphasis that Cowen does not see 
constitutional reform as the universal solvent. In connection 
with basic psychological and emotional changes, however, he 
believes it can make a valuable contribution to allaying the 
fears of South Africans of all colors and to the maintenance of 
decent government in the Union. 
Cowen's philosophical discussion proceeds on two distinct 
levels, and the second limits and qualifies the first. After of-
fering non-racial democracy as the only acceptable alternative 
for South Africa, he carefully analyzes the substantive and pro-
cedural aspects of democratic philosophy. As a substantive 
philosophy of government, democracy involves two basic ideas or 
principles: 1) primacy of individual human worth as the ultimate 
determinant of the relationship of man to organized society, and 
2) recognition of the variety and complexity of social lift. Im-
plicit in the first are the attribution to man of rationality, 
volition and responsibility for his actions and insistence that 
all associations and organizations "exist to enable men to ful-
fill their nature as men." The second argues that men's diverse 
potentialities will be best realized through efforts of in-
dividuals and varied groups, and requires the abjuration by any 
single association, specifically by the state, of pretensions to 
being the sole, necessary channel to individual and social well-
being. Procedurally, democracy demands the active, manifested 
consent of the governed for the power of government to be deemed 
just. 
Cowen fully recognizes the complexity of democratic method. 
Rejecting the notion that South Africa presents a special case, 
except perhaps for slight restrictions accepted on an interim 
basis, he favors universal adult suffrage. The actual procedure 
by which group decisions are to be reached, whether by simple 
majority vote or by some other means, presents more difficult 
questions. Cowen's acceptance of majority rule is at best 
qualified. He insists that majority decision makes little, if 
any, moral claim on the minority unless the minority has had 
full opportunity to express and propagate its views and thus to 
enjoy the possibility of becoming the majority. Even if these 
conditions are met in the formulation of group decisions, Cowen 
still fears the tyranny of the majority. He would, therefore, 
I 
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place the fundamental human rights beyond the easily exercised 
power of the majority by the constitutional devices mentioned 
earlier. 
Cowen's devotion to such limitations on majority rule leads 
him to the second level of his philosophical discussion. He 
seeks higher norms which validate certain values and entitle 
them to almost absolute protection, even from the adjustment 
seemingly implicit in democratic method. These he finds in 
natural law. In a final chapter, "Under God and the Law," he 
traces the evolution of natural law speculation and indicates 
his preference for the great formulations of St. Thomas as the 
"foundation of freedom" in South Africa or in any other country 
which would effectively bridle arbitrary power of government. 
Thurman Arnold once said that "most of the literature of 
jurisprudence ••• is tedious, not as hard subjects like physics 
and mathematics are tedious, but as throwing feathers, endless-
ly, hour after hour, is tedious" I hope to avoid contributing to 
the tedium, The case for and against the natural law viewpoint 
has been restated innumerable times, A further detailed refuta-
tion is not needed here. I, too, have great admiration for 
Aquinas, not only because he posited a view of man with which I 
can live comfortably, but because he recognized, as few of his 
followers have, the limits of human reason and thus avoided the 
absurdity of elevating to a universal and immutable level a 
variety of transient positive laws. 
Certainly today, as rarely if ever before in man's history, 
th~re is need for thoughtful and prayerful clarification of at-
titude on such pressing questions as: Who are we? What are the 
true non-negotiable in which we believe? How can we give them 
maximum protection in a hazardous world? The answers to such 
questions must be meaningfully related to the legal order, to 
family and social contexts far too delicate for the blunt in-
struments of the law, and to international relations which, 
strictly speaking, know no law. Perhaps one should not cavil 
when concerned scholars couch their gropings for significant 
supports for or restraints on the exercise of legal and govern-
mental power in terms of a "natural law." cavil or no, my own 
objections remain firm and rest on two basic points: 
(1) The exponent of natural law occupies an epistemological 
position, the unsoundness of which undermines his purpose. He 
insists, whether the higher norms are said to have a divine or 
humanistic origin, that they are "knowable" by the use of man's 
rational faculties. I have no sophisticated theories to advance, 
here or elsewhere, on the essential processes and limitations of 
man's knowledge. I can, however, suggest the difficulty with the 
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epistemological underpinning of natural law argument insofar as 
the world of practical affairs is concerned. The natural law 
norm, as such, helps to reconcile competing human desires and 
wills only insofar as it can be given fairly specific content 
and its validity then demonstrated to the rational rejector or 
doubter. The inescapable fact that human history does not reveal 
stable agreement on the substantive content of natural law norms 
belies any claim to self-evidence. Beyond that, the difficulties 
with the usual lines of proof are well illustrated by Cowen's 
single-sentence leap over the gap between the "is" and the 
"ought": "··· ultimately, in God's created order, being and 
oughtness are identical." This may be so, but modern logic of-
fers no aid in its proof. I do not need to deny the existence of 
the higher norms which natural law affirms. Far more modestly, I 
hope, I need only question the transmissibility of claimed know-
ledge of their existence or content, to make my point for pre-
sent purposes. Nor, for that matter, do I need to insist that 
all real knowledge is transmissible. Yet knowledge that lacks 
this quality is of limited utility at best. At the age of twelve 
I may have known that I kissed Suzie behind the barn, but if she 
denied it, how could I convince a doubting world that I had the 
makings of a lover? 
cowen's own attitude on the means of knowing the higher 
norms and, to some extent, on their substantive content appears 
ambivalent. If he attributes to all men the essential ration-
ality which discloses the norms, how does he account for the 
South African Nationalists and specifically their leaders, many 
of whom he considers "men of high integrity, no less honorable 
than their opponents ••• honestly believing their policy to be 
in the best interests of all." on what basis is the "reason" of 
such men to he declared less capable of gaining access to the 
"higher norms"? On the other hand, Cowen declares that he starts 
"with the premise that when entrusting power to human hands, it 
is essential not to believe in the sweet reasonableness of man." 
The meaning of this premise is unclear. It may mean that though 
all men have reason, they cannot be relied on to use it. It may 
mean that though guiding norms are rationally perceived, men's 
actual conduct, judged by these norms, is unreasonable or it may 
mean that while the dictates of reason provide reliable guides 
in many areas of human affairs, some other control is essential 
in allocating and channeling power. If the latter to his posi-
tion, he seriously impugns the significance of his rationally 
derived higher norms for positive law, which finds its essential 
character in the reserved monopoly of power or force that lies 
behind it. 
In cowen's elaboration of the substantive content of the 
natural law, I find unresolved conflicts or tensions. As he 
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notes, natural law thought became increasingly individualistic 
in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. This he attributes 
to individual human will's masquerading as reason with the 
result that the natural law itself came to he merely a deriva-
tive of individual rights and not their source. Cowen believes 
that a system of substantive natural rights could be developed 
from the earlier natural law, while preserving the restraints of 
a divinely ordered system. As a logical exercise this doubtless 
could be done, but I am inclined to think that such a change of 
emphasis would involve great distortion of Thomistic thought. 
The central concept in Aquinas' discussion of law was "the com-
mon good." Quite plausibly it can be argued that maximizing 
the common good requires opportunity for individual expression 
and realization of potential. Insofar as conflict arises between 
such individual interests and the common good, however, Aquinas 
seems committed to protecting the latter. Cowen, on the other 
hand, while insisting that individual liberty and social and 
economic security are not mutually exclusive ideals, and that a 
viable balance can be prudentially determined, seems to suggest 
that in the event of ultimate conflict some hard core of in-
dividual rights should prevail. Thus, he remains in the later 
individualistic natural law tradition, though insisting that he 
validates his position by rational perception of a divine order 
and not by the sanctification of individual desire or will, the 
sort of thing fellows like John Locke tried to pull off. 
With the substantive content poured into natural law molds 
by many of its exponents I can readily agree. Yet their in-
sistence that this acceptance rests on knowledge repels Far bet-
ter, it seems to me, to say "these values are the fabric, not of 
our knowledge, but of our faith, as, st. Paul put it, 'the sub-
stance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen'." I 
only fear that the speciousness of a claim to knowledge, at 
least in any transmissible form, detracts from a solemn declara-
tion of faith which otherwise might stir men's hearts and kindle 
their devotion to the basic decencies that civilized life seems 
to me to require. 
(2) The second objection can he stated far more briefly. It 
is trite to point out that in its historic impact natural law 
thought has been as frequently conservative as liberal or revol-
utionary. The tendency to identify the established, the 
familiar, with the natural in recurrent. Similarly, there is a 
dangerously short step between insistence that only that posi-
tive law is valid which coincides with the natural norm and 
sanctification of the legally enacted itself. Professor Cowen 
criticizes Kelsen for offering a theory which can "legalize 
political absolutism, and identity law with sheer power and 
domination." Perhaps Kelsen has done that, if one understands 
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"legalize" within the framework of the Reinerechtslehre. It has 
always seemed to me, however, that a cardinal merit of Kelsen 
was his insistence that he was not offering a theory of justi-
fication, that, in fact. law could not in any sense justify 
itself. Properly understood, Kelsen thus contributes to a 
healthy insistence that law, valid law, can also be bad law, and 
that it must be evaluated by extrinsic standards of ethics, re-
ligion, or morals. This insistence is too frequently muted by 
those who insist that "law" is itself a value concept. 
Aside from his natural law persuasion, Professor Cowen has 
made a valuable contribution to thought about law and government 
in South Africa. He has brought together in highly readable form 
many insights into the South African situation from literature 
not readily available to the non-specialist. His constitutional 
suggestions are of interest, though their practical influence 
seems doubtful. One can only hope that the moderate optimism he 
professes for developments in the Union is warranted. The inter-
national isolation of the Union, the growing resentment toward 
it in the United Nations, and the seemingly waning patience of 
its African majority suggest greater agonies ahead. The awaken-
ing of Portuguese Africa way in the not too distant future 
deprive the Union of the buffer provided thus far by Angola and 
Mozambique against black Africa's continental pressure toward 
freedom and justice. If real optimism that change can be 
accommodated without disaster seems beyond reach, one neverthe-
less continues to hope. 
The voices of Africa are many. In the United Nations they 
speak in fluent French and Oxford accents. They chant "Free-DOM" 
in Accra and "In-de-pen-DANCE" in Leopoldville. But in the 
gathering gloom of the Union of South Africa one may hear the 
insistent murmur of Sharpsville and Cato Manor, of massed 
humanity facing the guns armored cars of the modern state. As 
Prime Minister Macmillan has warned, the winds of change are 
blowing through Africa and the white minority in the Union 
cannot divert them. To them the voices of Time speak out: 
Surely a house so strong and hold, 
(The wind in rising, my son.) 
Will last till time is a pinch of mould! 
There is a ghost, when the night is old. 
There is a ghost who walks in the cold. 
(The trees are shaking, my son.) 
* * * All night long like a moving stain, 
(The trees are breaking, my son.) 
The black ghost wanders his house of pain. 
There is blood where his hand has lain. 
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It is wrong he should wear a chain. 
(The sky is falling, my son.) 
co-ent: BEGilftfilfG THE GHAlfA ADVENTURE 
The expected retirement from the Michigan Law Faculty of 
Professor Burke Shartel in about 1957 made operational the as 
signment to me of the primary teaching responsibility in the Law 
School for "Jurisprudence." Shartel's interests were largely in 
legal method; he offered only one course, called "Jurispru-
dence," and the Faculty had shown no interest, as far as I could 
determine, in a diversity of theory courses. When I became the 
responsible Faculty member, I recommended that we abandon the 
use of "Jurisprudence" as a course title on the ground that the 
word was overworked and unrevealing of the content of a course 
and that all members of the Faculty with interests in general 
theory be encouraged to develop and offer their own courses. 
These recommendations were adopted, and my first offering was a 
basic course entitled "Introduction to Legal Philosophy." 
While appreciative of the utility of a study of legal 
method, I was primarily interested in the values that guided the 
development of legal norms and sought effectuation through them. 
Generous support from the Rockefeller Foundation enabled me to 
spend the academic year 1955-56 at the University of Heidelberg. 
While I was formally a candidate for a doctorate (a status made 
attractive by tax considerations), I had no significant interest 
in the degree. Rather, I wanted a year to read widely and deeply 
in both classical legal philosophy and the newer thought stimu-
lated by the Nazi experience, as well as to develop a facility 
in German which I thought, mistakenly, I would need in my later 
work. On returning to Ann Arbor and resuming teaching, however, 
the view emerged that it would be useful in pursuing my inter-
ests to have not merely an academic exposure to the value issues 
in the legal order, but to pursue empirical research in an ac-
tual system in which efforts were being made to instill new 
values in the legal order and to use the instruments of the law 
oriented to those values in programs of planned social change. 
The venues in which such studies might be pursued included, I 
thought, possibly all of the new polities spawned by the breakup 
of colonial systems in which new elites were grasping the reins 
of power in government and law. 
Against this background, I asked my research assistant to 
give me a memorandum responsive to several questions concerned 
mainly with the logistics of research, e.g., receptivity to 
foreign research scholars, official languages, and calendars of 
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local universities and courts. Another critical factor was the 
size of the country. I had no interest in organizing a research 
project that could be carried out only by a large team. On the 
basis of the report of my assistant, I decided to carry out the 
research in Ghana. With continuing support from Rockefeller, I 
made my first trip to Ghana in 1960, not even vaguely aware at 
the time of the challenges, satisfactions, and hazards that lay 
ahead. 
In January, 1962, I planned to be in Ghana for a month to 
pursue my research, but also to participate in a conference on 
African legal education and law development sponsored by the Law 
Department of the University of Ghana. African participants came 
from other Anglophone countries, as well French-speaking areas. 
The other American invitees included Jim Paul of the University 
of Pennsylvania, Max Rheinstein of the University of Chicago, 
Arthur Sutherland from Harvard, and John Bainbridge of Columbia 
who administered a program funded by the Ford Foundation to as-
sist developing African legal education efforts.II 
The conference almost broke up at its inception because of 
the dissatisfaction of the French speakers with the lack of 
translation facilities. As the conference proceeded, however, it 
was increasingly clear that legal education in the host Univer-
sity was approaching a crisis. Faculty and student morale was 
extremely low. At that time, Law was not a separate faculty, but 
rather a department in the Faculty of Arts. The head of the 
Department, the only Professor who managed with a small staff of 
Lecturers, was John Lang. Lang was an English solicitor with no 
experience in education, a good, kind man of the best intentions 
but lacking much needed political skills and handicapped by the 
essentially paternalistic attitudes that many of the English ex-
patriates brought to Africa. Soon after the conference opened, 
we learned that in a dispute with the University administration, 
Lang had tendered his resignation. It seemed probable that the 
tender was simply tactical, a pressure device, and that Lang was 
surprised by its ready acceptance with immediate effect. 
After the conference ended, I planned to spend the follow-
ing three weeks on my own research. A day or so later, however, 
I received a message from Nana Kobina Nketsia, an able, educated 
Chief who was serving as the Interim Vice Chancellor of the 
8. Originally this effort, aided administratively by the In-
stitute of International Education, operated under the acronym f 
SAILER (Staffing African Institutions of Legal Education and Re-
search). Later, with enlarged funding from Ford, it became the 
International Legal Center. 
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University, asking me to call on him. When we met, he surprised 
me by asking, with few preliminaries, if I would be willing to 
come to Ghana for at least two years as successor to John Lang. 
I had not known Nana Nketsia and was unaware then and remain un-
certain today why he decided to extend this invitation to me. 
Since he and I were not acquainted, I assume that someone else 
must have proposed me, though I do not know who. 
I had never thought of any role in Ghana other than that of 
a research scholar, pursuing an interest in legal theory; I had 
never thought of myself as an Africanist (present or future). I 
found the prospect of an activist role in Ghana's development 
exciting, but I was also keenly aware of the hazards in that 
role for everything I had come to Ghana to do. I had worked hard 
for more than two years to establish relationships of trust and 
confidence with leading figures in government and politics that 
would encourage them to speak candidly with me with full as-
surance that nothing they said would be revealed in any way that 
could be personally attributed and, therefore, possibly damag-
ing. It seemed clear that if I took on an active, operational 
role, the kind of neutrality and acceptability to all that I had 
cultivated for research purposes would be imperiled and perhaps 
entirely lost. At the same time, I had to ask if that loss would 
not be justified if I could contribute in some way to the 
development of a capable legal profession for the country. 
My response to Nana Nketsia is described succinctly in a 
letter I wrote to Arthur Sutherland at Harvard shortly after my 
return to the United States. I had expressed the view that 
La~g's efforts had been ineffectual and that he was using ex-
pressions of support from American academics for his own pur-
poses. Arthur had heard of my view and objected somewhat to that 
interpretation. My letter dealt with both his criticism and my 
own reaction to the invitation to succeed Lang. I quote: 
"I can only say at the moment that the reports of my going 
to Ghana are like those of Mark Twain's death, greatly ex-
aggerated. At the close of the Accra Conference, I was asked by 
Nana Nketsia, the Vice Chancellor of the University, if I would 
come as John Lang's successor. It seemed to me then that neither 
the University nor I was in a position to deal with a definite 
invitation, and that it would be much more fruitful for us to 
explore relevant attitudes quite informally until I left Ghana. 
Since I had never contemplated anything other than research ac-
tivity in Ghana, the question raised by the University obviously 
called for discussions with my family and University. I indi-
cated that if the University [of Ghana] ultimately decided that 
it wanted to make a definite offer, I would give it the most 
careful consideration in the light of my impressions of the 
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situation there and of family and University [of Michigan] reac-
tions. Preliminary discussion here has not raised any seemingly 
insuperable obstacles to my undertaking a two-year secondment to 
Ghana. Thus far I have heard nothing more from the University 
and it is entirely possible that a decision has been made not to 
pursue the possibility. 
"I was perhaps too cryptic in my suggestion about avoiding 
all appearance that American support to legal education in Ghana 
was provided ad hominem. I fully share your view that this has 
not been the motivation of any support with which I have been 
familiar. The unfortunate fact remains, however, that American 
help in being and in prospect has been used there as a kind of 
personal lever. Parenthetically, I might add that although our 
evaluations of Professor Lang's contribution in Ghana might dif-
fer, I have no doubt whatsoever of his sincerity and good inten-
tions. The personal tragedy involved in the circumstances sur-
rounding his departure distresses me deeply and I fully share 
your hope that his actual leaving may be as warm and friendly as 
possible." 
Discussions with authorities of the University of Michigan 
were fully supportive of my going to Ghana, if I chose, and an 
extended leave was assured. Reactions in the family were some-
what divided. Marilou was ready to take the next plane, our 
daughter Anne, then sixteen, was enthusiastically negative, and 
our son Kent, twelve, showed a sort of quiet neutrality. Within 
this pattern, when the invitation from Ghana was reaffirmed, we 
decided to accept it. 
It was clear that expenses associated with the Ghana pro-
ject, while many of the home-front expenses continued, required 
funding beyond the salary provided by the University of Ghana. 
Quite reasonably the University sent to the United States State 
Department a request for supporting funds. Fortunately, even 
before I had an opportunity to express my own objections to such 
a funding arrangement, the Department had recognized the hazards 
and had forwarded the funding request to the Ford Foundation 
which responded promptly and generously. Thus, the way was 
cleared. Arrangements were made for Anne to finish her secondary 
schooling in Switzerland, while Kent elected to accompany us to 
Ghana. 
As I have mentioned, instruction in Law in the University 
of Ghana was structured in a Department of Law within the 
Faculty of Liberal Arts, though all of the courses were tradi-
tional law courses in the English mode. In addition to the 
University program, however, the Ghana Government had estab-
lished a separate Law School in Accra to offer evening instruc-
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tion. This School was under the direction of the Director of 
Legal Education, a statutory officer who also served ex officio 
on the General Legal Council, a statutory body having plenary 
responsibility for admission to and governance of the legal 
profession. There is reason to believe that the impetus for es-
tablishing the Ghana Law School was not merely to provide a 
route to qualification for older persons already in jobs who 
perhaps lacked qualification for University admission, but also 
to add to the legal profession a contingent of lawyers more 
favorable to the Government than the traditional, elitist Bar 
trained in England was thought to be. I believed that continuing 
the separation between the two programs of legal education was 
wasteful of scarce resources and would not be functional to 
sound development. I indicated, therefore, that if I came to 
Ghana I would want responsibility for directing both programs. 
Consequently, I was appointed Professor of Law in the University 
and Director of Legal Education of Ghana. During my first year 
in Ghana, the University moved Law instruction from Departmental 
status to a separate Faculty, and I was appointed Dean of that 
Faculty. The tenure I had agreed to was to be two years in dura-
tion. As I will indicate later, it lasted only about eighteen 
months. 
My arrival in the University of Ghana came at a fortunate 
time: it coincided almost exactly with the beginning of the Vice 
Chancellorship of Dr. Conor Cruise O'Brien. Shortly before, he 
had ended his assignment as Head of the United Nations Mission 
attempting to deal with the separatist movement in the Congolese 
Province of Katanga. Before taking that assignment on the in-
vitation of the Secretary General, he had been the Irish Ambas-
sador to the United Nations. I had not been acquainted with 
O'Brien before we began our tasks in Ghana, but very quickly 
friendship and a close working relationship developed. 
A VALUE ANALYSIS OF GHANAIAN LEGAL DEVELOPMENT 
SIBCE IHDEPENDENCE 
[The University of Ghana originated as an affiliated Col-
lege of the University of London, staffed largely by the 
English; its graduates received University of London degrees. 
Shortly after independence, the umbilical cord to London was 
severed and the University of Ghana became an independent in-
stitution. 
Not surprisingly, this change in formal status did not im-
mediately or substantially alter the institutional ethos. The 
relationship between the University and the Nkrumah Government 
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was chronically tense. The Government, not without reason, 
regarded the University as a center of elitism, and basically as 
a residue from the colonial past. While the Government funded 
the University generously, indeed extravagantly in my view, its 
dissatisfaction with and suspicion of the institution was 
patent. Unfortunately, the Government was unable to articulate 
in ways that would have been coherent and perhaps acceptable to 
many in the University community the grounds of dissatisfaction 
or the aspects of the University program and life style it would 
like to see changed. The result was mainly a running attack on 
symbols, such as the continuation of the English practice of 
students' daily wearing short academic gowns and the retention 
of the Oxbridge pattern of organizing student life in "Colleges" 
with students dining at "Low Table," and rising for a Latin 
grace when faculty members came in to "High Table." One might 
perhaps have expected, or at least hoped for, a more sophisti-
cated and understanding response from the University, but it did 
not develop. Every Government complaint about the preservation 
of a colonial remnant in an independent country was seen by many 
in the University as an attack on academic freedom. Indeed, 
about the time I went to the University of Ghana, an editorial 
appeared in the respected English journal NATURE attacking 
specifically the Government's criticism of students' academic 
gowns as an attack on academic freedom. I have no doubt that 
later a faction within Dr. Nkrumah's Convention Peoples Party 
did become active enemies of academic freedom; at the early 
stage to which I now refer, however, I think disquiet over 
elitism, retention of symbols from the colonial period, and the 
belief that the University's academic programs were unresponsive f. 
to ~he country's needs were the most important basis for 
Government-University alienation. 
One feature of English university life whose retention I 
favored was the inaugural lecture, expected of each new ap-
pointee to a professorship. Ideally this presentation introduced 
the new member to the university community, perhaps stimulated a 
contribution to the institution's intellectual life, and sug-
gested the direction in which his or her scholarship might move. 
The following lecture on legal development in Ghana was my in-
augural lecture delivered in the Lecture Theater of Commonwealth 
Hall on May 24, 1963. Donald Akenson, a Canadian historian, 
later described the lecture as the only serious mistake I made 
during my tenure in Ghana,~ a characterization I would question 
on two grounds: first, I think it unduly charitable; I'm sure I 
made far more mistakes than he discovered or pointed out. Sec-
ond, I'm doubtful that the lecture was a mistake, except in the 
9. Donald H. Akenson, CONOR: A BIOGRAPHY OF CONOR CRUISE 
O'BRIEN (Cornell University Press, 1994), pp.235-36. 
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raw political sense that it provided ammunition to those who 
wanted to attack the University, using me as their convenient 
target. If the lecture had not provided that ammunition, surely 
another source would have been found. 
As I looked over the audience at the lecture, I noted the 
presence of several people prominently associated with the stri-
dent extreme of the Convention Peoples' Party, some of them 
journalists whose diatribes were daily features of the political 
press. And surely, when the political attack on the University 
and on me several months later reached cruising speed, some of 
the views attributed to me on the basis of the lecture reap-
peared. For example, I was charged with making a public defense 
of the apartheid laws of South Africa! In any event, time has 
brought me no repentance for any views I expressed in the lec-
ture, though it has provided insights into the ways the politi-
cal game is played by some.] 
Mr. Chairman, My Lord Chief Justice, My Lords, Your Ex-
cellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen: 
Before turning to my subject, I beg your indulgence for a 
few very personal words. As I approach the end of my first year 
in the University of Ghana, I am encouraged by the significant 
development in legal education which has occurred. In this, many 
people have played important roles, but two groups merit special 
mention. The first of these is the General Legal Council of 
Ghana. The Council is a statutory body including all of the 
Justices of the Supreme Court, the Attorney-General, certain 
app9intees of the Minister of Justice and the Chief Justice, 
and representatives elected by the Ghana Bar Association. In my 
capacity as Dean of the Faculty of Law I have the honour of 
serving with this able and dedicated group which has been 
charged by Parliament with a wide range of responsibility for 
legal education, admission to the Bar of Ghana, and the good 
government of the legal profession. An important ingredient in 
the success of any law faculty is the confidence and support 
it receives from the leaders of the Bench and Bar. The General 
Legal Council, representing every segment of the profession in 
Ghana, has been generous and unfailing in support of the Law 
Faculty of the University. I would, therefore, with respect, 
pay full tribute to all members of the Council, and especially 
to its distinguished Chairman, Sir Arku Korsah, Chief Justice 
of Ghana. 
The members of the Faculty of Law, as well, deserve full 
recognition for the vital part each member has played in our 
work. In this period, when the tasks to be performed have so 
completely challenged the human and physical resources at our 
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disposal, they have laboured well for the present and built 
solidly for the future. The capacities and scholarly integrity 
of these men have placed this Faculty in the forefront of 
legal education in Africa: Justice Nii Amaa Ollennu, Robert 
Seidman, Samuel Asante, Kwame Afreh, William Ekow-Daniels, 
Thomas Rose, Joseph Agyemang and Kwasi Gyeke-Dako. A time-
honoured tradition provides me the opportunity to address you 
on this occasion. The honour you accord by your presence here 
this evening, however, is equally due to each of these men whom 
I am privileged to have as both colleague and friend. 
THE CONCEPT OF LAW 
I shall speak to you this evening about certain aspects 
of the law of Ghana. If we are to avoid confusion in discussing 
law, it is essential at the inception that we specify our mean-
ing of this central concept. The nature of law has been a peren-
nial problem of jurisprudence, and a preoccupation with it has 
doubtless contributed much to the tedium of the subject. Thurman 
Arnold once observed that "most of the literature of jurispru-
prudence ••• is tedious, not as hard subjects like physics and 
mathematics are tedious, but as throwing feathers, endlessly, 
hour after hour, is tedious." Without being, I hope, more 
than necessarily tedious, I shall indicate briefly what I mean 
when I speak of law. 
For many of its votaries, law involves some essential order 
of values. These values may make positive demands for implemen--
ta~ion by the manipulation of public force or may play only a 
negative role, setting the outer boundaries beyond which the 
public force may not go. In this view, any enactment not serving 
the postulated values would not be law. To others, law, as such, 
is value-neutral, being merely a technique of social ordering 
available for use in support of any value judgment that the 
manipulators of the technique entertain. In this view, the tech-
nique finds its essential identification in an ultimate reliance 
on the organised force of a society. I am of this latter mind. 
Like most men, I could, if called upon, suggest those values 
which represent my preferences or my strongly-held convictions 
of what a decent life requires. At the same time I must recog-
nise that many men do not share my preferences, and a number 
of legal orders do not protect my fundamental decencies. 
Nevertheless, I recognise the apartheid enactments of South 
Africa, which I abhor, as law in as full a sense as the prohibi-
tions of racial discrimination in American legislation, which I 
strongly support 
It is unnecessary here to off er further explanation or 
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defence of this completely instrumental conception of law. Even 
those who reject it or in some way limit it will nevertheless 
recognise, I believe, that its use can open wide ranges of 
fruitful social inquiry. In any society those who manipulate 
the technique, which I call law, reflect their value judgments 
as they select the purposes or ends in aid of which tbe techni-
que will be used. As a mere hypothesis at this sta9e,~I 
would off er the suggestion that the values selected for imple-
mentation through the systematic application of public force 
rank high in the hierarchy of goods perceived by those able to 
commit the force. Thus, if the data in the legal storehouse are 
carefully studied and analysed, one should be able to outline 
the organising values of a society and to sense at least the 
tension points at which the muscular pull of change challenges 
the bony commitments to the past. 
It is within this conceptual framework that I propose to 
examine briefly certain developments in the law of Ghana since 
independence. First, these developments will be described and 
analysed in their purely positivistic dimensions. It will then 
be possible to consider their value implications. 
LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS SINCE INDEPENDENCE 
Constitutional changes 
The transfer of sovereignty from the United Kingdom to an 
independent Ghana on March 6, 1957, brought changes of profound 
significance in the legal order. Most obvious of these, of 
course, was the transfer of full power over and responsibility 
for the management of the public force to African hands. Less 
obvious but equally significant were the developments, some 
brought into operation on independence and some occurring there-
after, by which legal power was structured and allocated among 
the various organs within the new state. 
Through most of history the people who lived in the area of 
modern Ghana were little influenced toward unity by either their 
indigenous leaders or the Europeans. Even when the European 
presence on the Guinea Coast was no longer dispersed in national 
economic rivalries, British administration of the Gold Coast 
dealt with the Colony, Ashanti and the Northern Territories as 
discrete units. Until 1946, when the Burns Constitution included 
five Ashanti members in the Legislative Council sitting in Ac-
cra, the law-making function for Ashanti was totally in the 
British Governor and imperial agencies. Representation from 
the Northern Territories in the central legislative body did 
not come until the Coussey Constitution of 1950. Thus, until 
virtually the eve of independence the colonial power def erred 
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basic steps which might have fostered in the British dependen-
cies of the Gold coast some greater perception of interrelation. 
British colonial policy, as formally announced, attempted 
to nurture and support the institutions of indigenous govern 
ment. In southern and central Ghana, these found their charac-
teristic expressions in the small Akan state, the independent 
town or village of the Ga-Adangbe people, and the Ewe division. 
While various combinations of these units were formed from time 
to time, largely for military purposes, no stable grouping ever 
emerged except in Ashanti. There, under the leadership of the 
Paramount Chief of Kumasi, as Asantehene, a powerful military 
confederation was formed, but civil government remained almost 
exclusively a function of the constituent states. Nevertheless 
the sense of a larger regional identification which developed 
early in Ashanti played an important role in the processes by 
which public power in independent Ghana was later to be struc-
tured. 
As has been noted, constitutional changes in 1946 and 1950 
forged some links between the Colony, Ashanti and the Northern 
Territories, but the rapid drive toward independence brought 
into sharp focus the basic lack of a common identification 
within the new country. 
The Reports of the Watson Commission in 1948 and of the 
Coussey Committee in 1949 considered not only reforms in 
the constitutional structure of the central government but also 
the allocation of powers and functions among regional and local 
units. Both of these Reports recommended a substantial decen-
tralisation, but the underlying theory throughout was that 
regional administrations were to be merely agents of the central 
government exercising such powers and functions as might be 
defined by legislation. With the organisation of the National 
Liberation Movement in September, 1954, however, the nature of 
the debate over the structuring of the Independence Constitution 
and the status of regional organs underwent a significant 
change. The issue was no longer the rational allocation of 
functions between a supreme central government and its regional 
agents; the issue raised was the very nature and power of the 
central government itself. 
The constitutional platform of the N.L.M. was federalism, 
a division of powers and functions between the central govern-
ment and regional agencies, each of which would have its consti-
tutionally defined areas of competence. It is noteworthy that 
the N.L.M. had its greatest support in Ashanti, where the Con-
federation had fostered a strong regional loyalty. The Conven-
tion Peoples Party, on the other hand, did not oppose some dis-
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persion of governmental functions among regional organs, but 
its central conviction on the constitutional allocation of power 
was unwavering: the central government must be supreme. 
It is unnecessary now to review in detail the work of Sir 
Frederick Bourne, who, as Constitutional Adviser, rejected 
federalism, the parliamentary elections demanded by the British 
Government to determine the extent of popular support for C.P.P. 
views, or the last-minute negotiations of Mr. Lennox-Boyd, the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies, seeking a reconciliation 
of the competing views. The Independence Constitution itself 
was a compromise, though in the main the views of the Convention 
Peoples Party prevailed. 
The Constitution required that Parliament should establish 
in each of the five regions of Ghana a regional assembly to ex-
ercise effective powers in the fields of local government, agri-
culture, animal health, forestry, education, communications, 
medical and health services, public works, town and country 
planning, housing, police and such others as Parliament might 
determine. Within each of these fields, however, the Constitu-
tion made quite clear the supremacy of the central government, 
as well as the fact that any specific power or function in the 
several fields could devolve on the regional assemblies only by 
Act of Parliament. 
The only constitutionally assured function of the regional 
assemblies was to review certain kinds of proposed legislation 
with the possibility of exercising a qualified veto. In certain 
areas Parliament could legislate only by a procedure which in-
cluded approval by two-thirds of the regional assemblies, in-
cluding any assembly directly affected. These specially pro-
tected areas included the modification of those provisions of 
the Constitution which defined the basic governmental structure 
and the public service, guaranteed regional organisations and 
chieftaincy, and assured compensation on the compulsory acquisi-
tion of property. The same procedure was required for any bill 
abolishing or suspending any regional assembly or diminishing 
its powers or functions. Other provisions of the Constitution 
were designed to protect the territorial integrity of the 
regions from action by the central government. 
Thus, it can be said that the constitutional order with 
which Ghana achieved independence reflected a variety of local 
loyalties and considerable suspicion of unified national author-
ity. No initiative for legal or governmental developments was 
given to sub-national bodies, however: their constitutional 
function was entirely negative -- to check, delay or prevent 
certain kinds of action by the central government. 
-67-
At the time of independence, no regional assemblies ex-
isted. These were later established by the Regional Assemblies 
Act of 1958, their functions being limited to advising and 
making recommendations to Ministers of the central government. 
The constitutive Act does not make it entirely clear whether a 
regional assembly might take the initiative in giving advice 
and making recommendations or whether even this function was to 
be performed only on ministerial request. Nor did the assemblies 
themselves survive long enough to permit experience to define 
more fully their role in national life. 
There is little reason at this time to speculate on the 
course of development that might have occurred if the opposition 
political groups had not decided to boycott the first regional 
assembly elections in 1958. That decision was in fact taken, 
and only candidates for the Convention People's Party stood for 
election. Thereafter, with C.P.P. forces fully in control of 
both the central government and the regional assemblies, and }. 
against the background of recurrent political boycotts by oppo-
sition groups, it is hardly surprising that steps were taken 
immediately to consolidate governmental power at the centre. 
In December, 1958, Parliament passed an Act to repeal the con- j 
stitutional restrictions which had required the assent of 
regional bodies for amendment of the Constitution and certain 
other purposes. In accordance with the constitutional require- J 
ment being repealed, this Act was approved by the regional 
assemblies. The clear legislative supremacy of Parliament, 
thus established, was almost immediately exercised in the 
repeal of the Regional Assemblies Act and the dissolution of 
the existing assemblies. 
The legal framework of national unity thus seemed complete. 
Nevertheless, the Government in submitting to the people in 1960 
a White Paper on a Republican Constitution asked for a further 
mandate to maintain the unity of Ghana. This was given, and the 
present Constitution declares that Ghana is a "sovereign unitary 
Republic." Only by a popular referendum can the unitary and re-
publican form of government be altered. 
Less dramatic than the constitutional structuring of uni-
fied national power, but in many ways as important, have been 
the statutory enactments by which local government has been 
reorganised and related to the centre. It is possible here only 
to summarise these developments. A much fuller analysis of the 
evolving formal structure is needed, supported by thorough em-
pirical studies of these institutions of government which stand 
closest to the ordinary citizen in his daily life. 
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on the eve of responsible African government in the Gold 
Coast, local government powers and functions were vested in Na-
tive Authorities created by order of the Governor. While the 
legislation authorising establishment of the Authorities made it 
entirely clear that designation depended on the fiat of the 
central government and not on chiefly status as such, the 
Colonial Government in general followed the practice of desig-
nating as the Native Authority for an area a chief and his coun-
cil. Since the same persons also functioned as the State Coun-
cils in the various states of the traditional order, it was 
often difficult to determine the capacity in which they acted 
in taking a particular step. The Native Authorities system did 
not work well, and even the Coussey Committee, on which the tra-
ditional authorities had strong representation, conceded in 1949 
that "the existing system of local government has proved unable 
to meet the requirements of an efficient and democratic adminis-
tration." The correctives applied by the central government 
since 1951 have related directly to the structure of local 
government; they have also affected profoundly the status and 
functions of the traditional authorities themselves. 
Local government 
Almost the first major piece of legislation enacted under 
Dr. Nkrumah's Government was the Local Government Ordinance 
of 1951. It authorised the creation and grant of local govern-
ment functions to Local, Urban and District Councils on which 
popularly elected members would ordinarily constitute a two-
thirds majority. The remaining one-third were to be appointees 
of the traditional authorities. The performance of the new coun-
cils was disappointing, in large part because many were estab-
lished on the geographical base of small, traditional states 
which possessed neither the population nor the resources to 
permit them to organise local services effectively. In 1959, the 
Government introduced corrective legislation; the old District 
Councils were abolished, and on ministerial orders many of the 
small Local Councils were consolidated into larger units. At 
the same time, the members of all councils who had been ap-
pointed by the traditional authorities were eliminated, and all 
local government bodies became entirely elective. The present 
scheme of local government, organised under the post-Republic 
Local Government Act of 1961, involves about sixty-five urban 
and local bodies which are supervised and related to the central 
government by administrative personnel responsible in each 
region to a Regional Commissioner, a political functionary with 
the rank of Minister to whom certain local government functions 
are delegated by the Minister of Local Government. In this 
scheme, the traditional, sacred and local repositories of au-
thority and responsibility have been definitively replaced by 
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elective, secular organs related to the national centre under 
articulated criteria of rationality and efficiency. 
INTERACTION OF ENGLISH LAW WITH CUSTOMARY LAW 
The pre-republican system 
Turning now from the formal structures of public power, 
within and through which legal force is directed and applied, we 
will consider the evolving content of the legal norms them-
selves. In the first instance it is desirable to consider this 
matter at the general level. Specific enactments may be con-
sidered later. 
A cardinal feature of the legal order inherited by Ghana 
from the United Kingdom was a pervasive dualism, that is, a body J 
of law derived from the colonial power and applied in a discrete 
system of courts co-existed with a body or bodies of indigenous 
or customary law applied mainly in a system of so-called Native \ 
Courts. In order to avoid chaos some scheme was necessary to I 
delimit the sphere of operation of each body of law and each 
system of courts and, insofar as these spheres coincided or con- I 
flicted, to determine which should prevail. 
The general standards defining the relations between 
English-derived law and customary law in the pre-independence I 
Gold Coast were posited by the imperial power in the Courts Or-
dinance of 1935. These standards employed two different techni-
ques for relating the different categories of legal norms. The 
first, which can be called the technique of horizontal ordering, 
involved the assignment of discrete areas of application to each 
set of norms in the system. The second, which we will refer to 
as vertical or hierarchical ordering, related the bodies of law 
and applying courts as superiors and inferiors. While both these 
techniques were used in the pre-independence Gold Coast, there 
was an ultimate resort to hierarchical ordering, that is, the 
imperial power defined the hierarchy itself and assigned to each 
set of norms its areas of application. 
The elements of English-derived law applicable in the Gold I 
Coast, briefly listed in the order in which they would prevail 
in any case of conflict among them, were imperial laws expressly J 
applicable in the Gold Coast or brought into effect there by or- . 
der in Council, ordinances enacted by the local legislative 
body, statutes of general application which had been in force in 
England on July 24, 1874, doctrines of equity and finally rules 
of the common law. Clearly reflected in this hierarchy are the 
idea of legislative supremacy and the moderating influence of 
English equity. It should be observed also that an historical 
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test determined the reception of English statutes of general ap-
plication. The use of such a test created a number of trouble-
some "mechanical" problems for the Gold Coast lawyer attempting 
to find the local law and also tended to preserve in the Gold 
Coast legal norms which had been changed or abolished by reform 
legislation in England. 
This body of English-derived law coexisted with a number of 
bodies of customary law in force in various parts of the Gold 
Coast. The relations between the two systems were defined by a 
horizontal order whose criteria were primarily ethnic. In causes 
to which the parties were "natives," the primary law presump-
tively applicable was customary law. A "native" could lose the 
benefit of customary law, however, if it appeared either from an 
express contract or by implication from the nature of the trans-
action out of which the question arose that he had agreed to 
have his obligations regulated exclusively by English law. on 
the other hand, if the parties to the cause included both "na-
tives" and "non-natives," English law was presumed to control. 
This presumption was rebuttable, however, and the courts were 
authorised to apply customary law if they determined that "sub-
stantial injustice would be done to either party by a strict ad-
herence to the rules of English law." 
Even within the areas thus assigned to it, customary law 
was not supreme, but was hierarchically related to certain 
limiting principles. Customary law could be applied in any court 
only insofar as it was not "repugnant to natural justice, equity 
and good conscience" or "incompatible either directly or by 
necessary implication with any ordinance." These limiting 
criteria were interpreted and applied by the courts, in the 
main by the superior courts staffed principally by English 
personnel, though it was, of course, possible for a Native 
Court to exclude customary law on such grounds. 
The formidable range of problems arising in the administra-
tion of this pluralistic legal order can only be suggested here. 
Some problems arose out of the interpretation of the provisions 
of the Courts Ordinance itself. Did the cut-off date in 1874, 
which clearly limited the reception of English statutes of gen-
eral application, apply to English common law and equity as 
well? What is a statute of general application? May parts of 
a statute be of general application and thus received, though 
other parts clearly are not? In what circumstances would an 
agreement between "natives" that customary law should not 
govern be implied? In what circumstances would the court's 
perception of injustice foreclose the application of English 
law where not all parties to the case were "natives"? Many 
questions such as these were not fully and satisfactorily ans-
wered before the Courts Ordinance itself was finally repealed. 
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Some of the most difficult problems arose in ascertaining 
the customary law when the general hierarchy of norms indicated 
its applicability. This was, of course, less a problem in the 
Native Courts, where the members were presumed to know the 
custom and could apply it on the basis of their own knowledge, 
than in the superior courts whose judges were actually forbidden 
to rely on such knowledge of customary law as their prior ex-
perience might provide. In the superior courts, therefore, a 
party relying on customary law was required to plead and prove 
it. While the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council had recog-
nised the possibility of the courts' taking judicial notice of 
certain customs which had become notorious through frequent 
proof, this means of avoiding the inconvenience and difficulty 
of extended proof was not in fact utilised by the courts. Proof 
of the customary law continued to be offered in the form of 
authoritative books or manuscripts, such as the work of John 
Mensah Sarbah on Fanti law, or by the testimony of chiefs, 
linguists, or others who could be qualified as experts. 
The proof of customary law in each case by the introduction 
of evidence may certainly be criticised on the grounds of in-
convenience and expense. The method also touched the sensitive 
nerve of emergent national pride, since to require proof by 
witnesses suggested that customary law was not real law but 
merely an operative fact. Yet there were advantages in the 
method. The strongest claim to respect which customary law can 
make is that it reflects the consensus of the community as 
manifested in actual usage. In the constant flux of society 
such usage will change. Proof of the customary law on a case 
by case basis, therefore, should provide the maximum assurance 
that the law applied will keep in step with the changing life of 
the people. There is surely less certainty that this will occur 
if customary law is established by judicial notice of what has 
been proved in earlier cases, or by the binding declarations of 
traditional councils, another method authorised by Gold Coast 
legislation. 
The grant of independence to Ghana in 1957 did not alter 
in detail the order of legal norms just described. To be sure, 
the supreme position in the hierarchy was occupied after March 
6, 1957, by the constitutional Order in Council, rather than 
imperial legislation of the British Parliament. Otherwise, the 
pre-independence body of law was left intact. 
Re-organisation since the Republican Constitution 
(1) New doctrine of stare decisis. The most important revi-
sions in the hierarchy of legal norms of Ghana became effective 
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on the creation of the Republic on July 1, 1960. These deserve 
careful analysis in detail, but here we can do no more than sug-
gest changes which may prove to be especially significant. 
First, the Republican Constitution contains a novel set of 
provisions dealing with the cardinal feature of a common law 
system, that is, the doctrine of precedent or stare decisis. 
The doctrine itself is not, of course, a new arrival in Ghana. 
During the colonial period the courts in the Gold Coast were 
bound by the decisions of the West African Court of Appeal and 
of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. On the other 
hand, decisions of the English Court of Appeal and the House of 
Lords were in theory not binding but in practice were treated 
as if they were. On the advent of the Republic, the possibility 
of appeal to the Privy Council was eliminated and the Supreme 
Court of Ghana became the tribunal of final resort. Thus the 
question was posed-- what effect in republican Ghana would be 
attributed to pre-republican decisions of the Supreme Court and 
of various English tribunals. 
Article 42 of the Republican Constitution speaks to this 
question with superficial clarity: 
The Supreme Court shall in principle be bound 
to follow its own previous decisions on questions 
of law, and the High Court shall be bound to follow 
previous decisions of the Supreme Court on such 
questions, but neither court shall be otherwise 
bound to follow the previous decisions of any court 
on questions of law. 
This article appears to be an unequivocal declaration of inde-
pendence for the superior courts insofar as the decisions of 
non-Ghanaian courts are concerned. The stability of legal in-
stitutions and the relative conservatism of judicial attitudes, 
however, make it inevitable that English decisions will enjoy 
for a long time a high degree of persuasiveness in Ghana. One 
may hope, nevertheless, that the Supreme Court and High Court 
will not be reluctant to re-examine long-established English 
precedents to determine their responsiveness to the developing 
needs of this country. 
When one turns from the status of foreign decisions to the 
functioning of the doctrine of stare decisis within the present 
judicial hierarchy of Ghana, much of the certainty in article 42 
disappears. If only the decisions of the Supreme Court are in 
the future to be binding, what is the "Supreme court" for this 
purpose? Is the court as constituted under the Republican Con-
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stitution to be deemed to be a new court, so that only decisions 
under the Republic are fully authoritative? or is a theory of 
antecedent and continuing existence to be applied? If the court 
is deemed to have had a pre-Republic existence, how far back in 
time will its earlier life be traced -- back to independence in 
1957 or some earlier date? These questions remain unanswered. 
Even with respect to decisions of the Republican Supreme 
Court, the stringency of the commitment to stare decisis is un-
clear. In Great Britain the view now prevails that the House of 
Lords is absolutely bound by its own prior decisions. If the 
ravages of time render their principles dysfunctional to social 
needs or the demands of justice, the Lords are incapable of ap-
plying correctives other than through the technical creation of 
distinctions. Any outright overruling of established doctrine 
requires an Act of Parliament. Does the Republican Constitution 
of Ghana commit the Supreme Court to such futility in the face 
of its earlier decisions which may call for modification? 
Arguably an affirmative answer is required, since article 42 
declares that the "Supreme Court shall in principle be bound to 
follow its own previous decisions on questions of law." In this 
provision, however, the key words seem to be "in principle." If 
they mean only that nothing in a case shall bind except its 
"principle," the words are patently redundant. Not even the most 
devoted adherent to stare decisis has ever suggested that any 
aspect of a case is binding other than its "principle" or ratio 
decidendi. If one assumes, therefore, that the constitutional 
fathers did not intend a redundancy, what purpose do the words 
"in principle" serve? I would suggest that they might be taken 
to mean "in general" or "ordinarily." If so interpreted, the 
stringent English doctrine of precedent would not prevail in 
Ghana by constitutional mandate. 
These questions do not represent a mere academic exercise. 
They go to the heart of the role of the judiciary in keeping 
the tension between stable legal institutions and social needs 
and values within tolerable limits. It seems to me at least 
doubtful that legislative bodies in most countries today have 
either the time or the interest for making those periodic ad-
justments in established doctrine that social change may demand. 
Within rather broad limits, I think the courts are the agencies 
best equipped to perform this function. I would, therefore, hope 
that the Supreme Court of Ghana in interpreting the Constitution 
and defining its own role in the processes of legal change will 
shun English judicial passivity and claim for itself a more af-
firmative, creative function. 
(2) The place of customary law. The second significant 
change in the structure of legal norms effected on the creation 
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of the Republic has to do with the status of customary law. It 
will be recalled that in the older order there was an initial 
presumption that customary law was applicable in any case be-
tween "natives," and, in cases between "natives" and "non-
natives," it applied if the court concluded that injustice would 
result to either party through the strict application of English 
law. The Courts Act of 1960 makes an understandable effort to 
avoid such an ethnic criterion for determining the applicable 
legal rules. The details of this effort need not concern us 
here. It suffices to observe that the old starting presumption 
of the applicability of customary law has been replaced by a 
presumption that common law prevails. This presumption is, of 
course, rebuttable, but any person who wants his cause control-
led by customary law must act affirmatively to establish to the 
satisfaction of the court that there is a relevant rule under 
some body of custom that the person can claim as his "personal 
law." 
The term "common law" has a much broader inclusion under 
the Republican legislation than the older English usage would 
suggest. It includes the traditional common law rules, the doc-
trines of equity, the English statutes of general application 
which had been in force in Ghana immediately before the Repub-
lic," and any rules of customary law which may be assimilated 
because of their suitability for general application. Thus, 
the common law which now enjoys an initial presumption of ap-
plicability need not be entirely the English law which has been 
received but may include, as well, certain rules of customary 
origin. 
The procedures by which customary law rules may be assimi-
lated into the common law of Ghana are provided by the Chief-
taincy Act of 1961. They have not yet in fact been used, and no 
customary rule has yet been assimilated. It would now be haz-
ardous indeed to attempt to predict the future of this assimila-
tion technique. Even should it be employed frequently, the 
resulting common law rule of customary origin would differ basi-
cally from the traditional customary law. Common law is na-
tional, while customary law is essentially local. Common law is 
built around the stabilising frame of stare decisis, while 
customary law reflects more directly the evolving life of the 
community. Thus, to bring into the common law the customs of 
some particular community does not merely alter the term by 
which they are described. Their scope of application and their 
future treatment in the legal order are also basically changed. 
PROGRAMME OF LAW REFORM 
The third significant development in the legal order of 
Ghana can only be suggested here. Adequate discussion of it 
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would require several substantial volumes. This is the major 
programme of legislative reform which was begun in 1960. Mention 
has already been made of the fact that much of the applicable 
legislation in Ghana had been received from the United Kingdom 
as of July 24, 1874. Once received, this legislation was un-
affected by later reforms in Britain which altered or repealed 
it domestically. Equally important was the fact that some major 
legislative innovations in Britain were never made applicable to 
the Gold Coast or Ghana. 
Since the creation of the Republic, a sweeping attack has 
been made on these legislative inadequacies. Much of the old 
received legislation has been repealed, thus clearing the ground 
for new building. Measures which have stood the test of time and 
still seem appropriate in Ghana's circumstances have been put 
into modern language and re-enacted by Parliament. Some partial 
codifications have been attempted, as in the Contracts Act of 
1960. In some instances legislative efforts have been preceded 
by major studies which examined the relevant problems in depth 
and proposed solutions. Such a study by Professor L.C.B. Gower, 
then of the London School of Economics, has produced a Companies 
Code Bill. Another by a commission under the chairmanship of 
Mr. Albert Adomakoh led to draft proposals for an Insolvency 
Bill and another on Companies Liquidation. A new Criminal Code 
and Code of Criminal Procedure have been enacted. Many more ex-
amples could be cited. 
Relatively little of the reform legislation has been radi-
cal in its innovation. It seems quite clear that English and 
Ir~sh models have been preferred, though on occasion American 
experience has been examined and solutions found workable there 
adopted. In general, the approach has been pragmatic and eclec-
tic. The quality of draftsmanship, particularly in the earlier 
Acts, has been high, though it must be said that the Marriage, 
Divorce and Inheritance Bill which the Government has promul-
gated for public criticism appears to represent the nadir of the I 
draftsman's art. In fact, however, one is inclined to suspect t 
that the inadequacies of this Bill arise from uncertainty and 
hesitation at the policy level which not even the most skilled 
draftsman could overcome. 
Time presses further discussion of legal developments them-
selves. The remainder of my remarks will be directed toward an 
axiological examination of the major changes in the legal order 
of Ghana since independence. Against the limited background 
available, conclusions must, of course, be highly tentative. 
Nevertheless, an examination of legal institutions with a view 
to their guiding value assumptions can be most revealing of 
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certain powerful forces that, with others, trace the vector of 
social change. 
No legal order with which I have any familiarity reflects 
a single, totally consistent scheme of values. Rather, the law 
usually reflects a number of antinomies, most of them recurrent 
in the various systems. For example, the law of the United 
states, which is frequently pictured as the last bastion of 
capitalistic individualism, reveals to even the most casual ob-
server an extensive pattern of regulation in the public inter-
est, that is, legal norms oriented mainly to the values of the 
community. In the soviet Union on the other hand, the New 
Economic Policy of the 1920s did not exhaust the need to recog-
nise more fully in the law and other official action the value 
of the individual, his personality and creativity. By and large, 
therefore, the axiological analyst sketches a value profile of a 
particular society by locating the critical fulcrum points where 
the weight of a certain value acceptance counterbalances its 
antinomic competitor. 
The value of nationhood 
In the evolution of the law of Ghana over the past decade, 
the value of nationhood has been dominant.I use the term "na-
tionhood" rather than "nationalism" in order to emphasise that 
the effort through legal, political and social means has been 
to create the perception of a new value and to organise its 
expression internally rather than to implement externally a set 
of developed and articulated national aims. The legacy of the 
col9nial era to Ghana was a collection of separate territorial 
units having some important ethnic, economic and cultural dif-
ferences and with little perception of the bonds which might 
draw them together. Since the advent of responsible African 
government, legal devices and techniques have been consistently 
used to neutralise sub-national power centres, particularly the 
traditional authorities, and to organise all legitimate power 
on a national basis. This is seen clearly in the successful 
struggle for a unitary and not a federal government, in the con-
centration in Parliament of plenary sovereignty, except where 
express]y limited by a reservation of power to the entire 
people. It is seen also in the revisions of the legal structure 
of local government, and in an important course of legislation 
we have not had time to discuss whereby the chiefs have been 
deprived of independent economic power. It is manifested as well 
in the constant pressure on customary law, with all its local 
variations, in favour of a uniform body of national common and 
statute law. 
While nationhood has thus far been the dominant value, the 
voice of a competitor has also been heard in the land. This is 
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the continental thunder of Africa or, at least, of a larger 
unity which can erase some of the grosser irrationalities of the 
national boundaries bequeathed by colonialism. In the main that 
thunder has been remote, but it has been constant. Its sharpest 
peal thus far sounds in the Republican Constitution which 
authorises Parliament to surrender the sovereignty of Ghana to 
a union of African states and territories. At the political 
level, though thus far not perceptibly at the legal, it appears 
also in efforts to forge a meaningful union of Ghana, Guinea and 
Mali. 
One of the most persistent value competitions in legal 
theory and in the practical orientation of a legal order is that 
between the individual and the community. In the traditional or-
ders of the Gold Coast, like most of Africa, the community rep-
resented the dominant value. The basic unit of social, political 
and legal life was the family, and legal institutions gave it a 
high degree of protection. While the evolving legal order of 
Ghana is certainly not directed by rampant individualism, it 
seems quite clear that a shift in favour of individual values 
has occurred. Political power is structured on a one man-one 
vote basis. At both the local and national levels, the new 
structure vests governmental powers and functions in elective 
bodies, leaving the traditional authorities, grounded on 
collective-family units, only a ritual significance. One of the 
most direct manifestations of this indivualising process is the 
new Marriage, Divorce and Inheritance Bill, whose provisions on 
inheritance strike deep toward the legal roots which support the 
extended family. Others can be found in many of the major pieces 
of reform legislation which provide a more rational legal 
framework for an increasing range of individual economic ac-
tivity. 
It must be re-emphasised that the aggrandisement of in-
dividual values just suggested stands out mainly in relation to 
the traditional order which the colonial regime at least at-
tempted to nurture. While it seems clear to me that legal devel-
opments in Ghana since independence have moved the individual 
closer to the centre of the stage, he does not occupy it alone. 
Community values have surely prevailed in the project for public 
development of the Volta Basin and in the creation and operation 
of the harbour facilities at Tema, as well as in the legal de-
vices for national administration of stool lands and other 
resources. Nevertheless, the guiding values of most legal change 
in independent Ghana appear to be predominantly individualistic. 
The competition between individual and collective values is 
often paralleled by that between democracy and autocracy. As 
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Ghana's legal development has tended to stress individualism, 
the legal structuring of its basic governmental institutions has 
been guided by democratic values. Popularly elected governmental 
bodies at both local and national levels, the elimination of 
special representation from the traditional authorities and 
major economic interests, the constitutional affirmation of 
popular sovereignty and the entrenchment of certain constitu-
tional devices to permit their change only after a referendum of 
the people, all these reflect an option for democratic prin-
ciples. On the other hand, the attraction of autocratic direc-
tion may be seen in the declared preference for a one party 
system, in the move, which was firmly rejected by Dr. Nkrumah, 
to make him President for life, and in the provisions of the 
Republican Constitution, thus far unused, granting special 
legislative powers to the first President of Ghana. It may be 
fairly said that thus far the democratic values have predomi-
nated in the formal structuring of legal and governmental in-
stitutions, while the autocratic values have tended to determine 
the realities of political life in Ghana. In this respect, of 
course, Ghana's experience is not unique. In most of the new 
countries, the leadership group which has directed the success-
ful drive toward independence has tended to claim a dominant 
or exclusive role in guiding the early years of post-indepen-
dence development. 
In Roscoe Pound's famous epigram that "law must be stable 
and yet it cannot stand still," is summed up one of the most 
persistent value competitions in all legal orders. I would be 
inclined to reject the notion that stability is a necessary 
characteristic of some objective concept or idea of law. At the 
same time, I would insist that the value of stability, of a 
fairly deep and firm channel to control the currents, whirl-
pools and eddies of social life, has been at all times and in 
all places perceived as a guiding value in law. The sharpness 
of the perception, the firmness of the value acceptance has, of 
course, varied with time and place. The currents of social life 
always challenge to some extent the restraining channel. If the 
restraint is too great, there is flood which finds or cuts a new 
channel that better accommodates the pressures of the flow. One 
should not press this analogy to the point of assuming, however, 
that the process always runs from social pressure as cause to 
legal change as effect. The analogy might be corrected by ob-
serving that a skilled engineer can cut a new channel into which 
at the appropriate time the stream may be diverted. So, to some 
extent at least, can the legislator, the judge, the administra-
tor, affect the flow of social life by innovations in the legal 
order. I say to some extent because we still know far too little 
about the extent of effectiveness of law as an instrument of 
planned social change. I do not assume the infinite plasticity 
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of social life; hence, I do not assume that it can be shaped 
and directed fully at the will of the manipulator of the legal 
technique. 
At the moment, with respect to developments in Ghana since 
independence, we do not need to determine where the principal 
well-springs of legal change may lie -- in the broad social 
group or in a narrower elite. our question is merely this --
which value, stability or change, has dominated the legal order. 
The answer seems clear indeed. Changes in the formal structure 
of legal power, in the extent and variety of official functions, 
in the relations between constituent elements in the pluralistic 
legal order, and in the various substantive aspects of public 
and private law have been great. Some of the more significant 
have been summarised earlier. On occasion, changes have been 
made too precipitately; errors have occurred which greater 
deliberation would have avoided, and correctives have been 
called for. 
Again, however, a word of caution is needed. The force of 
"the wind of change" in Ghana, to use Mr. Macmillan's felicitous 
phrase, has been strong indeed, but it has not been cyclonic. 
The changes have been ordered within a continuing legal tradi-
tion. Only in fixing the ultimate locus of legal power has the 
break with the past been complete. The constituent elements of 
the old legal order have been preserved, though the relations 
among them have been altered. Models to be considered in draft-
ing new statutes have been sought first of all in familiar 
systems of law. The basic techniques of ]egislation, of inter-
pretation and of common law trial and decision have been pre-
served. Nor has reliance on familiar customary patterns been 
foreclosed despite the attractions of a uniform national law. 
I have attempted to articulate some of the guiding value 
judgments in Ghana's legal development in the familiar terms of 
the legal theorist. Other terms having their own significance 
have been used by political leaders. We have heard much of the 
development and expression of the African personality, in law 
as well as other spheres. If such expressions have tended to 
suggest the postulation of an inflexible governing concept, of 
an overriding doctrine, they are refuted by the actualities of 
Ghana's legal development over the past decade. That development 
has been peculiarly non-doctrinaire. At the formal opening of 
the Ghana Law School in January, 1962, Dr. Nkrumah declared 
that "the law should be the legal expression of the political, 
economic and social conditions of the people and of their aims 
for progress." Such a relativistic and pragmatic approach has 
in my judgment led to the implementation of the value accep-
tances described in the evolution of the law of Ghana since in-
dependence. 
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COMMENT: GHANA, THE CORTAIH FALLS 
Even the least perceptive observer of Ghanaian politics 
would have recognized by the fall of 1963 that a crisis was ap-
proaching. The political opposition had resorted to terrorist 
activities; already there had been at least two attempts on Dr. 
Nkrumah's life, in one of which he was wounded by the explosion 
of a grenade thrown toward him at a public appearance in the 
Northern Territories. The assertive domestic and Pan-African 
rhetoric of the Government had quieted, and the President was 
virtually a recluse in his official residence, Flagstaff House. 
Two former Ministers in the Nkrumah Government and three other 
persons associated with the Opposition had been brought to trial 
for treason before a Special Court. still, these developments 
appeared to have little direct or immediate impact on the 
University, and I, at least, was sufficiently absorbed in 
University and Law Faculty problems and developments that I ex-
pended little energy in contemplating or worrying about the 
general political landscape. All of that began to change rapidly 
in October, 1963. I will review here the general developments in 
late 1963, and in an Appendix will provide a more detailed ac-
count of their impact on me and my tenure in Ghana. 
The opening shot across the University's bow was fired in 
October, 1963, when the President came to the University to 
speak at the formal opening of the Institute of African Studies. 
Since his talk had been written in the University, largely by 
Thomas Hodgkin, Director of the Institute, we readily recognized 
a surprising addition--a pointed attack on the Law Faculty. I 
was not mentioned by name but was a target only by inference; 
the central thrust was that the Faculty should be "Ghanaian-
ized." Immediately after the President's speech, I provided an 
aide memoire summarizing developments in the Faculty for Conor 
who called on the President the day after his talk. When Conor 
suggested the possibility that the President had been misin-
formed, pointing out, for example, that the present majority of 
the Law Faculty were Ghanaians, Nkrumah responded with surprise, 
"Do you think Professor Harvey is moving too fast?" After fur-
ther discussion of what Conor presented as healthy development 
of the Law Faculty, the President urged that I should be 
retained as Dean to continue this development. Conor told 
Nkrumah that he had already raised this possibility with me, but 
that I felt that my obligations to my home University neces-
sitated returning to the United States at the end of the 
academic year when my initial appointment was to expire. 
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Any encouragement we found in the President's conversation 
with Coner was fleeting. It soon became obvious that, whatever 
the President's personal view might be, an influential wing of 
his Party and Government was determined to be rid of me and to 
expand influence over the education of lawyers and perhaps more 
generally over the University. Very soon Coner was told by the 
Minister of the Interior and representatives of the Special 
Branch of the C.I.D. that the University should dismiss me. Con-
er indicated that the University had no basis for such an action 
and would not take it. These demands were repeated from time to 
time. I informed Coner that as long as the University was 
satisfied with my performance and I believed it possible to con-
tinue my work without any compromise of standa.rds, I had no in-
tention of resigning. As Government demands for my dismissal 
became more insistent, Coner informed the Government representa-
tives that, if I were forced out, he would think it necessary to 
resign as well. I certainly thought, as I'm sure Coner did, that 
this threat would be a significant deterrent to the Government's 
effort. Coner had an international stature and visibility that 
would have made his ouster or forced resignation an acute embar-
rassment to the Government. 
In November, the Special Court for the Treason Trial 
returned its judgment. While it announced conviction of the two 
defendants long associated with the political opposition, it ac-
quitted the the former members of the Convention Peoples Party, 
including two former Ministers. The political press reacted with 
outrage. It immediately saw an insidious connection between the 
actions of judges who refused to convict enemies of the State 
and the kind of education of lawyers the University was provid-
ing. Chari85 in the press that I was an agent of the c.I.A. were 
repeated. On the legal front, the most significant development 
10. For some time such charges had been familiar. I regard4 i 
them as sufficiently ludicrous that they warranted no attention ( 
from me. Indeed, I'm not at all sure what I could have done to 
rebut them, but their being taken seriously was illustrated 
after I left Ghana when my brother, a senior agent in the 
F.B.I., said to me casually, "What were you doing for the Agency 
in Ghana?" When I assured him that I had no relationship with 
"the Agency," he responded, "Really, Burnett, you don't have to 
be coy with me: we're in sister agencies." 
I met my first known C.I.A. agent in about 1969 when he 
called on me, wanting to discuss a number of Ghanaian political 
figures who were expected to be prominent in the civilian 
Government to be formed after power was relinquished by the Army 
and Police. I told him that everything I had thought worth 
saying out of my experience in Ghana was published and in the 
public domain. I added that, insofar as my research depended on 
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was the beginning of the process for amending the Constitution 
to make the tenure of judges dependent on the pleasure of the 
President. 
Clearly a crisis was impending, but we in the University 
had no clear view of its shape or its resolution. In this state 
of affairs, Marilou, Kent and I left Ghana at the end of term in 
mid-December for a long-planned swing around Africa, primarily 
to visit other universities and law faculties. It was my hunch 
that, if the Government were truly determined to force me out, 
the most effective ploy would be simply to refuse to readmit me 
when we returned to Ghana in January. As a simple immigration 
matter, the action would have attracted a minimum of attention 
internationally, and, locally, possible critics of the ouster 
would have no opportunity to organize any opposing effort. There 
was little we could do to prepare for this possible ploy, but I 
did make arrangements to secure the custody and later removal 
from Ghana of the sole existing copy of an almost completed 
manuscript of a book on which I had been working. 
We returned to Ghana in late January and never had a more 
expeditious processing by the immigration authorities at the 
airport. Clearly the pressures had eased or I had demonstrated 
what a poor prophet I was. A few days after our return, I began 
to feel unwell but had gone to the University in the morning. In 
late morning Coner called, asking me to come to his office. He 
informed me that he had had another, much more insistent, demand 
from the C.I.D. for my dismissal. Both of us reaffirmed the 
positions we had defined earlier. When I went home for lunch, 
whatever my illness was claimed me and I took to my bed. Up to 
that time, I had not shared with my Faculty colleagues informa-
(footnote continued): 
interviews, I had routinely assured those who spoke with me that 
nothing they told me would be used in any form that would be 
personally attributable. I intended to honor that assurance ful-
ly, but, subject to it, I would be glad to talk with him. We had 
two extended meetings. 
Idle curiosity prompted me in the mid-seventies to invoke 
the Freedom of Information Act to ask the C.I.A. for a copy of 
its file on me. To my amazement, I discovered that a file had 
been opened in about 1955 when I was a very young member of the 
Michigan Law Faculty. There were, of course, a number of dele-
tions from the file, but nothing disclosed to me was particular-
ly negative. The most disquieting aspect was the appearance that 
many of the informants must have had their contact with me in 
the University of Michigan or in st. Andrew's Episcopal Church! 
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tion about the pressures on me and our program; I did not want 
to alarm them unduly or imperil morale, and I had continued to 
hope that conor and I could manage the crisis. I decided that 
this reticence must end; so I sent word asking the Faculty to 
meet at my home that evening. While the meeting was in progress 
in my bedroom, officers of the Special Branch arrived and handed 
me a Deportation Order allowing me twenty-four hours to leave 
the country. 
Coner arrived at my home about thirty minutes after the 
Faculty meeting ended. My main concern was to persuade him to 
abandon his threat of resignation, for I believed that he stood 
as the principal, perhaps the sole, possibly effective force in 
resisting the Government's attack on the University. I said 
bluntly that if he wanted to go out like a White Knight with 
strong international approval, he could resign and accompany me. 
On the other hand, if he valued the University, as I knew he 
did, he would stay and resist, even though it was inevitable 
that some critics would attack him for not taking a more 
dramatic opposition stance. Later, when he had come to New York 
as the Einstein Professor of the Humanities at N.Y.U., this 
prediction proved to be distressingly accurate • .lll 
11. 
In late 1966, following a debate between O'Brien and Irving 
Howe on some aspects of American foreign policy, Mrs. Stephanie 
Harrington wrote to the village VOICE (November 17, 1966) sug-
gesting that when Conor was asked to make some "public gesture" 
about the Nkrumah Governments's dealings with the University, he 
had limited himself to "private protestations," rather than 
resignation. In the November 24, issue of the VOICE Conor made 
his own defense quite effectively, but I thought I should add my 
own. My letter appeared in the December 15 issue of the VOICE: 
"When the Ghana security police delivered a deportation 
order to me, my first thought was that I must contact Dr. 
O'Brien and, if possible, persuade his not to carry through his 
announced intention to resign in protest if Government pressure 
on the University led to my exclusion. When I saw O'Brien an 
hour later, I told him that I thought a protest resignation was 
the safe course for him; it would protect him from the kind of 
charges Mrs. Harrington has made. At the same time, it would 
have been disastrous for the University which was then a prime 
target for extremists in Dr. Nkrumah's party. Many of us had 
fought hard for the integrity of the University, but O'Brien had 
an irreplaceable combination of assets for continuing the fight: 
1) a sensitive awareness of what in the nature of a university 
is non-negotiable, 2)a political stature that gave him some pro-
tection from dismissal and expulsion, and 3) guts. I have no 
doubt that Dr. O'Brien's's decision to stay in his post served 
the interests of the University of Ghana, while it imperiled his 
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In Appendix II, I have provided a more detailed account of 
the final phase of my work in Ghana and of Marilou's truly 
heroic accomplishments in arranging our affairs, getting Kent 
off alone to friends in New York and then on to Ann Arbor, and 
negotiating our departure for Britain. The doctors firmly vetoed 
any immediate travel for me, and through the efforts of Conor 
and Bill Mahoney, the American Ambassador, a brief extension was 
allowed. About a week later, we left for London where I entered 
the Hospital for Tropical Diseases at St. Pancreas. After a 
month in London, we returned to Ann Arbor. When I was able to 
resume some work, I prepared an extended report for the Interna-
tional Legal Center, the Ford Foundation and the Rockefeller 
Foundation on the project in Ghana and its conclusion. In iden-
tifying the causes of our difficulties in Ghana, I can do no 
better today than to cite the relevant portions of that report, 
as it appears in Appendix II. 
(footnote continued): 
"When the Ghana security police delivered a deportation 
order to me, my first thought was that I must contact Dr. 
O'Brien and, if possible, persuade his not to carry through his 
announced intention to resign in protest if Government pressure 
on the University led to my exclusion. When I saw O'Brien an 
hour later, I told him that I thought a protest resignation was 
the safe course for him; it would protect him from the kind of 
charges Mrs. Harrington has made. At the same time, it would 
have been disastrous for the University which was then a prime 
target for extremists in Dr. Nkrumah's party. Many of us had 
fought hard for the integrity of the University, but O'Brien had 
an irreplaceable combination of assets for continuing the fight: 
1) a sensitive awareness of what in the nature of a university 
is non-negotiable, 2)a political stature that gave him some pro-
tection from dismissal and expulsion, and 3) guts. I have no 
doubt that Dr. O'Brien's's decision to stay in his post served 
the interests of the University of Ghana, while it imperiled his 
reputation among the uninformed. 
In a crisis like that in Ghana in early 1964, men must 
act on their judgments of what is right and useful. Mrs. Har-
rington is entitled to her post hoc assessment. My judgment and 
that of senior Ghanaians in the University was that O'Brien's 
decision was the right one for the University we were trying to 
develop and sustain. That remains my view. Criticism like Mrs. 
Harrington's fits into a disturbing pattern one often sees in 
the statements of spokesmen for liberal causes: the prime objec-
tive seems to be verbal proof that they are on the side of the 
angels rather than effective contribution to freedom and human 
dignity." 
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is in the public interest?" Unquestionably my old and good 
friend, Conor Cruise O'Brien, was in attendance. Conor had an-
nounced his presence by using the repeated response of the Ghana 
Government in 1964 when he had tried to get a specification of 
the charges against me that underlay my deportation: the Govern-
ment's only response was that my continued presence in Ghana was 
not in the public interest. 
Conor told me that he had been invited to attend the dinner 
and participate as a commentator on my talk. He said he would be 
aided by some indication of what I intended to talk about. En-
joying my advantage, I assured him that I intended to talk about 
"automation." Conor had to suffer through the talk before 
making, as usual, insightful comments on Ghanaian developments. 
As I have reviewed the text of the talk on the judiciary in 
Ghana, I have become acutely concerned that I attempted too much 
in the brief time available, with the result that the essential 
points I wanted to make are obscured. Therefore, with the loss 
of some historical accuracy, I have edited the talk somewhat so 
as to make clearer the message I hoped to convey: that neither 
traditional institutions nor the colonial experience cultivated 
a prizing of judicial independence and that the political im-
peratives of post-independence Africa are equally unlikely to 
foster an inclination to develop truly independent courts, but 
that with understanding of the African experience and present 
aspirations, we should be patient witnesses to the important 
values that can be served by judges free to apply the law as 
they understand it, even though they may err from time to time.] 
I begin with a story that, at least in broad outline, is 
familiar, I suspect, to all of you. 
In November, 1963, a Special Ccourt sitting in Ghana, com-
prising the Chief Justice and two other members of the Supreme 
Court, concluded a Treason Trial which had been going on for 
about three months. The principal defendants were three promi-
nent former officials of the government and the Convention 
People's Party, two former Ministers and the former Party Secre-
tary~ the two lesser defendants were, or had been, associated 
with the opposition. All had been ably represented by counsel 
during the course of a long and rather tedious trial. 
On December 9, 1963, the court handed down its judgment: 
the two lesser defendants were convicted, but the three prin-
cipal defendants were acquitted. The reaction was almost immedi-
ate. On December 11th, only two days after announcement of the 
judgment, the President dismissed the Chief Justice from that 
office, and a few days later Mr. Justice Van Lare, another of 
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the Justices who had heard the case, resigned from the judicial 
service. The Chief Justice, after being dismissed from that 
particular office, remained a member of the Supreme Court, but 
shortly thereafter he too resigned. 
Following the enactment of legislation authorizing it, the 
acquittals of the three principal defendants and the convictions 
of the two lesser defendants were annulled. Subsequently they 
were tried by another court under a new procedure and sentenced 
to death. I believes, however, that these sentences have not 
been carried out up to this time. 
The concern of my remarks tonight is not specifically with 
the trial itself, the evidence adduced, or the guilt or in-
nocence of these particular accused. Rather, it is with the 
status and function of the judiciary in Ghana, in the revolu-
tionary climate that prevails there. Some light may be thrown on 
this by the general background and the immediate aftermath of 
the Treason Trial. 
Briefly, by way of capitulation of what I suspect is 
familiar to all of you, the cardinal feature of the legal order 
in the Gold Coast, or as it is now, Ghana, and in most parts of 
former British Africa was and is a dual system of courts: Native 
Courts, as they were once called, administering various systems 
of customary law to the great mass of the population, and a 
system of superior courts administering received law, and now, 
of course, an increasing amount of national legislation. 
During the early stages of British rule, the Native Courts 
had a somewhat ambiguous status. Until reforms that took place 
under Colonial Ordinances in the 19JO's and 1940's, the pre-
vailing theory was that the Colonial Government merely recog-
nized and acquiesced in the continuance of certain courts 
within the indigenous societies, and the members of those 
courts served by reason of their status in the traditional 
regimes. Under the reform legislation, however, the theory 
changed; Native Courts were created by official Act and brought 
within the framework of colonial government. Unquestionably the 
colonial government tried to effect certain improvements in the 
operation of these courts, but a number of features, and if you 
will, many inadequacies, remained. Moreover, additional ones 
were introduced. 
The first was that members of the courts were appointed 
by the Governor or Governor-in-Council without any stated 
criteria of qualification; they had, understandably, absolutely 
no protection of tenure, and were fully subject to administra-
tive discipline, suspension or even dismissal from their posts. 
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The second feature that I think worthy of notice is that 
proceedings in the Native Courts were subject to review and 
modification by administrative officers of the colonial govern-
ment, and finally, I think it remained true throughout their ex-
istence that the Native Courts were replete with corruption, 
dilatory procedures, political bias, and general incompetence. 
I am not reporting to you my own views. I am reporting the 
views of commissions that studied the operation of the courts, 
the last of them being a commission headed by Sir Arku Korsah, 
who later became Chief Justice. His commission reported in 1951 
a set of conclusions that showed the ineffectiveness of the 
colonial reforms. In 1958, legislation was passed substituting a 
regime of Local Courts for the Native Courts. These are under 
the supervision of the higher judiciary, but I think the 
evidence demonstrates that the operation of the Local Courts has 
remained quite unsatisfactory, and that to a very considerable 
extent they lack the respect or the confidence of the people. 
Now, alongside the Native Courts existed the superior 
courts. At the moment I am not concerned with their formal 
hierarchy. I would like, however, to point out some developments 
that are relevant to the status and function of judges as they 
were revealed, I think, at the time of the Treason Trial. 
During the colonial period itself, the Supreme Court judges were 
appointed by Royal Letters Patent, and served at the pleasure of 
the Monarch. All other judicial officers of the Gold Coast were 
appointed by the Governor and, as best I have been able to 
determine by careful examination of the law of the Gold Coast, 
there was no legally articulated protection of their tenure or 
of their independence during this period. 
As independence approached, however, the concern of the 
colonial power for judicial independence became considerably 
more pronounced, and in the Constitution of 1954, the so-called 
Nkrumah Constitution, a provision was included that judges of 
the Supreme Court could be removed from off ice only on resolu-
tion of the Assembly, passed by a two-thirds majority of all 
members, on stated grounds of misbehavior or infirmity of mind 
or body. In addition, there was a separate provision which pro-
tected them from diminution of salary during their terms of of-
f ice. 
It bears emphasis, however, that below the level of the 
Supreme Court, none of these protections was available. It also 
bears emphasis that in the lower order of the judiciary, the 
courts remained very closely identified with the administration, 
because of the fact that District Commissioners exercised judi-
cial powers as magistrates. 
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The grant of independence to Ghana in 1957 affected the 
judicial order very little. The dual court system remained, and 
protection of the tenure and independence of judges was not ex-
tended beyond the supreme Court level, where it had previously 
existed. 
There were some important changes in the general legal or-
der of Ghana in 1960, when the country became a Republic. The 
right of ultimate appeal from the Supreme Court of Ghana to the 
Privy Council was terminated. For the first time, all judicial 
power was inside Ghana. 
Under the Republican Constitution, all appointive power 
over Superior Court judges was vested in the President. The Con-
stitution did not state any qualifications for judicial office 
and did not require confirmation of the President's appointments 
by any other body. The judges of the Supreme Court and the High 
Court enjoyed constitutional protections of tenure and salary of 
much the same kind as I mentioned earlier. However, the Chief 
Justice specifically was removable from office by the President. 
The White Paper that had presented the Constitution to the 
people offered as the official explanation for this unfortunate 
provision that the Chief Justice, as the administrative head of 
the judicial system, ought to give loyal cooperation to the 
President. 
While the constitutional guarantees did not extend below 
the level of the Supreme Court and the High Court, the Judicial 
Service Act, which was enacted at the same time, did include 
some rather important guarantees of a fair hearing for judicial 
officers at the lower level in cases where they might be brought 
up for discipline. But even those protections did not extend to 
Local Court judges who remained fully subject in terms of ap-
pointment, discipline, dismissal, etc., to the actions of the 
relevant Minister. This, then, was the general position of the 
judiciary at the time of the judgment in the Treason Trial which 
I mentioned earlier. 
One other innovation in the court system does bear mention. 
In 1961, in a period of political tension following a political-
ly motivated strike, Parliament passed legislation authorizing 
the creation of Special Criminal Courts to be manned by three 
judges. Such courts were authorized to proceed summarily in the 
trial of a specified range of criminal offenses. They were to 
operate without a jury or assessors under a restricted applica-
tion of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and the accused had no 
right of appeal from their judgments. The President's preroga-
tive of mercy was, of course, available in cases of conviction. 
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It was such a court as this, a Special court sitting as a 
Special Criminal Division of the High Court of Ghana, composed 
of Chief Justice Sir Arku Korsah, Justice William Van Lare, and 
Justice Edward Akufo-Addo, which tried the five defendants 
charged with treason and acquitted the three principal accused. 
As I have suggested, the reaction of the President and 
others to the judgment was immediate and vigorous, to say the 
least. The President removed the Chief Justice from office; the 
Attorney General summoned a press conference and described the 
judgment as a "travesty of justice." The Evening News, a Party 
organ, commented as follows: 
"The courts, ideally an instrument of Socialist education 
and discipline, not of class insolence and subversion, ye have 
made a den of thieves, assassins and corruption. 
"And the voices of the people say away with them. No more 
shall we entrust such vital machinery in the hands of the class 
enemy." 
I might simply state, parenthetically, that there were 
those with imagination or acumen sufficient to see a rela-
tionship between the acquittals and the kind of legal education 
that was going on in the University of Ghana. And they perhaps 
were right in a certain sense as I will point out in a moment. 
The reaction of the Government, of officialdom, and of the 
Pa~ty press was not restricted to vituperation, however. The 
President moved, without delay, for summary power of dismissal 
over Superior Court judges. Since those provisions protecting 
the judges' independence and tenure in office were entrenched in 
the Republican Constitution, both a favorable plebiscite and 
parliamentary approval were required, if the President was to 
achieve his objective. 
The plebiscite was held and by a reported overwhelming vote 
the proposed amendment was approved. It was simply inserted in 
the Constitution, following the protections of tenure and inde-
pendence which I mentioned earlier, providing "that the Presi-
dent may at any time for reasons which appear to him sufficient 
remove from off ice a Judge of the supreme Court or a Judge of 
the High Court." 
On the 2nd of March, 1964, in the exercise of this power, 
President Nkrumah dismissed from the Supreme Court Justice 
Akufo-Addo, who was the last member of the Special Court panel 
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that had tried the treason defendants still in judicial office. 
He also dismissed two other Justices of the Supreme Court who 
had not even been involved in the Treason Trial. Somewhat later 
he dismissed, without any explanation or statement of cause 
(none being legally required, of course) Justice Henry Prempeh 
of the High Court in Kumasi. 
It would be easy at this point to work toward the conclu-
sion of these remarks with some facile cliches about Ghana's un-
preparedness for political independence, about the evils of 
black authoritarianism, and what have you. I would hope to avoid 
any conclusions of that kind, although as substitutes I can of-
fer no guaranteed insights into either the past or the future of 
judges, or the value and status of judicial independence, in 
Ghana or anywhere else. I can only hope, in a few concluding 
remarks, that I may be able to place Ghana's judicial experience 
and its problems in a clearer and realistic perspective. 
There are several points I would like to make. The first is 
simply that I do not believe that the experience of the judges 
in Ghana reveals any peculiarly Ghanaian or peculiarly African 
problem. 
Experience in this country, highlighted in the 1930s with a 
court-packing plan rather crudely designed to solve the problem 
created by the Supreme Court's voiding of social welfare legis-
lation enacted by a democratically elected Congress, and again 
today when the Supreme Court is under severe attack from racists 
and quite decent exponents of more vigorous enforcement of the 
cri~inal law, provides a basis, I think, for raising the ques-
tion, what do we mean by an independent judiciary and how highly 
do we prize it? What sort of price are we willing to pay for it? 
What do we mean by an independent judiciary? From what do 
we want our judges to be independent? What is it we want them to 
be independent to do? A part of the answers to these questions 
would surely be clear to all of us. We want our judges to be in-
dependent of political pressure or calculation of political gain 
or loss, so that they may apply clearly formulated general rules 
to specific cases without regard to factors other than those 
determined by the rules themselves to be relevant. But in a 
group of this kind, it needs no argument to establish that this 
basic function does not comprehend fully the scope of the judi-
cial off ice. 
What about the cases that lie outside the clear core of the 
rule, where judges must resolve penumbra! uncertainties by crea-
tive choice? In such cases, of what is the judge to be independ-
ent? Is he to be independent of his own political philosophy, 
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his own moral commitments, of the general community's value 
structure that he may not be able to establish empirically but 
which he may in some way sense? Is he to be independent of the 
views of the dominant political leadership of the state, which 
may have been invested through the democratic choice of the 
people? 
Now these are important questions, and they are hard ques-
tions which the usual cliche of judicial independence doesn't 
really answer for us. As we search for answers, however, the 
long history of our own institutions, which we sum up rather 
grossly in the doctrine of separation of powers, aids us. But to 
what extent does Ghana share a similar institutional history and 
tradition? 
In response to these tough questions, time permits only a 
few summary suggestions. 
The first of these is that in the traditional societies of 
Ghana, there was nothing that I can detect that might be 
regarded as an embryonic doctrine of separation of powers. The 
chief and his councillors exercised "executive" powers. They 
also sat as a court, and, insofar as there was law-creation by 
human fiat, as against the slow accretion of custom, it was 
again the chief and his councillors who exercised the legisla-
tive powers. 
This is the traditional background. Against it, it seems to 
me quite clear that British tutelage in the Gold Coast during 
most of the colonial period hardly fostered a doctrine of 
separation of powers or nurtured the value of an independent 
judiciary. 
When Native Courts came to be established, their members 
(and note that they were "members" and not "judges") were fully 
subject to discipline, suspension, or dismissal by executive of-
ficers. As I said earlier, the lowest level of the colonial 
court structure, with which most of the people of the country 
probably were more familiar than they were with the superior 
courts, comprised the District Commissioners, who ordinarily 
were not legally educated and who combined executive and judi-
cial functions in the exercise of which they did not enjoy the 
protections of independence with which our tradition cloaks our 
judges. Only in 1954, as I have said, were these protections ex-
tended to the judges by express enactment, and then only for judges at the level of the Supreme Court. 
Finally, I would mention one further factor, though with 
considerable hesitation and only because it seems to me neces-
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sarily relevant if one is determining the desirability of 
guaranteeing independence to the judges of Ghana. My own studies 
in Ghana produced evidence that rather strongly suggests that 
the ordinary Ghanaian views lawyers as a devil's mixture of 
greed, mendacity, general untrustworthiness, and arrogance. In 
the data I gathered, the judge is a special sub-type of the 
general class, but he fares somewhat better in the general com-
munity view. As a matter of fact, he fares considerably better. 
Yet, approximately one-third of the people whose views I ex-
amined indicated a common belief that the judges were under the 
control of the executive, were biased in any case having politi-
cal overtones, and could be influenced, privately, as was said, 
by "money or drink." This didn't mean getting the judge drunk; 
it meant providing presents of various kinds. 
Fortunately, I found that popular regard for the judges im-
proved as one moved toward the top of the judicial hierarchy. 
Nevertheless, if one considers the general image of the legal 
profession in Ghana, it would be surprising if guaranteeing the 
independence of judges would be a dominant social value. 
Today in Ghana, as in all of Africa, the society is in the 
throes of a revolution, of aspiration if not of actuality. Its 
dominant political elite is using law and other instrumentali-
ties of the state to further rapid social change. That elite, 
whatever its ideological bent, is going to be concerned about 
the status and function of the judiciary and is going to try to 
shape it so as to make it functional to the revolution. If, as 
tends to be the case in Ghana, the political leadership regards 
the judges as unduly dominated by a foreign culture, as dan-
gerously conservative and thus unsympathetic to the aspirations 
of the revolution, it is not surprising, whatever our ultimate 
evaluation might be, that systematic attacks are made on judi-
cial independence, which is seen as a prerogative to decide 
cases on the basis of personal preferences without reference to 
the viewpoint of the political leadership. 
We would condemn, I am sure, a judge who, behind firm 
guarantees of independence, used his own ideological persuasions 
as the operative basis for his judicial actions, and refused to 
find the facts in accordance with the evidence, or refused to 
apply a clear rule of law. In the Ghana Treason Trial, I strong-
ly suspect, without knowing, that President Nkrumah believed 
that the Supreme Court had committed such indefensible judicial 
acts. I believe, however, that he was wrong. In my judgment, 
the Special Court did not acquit because of an anti-state or 
anti-Nkrumah bias, or even because there was a reasonable doubt 
on the evidence adduced as to the guilt of the accused. Rather, 
it acquitted, probably reluctantly, because the government simp-
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ly did not make a case that would have enabled a court operating 
within the range of judicial decencies to convict these particu-
lar defendants. I suggested earlier that those critical of the 
Special Court's acquittal postulated a connection of similarity 
between the judicial action and the kind of legal education my 
colleagues and I were providing in the University of Ghana. The 
latter was thought subversive. As I said at the time, if it is 
subversive to teach students that the state bears the burden of 
persuading with evidence that conviction is warranted, the Law 
Faculty was indeed subversive. 
In conclusion, then, I would say that the judgment in the 
Treason Trial offered no possible justification for the Presi-
dent's humiliation of the judges of Ghana or for the constitu-
tional steps that were taken to subordinate the higher judiciary 
to the President's whim. 
But putting aside the case in which the judge may have vio-
lated the clearest duties of his judicial off ice by basing his 
action on factors irrelevant under a clear and applicable rule, 
what should we say about the risk that the highest courts, be-
hind their protections of tenure and independence, may exercise 
their creative choices within the penumbral area so as to shape 
the governing norms in line with personal preference but in con-
flict with the developing sense of the community and contrary to 
the views of the dominant political leadership -- which may be 
democratically elected? Should a society should a society 
tolerate and even institutionalize protections for a judicial 
oligarchy given to such conduct, a judiciary that is usually in 
no sense democratically responsible? 
This is a tough question. It is an important question, and 
I would simply suggest to you that my answer is yes, and a 
resounding yes. 
Certainly if our concern is with the judge who violates the 
clearest duties of his office, virtually every system provides 
some mechanism for removing that kind of judge from off ice on 
the basis of objectively stated grounds of misbehavior or, pos-
sibly in some cases, infirmity. Where the problem is one of 
judges performing their function of law creation contrary to 
community need or democratically formulated and expressed 
desire, the expedient of legislative correction or even consti-
tutional modification is also available. 
Admittedly these processes are slow and cumbersome and it 
is not surprising that the impatient leadership of revolutionary 
Africa should chafe under the necessity for invoking them. Yet 
it seems clear, to me at least, that human history up to this 
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point has rather clearly demonstrated that if you concentrate 
too much political power in a single organ of government, as by 
granting judicial powers to the executive or the legislative 
body or making the judiciary subject to the whims of the execu-
tive, than you have placed in mortal danger man's hope for 
political liberty and satisfaction of some of the most deep-
seated claims of the human personality -- whether it be the 
human personality in Africa or in the United States. It is from 
this perspective, it seems to me, that we may, with sensitivity 
and patience, add our voices to the call for judicial integrity 
and judicial independence in Ghana or in the United States, or 
anywhere else in the world. 
THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN AMERICAN LAW 
[The remarks below are an excerpt from a talk I gave on Au-
gust 7, 1968, to the Second Annual Conference of Bench and Bar, 
held at the University of Ghana. The main body of the talk does 
not merit inclusion here: it reviews a line of development 
familiar to all American lawyers. I include the excerpt because 
the talk was given on my first trip back to Ghana since my 
departure in 1964. The occasion thus provided me an opportunity 
to reaffirm the great affection I still felt for the country and 
its people.] 
My Lord Chief Justice, My Lords, Ladies and Gentlemen: 
The American writer, Thomas Wolfe, one of my great 
pleasures when I was young, once wrote a book entitled You Can't 
Go Home Again. That proposition, stark and depressing in its 
finality, is much in my mind as I return to Ghana, which I once 
regarded as home and in which I had the privilege of living and 
working with many of you. Wolfe's rejection of the possibility 
of homecoming is, I'm sure, based on the fact so clear to all of 
us--that the rule of life is change: change in our surrounding 
circumstances, as well as change in ourselves. On this return to 
Ghana, I am deeply impressed by the changes which have occurred 
since I left in early 1964. I need not recount those changes, 
since I am sure they are obvious to all of you. I am sure they 
are welcome to all of you, as they are to me. While less obvious 
and less significant, I am also sure that I too have changed in 
the years since my departure. Yet in one aspect, I am sure no 
change has occurred, that is, in my deep and abiding affection 
for this country, for the University of Ghana, and for the large 
number of you for whom I have had the opportunity over the years 
to know, to respect, and to regard with warm friendship. The 
English poet Browning once observed that one who could see his 
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heart would find engraved there the word "Italy." Similarly, on 
the roll of my deepest attachments is inscribed the name of 
Ghana. While I recognize, therefore, that I can't go home again, 
in the sense of recapturing in full measure the surrounding cir-
cumstances, the critical relationships, the attitudes and state 
of mind which Ghana embodied for me in an earlier period, I am 
equally sure that I shall always have a strong feeling of 
homecoming when I return to your country and to the renewal of 
contact with my friends here. 
It is a pleasure and an honor for me to speak to you today 
on a subject of profound significance to the legal profession, 
to those members in active practice, as well as to those who 
have received the high honor of appointment to the bench. This 
subject has to do with the right to legal counsel. I shall 
devote most of my time to a report to you on the developing per-
ception of that right in my own country, where a series of deci-
sions of the Supreme Court of the United States over the past 
few years has moved the right to effective representation by 
counsel from the wings of the constitutional theater to the very 
center of the stage. I hope this report of developments in 
another country, which shares with Ghana common origins in the 
humane traditions of English law, will be of interest to you and 
will stimulate your own consideration of the most appropriate 
response to the need for legal services in your own country. 
[In the body of this talk I traced developments through a 
series of decisions including among others, Johnson v. Zerbst, 
304 U.S. 453 (1938), through Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 450 
(1942), Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), Escobedo v. 
Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 
(1966), and United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).] 
I have reported these developments in my own country as 
matters of assured interest to colleagues in the legal profes-
sion. It would be presumptuous of me to try to suggest what im-
plications you might find in these American developments which 
may be relevant to the developing constitutional and legal order 
of Ghana, Certainly some aspects of the American experience, 
particularly the problem of conflicting sovereignties in a fed-
eral system, should not recur in your own elaboration of the 
right to counsel. On the other hand, you here in Ghana and we in 
the United States face a number of common problems. Each country 
has a segment of its population which cannot afford to provide 
legal assistance for itself in the private market place. Each 
country, thus far, has relied largely on the altruism of private 
members of the bar to provide legal services to the indigent. In 
each country the supply of lawyers, in gross, is probably in-
adequate to cater for a greatly expanded clientele, including 
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not merely the range of traditional users of legal services but 
the number of indigents who in the past have found it necessary 
to confront the power of the state without legal counsel. And in 
Ghana, in the United States, and in every other country, the 
private citizen cannot safely rely on the paternalistic 
benevolence of government to maintain fundamental decencies in 
the ever widening range of contacts between officials and the 
citizen. 
You are now in a creative and optimistic phase of your na-
tional life. A new constitutional order is emerging to channel 
national energies and official power into productive courses for 
the benefit of all citizens. May I therefore conclude these 
remarks with a respectful suggestion for your consideration. 
Should you not give thought at this time to the extent to which 
the new constitutional order of Ghana should guarantee the as-
sistance of counsel to all persons, at the expense of the state 
if necessary? To you, as the leading members of that profession 
to which the nurture of the rule of law is especially committed, 
I would suggest with respect your clear responsibility to bring 
graphically to the attention of your fellow citizens the in-
dispensable role of the lawyer and the ultimate responsibility 
of the state to see that access to legal counsel is assured to 
all. The view I suggest to you was admirably state by the Inter-
national Commission of Jurists in the Conclusions of the 1959 
New Delhi Conference, in the following passage with which I con-
clude: 
Equal access to law for the rich and poor alike 
is essential to the maintenance of the Rule of Law. 
It is, therefore, essential to provide adequate legal 
advice and representation to all those, threatened as 
to their life, liberty, property or reputation who are 
not able to pay for it. This may be carried out in 
different ways and is on the whole at present more 
comprehensively observed in regard to criminal as 
opposed to civil cases. It is necessary, however, to 
assert the full implications of the principle, in par-
ticular insofar as "adequate" means legal advice or 
representation by lawyers of the requisite standing 
and experience. This is a question which cannot be 
altogether dissociated from the question of adequate 
remuneration for services rendered. The primary obli-
gation rests on the legal profession to sponsor and 
use its best effort to ensure that adequate legal ad-
vice and representation are provided. An obligation 
also rests upon the State and the community to assist 
the legal profession in carrying out this responsi-
bility. 
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DEMOCRATIC VALUES, SOCIAL CHARGE AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 
IR THE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS 
[In 1967, Arnold Rivkin, an officer of the World Bank, on 
leave to serve as Regents' Professor of African studies in the 
University of California, Los Angeles, organized a "Colloquium 
on Institution Building and the African Development Process." 
The core group in the Colloquium comprised forty to fifty 
faculty members and graduate students, with visitors attending 
many of the sessions. I presented the following talk to the Col-
loquium, the subject being in effect assigned. Had that not been 
the case, I am not sure I would have undertaken such an am-
bitious subject in such a restricted format. The talk, as 
presented, was later modified slightly to make its form ap-
propriate for inclusion in a book edited by Professor Rivkin, 
entitled NATIONS BY DESIGN (Item 28 in the Bibliography).] 
The subject of this paper may be formulated as a question: 
what role can law and legal institutions play in inculcating or 
preserving democratic values, while stimulating and guiding the 
modernization of economies, social structures, and political 
processes? I have been careful to frame the question in terms 
of the role that can be played, rather than the role that is 
being played. To answer the latter question would invite, indeed 
require, more empirical data than I or anyone of whom I am aware 
now has. This essay, therefore, will be analytical, not descrip-
tive. As the reader will detect, I am uncomfortably aware that 
analysis also needs an empirical base and that legal scholarship 
thus far has provided a relatively inadequate one. Arguably, 
however, analysis responsive to the "can" question may proceed 
on a narrower factual base than description would require. 
The question utilizes three key concepts that call for 
analysis: first, value, and more specifically "democratic 
values"; second, law and legal institutions; and third, "modern-
ization" as a particular kind of social change. Adequate 
analysis of any one of these concepts is too large a task for 
this paper, even if I were competent to undertake it anywhere. 
Therefore, I shall indicate only briefly, with little supporting 
analysis or argumentation, the meanings I shall ascribe to these 
key concepts in the later discussion. In this way, I would hope, 
in Lon Fuller's neat phrase, that even if I am clearly wrong, I 
will be wrong clearly. 
I take a "value" to be merely a specific focus of human 
desire that may be, and often is, manifested objectively in a 
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claim or demand advanced by an individual or a group. If there 
exists, aside from such values, an order of true or real values, 
these are deemed irrelevant as beyond the range of human cogni-
tion other than by intuition or revelation. such routes to 
knowledge, however significant they may be to those advantaged 
by valid intuition or gift, share the critical limitation that 
the knowledge to which they lead is not inter-subjectively 
transmissible in any reliable way. When my intuition conflicts 
with yours, how can you persuade me, or I persuade you? We mere-
ly tolerate each other, or we fight. 
It is often useful to distinguish between ultimate (immedi-
ate) and instrumental (mediate) values. Roughly corresponding to 
the two categories are the concepts of ends and means. At 
the level of instrumental values or means, we may have a basis 
for resolving conflicting desires through scientific inquiry and 
rational discourse--if we can agree on an ultimate value to 
which the instrumental value must be related as means. Important 
though the distinction may be, it is not the universal solvent 
of value conflict or competition. Almost always a particular 
value choice is both ultimate and instrumental, that is, while 
we may desire something as a means to a further end, we also at-
tach to it certain ultimate or non-instrumental preferences. 
Similarly, in human experience, it is rarely entirety clear that 
a particular value, though prima facie immediate, is not in some 
measure a means to an end only dimly perceived. Consequently, 
while certain value judgments may be moved within the range of 
cognition by resolving them into choices of instrumental values, 
that is, by making them questions of fact, the fact that the 
means-ends categories are not mutually exclusive prevents in 
many cases a fruitful resort to factual inquiry and rational 
discourse. 
Within this axiological framework, "democratic values" are 
viewed as only the preferences or desires of some men in certain 
times and places. They would perhaps acquire a special order of 
importance if they were deemed to be part of a common denomin-
ator of desires of all mankind. The factual support for such a 
premise in by no means clear, however. Even though validated 
only as desires, claims or demands, democratic values may appear 
more important by reason of the fact that at certain times and 
places men have thought them desirable enough to risk all, in-
cluding life, for their preservation. 
Beyond the general status that can be ascribed to "demo-
cratic values" under the non-cognitivist and relativistic axiol-
ogy presented here, what further elucidation of them can be pro-
vided? For the purpose of this essay, I shall take "democratic 
values" to comprehend the claim or demand that government find 
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its validation in the consent of the governed. An effort to par-
ticularize beyond this fundamental claim -- to inquire whether 
the consent must be manifested in a particular way, whether it 
may be granted en bloc for all time or must be renewed periodi-
cally, whether it must also involve continuing active involve-
ment by the governed in the affairs of government, and what con-
cept of man himself is implicit in the basic claim -- such an 
effort involves one in an infinite diversity of detail and in-
numerable subtle gradations. At the risk of gross over-
simplification, therefore, I will restrict the concept of demo-
cratic values to the fundamental claim, recognizing a variety of 
approaches to its realization. 
The only justification for this summary statement of value 
theory is that it confronts directly and at the inception a con-
cept of law that must be examined briefly and laid aside. This 
is the natural law view or actually views that have appeared in 
innumerable guises over the centuries. I am not concerned here 
with that variety of natural law thinking that invokes a higher 
law merely as a standard of justice, a means of identifying the 
unjust law. Some natural law philosophers, have held, however, 
that a certain irreducible value content must be found in any 
norm in order for it to qualify as law. If the adherent to such 
a natural law position is also a democrat, he is able summarily 
to avoid or dispose of much of the discussion in this essay 
merely by asserting that the implementation of some minimum of 
democratic values is essential for the achievement of law. Non-
democratic enactments, whatever effect they may be given by at-
tendant sanctions, he simply would not regard as law. 
While I share the value preferences of many who hold a 
natural law view, I regard most natural law thinking as a snare 
and a delusion. I find no contribution to clear thought in an 
insistence that law, in order to be law, must adopt any particu-
lar value content. To me, law is merely one among many techni-
ques for ordering, controlling or channeling human conduct; it 
requires commitment to no particular values. This is not an ap-
propriate occasion for an extended analysis of that technique, 
though some brief comments on it will be offered later. Nor is 
it, in fact, necessary to press to its ultimate the view that 
law, as technique, is value-neutral. One might agree with H.L.A. 
Hart that any discussion of law presupposes a social arrangement 
for continued existence, not a suicide club, and that law there-
fore necessitates a minimum value commitment to survival. Such 
agreement, however, would not involve the further view that law 
has any irreducible content of democratic value. Insofar as that 
value is concerned, law may be regarded as fully a value-neutral 
technique. An understanding of law's relation to democratic 
values must depend, therefore, on a study of the value prefer-
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ences of those in the society who are in a position to utilize 
the legal technique and of the ways in which those preferences 
are introduced into the legal order for implementation. 
One further distinction must be suggested in this ab 
breviated analysis of the concept of law. The most charac-
teristic expression of law is the norm. Following Kelsen, we may 
regard the legal norm as a hypothetical judgment--a coupling of 
a conditioning circumstance with a conditioned consequence: if 
and only if A, then B--if one takes another human life with 
malice aforethought, then he shall be hanged. The coupling of 
circumstance and consequence is not causal but purposive, de-
pendent upon the intervention of human agents who, it is contem-
plated, will intervene to produce the consequence in order to 
effectuate the purpose implicit in the norm. The norm is not 
realized most fully, however, when the conditioned consequence 
results. For the purpose implicit in the norm is not primarily 
that the murderer be hanged, but that human life not be 
destroyed. That purpose is most fully achieved by the for-
bearance from murder by all members of the society. In a stable 
and successful legal order, that forbearance is induced not only 
by the legal norm but by religious, ethical, and 
social standards as well. 
The norm, traditionally the most characteristic expression 
of law, remains of central importance today. over the last cen-
tury or so, however, changes of profound significance have oc-
curred in virtually all societies. These have affected the ex-
pectations directed toward government, and they are reflected, 
therefore, in the roles of official actors within the legal or-
der. From the traditional roles of norm creation and execution, 
that is, of defining the norm and, on the happening of the con-
ditioning circumstance, intervening to produce the consequence, 
official actors have come to assume in most societies more per-
vasively active roles. Instead of relying on private conduct in-
duced by general norms for securing desired actions and for 
achieving their purposes, those who manipulate the legal techni-
que now frequently address norms to official actors so as to 
pattern their conduct for the actual doing of desired tasks. 
This manifestation we may refer to as the law as "institution." 
It is not novel. A court, for example, is the expression of law 
as institution. In contemporary societies, however, this mani-
festation of law has become much more frequent; it involves of-
ficial actors in a far wider range of tasks, e.g., the provision 
of social services such as transportation or the planning and 
implementation of economic development. 
This preliminary sketch of concepts would be incomplete 
without a brief discussion of development. This concept is in-
voked by two terms in my subject -- "social change" and the 
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"development process." Presumably more is intended by the first 
than the basic premise of social fluidity. Certainly no society 
is absolutely static. Change occurs everywhere, though vastly 
important differences in the rate of change may appear in dif-
ferent times and places. The term "social change" is relatively 
ambiguous as to the direction or quality of the change, however, 
and on this ground alone we might pref er different and more 
precise terminology. "Development" enjoys an aura of approbation 
and might serve to suggest the kind of values or claims now 
being advanced in many parts of the world. It may also suggest, 
however, a teleological view of social movement that many would 
reject, and on that ground I have rejected it in favor of the 
concept of "modernization." 
In the present discussion, I take modernization to en-
compass a technique involving the purposive employment of 
scientific method to achieve knowledge of physical and social 
causality in order to design means rationally related to achiev-
ing satisfaction of values, that is, of human desires, claims or 
demands. These values may cover the broad spectrum of human 
wants, and the means for satisfying them may involve social 
structures, economic arrangements, and political processes. 
In the light of this statement of the conceptual apparatus, 
it is possible to break down the initial question into possibly 
more precise and useful components. Three questions emerge. 1) 
What role can the value-neutral technique of law, manifested as 
both norm and institution, play in satisfying the claim of men 
in society that their government be validated by the consent of 
the governed, or in stimulating the advancement of such a claim? 
2) What role can law, so conceived, play in stimulating and 
guiding modernization of the social, economic and political life 
of a society? 3) To what extent are these two roles compatible? 
It in probably now evident and will become increasingly 
clear that theorizing about law in relation to human values has 
both an affirmative and negative thrust. The affirmative presses 
the question: how can law be employed to maximize the realiza-
tion of values? This question may be put either from the per-
spective of a governing elite that wants to use law to realize 
its own values or from the perspective of the governed. The neg-
ative, on the other hand, usually emphasizes the problem of con-
trolling law, and ultimately those who manipulate it, so that it 
does not serve to deny or defeat the values of the governed. The 
latter question has been considered frequently in the long his-
tory of political and legal philosophy. It is the central theme 
of much of the contemporary concern about the "Rule of Law." 
Without denying the importance of the negative thrust, however, 
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I would suggest the desirability of equal attention to the 
affirmative. Both will be considered in the following discus-
sion. 
As I turn to the first question, it is necessary to sketch 
briefly a set of factual hypotheses in order to relate the 
analysis to contemporary Africa. Many of the indigenous peoples 
of Africa lived under traditional governmental and legal orders 
that had a fundamental democratic underpinning. This was often 
obscured by a tendency to combine in the same functionary the 
roles of secular ruler and priest and by the restriction of 
eligibility for chiefly office to certain royal lines. Very 
commonly, however, each royal line presented a number of 
eligibles, and choice among them was expected to result from 
pervasive consultation, not voting in a modern sense, but an ap-
proach toward consensus. Further evidence of democratic tenden-
cies in traditional systems was the possibility of removing from 
office a traditional ruler who failed to perform to the satis-
faction of his people. 
Generalization about African law and legal-governmental 
institutions is hazardous, and here the hazard can be avoided. 
For our concern is with modern African government and law. The 
extent to which democratic values were implemented in tradi-
tional institutions is irrelevant, since these institutions are 
in no meaningful sense the antecedents of the governments and 
basic legal orders of post-colonial Africa. The independent na-
tional governments of Africa are the progeny of colonialism, not 
the successors to traditional groups and their governmental ar-
rangements. An African government that received the imperium 
from the departing metropolitan powers can not, therefore, de-
rive its legitimacy from the consent accorded to traditional 
regimes. The new national units usually comprised an aggregate 
of traditional units or fragments of units with disparate 
governmental and legal orders. If popular sentiment could have 
been gauged accurately on the eve of independence, it is doubt-
ful that significant agreement would have been found on the 
scope of the society to be organized into a national state, on 
any order of unifying values within the new national group, or 
on a useful set of symbols for those values. On occasion, inde-
pendence was preceded by a plebiscite or election, and the 
colonial apologist might contend that it provided democratic 
validation for the new regime. More realistically, however, the 
results might be regarded only as a manifestation of desire for 
the departure of an alien power, not as a truly consensual grant 
of power to a new government. I doubt, therefore, that most of 
the legal-governmental orders in Africa even at their inception 
stood on democratic values. 
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Even if it were assumed that the constituent elements of 
the new nations were democratically united at independence, it 
would seem quite clear that the evolving legal-governmental or-
ders in most cannot claim continuing validation through demo-
cratic choice. The hallmark of post-independence Africa has 
been frequent change or merely abrogation of constitutions. In 
most states progressive efforts have been made to concentrate 
the power to manipulate the techniques of law in the hands of 
elite groups, civil or military, whose claim to govern by con-
sent can hardly be seriously advanced. It is not surprising in 
these circumstances that the new national governments of Africa 
It has been fashionable in many quarters to justify this 
movement toward government by non-democratic elites on the 
ground that it was essential for the achievement of moderniza-
tion. Certainly few Africanists, if any, would contend that the 
traditional authorities, whatever their democratic support, 
could have been relied upon for successful modernizing initia-
tives. Stimulation of and guidance for modernization had to come 
from and through new governmental agencies and laws. Yet surely 
experience is now sufficient to indicate that authoritarian 
government by an elite provides no assurance of modernization, 
of rational, scientific efforts to satisfy the desires, and 
demands of the people. Although the sacrifice of democratic 
values does not assure modernization, however, it may in the 
circumstances of contemporary Africa be essential to achieve 
~ at the level of the new nation states. Opening the door to 
democratic choice could in many places loose such an array of 
centrifugal forces oriented toward traditional groupings that 
the· fragile structures of the new nation state could not sur-
vive. The question whether new and more viable groupings, with 
governments validated by democratic choice, would emerge from 
the breakdown of the nation states spawned by colonialism, and, 
if so, when, leads to speculation too extreme for useful pursuit 
here. 
The earlier analysis indicates that the failure of a legal 
order to rest on consent and thus to implement democratic values 
does not deprive its enactments of the character of law. Thus, 
an elite group within a certain territory that has been able to 
monopolize sufficient sanctioning force for its enactments to 
make them generally effective is entitled to insist that they 
are law, even if it admits candidly what no elite is likely to 
concede--that its power to rule is in no sense grounded on 
the consent of the governed. As long as its power remains in-
tact, the elite is able to make law and to accept for attempted 
satisfaction in the legal order such values as it chooses. It is 
possible, though not likely, that an elite without democratic 
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support would opt for democratic values, thereby risking the 
possibility that it will be ousted and the entire order frag-
mented. If such an elite were unwilling to open the door to dem-
ocratic choice sufficiently to imperil the entire governmental 
and legal order but were, nevertheless, committed to an ultimate 
satisfaction of democratic values, we may ask what contribution 
toward that long-range satisfaction its norms and institutions 
might make. Though the factual premises may and probably do for-
sake reality, the question deserves serious consideration. 
A non-democratic government that values and aspires to dem-
ocratic legitimization might gain it or open the possibility of 
gaining it by successful efforts to maximize the realization of 
the non-political desires, claims, and demands of its people. 
Thus, success in maintaining the public peace and rendering 
human life more secure, in furthering economic modernization and 
improving the standards of life and health, and in dealing with 
citizens generally as if their interests are worthy of respect 
would be contributive. Coupled with such activities might go 
educational programs designed to cultivate in the citizens the 
perception of a community wider than their traditional groups, 
encompassing the entire nation, and of an identity of interests 
that can be furthered adequately only by a governmental and 
legal system comprehending the nation. Important in this effort 
is the discovery or development of symbols of national cohesion, 
some of which might be "legal." In the United States, for ex-
ample, the unifying symbolic value of the Constitution is well 
recognized, even though many people would dispute or reject its 
specific interpretations when they are known. Finally, even 
within the political arena, democratic choice and participation 
might be nurtured at the level of local government under consti-
tutional or statutory delegations of limited power to be ex-
ercised subject to supervisory control at the national level of 
government. Many of these efforts obviously involve the use of 
law as a tool for modernization which will be considered later. 
A governing elite with ultimate democratic aspirations 
might also further its aims by the ways in which it structures 
its own power. One of the persistent dangers of elitist regimes 
is that significant power will be progressively concentrated in 
fewer and fewer hands. Such a progression in the allocation of 
power seems usually to be paralleled not only by deterioration 
of any commitment to democratization of government, but also by 
the denial of a wider range of human values. An elite without 
democratic support that desires to arrest this progression or, 
for that matter, a democratically chosen government that seeks 
to impede any movement toward undemocratic usurpation of power, 
has available a number of legal techniques that human experience 
has shown to be useful to these ends. Whether or not the effort 
is described in the traditional American terminology of "checks 
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and balances," it is prudent to disperse governmental power 
widely enough that the individuals and groups sharing power may 
impose mutual restraints. Equally wise is an insistence, vigor-
ously implemented, that official actors find their authority to 
act in clearly articulated norms. such an insistence does not 
preclude official discretion, but it counsels against the grant 
of unlimited discretion. Where grants of discretionary 
authority are needed, as will often be the case, discretion 
should be limited by articulated standards and purposes, by 
reference to which the conduct of the official actor can be 
reviewed. Values of great importance to individuals may be 
defined in and their greater protection assured by a Bill of 
Rights that is not easily subject to revision and is enforcible 
against executive or legislative action by an independent judiciary. 
Such techniques are familiar, and experience in many 
societies has found them useful. It bears emphasis, however, 
that they are only techniques, not guarantees. They will rarely 
be utilized by an undemocratic elite, for they impede the aug-
mentation and preservation of its own power. And even when 
adopted and entrenched by a democratic government, they may be 
and frequently have been subverted by elites able to array an 
overriding power. The effectiveness of all legal techniques must 
be assessed, therefore, in the light of the power ratios within 
the society. 
In brief summary of the argument thus far, we may say that 
the achievement of law does not depend on the implementation of 
democratic values. On the contrary. in the social fragmentation 
of contemporary Africa, the achievement of law at the level of 
the new nation states may well require substantial rejection of 
democratic values, if the latter require the consent of the 
governed for legitimization of the power of government. It is 
theoretically possible, but factually improbable, that a 
non-democratically chosen but democratically inclined elite may 
take certain steps leading toward an infusion of democratic 
values in the legal order and an ultimate democratization of 
government. Thus far, the brief experience of independent 
governments in Africa justifies little optimism for this 
development, but the longer experience of the Soviet Union may 
provide a thin basis for hope. In the final analysis, the 
greatest and probably the only effective assurance of democratic 
government is the strongly and persistently advanced claim of 
the people of a society that government and law be validated 
only by their own consent. The prevalence and vigor of that 
claim in Africa today is fairly subject to dispute. Where the 
claim has been advanced and implemented, it has frequently 
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focused or a level and form of government that cannot respond 
effectively to the claims or demands for the fruits of moderni-
zation. To those claims, which are probably asserted in Africa 
today more vigorously than the claim for democratic government, 
we will now turn. 
I will assume that the desires, claims or demands for the 
fruits of modernization--particularly more and better food, 
health, and material well-being--are widespread among the people 
of Africa. A similar assumption with respect to modernization 
itself, as an instrumental value, is probably not warranted. 
Among the African governments we will assume not only a desire 
for the fruits of modernization, but some degree of commitment 
to the technique as well. The latter assumption may, of course, 
be seriously questioned. Too frequently the new African govern-
ing elites seem committed primarily to the increase and preser-
vation of their own power and perquisites, to conspicuous con-
sumption in the midst of general privation, to prestige expendi-
tures rather than productive investments, and to settling old 
accounts on actual or imagined wrongs, rather than construction 
of a new social cohesion and cooperation. In the present discus-
sion, however, we will assume an enlightened government, firmly 
committed to modernization. The question may now be posed, what 
role can the legal norms and institutions of such a government 
play in stimulating and guiding modernization. 
In this part of the discussion, the distinction suggested 
earlier between law as norm and law as institution becomes 
especially relevant. The effectiveness of law as general norm 
depends on communication of the norm to and understanding of it 
by the persons whose conduct it is intended to affect. Perhaps 
more importantly, it depends in large measure upon their inter-
nalization of the law's implicit values so that compliance is, 
in the majority of cases, not the result of threatened sanc-
tions. In the absence of such internalization, the effectiveness 
of the norm depends heavily on the immediacy and certainty of 
the occurrence of the conditioned consequence following the con-
ditioning circumstance. Consequently, for the law manifested as 
norm to have significant effect, one must have either substan-
tial internalization of the values implicit in the norm and, 
thus, voluntary compliance by most of the people, or assured and 
probably frequent resort to the ultimate sanctioning force be-
hind the norm. For the effectiveness of law as institution, nei-
ther voluntary compliance with desired standards of conduct nor 
efficient and forceful organs of government are irrelevant. It 
does seem clear, however, that understanding and cooperation of 
the people are less critical, if effectiveness for the law is 
sought primarily through the conduct of official actors who are 
charged specifically with the actual doing of the desired acts. 
An over-simplified illustration may make the point clearer. A 
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government desiring to improve transportation facilities between 
two large towns might consider at least two expedients: first, a 
general norm imposing a fine if any driver of a private vehicle 
between the two towns does not stop at a central depot and load 
his vehicle with passengers and goods waiting there for trans-
portation; second, the establishment by the government itself of 
a bus and truck line to provide the needed service. The second 
approach obviously depends for its success on less widespread 
private action and, therefore, less official policing to secure 
the desired action. 
The significance of the foregoing distinction emerges 
clearly in the light of two factors: 1) the enclave phenomenon 
that characterizes African societies and 2) the relatively 
sophisticated action required for modernization. We will con-
sider each briefly. 
A characteristic feature of African societies, produced out 
of the colonial experience, is the existence of a relatively ad-
vanced enclave within or, perhaps more nearly accurately, Qil the 
wider, less advanced society. Typically the latter depends on 
subsistence agriculture or pastoral activities, has a minimal 
level of education or even literacy, is relatively static, and 
has most of its significant relationships governed by customary 
law. The enclave, comprising the expatriate community and a thin 
stratum of more affluent Africans, tends to be urban, better 
educated or at least literate, engaged more frequently in 
salaried employment, business or a profession, is more mobile, 
and is governed either entirely or in a broad range of its rela-
tionships by metropolitan law and modern local enactments. This 
is the enclave phenomenon in its most obvious form. In reality, 
however, the broader, less advanced society itself may be con-
sidered an aggregate of often highly disparate ethnic enclaves, 
each differing from the others in aspects as significant as 
their collective differences from the Europeanized enclave. 
Little discussion is required to make the point that mod-
ernization requires action that is usually more extensive, sus-
tained, complex and purposive than traditional forms of social 
organization and control could or would have stimulated or per-
haps even tolerated. An adequate illustration of the point can 
be found in the well-documented efforts in West Africa to clear 
tsetse-infested bush. Lack of understanding of the purpose of 
the action, doubt of its effectiveness, and superstition com-
bined to place even this modest action well beyond what could be 
achieved along traditional routes and almost beyond the 
capabilities of colonial agencies. 
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Against this background, assessment of the role of law in 
stimulating and guiding modernization suggests the following 
conclusions. Within the advanced enclave, law as norm often can 
be a reasonably effective tool for modernization. Communication 
of the norm, understanding of its purposes, and acceptance of 
its objectives will frequently be sufficient to induce a wide 
range of compliance with relatively modest official interven-
tions for enforcement purposes. Outside the enclave, however, 
the problems of effectuating law as norm tend to become too 
great when the norm is innovative and geared to the needs of 
economic or social modernization. To be sure, within this seg-
ment of the population many norms of the customary law are quite 
effective. As has been suggested, however. customary law and the 
institutions through which it is applied are rarely functional 
to the needs of modernization. 
Even within the advanced enclave, where economic activity 
is above subsistence levels, conduct required for modernization 
often cannot be induced and guided simply by general norms. For 
example, saving for re-investment rather than consumption, or 
choosing the type of investment for any surplus earnings, re-
quires planning and coordination of action beyond what a general 
norm can usually induce. Consequently, law as institution, fre-
quently manifested as an official planning agency, is required, 
even though its actions and decisions may ultimately need the 
support and sanctions of legal norms as well. 
If the foregoing analysis is correct, it would seem that 
law's most fruitful role in modernization processes within the 
br~ad social group would involve its manifestation as institu-
tion. This necessity has been and will continue to be reflected 
in Africa, for example, in government schools, state corpora-
tions, and planning commissions, that is, agencies created by 
law and staffed by public agents charged with the responsibility 
for organizing and frequently carrying out modernizing activity. 
While emphasizing the central role of law as institution, how-
ever, I do not intend to minimize unduly the importance of the 
legal norm. Reliance upon the latter manifestation or technique 
of law should be preferred where it offers the prospect of rea-
sonable effectiveness, since the burden it imposes on scarce 
public manpower and other resources is lighter than a public in-
stitution would impose. Furthermore, even when an institution is 
necessary or desirable, its activity usually needs the support 
of norms, some directed broadly to the social group, but many 
specifically directed toward other officials. For example, the 
work of a planning commission can be defeated unless other off i-
cials are required to supply it with reliable data and to imple-
ment its decisions within the sphere of their own activity. For 
these purposes, norms addressed to officials play an indispen-
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sible role in supporting the institution. 
The view advanced here on the role of law in modernization 
involves substantial reliance on public activity in many aspects 
of social and economic life which we in the developed societies 
remit to the private sector under varying degrees of regulation 
by norm. I hope to make clear, however, that this view is 
grounded entirely on functional considerations related to exist-
ing circumstances in Africa, not on any doctrinaire preference. 
I would hope that the modernizing activities of the various in-
stitutions created by law would serve to move the general 
population toward levels of understanding and value agreement 
that would permit greater reliance on modernizing private ac-
tivity guided and regulated by general norms. If modernization 
is the assumed objective, however, it seems essential to rely 
primarily on those persons committed to the objective and the 
relevant technique and possessing the requisite knowledge and 
other resources. At this stage of African development, such per-
sons and resources are concentrated overwhelmingly in the public 
or governmental sector. 
In Africa, a heavy reliance on the law as institution car-
ries with it a potential for democratization that deserves brief 
mention to re-emphasize a point made earlier. Consolidation of 
governmental power in a single leader or a compact elite pre-
sents the maximum risk that democratic values will not have been 
satisfied at any time or that initial democratic legitimization 
will be eroded through increasingly authoritarian action. Effec-
tive assertion of a claim to be governed only by their consent 
is very difficult for the people who lack organization or re-
sources. As a leader or elite creates institutions, however, 
some dispersion of power among them is inevitable. In theory, 
the various institutional power centers could maintain full 
cohesion and mutual support for the preservation of an un-
democratic and repressive regime. In fact, however, a new in-
stitution that shares governmental power is potentially a com-
petitor for a larger share. Institutional competition may intro-
duce patterns of mutual restraint, and as such competition 
develops, popular support may be sought by one or more of the 
institutions simply to improve its own competitive position. It 
appears possible, therefore, that institution-building may not 
only impose restraints on the broader elite among whom power is 
dispersed but also contribute indirectly to democratization of 
the regime. 
Progressive modernization, whether by unregulated private 
activity, by the general guidance of legal norms, or by the ac-
tivity of public institutions, presents the indispensable re-
quirement of a peaceful society in which at least human life is 
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relatively secure. Beyond that, some security of property, both 
public and private, and of expectations induced by promises, is 
probably essential as well. Unless one imagines an utopian 
society that is peaceful and secure by reason of its inherent 
homogeneity and coherence, the postulated requirements neces-
sitate a government, an identifiable group of actors, that has 
sufficiently monopolized force to impose peace, assure the req-
uisite degree of security, enforce its norms when they are 
breached, and organize and staff the legal institutions required 
for its programs. Obviously the existence of such government is 
debatable in many parts of contemporary Africa. 
With this consideration, our discussion has completed its 
circle, for we are brought back to the interrelation between the 
implementation of democratic values and the achievement of law. 
The general lack of social homogeneity and coherence in Africa 
today makes difficult or impossible in many places the organiza-
tion of national governments based on democratic choice. With 
increasing frequency, therefore, one encounters elites, civil 
and military, with no plausible claim to democratic support, 
seeking a sufficient monopoly of force that they can secure 
their own positions and achieve a legal order of national exten-
sion. If one indulges the assumption that such elites, or some 
of them may be committed to the values of modernization, one 
still confronts the question whether they will be able to 
achieve the law required for minimum social peace and security 
or for active modernizing efforts. Without the support of demo-
cratic consent, the monopolization of force for the achievement 
of law and effective legal action is an awesome task. 
I would be happy to conclude on a more hopeful note. Rele-
vant examples like Nigeria, however, do not stimulate optimism 
on the prospects of reconciling democratic values, national 
legal institutions, and the processes of modernization, and on a 
relatively short-term basis I am not optimistic. For the much 
longer run, without assurance or even great optimism, I would 
suggest as the basis for continued effort the hope that through 
the cycle of social upheaval, official corruption, governmental 
collapse or overthrow, and new gropings for power, there will be 
at least halting progress toward social cohesion and mobiliza-
tion. If a government proves itself capable of governing and is 
committed to modernization, I think it deserves support and 
assistance, whether or not it rests on democratic consent. For 
if modernization does occur, the government in time may receive 
such consent. If the people continue to withhold their consent, 
modernization may facilitate their ultimate replacement 
of an undemocratic government by one of their own choice. 
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SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY AND THE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS 
[The following talk was made on November 29, 1966, to the 
Meeting of the American Section of the International Association 
of Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy, held at Washington 
University, St. Louis. I've felt much doubt about including it 
here, since it lacks context--the numerous papers presented and 
discussions on them. I finally decided on inclusion because the 
views expressed cast some light on the genesis of my involvement 
with Ghana and also on some of the attitudes that continued to 
guide my work. ] 
It is a pleasure to be here, to participate in the discus-
sions of this conference, and to share the thinking of many old 
friends and able colleagues. It is a special pleasure for me, 
however, since the agenda of the conference relates to what I 
have come to regard as the central set of issues facing legal 
scholars,, social scientists, and perhaps even philosophers. 
Those are the issues arising on the inter-face between law and 
other techniques of social ordering and the development proc-
esses that hopefully are beginning in many parts of the world. 
My task in these brief remarks is a difficult and challeng-
ing one. The challenge has come to seem more awesome as I have 
read and studied the principal papers and the responses and, 
yesterday and today, have listened to the discussion of them. 
The task, as I understand it, is not to comment specifically on 
the written or oral contributions to the conference, but to 
essay a general view, an assessment, if you will of the enter-
prise in which we here are engaged. Thus, I confront, with you, 
the basic questions: do legal and social philosophers have any-
1 thing to contribute to an understanding of the problems of development and to their solution? If they do, is the course we 
are following in this conference a fruitful one for realizing 
that contribution? 1 
Our Program Committee has given careful thought to the 
format or structure of our discussions, in an effort to assure 
that in general we consider the same questions. The Committee 
has asked us to share certain starting assumptions and then to 
deal with problem cases, making specific reference to suggested 
approaches to solution. 
Without questioning in general the utility of these techni-
ques for focusing discussion, I would offer a few comments and 
suggestions on the assumptions proposed and the ordering of 
problems. Some of the assumptions are so clearly warranted that 
any comment runs the risk of becoming a quibble. Others are more 
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troublesome. Are we, for example, really warranted in assuming 
that the effective use of modern technology for economic 
development "entails radical social change?" What does the as-
sumption# in fact mean? That the utilization of technology 
necessitates antecedent social change of radical proportions? Or 
that the exploitation of technological advance for economic 
development inevitably will produce such changes in society? Or 
are we asked, to some extent, to indulge both assumptions? The 
ambiguity of the proposed assumption may stimulate a further 
question: what grounds do we have for making any assumptions? 
What is the actual state of our empirical knowledge of the in-
terrelation of modern technology and social change? With this 
question, however, I begin to anticipate some thoughts I will 
try later to develop·briefly. 
We also are asked to assume that social change can be more 
peaceful -- and this is assumed to be good or desirable -- if 
"arbitrary uses" of political power are prevented; and fur-
ther ,that "such prevention requires established patterns of 
thought and actions and institutions of application, but it 
begins with achieving consensus upon the distribution of author-
ity to decide or act on central issues of modernization." Here 
again, my capacity for assumption is seriously strained by ques-
tions as to what I am asked to assume. Perhaps I would be aided 
by a clearer understanding of the relevant concept of arbitrari-
ness in the uses of political power. Certainly, one needs ex-
plication of the critical process by which patterns of thought# 
action and institutions of application of political power may 
become "established," in the Committee's terms, so as to prevent 
its "arbitrary" use. 
Assumptions doubtless are needed to structure our thought 
and discussion. Whenever we make such assumptions, it is im-
portant that we identify and articulate them. At the same time, 
it is surely indispensable that we strive for complete clarity 
on the meaning of these bases of our dialogue. 
The agenda style at philosophical meetings in recent years 
has aimed, it seems to me, at a relatively sterile level of ab-
straction. For example, the subject proposed may be simply "com-
munity" or "responsibility." Here the Program Committee has 
abandoned such abstraction and has attempted to focus discussion 
on certain fundamental problems in the development context. Per-
haps this effort is only a concession to the common lawyers' 
aversion to abstraction, but I feel the Committee should be com-
mended for its insistence that we are philosophizing in the con-
text of actual problems that press in upon us. 
Turning now to those problems, perhaps I err in assuming 
that the Committee saw a logical order of priorities from Prob-
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lem A through Problem c. If they did, then I must say, with 
respect, that the order proposed involves, in my view, a curious 
inversion. It seems to me more plausible to begin discussion 
with the problem of loosening the social fabric sufficiently to 
introduce a potential for innovation (Problem C), to move then 
to a consideration of the appropriate forms of social organiza-
tion to accommodate whatever changes may be desired (Problem B), 
and to conclude with discussion of such problems as marshaling 
capital resources and entrepreneurial and technological skills 
for accelerated economic development. 
I mention this matter of priorities to emphasize the con- I 
viction that social and political adaptations are pre-conditions ( 
to economic development. This view confronts directly a fallacy 
that aid programs often reflect, that economic development can 
be effectively stimulated by a substantial capital in-flow and I 
imported technology with little regard for the surrounding so-
cial and political institutions. If this appraisal is correct, 
we perhaps may buttress it by the course we follow in our own 
deliberations. 
Today, a substantial part of the world's population is en-
joying a quantity and quality of material well being that would 
have been almost beyond imagination even two decades ago. An 
even larger part, however, remains under the awful burden of 
poverty, disease, and ignorance. The dichotomy between the rich 
and the poor, the haves and have-nots, is not novel. What is 
novel is the breadth of the gap between them and the rate at 
which it is widening. Two other elements combine with this in-
creasing disparity to precipitate the concern that the agenda of 
this conference reflects. The first is the world-wide communica-
tions system that makes today's events in Togo or in Thailand 
today's news in St. Louis or Seattle. That same system with 
somewhat less efficiency makes the Ghanaian or the Congolese at 
least vaguely aware that his condition of life contrasts starkly 
with that of his counterpart in the United States, France, or 
the Soviet Union. The consequence is a radical change in the 
pattern of demands, expectations, and hopes of a substantial 
part of the population in the less developed parts of the world. 
The second element is a development in the social sciences and 
in government that seeks to attain an understanding of the 
critical processes of man's life in society, and to develop ef-
fective programs through planning and governmental intervention 
in various aspects of individual and social life, so as to 
ameliorate the lot of the less advantaged. 
We are citizens of a major power that is deeply involved 
with these problems in many parts of the world. We are human 
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beings somewhat sensitive to the plight of others. Hence, we 
have a double concern with the success of contemporary attacks 
on poverty and disease. The critical question before us in this 
meeting, however, is whether philosophy, particularly those 
branches most concerned with the social and legal order, has any 
peculiar competence to contribute to the success of these ef-
forts. Within certain guidelines, my answer to that question 
would be "yes." In the next few moments, may I suggest a view on 
the nature of that contribution and relate it to our discussion 
here. 
The first contribution of further philosophical activity 
has been anticipated by some of my earlier remarks. The con-
ceptual apparatus we employ in discussing development problems 
requires elucidation. Examples readily come to mind. In our 
agenda, we encounter such concepts as "obligation," specifically 
the obligation to contribute capital for modernization; "right" 
especially the right to participate in certain critical deci-
sions on social organization; and "authority" to participate in 
decisions and actions to remove obstacles to modernization. 
Almost without exception, contributors have accepted and 
employed such concepts without attempting explication. One 
notable exception is Professor Jenkins who has submitted a care-
ful and useful analysis of the concept of authority. 
If one examines the relevant literature on development and 
especially if one works in less developed parts of the world, 
the need for analysis and clarification of our conceptual bag-
gage becomes crystal clear. The more naive American will be 
shocked to discover that in many parts of the world, "capi-
taiism," to him one face of the great American epic, is a dirty 
word. "Socialism," which he has been conditioned to fear, is 
quite acceptable through most of the underdeveloped world, 
though, in Africa at least, it usually becomes "African 
Socialism," a variant that still awaits explication. Philosophi-
cal inquiry into the meaning of such concepts may settle the mud 
in our thinking. Equally important, it may help to open some of 
the channels of intercultural communication, without which the 
most effective attack on underdevelopment cannot be made. 
Consider other examples. What do we mean by "moderniza-
tion"? Some time ago, in Ibadan, Western Nigeria, I sat through 
a conference that included legal scholars from several 
countries. our subject was the "modernization" of African law. 
After an extended period of puzzlement, I concluded that the op-
erative test of modernization was the extent to which an African 
state adopted or received contemporary English law. It seemed 
to matter little whether that law was functional to the needs of 
English society, and even less what relevance it might have to 
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African circumstances. such a concept of modernization might be 
understood, but I doubt that it would have been defended even by 
my colleagues in that conference. They simply had not examined 
with thoughtful care the content of the notion of modernization 
they sought to employ. 
A final example will conclude this point. The principal 
paper submitted on Problem c, removing obstacles to social 
change, presents a careful analysis of the concepts of value and 
authority. It concludes that "authority to direct change must 
vest in individuals and groups who belong to the society being 
changed." This is an appealing position. I would suggest, how-
ever, with respect, that it avoids or disregards a crucial issue 
that inevitably arises in implementing the position. What does 
the proponent of this view mean by "society"? Are existing 
national boundaries to be taken as definitive of the metes and 
bounds of the several societies that may exist in a given area? 
Or is account to be taken of sub-national or supra-national 
tribal, linguistic, and religious factors as well? 
The complexity of the concept of "society" way be fully il-
lustrated by the state of affairs in contemporary Africa. The J 
colonial scramble for Africa took little or no account of either 
the natural features of the land or the characteristics of the 
indigenous people. In the main, the present national boundaries 
have followed the colonial demarcations. Consequently, in- \ 
digenous groups having some sense of a unifying identification 
have been divided-- the Ewe between Ghana and Togo, the Yoruba 
between Dahomey and Nigeria, the Somali among Kenya, Ethiopia, 
and the Somali Republic. It is not surprising, therefore, that 
among the most difficult tasks of African national leaders has 
been and is the nurturing of a new organizing value--the 
Nation--to bring together for effective social and legal action 
the diverse elements within their borders. In such circum-
stances, we surely will agree that one would assign a directive 
role in social change to persons or groups "within the society" 
must assume the burden of careful elucidation of the operative 
concept of society. 
This concluding illustration leads naturally to mention of 
the perspective and background I would suggest for philosophers 
addressing the problems of development. At the risk of trans-
gressing the universalist urge present in all of us, I would 
suggest that we philosophize in context, that is, insofar as we 
are able, from within the social matrix whose development we 
seek to understand and perhaps to influence. 
About ten years ago, as I tried to project my own work in 
legal philosophy, I reached the conclusion that, for me at 
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least, armchair speculation in the secure confines of an Amer-
ican university was not sufficient. There seemed so little 
knowledge of matters I believed important: the actual operation 
of law in society, the forces that shaped it, the processes by 
which value acceptances within the society were able to enlist 
the public force on their behalf, and the extent to which the 
tools of law were or could be made effective for reshaping the 
value acceptances within a society, and thus for guiding and im-
plementing programs of planned and accelerated social change. 
It occurred to me that in the new nations, where the reins of 
power were being transferred to new hands, some of these proc-
esses could be studied with great benefit. Out of such study, I 
hoped would emerge some practical help in the development proc-
ess, and possibly some insights of general application into the 
nature and utility of law. 
The perspective for legal and social philosophy I am 
proposing is extremely difficult to achieve. I would not offer 
my own limited efforts as a standard of what can or should be 
done. Relevant social date for much of the less developed part 
of the world are insufficient but are increasing. Much of the 
investigation of indigenous legal systems lacks the rigor 
lawyers require, in part because legal scholars have not respon-
ded to any great extent to the challenge offered by legal 
institutions in the under-developed areas. If legal scholars and 
philosophers attempt in these areas the systematic value 
analysis urged upon us by our Program Committee in this meeting, 
they must recognize grave cross-cultural hazards. It is easy to 
attribute to legal institutions in other societies the same 
value implications we assume or believe similar institutions 
have in our own society. It is surely possible to overlook other 
significant value acceptances being implemented or affected by 
law In an alien culture, merely because such acceptances are un-
familiar in our own. 
These hazards are real, but they are not insurmountable ob-
stacles. They should serve only to induce a modesty in the 
claims we make for our efforts. They should not discourage the 
efforts. If we try to relate our axiological analyses to 
relevant social forces, we may further significantly our under-
standing of the interplay between values and the techniques of 
law. In addition. as we consider the range of choices suggested 
by our present agenda, we may see more clearly which of them are 
actual living choices. True, we face the risk that the views we 
may develop will be wrong, but I suspect we diminish what seems 
to me the far graver risk -- that we will be merely irrelevant. 
I suppose it is clear from my earlier comments that my view 
of the contribution of legal and social philosophy is essential-
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ly methodological, not substantive. I will not pause to battle 
the view that our substantive philosophical predilections, our 
value acceptances,, are a universal panacea. Even if they were, 
or we believed they were, we would face a critical inability of 
persuading others, and the effort to persuade or to coerce ac-
ceptance would create its own grave problems. If legal and so-
cial philosophy is seen as methodological, as presenting a mode 
of inquiry and elucidation, it has an important role to play. A 
part of that role has been suggested earlier in my comments on 
the necessity for conceptual clarity. At the axiological level, 
however, the role includes exploring the critical value premises 
that underlie and support existing legal and social institutions 
and norms. It includes the identification of the value implica-
tions of alternative courses of action that may be under con-
sideration. Further, it includes the effort, insofar as pos-
sible, to resolve conflicts or competition of values, as they 
seem to arise, from the level of ultimate or immediate values to 
that of instrumental or mediate values. If this is done, the 
range of application of scientific inquiry and rational dis-
course is extended. When such a resolution cannot be effected, 
the role of philosophy includes the clarification of those im-
mediate values between which a choice may be required. 
I come now to a final suggestion on the contribution that 
can be made by social and legal philosophy, which in turn sug-
gests a guideline for further effort. Philosophers often possess 
a companion qualification. Social philosophers may also be so-
cial scientists, legal philosophers also lawyers. In these com-
panion roles, they frequently have a sensitive awareness of 
man's accumulated experience with various techniques or instru-
ments of social ordering. Consequently. once critical value 
choices have been made by those to whom a society has committed 
the power to make effective decision, they may be able to sug-
gest some of the norms, institutions, and techniques that ex-
perience elsewhere has shown to be effective in maximizing the 
chosen values. Illustrative of such a contribution, familiar to 
all of you, is the Working Paper on the Rule of Law In a Free 
Society, prepared for the International Congress of Jurists that 
met in New Delhi in 1959. The authors of the Paper did not un-
dertake to postulate a set of objective, universally valid 
values, although they did indicate the belief that there is a 
widespread, though embryonic, consensus on "certain fundamental 
ideals concerning the purposes of organized society." With such 
a consensus assumed, they moved on to consider the "practical 
experience (of mankind) in terms of legal institutions, proce-
dures and traditions, by which these ideals may be given ef-
fect." This mediating role between the ideal and the practical, 
between value and legal or social techniques, is one that can be 
played fruitfully by the participants in such meetings as this. 
' 
' 
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In conclusion, may I leave one further thought with you. 
Our topic is "Law, Morality and Social Change." Understandably, 
our Program Committee has directed our attention toward the so-
called Third World--to Africa, Asia, and Latin America, where 
recently awakened demands have focused the world's attention on 
development processes. This is a proper emphasis, but I would 
balance it with this suggestion. Human efforts through law and 
other social institutions to mobilize and channel energies in 
the interest of economic development, cultural enrichment, and 
peaceful conflict resolution are not limited to the Third World. 
Poverty, disease, ignorance, and social unrest are world-wide. I 
am sustained by the hope, indeed the belief, that the insights 
we develop into the interplay of values, techniques of social 
ordering, and social change will be valid not only in Mali but 
in Mississippi, not only In Lagos but in Harlem. If this hope 
and belief are warranted, the age-old aspiration of the 
philosopher for the universal may yet in our own efforts be to 
some extent fulfilled. 
The Development of Law and Bwnan Riqhts in West Africa 
[The following talk was made on June 11, 1968 at the 
University of Iowa to the Midwest Conference of Fulbright 
Professors.] 
The subject assigned to me this morning is broad and com-
ple~, and I despair of saying anything profound about it. Since 
I shall remain well within my forty-minute allocation, however, 
I can assure you that what I say will not be prolonged. 
The suggested limitation of our discussion to West Africa 
is helpful. Beyond that, I shall limit the principal focus of my 
remarks to English-speaking West Africa, since that is the area 
I know best. Among the Anglophonic states, my own experience has 
been mainly in Ghana. The statement of these limitations sug-
gests, I think, a necessary general caveat. All generalizations 
about "Africa" are suspect. As analyses become more modest in 
scope, focusing on regional, or national, or sub-national-ethnic 
phenomena, they have progressively better chances of being 
sustainable. Consequently, I am strongly attracted to a rela-
tively narrow base for my comments. Perhaps I may be permitted 
the hunch, however, that the difficulties, disappointments, and 
longer-range hopes that one experiences in looking at law and 
human rights in Anglophonic West Africa would be quite similar 
to reactions induced by developments in many other parts of a 
vast, complex, and fascinating continent. 
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May I say a brief word to elucidate somewhat the rather 
large term -- human rights. Since the post-World War II years 
have seen the development of a number of international conven-
tions dealing with various "human rights," one might conclude 
that the term now embraces a fairly firm body of well-recognized 
claims of the individual, which have as their correlatives 
equally well-defined duties in other individuals, social groups, 
or governments. I am doubtful of the extent of shared agreement 
on these matters, however. For our purposes today, we need not 
pursue very far the search for certainty in the concept of 
"human rights." I shall take that term to include broadly two 
fundamental components: first, the right to political participa-
tion, to a significant involvement in determining the structure 
and composition of that government under which one is to live; 
and second, the right to reasonable freedom in order to engage 
in certain types of activity without which the right to politi-
cal participation cannot flourish and without which the in-
dividual human personality cannot develop and express itself 
creatively. Among these activities are speech in all its forms, 
assembly, and association. My concern today is with the rela-
tionship between law and these fundamental "human rights." 
Before turning to an analysis of the role legal institu-
tions can play in furthering human rights, as thus defined, it 
will be helpful to survey very briefly the relevant African ex-
perience. We need pause only briefly over the colonial period 
when the African peoples had their initial contacts with modern 
legal norms. It will suffice to observe that very little in the 
colonial experience could have suggested to the Africans that 
democratic participation or individual freedoms had much to do 
with law. Quite the contrary. Colonial power was essentially 
autocratic. Whatever altruistic motivations might have been 
claimed for it and however consistently it may have sought to 
work through and utilize traditional governmental functionaries 
who often had indigenous democratic roots, the law of the 
colonizers was imposed law, making no serious claim to demo-
cratic validation. It was law imposed for an exceedingly limited 
range of purposes -- preservation of peace and order, collection 
of taxes, and facilitation of such exploitative enterprises as 
might have been introduced to support the metropolitan economy. 
It is not surprising, therefore, that the Africans came to view 
law and legal institutions as the tools of a dominant power 
elite, used to serve the purposes and interests of that elite. 
There were, of course, certain countervailing influences in 
the colonial experience. Mission teaching spoke to some extent 
about individual values; African pupils and university students 
studied the British constitution and laws with their supporting 
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conventions of governmental restraint and responsibility; and on 
the eve of independence the colonial power undertook to implant 
formally democratic governmental institutions and safeguards for 
individual rights. These manifestations of colonialism's death-
bed repentance cannot blur the image or soften the impact of its 
life in Africa, however. I would suggest, therefore, that 
African perceptions of the relationship between law and human 
rights, as these perceptions were shaped by colonialism, provide 
little basis for early optimism that developing African law will 
accord a high priority to the protection of human rights. 
As I have suggested, the colonial powers, on the eve of 
their withdrawal from Africa, became far more concerned with a 
democratic underpinning for the independent African governments 
and with legal protection of human rights. All of the independ-
ence constitutions, to some extent negotiated but largely 
"granted" by the metropolitan powers, provided for democratical-
ly based governments and for some assurances of individual 
rights and liberties. Constitutional bills of rights sometimes 
appeared; minority interests were often protected by federal or 
regional structures; and efforts were made to balance and there-
by restrain governmental power centers. Whether these seeds, 
planted so late in unprepared soil, could have germinated and 
grown is questionable. That question has been rendered moot, 
however, by events. 
The ink was hardly dry on many of the independence consti-
tutions before efforts were begun to change them. Being imposed 
arrangements, the constitutional orders could claim little, if 
any, of the emotive support that gives great stability to the 
American and British constitutions. The new African constitu-
tions were alien, and they attempted restraints under which the 
new African leaders chaffed. Restraints, therefore, were soon 
removed by constitutional or legal processes, or simply ignored. 
The various governments of the new African states were charac-
terized by rapidly increasing authoritarianism, corruption, and 
ineffectiveness, This sums up what we may call Phase I of post-
independence West Africa. 
In many of the states of West Africa, Phase I has now been 
ended by military coups, which were accompanied often by public 
rejoicing. Phase II is the current period of military govern-
ment. In important respects, particularly with respect to 
economic rationality and the reduction of corruption, Phase II 
appears to be substantially better than the past. some of the 
military governments, especially that in Ghana, also have shown 
themselves to be far less inclined to political repression than 
their civil predecessors, They are, however, governments imposed 
by force of arms, without democratic legitimization, and it may 
-121-
be quite unrealistic to expect of them major innovations in the 
legal protection of human rights. 
out of these governments must come Phase III, the return of 
government to civilian hands under constitutional arrangements 
which, one hopes, will carry assurances of stable, decent, and 
effective government. To the potential role of legal institu-
tions in furthering respect for human rights during the next 
phase of governmental development in West Africa, I will turn 
now. In the few moments remaining to me, I will seek to make 
three points: first, that the African context is and will con-
tinue to be relatively unpropitious for the development of as-
sured human rights to either effective political participation 
or individual liberties; second, that the affirmative or crea-
tive role of law in furthering the development of human rights 
will be and can be relatively modest; and third, that despite 
the foregoing fairly pessimistic assessments, human experience 
in many countries has suggested certain techniques for use in 
the constitutional and legal order which can be helpful in the 
furtherance of human rights in societies committed to their 
preservation. 
First, let us consider the West African cultural matrix and 
its relationship to a modern state and a legally assured regime 
of individual human rights, In the West African societies, I 
have not discovered that strong and consistent strain of in-
dividualism which most obviously would foster effective demands 
for security of personal freedoms. Traditional African societies 
appear to be largely group-oriented -- to the family, the clan, 
or the tribe. Within these groups there are, to be sure, many 
manifestations of humane valves, including in many instances 
democratic underpinnings of traditional institutions of govern-
ment. But the individual as the locus of protected rights and 
freedoms does not emerge as he has in the developed societies of 
Western Europe and America. For this reason, the societal pres-
sures for individual rights of political participation and per-
sonal freedom are far less in the countries of West Africa than 
we would assume them to be in our own culture. 
Another factor which is far more prejudicial to the 
development of security for human rights than is the lack of in-
dividualism in indigenous societies is the absence in the new 
nation-states of unifying values and coherence at the national 
level. Colonialism in its classic form has almost ceased in 
Africa, but it has left its firm imprint on the face of the con-
tinent. The current nation-states are the pieces tumbled out of 
the colonial grab-bag. The lines that defined the various areas 
of metropolitan control were drawn without reference to 
topography, natural boundaries, or ethnic realities. Tribal 
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groups were split by colonial boundaries and their fra<Jlllents 
covered by the veneer of various metropolitan cultures, lan-
guages, and legal systems. As a consequence, each colony was a 
miscellany of indigenous ethnic grdbps with numerous traditional 
differences and even hostilities. 
During the colonial period, these diverse elements were 
held together by the firm hand of the metropolitan power. Little 
or no effort was made by the colonizers, however, to nurture 
among the African peoples perceptions of other unifying values 
that transcended their traditional cultural groups. When the 
unifying colonial power was withdrawn and national sovereignty 
was granted, the result was a collection of nation-states 
replete with strong, centrifugal forces related in one way or 
another to sub-national centers of allegiance and power. The 
classic example of the ultimate predominance of those forces is, 
of course, Nigeria. Even now, after a period of bloody civil 
war, it remains doubtful whether reunification of Nigeria in its 
immediate post-independence form can be achieved. 
To complete the picture, we must set off against the 
centrifugal forces of traditional loyalties and hostilities, the 
drives of national leaders to whom the fragile reins of power 
were handed by the departing colonialists. However the motiva-
tions of these leaders may have been diluted later by the per-
sonal gratification of power, I think we may assume that they 
were initially motivated, in part at least, by the perceived 
need to modernize their societies and economies. For this rea-
son, I think we may refer to most of this first generation of 
African leaders as part of a modernizing elite who saw govern-
mental and legal power as the crucial tools in the painful, ar-
duous tasks of moclernization and development. A modernizing 
elite with a shaky hand on the controls of national government 
and a society torn by centrifugal sub-national forces do not 
create a felicitous matrix for the development of expanding 
political participation, for counterbalancing power centers, or 
for security in the exercise of individual freedoms of speech, 
association, or assembly. Increasingly political opposition has 
been equated with treason. Opponents were bought off, forced 
into exile, or jailed. constitutions were amended to unify power 
at the center: laws were enacted to control association and the 
expression of ideas. Paralyzed by growing fears of their inter-
nal opponents and their external enemies, the African govern-
ments have ,ailed to meet effectively the demands of their 
people for some relief from the grinding pressure of poverty and 
disease. The disappointed expectations of the people have been 
matched only ~y the conspicuous and wasteful indulgence of the 
leaders. It was into this unhappy situation that the armies and 
police forces have moved in recent years in most of the West 
African states. 
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As I have suggested earlier, the military-police coups, 
however odious thef may be to most of us, have effec~ed certain 
improvements. Particularly has thif been true in Ghana where the 
National Liberation Council has governed, as best one can tell, 
honestly and humanely and already has produced a draft constitu-
tion for a return to civilian government. But the Phase II 
governments in West Africa have not been able, and will not be 
able, to resolve over a short period all of the obstacles to 
stable and decent government. Sub-national loyalties and tradi-
tional hostilities still exist; political leaders and civil ser-
vants of ability and inteqrity are still in short supply; the 
cultural set that equates institutionalized opposition or even 
criticism to disloyalty is still present; and the hard economic 
facts make significantly greater satisfaction of the needs and 
desires of the people seem remote indeed. For these reasons, I 
continue to regard West African circumstances, in general, as 
relatively unfavorable for the development of a regime of human 
rights firmly secured by the laws of stable governments. 
My second proposition, applicable generally and not merely 
in West Africa, is that the initiating or creative role of law 
in developing human rights is modest indeed. In my view there is 
a tendency in many societies to expect more of law and legal in-
stitutions than they can be expected realistically to produce. 
We see this in the inclination of many legislative bodies in 
this country to respond to a wide variety of difficult social 
problems by enacting laws, often penal in character. We see it 
also in the recurrent inclination to rely somewhat naively on 
constitutional arrangements, such as bills of human rights, for 
assurance that decent relations between officialdom and the 
citizen will be maintained. I do not want to sound too pes-
simistic, nor do l want to ascribe to law an unduly passive 
role. Law is an important, perhaps the most important, technique 
of social ordering available. Into that technique can be built 
different value acceptances. In looking at law -- whether at the 
fundamental constitutional level, at the level of statutory 
enactment, of executive regulation, or of the day-to-day conduct 
of officials -- it is always appropriate and often enlightening 
to inquire: what values have been accepted for implementation by 
the law in question. 
It is obviously important from our perspective that the 
value of the individual human personality and the value of in-
dividual self-expression through speech, assembly, and associa-
tion, as essential instruments in shaping the government under 
which a people lives, be reflected in the legal order. While 
recognizing that importance, however, we should impose certain 
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restraints on our expectations from the legal order. Legal in-
stitutions are in a sense empty vessels into which various kinds 
of value acceptances can be poured~If humane values are poured 
in, whether by an elite which has JIOnopolized control of the 
legal order or by a broad democratic consensus, this is a step 
in the right direction. It is only a step, however, for there 
can be and often is a wide g~p between the values formally 
stated in constitution, statute, or regulation and the values 
actually implemented at the innumerable points of contact be-
tween official actors and the citizen. Being essentially a prag-
matist, I am far more concerned with this operational level than 
with the pious posturing of formal enactment. some of man's 
grossest inhwnanity to man has occurred through official action 
in societies whose constitutions solemnly affirmed the fundamen-
tal rights of man, as has the Soviet Unions's constitution for 
many years. 
We must recognize, therefore, that the achievement of law 
does not necessitate any assured protection of human rights. 
Similarly, law which formally incorporates humane values still 
may be totally ineffective, for law is not self-executing. Its 
execution, its effectiveness, depends on the attitudes of offi-
cial actors and on the attitudes, expectations, indeed the 
demands, of the citizens. The view I am suggesting was clearly 
stated last year by the editors of West Africa, commenting on a 
proposed new constitution for Sierra Leone. They said: "There is 
a tendency to assume that constitutional provisions in them-
selves can safeguard liberty, whatever the intention of powerful 
politicians. Experience elsewhere suggests that in the end 
politicians will have their way unless people at large are 
vigilant. • (West Africa, January 28, 1967, p. 124). 
One addition must be made to this observation. The 
vigilance of the people will help to control the politicians, 
but thought must also be given to the leaders of the armed 
forces and police. These agencies often retain a discipline and 
coherence greater than most other power centers in the society, 
as bas been the case in West Africa, and, most importantly, they 
monopolize the instruments of violence that can, for a time at 
least, intimidate and control even a vigilant population. There-
fore, we need to recognize that the effectiveness of any legal 
order and of the values built into it, depends ultimately on the 
po~ ratios within the society. If the pattern of military-
police coups which bas recently characterized West Africa con-
tin.ues, if the return of the soldiers and police to their bar-
racks is regarded as temporary -- until civil government again 
displeases -- the significance of the established legal order 
and of its implicit values is seriously compromised. 
-125-
I can end my comments on my second proposition on a happier 
note, however. While generalization is hazardous, most of the 
West African coups have overthrown governments whose abandonment 
of humane values and basic human rights was reasonably clear. 
That abandonment has been in some significant measure an induc-
ing cause of the military-police intervention. Thus, one might 
conclude that the military-pqlice regimes have been thus far 
firmer supporters of humane values and human rights than their 
civil predecessors. If the military-police regimes retain power 
or periodically reassert it, however, and, in doing so, if they 
deny basic human rights, I am persuaded that even such regimes 
of overt force ultimately can and will be subverted and replaced 
by any society whose commitment to human dignity and freedom is 
clear and" consistent. Thus, I conclude this strand of my argu-
ment: the affirmative, creative role with respect to human 
rights is not for the law itself but for the people. If the 
people play that role and present their demands with firmness, 
clarity, and vigilance, they will be able to incorporate the ap-
propriate values into the legal order and assure that those 
values are realized as the legal order makes contact with the 
citizens. 
I turn now to my third proposition which I may dispose of 
with a brief summary. The proposition is that experience in many 
societies has identified a number of constitutional and legal 
techniques which can be functional to the end of assuring that 
governmental power does not deny unduly the claims of citizens 
for effective political participation and individual rights. I 
will offer examples, not an exhaustive catalog. Prominent among 
these techniques is a constitutional bill of rights with juridi-
cal status. The effectiveness of this device depends in turn 
upon the existenc.e of an independent, competent and courageous judiciary through whose decisions, on the complaints of ag-
grieved citizens, the powers and actions of legislative bodies 
and executive officers can be restrained properly. 
This role for the judiciary can be generalized, of course, 
into a broad principle of checks and balances. In the circum-
stances of most, if not all, of the West African countries, the 
application of this principle is difficult and indeed may appear 
hazardous. Checks and balances may seem to compromise the 
ability of government to act decisively and with dispatch to 
meet needs of the greatest urgency. Significant balancing power 
centers may represent strong centrifugal tendencies that could 
threaten the very existence of a national polity. These dangers 
are real, and the devising of checks and balances, which go far 
enough but not too far, will require great wisdom and probably 
much trial and error. 
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The Austrian economist and political theorist, Friedrich 
Hayek, identified the Rule of Law with reliance on hard, 
specific rules and the total absenc.e of discretionary powers in 
official hands. I think that view i,, its qenerality is unsound, 
but I shall not pause for a detailed refutation. In fact, Hayek 
offered a half-truth, and I will try to suqqest the valid half. 
The enemy of the Rule of Law is not the existence of discretion-
ary powers, but the allocation of uncontrolled discretion to of-
ficials, usually executive officers. This thouqht suqqests two 
specific leqal techniques for helpinq to assure that official 
action stays within appropriate bounds. The first is the in-
sistence, firmly backed by controls which can be invoked by the 
citizen, that every official be required to establish in a clear 
enactaent of law his authority to act. The second is the in-
sistence, where an official has been authorized by law to act in 
his discretion, that the discretion be circumscribed by an offi-
cial statement of the standards which are to qovern its ex-
ercise. These techniques do not unduly restrict the deleqation 
of authority, even discretionary authority, to officials. They 
do provide, however, some assurance aqainst action without any 
authority in law and some basis for the review of actions 
claimed to be taken within the scope of official discretion. 
Perhaps the most important prerequisite to the establish-
ment in West Africa of stable qovernments under which a reqime 
of hwaan riqhts assured by law can be developed is discernible 
proqress of the qovernments in meeting the urqent and leqitimate 
demands of their people for improved conditions in health, edu-
cation and economic opportunity. Whatever their own merits, the 
African qovernments on their own cannot achieve that proqress in 
sufficient measure. They need the moral and material support of 
the developed, affluent nations of both West and East. 
The record of the developed world thus far in respondinq to 
the needs of Africa is disquietinq, but that is a subject for 
another day. 
FRRBIXBI, UlfIVBRSI'l'Y ARD I.Alf 
TllB LEGAL STATUS OP ACADBllIC PRBBllrlJI Df TllB UllIVBRSITIBS OP 
BLA.C1t APRICA 
[In 1975, I was invited by the Faculty of Law of the 
University of Laqos to deliver a series of lectures on an endow-
ment honorinq the late J.I.c. Taylor, Justice of the supreme 
Court of Niqeria and later Chief Justice of Laqos State. There 
beinq no transmitted tradition of academic freedom in the new 
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universities of formerly British Africa, I decided to explore 
that subject, beqinning with some rudimentary analysis of the 
concept that would have been unnecessary in speaking to an Amer-
ican audience. The lectures were presented on November 15, 16 
and 17, 1976.] 
The lingering twilight of the colonial era and the hopeful 
dawn of freedom from alien rule saw the birth of a number of 
universities in sub-Saharan Africa. These infant institutions, 
and freqUently political and governmental leaders as well, ac-
corded a high priority to the development of law faculties to 
educate professionals for both governmental service and private 
practice. This primacy was dramatically illustrated in 1961 when 
President Julius Nyerere assigned to the new University College 
in Dar es Salaam the building just completed as headquarters for 
TAHU, the President's political party, so as to permit the 
Faculty of Law to begin its work without delay and thereby to 
become the first division of the University of East Africa es-
tablished in Tanganyika. These events in recent memory, and 
their significant continuing implications, suggest the dominant 
themes in these lectures: freedom, universities and law. We will 
explore the nature and mission of a university, particularly in 
the context of the new sovereignties of Anglophone Africa; the 
dimensions of that special freedom without which the univer-
sity's nature cannot be realized or its mission accomplished; 
and the role of legal institutions in securing that critical 
range of liberty. 
our discussion will address a question far more modest than 
the legitimate entitlement to freedom of each individual, 
grounded on his humanity. Indeed, it will analyze and assess a 
unique claim advanced by a limited group of persons on the basis 
of their function in a specialized institution -- a university. 
Therefore, it seems essential at the beginning of the analysis 
to inquire into the purpose of that institution. If the relevant 
claim to freedom is properly limited to a subset of human 
beings, its ultimate validation must rest on the peculiar needs 
presented by the claimants' institutional setting in order for 
them and the institution to function effectively to the achieve-
ment of their own purposes or mission. 
An extensive international literature on the mission of a 
university reveals a broad spectrum of agreement on two basic 
functions: to transmit the accumulated body of knowledge and, 
through continuing enquiry, to refine and extend it. We would, I 
suspect, agree on the primacy of these functions while recogniz-
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ing that their postulation implicitly raises but does not 
resolve a number of recurrent, complex, and important questions 
which we cannot hope to explore fully here. We may not, however, 
pass them entirely unnoticed. ~ 
When we speak easily of the university's function of trans-
mitting knowledge, of its teaching role, what distinctions, if 
any, are we prepared to accept between university teaching and 
that which properly characterizes the lower schools and other 
institutions? Is it the function of a university to orient its 
teaching proqram to shaping the character of its students and to 
instilling in them a commitment to the dominant current values 
of the society, or is such teaching responsibility properly 
remitted to the home, church, school, or sectarian association, 
rather than to a university? Where is the proper balance in 
university teaching between fact transmission (at progressively 
more advanced levels) and development of skills and insights 
into modes of enquiry and into the processes of critical judg-
ment? Does a university distort its mission or imperil its 
basic identity if it develops teaching programs to prepare its 
students for particular professional or vocational roles? 
These are important and sometimes difficult questions, and 
one's response to them influences significantly his attitude 
toward our central concern -- the appropriate freedom of 
teachers and scholars in a university. To avoid trying your 
patience unduly, however, I will suggest only briefly, and 
largely without supporting analysis, the views which shape my 
own answers to these questions and, consequently, my attitudes 
on certain of the basic themes of these lectures. 
Despite prestigious countervailing examples -- particularly 
Oxford and Callbri4ge Universities until a relatively few years 
ago -- molding the character of its students to socially ap-
proved patterns and inculcating accepted values are not a 
university's primary tasks. Indeed, aside from certain values 
that are truly central to the pursuit and dissemination of 
knowledge, I would suggest that they are not properly included 
in the institution's role-definition .• Character formation and 
basic socialization involve the postulation of values -- and 
therefore of faith, belief, indeed, of preference -- and not of 
knowledge. Even if a social, economic, and political consensus 
could be found1 a university's acceptance of the role of 
propagator would smack of indoctrination, not that of objective 
pursuit of knowledge and constant challenge to and re-testing of 
accepted truths which seem to me the central mission of a 
university. 
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Rejection of an essentially parietal role can be supported 
by the university on further pragmatic grounds. I retain the 
gravest doubts that much in the way of character formation or 
socialization remains to be done, er can be done effectively, at 
the ages when students typically begin university. Modern 
psychiatry has suggested that a child's character is basically 
set in infancy, and by the t~me a person enters the doors of a 
university his basic view of himself, his world, and the rela-
tion between them is fixed. One would not deny, of course, that 
some shaping influences may be exerted within the university en-
viromnent. Many university teachers, by their examples of 
honesty, diligence, and human sympathy, have left deep imprints 
on their students. In the main, however, I suspect that such in-
fluences, when effective, serve to reinforce existing commit-
ments. FUrthermore, influencing character and value attitudes 
through the examples of individual teachers differs radically 
from an effort to exert a similar influence undertaken by the 
institution itself. 
It would be fatuous to insist on a sharp, absolute cleavage 
between the responsibilities of the schools and the university 
for learning in the sense of fact acquisition. The student who 
assumes that he brings with him from the schools all the facts 
he needs for his university career will doubtless find that 
career quite brief. While recognizing, therefore, that fact ac-
quisition -- at progressively higher and more complex levels --
remains an important emphasis in the university, we may still 
insist on profoundly important differences between the schools 
and a university in responsibility for dealing with the corpus 
of factual knowledge. The university's institutional respon-
sibility for extending that corpus -- the research role to which 
we will turn sho?1:ly -- inevitably sharpens an awareness of the 
ever-shifting content of the body of reliable knowledge and 
reflects itself in the teaching program in greater emphasis on 
modes of inquiry, the ways in whi.ch knowledge is sought and 
validated, and on the processes of critical judgment. Just as 
the student entering from his school must recognize that he will 
continue to learn facts, so the university graduate must recog-
nize that much he has learned will be superseded by new 
knowledge, perhaps within a relatively brief time. While few 
graduates will function at the true research level and through 
their own efforts open wider the curtains of ignorance or mis-
conception, all should be aware of and sympathetic to this proc-
ears. Also, at a mundane but important level, the un,iversity's 
teaching program should have prepared each graduate to seek out, 
marshal and use the factual knowledge - -new and old -- that he 
needs in his own life and work. 
Finally, at this summary level, may I comment briefly on a 
matter made relevant largely by the great influence of English 
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universities on those in Africa -- the university's role in 
teaching for career or vocational preparation. I take it that 
those who have abjured job- or vocation-oriented teaching at the 
university level are not denying thtt utility of knowledge, the 
processes of its acquisition, or critical judgment in the prac-
tical work of the world. Rather, they are insisting that the 
university should occupy the high plane of general knowledge and 
should leave to lesser institutions the preparation of young 
people for particular vocations. Such specialization of mission, 
leading inevitably to the proliferation of teaching institu-
tions, does not seem to me dictated by the non-negotiable nature 
of a university. Prudent utilization of scarce resources and the 
desire for high quality in professional and vocational education 
argue for the university's participation in it. 
Perhaps I may illustrate my view by a few comments on 
education for the profession of law. Hon-university institutions 
in England assumed responsibility for the education and training 
of lawyers at an early stage of history. Even when the older 
English universities began instruction in law, it was con-
ceptualized as general, non-professional education for un-
dergraduates who might or might not go on to the Inns of Court 
(or to a solicitor's office) for professional qualification. 
Even on this restricted basis, however, law teaching in a 
university did not seem to many academics entirely respectable. 
The effort to achieve a "proper" university status for law study 
had a marked influence on curriculum. Subjects readily related 
to traditional, respected parts of the university curriculum --
for example, Roman Law and jurisprudence - -were welcomed. But 
Taxation, Company Law or Civil Procedure were banned in earlier 
times from the university, since these involved only "practical" 
training. 
Instruction in law and the attitudes of law teachers in ox-
ford and Cambridge have changed substantially since the earlier 
period, but acceptance of responsibility for truly professional 
education still has not reached the point that would seem 
desirable. Why is instruction in the subject matter of a parti-
cular profession appropriate for a university and how does its 
university home influence such instruction? 
The argument might be pursued at many levels, but I will 
abbreviate it by continuing to focus on education in law. First, 
:may I emphasizer my profound agreement with one premise of the 
earlier Oxbridge position. Instruction related to the origin, 
development, and current functioning of law and legal institu-
tions should not be the monopoly of a professional school or a 
group of pre-professional students. one of the most challenging 
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and illuminating studies for any educated person deals with the 
basic structure of public order and the pattern of restraints 
through which social energies are channeled and directed. The 
sociologist, political scientist, economist or philosopher can 
learn much that is germane to his own discipline by studying the 
institutions of the law. 
I am entirely willing, however, to argue the case for a 
university home for law, even if we think only of the education 
of professionals. At its best, legal education is not mere 
learning of legal rules and craft skills. It is an intellectual-
ly challenging exploration of the genesis and growth of basic 
social institutions. It can and should bring to bear in a 
focused context the substantive insights and some of the 
methodologies of the social sciences and humanistic disciplines. 
Good legal education develops intellectual rigor, analytical 
power, and the habit of objective, critical judgment. By accom-
modating it in the university, institutional standards need not 
be lowered nor its mission distorted. The study of law can be 
enriched and deepened by the influences of the social sciences 
and humanities in a university environment. At the same time, 
the general intellectual life of the university can be streng-
thened through the contributions of teachers and students of 
law. 
Lest these claims for the rightful place of law in the 
university's program of teaching and scholarship be discounted 
as mere expressions of guild pride, let me concede J;'eadily that 
legal education can forfeit its entitlement to university 
status. If its teaching becomes mere rote-learning of rules and 
doctrine or drills in craft skills, if its study is abstracted 
from the cultural, economic and political life of the society, 
if it contents itself with mapping the flat plane of positive 
law without subjecting that law to critical judgement on the 
standards of internal coherence, social utility, or the elusive 
but eternal quest for justice, it has no proper place in an in-
stitution entitled to be called a university. 
The claim of law, properly studied and taught. to a 
respected place in the life and work of a university can with 
proper adaptation of the argument be sustained for other fields 
with a pr0fessional or vocational orientation. Medicine, nurs-
ing, agricul'ture, the organization and management of economic 
ente~.~se and governmental institutions enjoy a similar entit-
lement if the.ir intellectual content is explored and their stu-
dents are encouraged to bring to their study enquiring minds and 
critical jud~ents. Especially is this true, I believe, in the 
new nations of Africa where the content of curricula has been 
shaped unduly by uncritical acceptance of foreign models. Even 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
l 
l : 
l 
l 
L 
L 
L 
l 
l 
f 
l 
I 
-132-
if concern for quality and relevance to local circumstances did 
not press so urgently for university responsibility in education 
for various professions, economic factors would do so. Prolifer-
ation of narrowly specialized teaching institutions exacts costs 
that should be avoided if critical educational needs can be met 
in other ways. 
Let us turn now to the second function of a university 
reflected in the broad consensus mentioned earlier. Despite the 
easy lip service paid to the research function, it too raises 
some difficult questions. What is research? Do all members of 
the university's academic staff share some responsibility for 
pursuing it in support of the institutional mission? And, cru-
cially, what is the proper balance between the research and 
teaching coaponents of the university's responsibilities? Even 
in the older universities, these questions recurrently pose dif-
ficulties: they have a special cogency, however, in the new 
universities of Africa. 
In its purest and most advanced form, research is the pur-
suit of truly new knowledge through hypothesis, testing, and 
validation to that level of strong probability which seems to be 
the practical limit of the human mind. So conceived, research 
will make effective claims on the time and energies of relative-
ly few of the members of a university faculty, for only a few 
possess the quality of mind, commitment, and, in many institu-
tions, the practical facilities required for pure research. Pos-
sibly this is as it should be, for pursuit of pure research ex-
acts high costs. Work at the real frontiers of knowledge demands 
an •xtreme specialization, a narrowing of focus to sharpen the 
probe into the unknown, and a singleness of purpose that may 
preclude other work, reasonable leisure, and a social or family 
life. ortega y Gasset, the Spanish social critic, conceiving re-
search (in his terms "science") in this pure form, regarded it 
as an activity that surrounds, sustains, and illuminates the 
central mission of the university (transmission of culture and 
training for the professions). He argued, however, that society 
needs few pure researchers, so that few need be trained for re-
search: he thought that few people have a real aptitude for it: 
and ha proposed the somewhat acerbic but probably not un-
reali&tic premise that most true researchers are poor teachers, 
that combining the roles of teacher and researcher is unwise. 
Whether such views as these can be sustained in all times for 
all universities, it is more clearly arguable that at this time 
in the relatively young African universities, pure research is 
not a responsibility comparable to the teaching function. Re-
search is costly, particularly in the physical sciences, but 
also in the social sciences if many of the modern techniques of 
investigation are used. FUrther, a research orientation nurtures 
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specialization, not simply to a single discipline but often to a 
narrow set of problems within a discipline. Therefore, a strong 
university orientation to pure research may be reflected in a 
curriculum unduly characterized byt0ne-subject honors degrees. 
Further, stress on the development in students of sophisticated 
research competences may leave them on graduation fitted actual-
ly or in their self-conceptiops only for careers in which no 
relevant opportunities exist in their own societies. Considering 
this range of problems, Lord Ashby has suggested that now and 
for the foreseeable future the prime need that Africa addressed 
to its universities is for the broadly-educated graduate capable 
of manning the civil service, the schools, and the professions, 
rather than research scientists. In broad measure, I would share 
this view and would regret an uncritical emulation of English, 
American or European universities in their research COJIUllitments. 
In one respect, however, the desirability of a major re-
search role for the African universities seems entirely clear. 
In the pursuit of knowledge of the history and cultures of the 
African people and of the physical and biological environment of 
Africa, scholars in the new universities there have special 
responsibilities and opportunities. Recognizing these and with 
prudent management of their own resources, the African univer-
sities can play their proper role in adding to the stock of 
world knowledge. 
Thus far I have spoken of pure research whose success adds 
some new datum, great or small, to mankind's knowledge. If we 
abjure puristic limitations, however, and include within re-
search continuous inquiry that serves to master existing and 
ever-growing knowledge, that attempts new assimilations in order 
to produce clearer insights into critical relationships or new 
applications for the improveaent of man's lot, we have defined a 
research role in which a larger S8C)Jlent of a university faculty 
can participate. Such research is not only an indispensable sup-
port for a vital teaching proqram. It also lessens the risk of 
unduly narrow specialized courses and degree syllabuses and it 
more rtaadily facilitates the university's response to the cur-
rent pressing problems and needs of its surrounding society. In 
the house of the university there are many mansions, and I am 
not prepared to assign to this one less dignity, worth. or 
entitleaent to recognition among the major institutional roles 
than to pure research. 
With this brief survey we have treated the roles or mis-
sions of a university that are reflected in the broadest con-
sensus. Though perhaps more usually ascribed, at least in the 
United States, to the individual faculty member than to the 
university itself, another frequently mentioned function is 
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"service." The ambiguity of this ascription is not significantly 
reduced by the usual gloss specifying service to the "nation, 
region, or local community" or, with emphasis on the role of the 
individual faculty member, service to the university itself. 
For its well-being, growth, and development, the university 
as an institution needs many services. Among the most sig-
nificant are the services of its non-academic staff, but our 
concern with the expectation of service focuses on the members 
of the faculty. What obligation to serve the university is a 
non-negotiable part of the obligation of each faculty member? 
The answer I find most readily acceptable is that the fundamen-
tal service responsibility of a member of the academic staff is 
met by teaching and research activities and by participation in 
those deliberative processes of the institution through which 
the teaching and research programs are defined, refined, and im-
proved. If the university is entitled to expect from each 
faculty member some further range of service to the institution, 
the resulting diversion of time and effort from the basic 
faculty roles can be extremely costly in terms of quality, may 
demand talents which the committed teacher-scholar does not pos-
sess, and may succeed in making faculty status less attractive 
than it should be. 
May I offer a single example? In every university in which 
I have served, there have been indications from time to time, 
fortunately always within manageable proportions, that some mem-
bers of the university community viewed the law faculty as a 
pool of legal talent upon which other members of the faculty, 
perhaps students as well, and certainly the university itself 
should be able to call as problems requiring the services of an 
attorney arose. On occasion I have responded to such requests 
for legal services, as I know many faculty members have, and I 
would be distressed by an assertion that my individual decision 
to render such service was incompatible with my responsibility 
as a faculty member. I would be even more distressed, however, 
by an assertion that by virtue of my status as a faculty member, 
I had an institutional responsibility to render this service. In 
my view, the faculty member fully discharges his institutional 
service obligation by rendering a high-quality performance in 
teaching and research and in participating in the work of the 
various university agencies through which deliberations and 
decisions concerning research and teaching take place. 
Fortunately, many faculty members, presumably voluntarily and 
reflecting their own interests and perceptions of competence, do 
go further and help to meet a wide variety of service needs that 
arise in the institution. 
If one shifts attention from the individual faculty member 
to the university itself and asks what the service function of 
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the university is, I find myself again most comfortable with the 
view that the university's service to its society is simply the 
sum or product of its teaching and research missions. I doubt 
the wisdom of regarding a university as a general purpose social 
welfare agency, available on call to meet an infinite variety of 
social, governmental or business needs to which trained manpower 
must be deployed. As the university permits its role to expand 
beyond teaching and research to activist roles in addressing 
specific problems, devising programs, and implementing them, it 
runs an undue risk, in my judgment, of diverting its best 
energies from its fundamental roles and, through activist com-
mitment, of compromising that detachment from the marketplace, 
the legislative halls, and the executive offices which nurtures 
objectivity. 
Clark Kerr's generally approving analysis of the modern 
American "multiversity" reveals clearly how far many institu-
tions in the United States have moved from the views I have ex-
pressed on the proper service function of a university. As 
organizer of cultural events and athletic spectacles, as a 
custodial "foster home" for many young people who have little 
interest in education but are not needed in the labor market, as 
a source of researchers, advisers, planners and executives 
available on call from government and the great corporations, 
many American universities have grown in size, complexity, and 
in the scope of the financial resources they marshal and expend 
to the point where many have lost any integrating sense of com-
munity, requiring for their efficient functioning a massive 
bureaucracy far removed from teaching or scholarship. I would 
not deny the reality of certain practical benefits from this 
proliferation of university functions. It would be prudent, how-
ever, to keep in mind the indictment presented by many of the 
student protesters of the 1960s that the universities had become 
simply uncritical servants or partners of government and busi-
ness in preserving the status quo. Those protests asserted that 
the universities owed something more and different to society--
particularly an on-going, penetrating critique of the social or-
der, illuminated by advancing knowledge and humanistic values--
and I agree. 
Do the circumstances of the recently independent countries 
of Africa and their universities warrant assigning to them a 
broader service function than that I have suggested? The argu-
ment for doing so would stress the urgent need for rapid prog-
ress in attacking poverty, disease, and ignorance and in 
developing governmental and private institutional structures 
that are functional to these tasks, and would point cogently to 
the widespread shortage of educated manpower and the general ab-
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sence of institutions, other than the universities, that can 
respond to these pervasive social problems. The views developed 
during the years I have lived and worked in Africa and African 
universities avoid, I hope, the absolutist fallacy of insisting 
that the university and its faculty should reject all tasks that 
cannot be justified strictly in terms of their traditional func-
tions of teaching and scholarship. They are characterized less 
by rigid lines between the proper and improper than by certain 
cautions to guide particular decisions. 
African governmental and political leaders have consistent-
ly expressed an expectation that the universities, supported by 
scarce public resources, will join actively in the effort to im-
prove the quality of life of the people. The statement by Presi-
dent Nyerere of Tanzania at the inauguration of the University 
of East Africa is typical: 
The University Colleges which comprise this Univer-
sity cannot be islands, filled with people who live 
in a world of their own, looking on with academic 
objectivity or indifference at the activities of 
those outside. East Africa cannot spend millions of 
pounds, cannot beg and borrow for the University, 
unless it plays a full and active part in the ur-
gent tasks of East Africa. Even if it were desirable, 
we are too poor in money and educated manpower to 
support an ivory tower existence for an intellectual 
elite. 
Our problems will not wait. We must, and do, demand 
that this University take an active part in the so-
cial revolution we are engineering. 
In similar vein, President Houphouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast: 
But our tasks are too pressing and our time too 
limited for us to rely on the slow process of the 
creation of an elite through universal and largely 
disinterested methods of instruction. Problems of 
political, economic, and cultural development of 
our societies, and the raising of the standard of 
living constitute immediate objectives which re-
quire us to enlist the help of all the institu-
tions of our states and, more particularly, those 
whose mission it is to prepare the finest elements 
of the young for the immense tasks expected of them. 
Our university must, then, in addition to its tradi-
tional role, put at the disposal of the nation men 
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and women who possess the technical knowledge that 
will permit them to participate fully and usefully 
in the economic and social development of the country. 
~-
There is no doubt that in speaking thus to the universities, 
these political leaders are voicing views widely held in their 
societies. 
While one might respond forcefully and truthfully that a 
university and its faculty contribute to the solution of 
society's problems and can further a social revolution while 
remaining within the parameters of their basic functions of 
teaching and scholarship, it is clear that more is being asked 
and, within limits difficult to define and sometimes hazardous 
to defend, more must be given. I will not argue, therefore, that 
the African universities should respond to the imperatives of 
development only through their basic roles in teaching and re-
search, but I would suggest certain lines for use in defining 
the university's role that are crossed only at great cost to the 
university and to the society. 
First, even those who demand most eloquently that the 
university participate actively in programs of social, economic 
and political development probably recognize certain priorities 
in allocating the university's resources. First and foremost are 
those functions uniquely assigned to the university -- teaching 
and research. If these are imperiled in their appropriate 
quantity or quality by the diversion of faculty time and effort 
to other activities, however worthwhile, the society suffers. 
Sound, longer-range development is sacrificed for limited im-
mediate gains. When considering the wisdom of responding to re-
quests for service activities beyond the basic functions, there-
fore, the prudent university administration or faculty member 
will weigh carefully the impact of an affirmative response on 
the institution's ability to perform creditably the tasks it was 
established primarily to perform. 
Second, there are, I believe, certain constraints on ex-
ternal activism that are imposed by the basic mission of a 
university, if its integrity is to be maintained. lmplicit in a 
university's search for knowledge and in its effort to develop 
in students a capacity for objective enquiry, analysis, and 
judgment is an inevitable tension with the surrounding society. 
The established mores, the conventional wisdom, the current 
political programs and their ideologies, all must be within the 
range of the university's on-going critique. This view of the 
university's role underlies the cryptic observation of David 
Star Jordan many years ago that society has the right to expect 
the scholar to serve as the antidote to the demagogue. 
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Fortunate]y, a similar attitude has found expression in the 
African context. In the address quoted earlier, President 
Nyerere observed: ·· 
In all its research and teaching the University of East 
Africa must be as objective and scientific as is humanly 
possible. It must work against prejudice of all kinds, 
searching always for that elusive thing -- truth. It is in 
this manner that the University will contribute to our 
development, because the fight against prejudice is vital 
for progress in any field. In this fight the University 
must take an active part, outside as well as inside the 
walls. And this may mean standing out against the expressed 
beliefs of the majority, for prejudices are the point to 
which men retreat when the real problems are tough and 
when they are not prepared to face the implications of 
their personal or community difficulties. 
The path of the university and its faculty in Africa, and indeed 
in most parts of the world, in pursuing the course pointed out 
by President Nyerere will be a thorny one. But it must not be 
abandoned. 
Calls upon the universities to assume activist roles in 
fur- thering programs of social change frequency imply, and 
sometimes explicitly demand, commitment to a particular ideol-
ogy, political faith, or economic order. An Asian Prime Minister 
declared in the University of Lagos some years ago that "the in-
tellectual elite must march in step with the political elite, 
otherwise momentum will be lost." To the same effect, Ghana's 
Minister of Education in 1965 assured the University of 
"generous and unstinted support" if it fulfilled its obligations 
"with scrupulous loyalty and devotion to the cause of our Party 
and Country." Whatever the personal political views of in-
dividual faculty members may be -- and no one can rightfully ex-
pect that the university teacher-scholar will be a political 
eunuch -- I would suggest that neither a university nor its 
faculty members can unquestioningly "march in step" with a 
political elite or demonstrate "scrupulous loyalty and devotion" 
to the cause of a political party and still perform with in-
tegrity their basic functions. 
At a less focused and more subtle level, however, even when 
institutional loyalty to an ideology is not at issue, active 
participation in devising and implementing programs can imperil 
objectivity and the development of critical judgment. The 
faculty member who serves as a political adviser to a governmen-
tal agency or private corporation or who assumes operational 
t 
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responsibility for a particular program has in some measure put 
at hazard his ability to treat that policy or program and its 
underlying assumptions with full objectivity. Whether the pos-
sible loss reflects a calculated, prudential protection of his 
own investment or merely the intrinsic limits of the human mind, 
the university teacher-scholar should recognize the risk that 
the commitments of his extra-curricular activism may affect, 
possibly prejudice, his university role and obligation. Not all 
external undertakings are fungible, of course, and vitally im-
portant discriminations can be made on the basis of the extent 
to which an external role can be expected to impose constraints 
on continuing analysis and criticism. In some instances the 
probable constraints may counsel rejection of the role; in all, 
1
\ 
they warrant careful assessment before the role is assumed. 
One cannot overestimate the difficulty -- often the hazard 
-- for the African university and its faculty in defining and 
defending their position on service beyond the traditional func-
tions of internal teaching and research. Failure to respond to 
pressing needs and demands may invite condemnation of academic 
elitism and ivory tower detachment. Response may imperil the 
quality of the university's performance of its unique missions. 
And if that mission, including its expression in a penetrating 
critique of dominant values and programs, is well performed, the 
risks of hostility to and sanctions against the university and 
its faculty are ever present. Even President Nyerere, in the l 
thoughtful address to which I have referred, after asserting the , 
university's responsibility to press its search for truth into a 
critique of dominant attitudes, recognized great hazards: 
I know I am asking a great deal of the University 
of East Africa. I am asking its members to be both 
objective and active -- which is a difficult combin-
ation. What is more, I am asking this under circum-
stances in which I know that both are liable to 
give rise to some misunderstanding with the govern-
ment and people. This will be reduced if there is 
complete honesty, but courage end self-sacrifice 
may be demanded from all of us, including the uni-
versity members. Because I cannot claim that I, any 
more than my colleagues, will never mistake honest 
criticism for unconstitutional opposition. Nor can I 
honestly promise that our need for national unity 
in the struggles ahead will never lead us into the 
error of abusing the nonconformist. I hope we shall 
not make these mistakes, but of only one thing I am 
quite certain. The basis of human progress through-
out history has been the existence of people, who 
regardless of the consequences to themselves, stood 
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up when they believed it necessary, and said "That, 
is wrong: this is what we should do .••• "If we 
know that the world is round we must say so, even 
if the majority of our people may still think that 
it is flat. 
Any invitation to soar to the sky involves the hazard of plum-
meting painfully to the earth. Great honesty demands great 
courage, and even the courageous may suffer. 
The outline I have sketched of a particular social institu-
tion contains little or nothing that is novel: it adheres close-
ly to the basic concept of a university as this has developed 
through nearly a millennium in the Western tradition. Within 
that concept there is ample room for institutional diversity. A 
university in one of the new countries of Africa, as in every 
other society, will and should respond to the particular needs, 
values, aspirations, and opportunities of its own social set-
ting. It does so, however, within the constraints set by its 
basic mission if, in the words of Lord Ashby, it is to "belong 
to the commonwealth of universities--remain loyal to the idea 
which brought the studium generale into being seven centuries 
ago." 
The question remains, of course, whether the peoples of 
Africa want such institutions. Whatever the short-term travails 
of particular universities in various countries have been -- and 
I do not discount their seriousness -- I remain hopeful that the 
African societies do want and will develop universities of grow-
ing strength whose membership in that "commonwealth" will be 
beyond doubt. 
Should one be confident in such a prognosis? It is, I be-
lieve, only a partial answer to point out that only from their 
universities can the African societies expect a growing stream 
of educated men and women who can deal creatively and competent-
ly with the urgent problems of hunger and disease. One must also 
add that only in their universities can the African people 
satisfy that universal urge that has lighted man's slow emer-
gence from the primeval darkness -- the compulsion to push back 
the barriers of the unknown, to learn his origins and to know 
his heritage, to assay and refine the fundamental values of his 
culture. 
If a society wants to establish and nurture a true univer-
sity, what are the essential conditions for its development? If 
an institution aspires to university status, what claims or 
demands must it address to its surrounding society and polity? 
Our inquiry here, prompted by such questions, cannot be exhaus-
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tive. Rather, we will consider a single supportive condition to 
which the institution must lay claim -- an environment of 
freedom in which the educational and scholarly activities of 
faculty and students can occur. :; 
Human history is replete with the struggles of men to 
define the legitimate parameters of freedom and to defend those 
bounds once set. Obviously these efforts are neither limited to 
nor defined by the particular needs or claims of educational in-
stitutions. Through much of Africa, the past two decades have 
seen the successful assertion by the people of the claim for 
freedom from an alien political control; in some parts of the 
continent that struggle continues today. Throughout the con-
tinent also the struggle continues for freedom from a powerful 
alien economic and cultural hegemony. Within the new countries 
the appropriate entitlement of the citizen to political and 
civil liberty has not been adequately clarified or secured. Vi-
tally important though the issues and problems at this general 
social and political level are, they are beyond the scope of my 
present concern. My comments relate to a special form of 
freedom, usually called academic freedom. It may not exist even 
in a society where the usual range of civil liberties and 
political freedoms enjoy adequate protection. We should note, ~ 
however, that in an authoritarian polity, where no individual 
enjoys such freedoms, it would be futile to search for an ac-
ceptable measure of academic freedom. At a certain level of 
repression, all freedoms are unified in their rejection. 
Much of the discussion of academic freedom is expressed in 
both individual and institutional terms: the freedom of the in-
dividual teacher-scholar to inquire, speak, write and publish 
without fear of sanction, and the freedom or autonomy of the in-
stitution to make its own decisions on a broad complex of issues 
without interference from external, non-university agencies. I 
find the joinder of these two strands of discussion frequently 
productive of confusion and error. We will separate them, there-
fore, considering first the claim of the individual faculty mem-
ber. 
"Academic freedom, in its primary sense," runs one defini-
tion, "is the freedom claimed by a college or university profes-
sor to write or speak the truth as he sees it, without fear of 
dismissal by his academic superiors or by authorities outside 
his college or university." Even as a starting concept, I be-
lieve this definition needs amendment in one important respect: 
dismissal of a faculty member is not the only sanction whose im-
position, because of the expression of the teacher's perception 
of truth, would violate academic freedom. Demotion, the with-
holding of merited promotion, adverse salary adjustment, 
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censure, or any one of a wide variety of sanctions could also, 
in view of the cause of the sanction, warrant the conclusion 
that a faculty member had been deprived of his academic freedom. 
Academic freedom, in this primary s~nse, therefore, does not ex-
ist where the actuality or the reasonable prospect of the im-
position of any disadvantage or the withholding of any benefit 
serves to limit the teacher-scholar in the search for truth or 
in the transmission of the fruits of that search to students or 
to the scholarly world. 
Freedom of such scope may seem excessive, and its claim by 
the university teacher may appear to be simply another 
manifestation of frequently-attacked academic elitism. It may, 
indeed, smack of irresponsibility, nurtured by an immunity from 
the natural consequences of offending those among whom he lives 
and works. Clearly the freedom claimed by the university teacher 
to do his work and speak his mind exceeds the realistic expecta-
tions in many professions or vocations where the prospect of 
loss of clientele, patronage, or job provides strong incentives 
to avoid offense. Before turning to the defense of this broad 
claim to freedom for the academic--and I believe it can be 
def ended-- let us pursue somewhat further our analysis of the 
claim itself. 
The effective protection of academic freedom does not mean 
that the teacher-scholar is free of all constraints, has no 
duties correlative to his right to freedom, or is totally free 
of the possibility of sanctions. In the United States, where an 
extensive literature has developed, the most influential state-
me~t on the scope of academic freedom, that formulated by the 
American Association of University Professors, makes clear that 
the asserted freedom is not license. Consider a few illustra-
tions from that statement. While entitled to freedom in the 
classroom in dealing with his own subject, the teacher should 
not introduce controversial matter unrelated to his subject. 
Recognizing that the university faculty member is a citizen, a 
member of a learned profession, and an officer of an educational 
institution, the statement enjoins him to "remember that the 
public may judge his profession and his institution by his ut-
terances. Hence he should at all times be accurate, should ex-
ercise appropriate restraint, should show respect for the 
opinions of others, and should make every effort to indicate 
that he is not an institutional spokesman." 
The AAUP statement also makes clear that the protection of 
academic freedom does not make absolutely inviolate a person's 
status as a member of a faculty. That status can be terminated 
for "adequate cause," a concept not fully explicated but some of 
whose content is suggested. Adequate cause clearly includes in-
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competence in the faculty member's field as judged by his 
professional and collegial peers. Arguably it also includes 
moral delinquencies of a sort suff ~ciently grave to imperil vi-
able relations with colleagues and .. students. And rationally it 
could not exclude clear and substantial failures to perform 
teaching and research functions implicit in the status to which 
the faculty member was appointed. Further, it should be empha-
sized that the immunity from university or external sanction 
based on his teaching and research does not immunize those ac-
tivities from scrutiny, criticism and evaluation. 
Perhaps a brief illustration, based on an episode in an 
American university, will serve to make the scope of the claimed 
freedom clearer. 
A research-oriented sociologist began an empirical study of 
sexual practices among the male population. He and his staff 
used interview techniques and relied heavily on volunteer parti-
cipants who were willing to respond, truthfully and accurately 
it was hoped, to questions concerning their sexual histories and 
current practices. Individuals did not, of course, remain iden-
tifiable. In the course of time, the research resulted in a book 
projecting a statistical profile of the sexual characteristics 
of the American male. Perhaps not surprisingly, in view of the 
historic Puritan strain in the American experience and the cur-
rently expressed, though infrequently practiced, morality, the 
research and its published results aroused a storm of protest. 
Many patrons of the university where the sociologist held a 
professorship and where the research project had its base and 
(the university being state supported) many citizens who ob-
jected to the assumed use of tax dollars to support such in-
vestigations, demanded that the research be terminated and that 
those responsible for it be dismissed. Had their demands been 
met, the clearest violation of the academic freedom of those 
conducting the research would have occurred. Fortunately, the 
administration and faculty of the university asserted vigorously 
and courageously the claim to academic freedom and, not 
unimportantly, displayed considerable political skill. The 
professor and his associates retained their posts, and the re-
search continued. 
Were these faculty members who offended the moral sensibil-
ities of many members of the general community and perhaps of 
some members of the university itself totally immune from scru-
tiny, evaluation, criticism and sanction? I suggest that not 
even the staunchest def ender of their academic freedom would 
contend that they were or should be. In delimiting the acceptab-
le, or at least accepted, negative responses to the research 
from those which would have violated academic freedom, some 
clearly recognizable and defensible lines emerge. 
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First, neither the university nor its members were claiming 
for their activities any immunity from the general law of.the 
land. The research in fact violated: no criminal statute, nor, 
insofar as I am aware, did it transgress any duties imposed by 
the general law of tort. Had it done so, the university and its 
faculty would not have been entitled, at least not exclusively 
in the name of academic freedom, to have maintained any objec-
tion to a criminal prosecution or to a civil action against the 
researchers. This is not to say, of course, that the relevant 
law of crime or tort, if it could have provided the basis for 
such action, would have been unobjectionable. It might have been 
legitimately attacked as unduly repressive, as violative of 
desirable civil liberty, and probably, in the American context, 
as invalid under generally applicable constitutional guarantees. 
The fact that the general law would unduly limit academic re-
search and publication may support an additional pragmatic argu-
ment in defense of general liberty, but in an analysis of 
academic freedom it is beside the point. Insofar as the academy 
is unduly constrained by the proscriptions of general law, ap-
plicable to teachers, researchers, and all other citizens, the 
basic objection is not couched in terms of academic freedom, but 
rather in terms of the desirable freedom of all citizens. 
Academic freedom, as such, grounds no claim to immunity from 
generally applicable legal norms. 
Next, let us recognize that research or teaching may elicit 
a range of responses, sanctions if you will, which have the 
potential for limiting academic activity, but which few, if any, 
would seriously contend involve violations of academic freedom. 
Those who believed, for example, that the sex research offended 
acceptable standards of decency might have said so, perhaps in 
terms little affected by the standards of civility, and might 
have shunned any further social intercourse with those involved 
in the research project. However regrettable we might find such 
attitudes and conduct, they fall, I believe, within the legiti-
mate area of freedom of the critics. I know of no sanctions that 
could be effective against them, but even if sanctions could be 
found, I would find their use objectionable. The claim to 
academic freedom cannot and should not serve to silence the 
critics of the academy or its members, however unenlightened we 
might think the criticism on occasion to be. 
At a more fundamental level, there is another type of 
criticism we should recognize as not only compatible with 
academic freedom, but as essential to its full realization and 
to furthering those ends which academic freedom itself serves. 
This is criticism involving the standards of the academic enter-
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prise itself, those that find their warrant in the effectiveness 
of the search for truth and its transmission. Recall again our 
illustration of the sex research project. The publication of its 
first major study produced substan~ial criticism within the 
universities and outside. Much of this related to the validity 
of the statistical methods employed in the study, to the evident 
failure of the researchers to achieve a random sample of the 
relevant population because of their heavy reliance on voluntary 
interviewees, and, therefore, to the doubtfulness of certain of 
the conclusions reached. Insofar as such criticisms were ad-
vanced by other teacher-scholars, their expression may be 
regarded as the exercise of the academic freedom of the critics. 
More importantly, however, academic freedom establishes no im-
munity from scrutiny for error or incompetence in the search for 
or the transmission of truth. One may hope, of course, that 
criticism will be offered with civility and with a becoming 
modesty that rests on the recognition that the critic may be 
wrong. Since academic freedom itself finds its basic justifica-
tion in the effective search for and transmission of truth, how-
ever, its claimant must not only tolerate but welcome the open 
scrutiny of his efforts and the criticism of them on criteria 
relevant to the enterprise. 
The proper protection of academic freedom is concerned with 
the security of status of the teacher-scholar and with the sig-
nificant terms and conditions of that status. Primarily, there-
fore, the sanction limited by academic freedom is dismissal or 
the adverse manipulation of status perquisites. It must be 
emphasized, however, that such sanctions are limited, not ex-
cluded. In defining the limits, two basic features of a dismiss-
al that can be reconciled with academic freedom must be 
stressed. First, the application of the sanction must result 
from the internal decisional processes of the university itself. 
Second, it must be grounded on criteria or standards which are 
demonstrably functional to the integrity of the university's 
basic mission--the effective search for and transmission of 
truth. These features of a defensible sanctioning procedure are 
best assured by two other characteristics of the process: parti-
cipation in the disciplinary proceedings, as both witnesses and 
decision-makers, by members of the faculty, and procedural 
safeguards which assure to the affected faculty member a fair 
hearing.· We will return to these vitally important aspects of 
the discipline of academic members of a university in later dis-
cussion. 
Before turning to a consideration of the justification for 
the academy's special claim to freedom, let us consider the sec-
ond aspect usually subsumed by the claim, that is, the autonomy 
of the university as an institution. It is this assertion of in-
~ 
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stitutional autonomy, I believe, especially in the context of 
the new universities of Africa, that has been most productive of 
confusion and tension. 
While Africans point with legitimate pride to ancient 
universities such as Al Azhar in Cairo and Sankore in Timbuctoo, 
it is clear that the modern universities of Africa that now con-
cern us owe little or nothing of their structure or role-
perceptions to these institutions of learning. Rather, they are 
in character and mission. if not always in time, part of the 
legacy of colonialism, finding their models in England, France, 
Belgium, and, in one or two instances, the United States. It is 
not unfair to observe, therefore, that the modern universities 
were and to some extent still are alien institutions in their 
African settings. That alien quality has been emphasized through 
most of their brief lives, though decreasingly to be sure, by 
heavy reliance on administrators and faculty recruited from 
Europe or America who brought with them, both as strengths and 
as limitations, conceptions of the university as an institution, 
its mission, mode of governance, and relation to the external 
society, that had been shaped in their own countries. In fair-
ness, it should be added that if alien models have created prob-
lems for the African universities, responsibility must be shared 
fairly equally by expatriate staff and African faculty members. 
I recall vividly one colleague in the University of Ghana some 
years ago, a man quite vocal in his self-identification as an 
African socialist and "Nkrumahist," whose ultimate line of oppo-
sition, when almost any innovation in the educational program 
came to be considered, was the plaintive cry, "But this is an 
Engiish university !" Thus, expatriate staff whose vision was 
unavoidably limited by their own social and university experi-
ence frequently abetted by African faculty members educated 
abroad and concerned that their new institutions be recognized 
and respected by universities in other parts of the world, have 
projected images of the new universities that are largely in but 
not of the societies that support them. 
Expressing vigorous new African nationalisms and expecting 
from the universities practical support for their conceptions of 
nation-building and development, many of the political and 
governmental leaders of the new countries understandably have 
objected to the seemingly alien character of the new universi-
sities and have sought to influence their life-styles and func-
tions. Often these efforts have been directed largely, as in 
Ghana in the late 1950s and early 1960s, toward the super-
ficialities, indeed the trivia, of university life, such as stu-
dents' academic gowns or the Oxbridge conventions of high and 
low tables in the dining halls. Even trivia can have symbolic 
value, however, and these imported trappings often have seemed 
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to assert not only an unwarranted elitism but a commitment to 
European, not African, values and purposes. 
A more substantive expression:~ of the educational objectives 
of the political leadership and its effort to remold the univer-
sities is illustrated by the University of Ghana Act of 1961 
which listed among the principles to guide that university's 
development of its educational program the followings: 
1. that in determining subjects to be taught emphasis 
should be placed on those "which are of special relevance to the 
needs and aspirations of Ghanaians, including the furtherance of 
African unity"; 
2. that students should be given "an understanding of world 
affairs, and in particular of the histories, institutions and 
cultures of African civilizations"; and 
3. that research programs should reflect a "special atten-
tion to subjects which relate to the social, cultural, economic, 
scientific, technical and other problems which exist in Ghana or 
elsewhere in Africa." ·~ 
To similar effect, President Houphouet-Boigny, on laying 
the cornerstone of Abidjan University in 1963, declared that: 
"(The University) should ••• not be oriented too exclusively 
toward a culture inspired by that of European peoples, although t 
th~ acquisition of that culture is, in fact, indispensable to \ 1 
the material progress and economic and social development of our 
states. It must exercise the functions of guardian and defender 
of the national patrimony of the African Community in the mids~ 
of which it is placed, both in the religious, philosophical, and 
linguistic spheres, as well as in the domain of the arts, 
literature, and music." 
Clearly, if university autonomy as a component of academic 
freedom means that the members of the university community alone 
should enjoy the prerogative of defining the university's pro-
gram and shaping its mission, that principle will be severely 
challenged in post-independence Africa. 
Regrettably, members of the universities too frequently 
have responded to expressions of concern that the universities 
be African institutions by mounting the barricades and asserting 
in the most extreme form a claim to university autonomy. Con-
sider the following statement which appeared in 1964 in an East 
African university journal. Regarding the true university as a 
community of scholars, of which the lay members of the 
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university's governing board or council were not truly a part, 
the author declared: 
"··· academic groups are the only groups competent to 
decide upon academic questions. In this connexion it has to be 
remembered that the Council of a University, although in varying 
degrees containing academic representation, is a non-academic 
body and it is made no more academic by being part of the 
university structure. For this reason Councils need to be 
regarded by the academic community with suspicion. It is often 
from within these bodies that the first inroads are made upon 
academic autonomy. This becomes especially true where the view 
is taken that a master-servant relation exists between the Coun-
cil and the academics. 
"The academic community must continually remind itself and 
its Council that the direction in which teaching and research 
moves within the community can properly only be determined by 
the interests of learning itself. And the only bodies competent 
to decide what are these interests are the academic bodies." 
Lest there be any doubt about the extent of the claim to 
autonomy which he asserted, the author continued: 
"If the Council is not competent to determine academic 
questions, then a fortiori neither is Parliament or any other 
non-academic group. 
"If government wants a university then it is the academic 
community which determines its educational policy ••• ; if it 
wants an institution which adjusts its work to the training of 
teachers, or agricultural officers, or social workers, then it 
does not want a university. There is no reason why a university 
should not train teachers or what have you, but, if it does so, 
it does so on its own terms, and the usefulness of its graduates 
for Ministries of Education and Agriculture is purely inciden-
tal.-
Fortunately, such views have not been unanimous, either in sub-
stance or abrasiveness of language, among those concerned with 
universities in Africa. The countervailing view, to which I 
would subscribe, was succinctly stated by Ashby in his Godkin 
Lectures: " ••• African leaders have now come to realize that 
autonomy is not always exercised wisely, and in a new country, 
although a univer- sity must not become a pawn for politicians, 
academic policy must be responsive to legitimate demands from 
the state." 
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The problem remains of defining the "legitimate demands 
from the State," since these centrally delimit the proper sphere 
of university autonomy. If clarity and in time consensus on that 
sphere can be achieved, it should he possible to secure the es-
sential values and purposes of a university, to avoid its becom-
ing a mere pawn of the politicians, and, at the same time, to 
prevent its developing as a costly and irrelevant enclave within 
an underdeveloped society. Again we may be aided in our analysis 
by considering a concrete case in which violation of proper 
univer- sity autonomy was vigorously asserted. 
In August, 1964, Dr. Conor Cruise O'Brien, then Vice-
Chancellor of the University of Ghana, was recalled from leave 
to be presented with a "Presidential Command" for the transfer 
of the University's Institute of Education from Legan to the 
University College of Science Education at Cape Coast. Neither 
Dr. O'Brien nor any University body had been consulted in ad-
vance about the transfer decision. The Government seemingly 
regarded the transfer as effectuated by executive decisions of 
the Ministry of Education without reference to any views 
developed within or action taken by the governance mechanisms 
set up by the University of Ghana Act and the University's own 
statutes. Objecting to this summary action, Dr. O'Brien. sought 
the views of the University Academic Board which, by a nearly 
unanimous decision, resolved to ask the governing body of the 
University, the Council, to recommend to Government a 
reconsideration of its decision. The Board set out fully its 
reasons for regarding the transfer of the Institute as unwise. 
The Council, however, did not forward this recommendation to 
Government, not because of substantive disagreement with the \' 
views of the Academic Board, but because it regarded the trans-
fer as a fait accompli. 
In the ensuing months, the work of the Institute of Educa-
tion was brought to a standstill, since no faculty member on its 
staff was willing to accept transfer or secondment to the 
University College at Cape Coast. The University Council, being 
unsure whether it could pay compensation to members of staff who 
were rendered redundant by the transfer of the Institute, sought 
advice from the Attorney-General who, under Ghanaian law, was 
the legal adviser to all statutory bodies including the Univer-
sity. In a cryptic opinion, the Attorney-General responded that 
if the Institute had been effectively transferred by act of 
Government, there would be no contracts between members of the 
staff and the University under which compensation would be due, 
since these contracts would have been "frustrated." On the other 
hand, if the transfer ordered by Government remained to be ef-
fectuated by action of the University Council, the Council had 
the legal power to direct staff, and any staff members who were 
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not inclined to proceed to Cape Coast might be held in breach of 
their contracts and liable for damages. On this view the status 
of faculty members, defined in their contracts of appointment, 
was subject to unilateral abrogation by action of Government, 
without University participation or support, or, if the status 
was maintained, it imposed on the faculty members· a contractual 
obligation to serve in an institution having no juridical con-
nection whatever with the University in which they accepted ap-
pointment. 
We need not pause over all the dreary details of this 
episode. The Vice Chancellor was denied an opportunity to dis-
cuss the issues raised by the transfer with the Chancellor of 
the University, Dr. Nkrumah. Disturbed by this apparent lack of 
confidence and, therefore, by the seeming disutility of his fur-
ther service, and concerned over the grave implications of the 
Government's action for the integrity of the University, Dr. 
O'Brien. decided to tender his resignation. He was ultimately 
dissuaded from doing so only by a formal request from the Con-
vocation of the University. The transfer of the Institute was 
effectuated without University action, but the Council voted ex 
gratia payments to its staff which, as distinct from the basic 
transfer decision, the Vice-Chancellor deemed reasonable and 
equitable. 
Much of the disquiet engendered in the University of Ghana 
by this episode was articulated in terms of university autonomy. 
What insights into the legitimate scope of that concept can we 
derive from reflection on that experience? 
First, I would make clear my own view that in an African 
university, drawing its support from public funds, it is the 
legitimate prerogative of Government to frame overall state 
policy on higher education and to seek to make that policy ef-
fective. That policy may appropriately subsume, for example, 
such matters as the assignment of various areas of study and re-
search to different university institutions, the scaling of 
priorities in budgetary support, or the granting to students 
from areas of the country that have suffered an historic dis-
advantage in educational opportunity of a preferred position in 
university admissions. Indeed, in the controversy in the 
University of Ghana the Vice Chancellor explicitly recognized 
such a Governmental prerogative. Why, therefore, did he think, 
as I do, that the action of Government was an attack on the 
autonomy of the University that merited condemnation and opposi-
tion? 
First, he was insistent that Government's transfer of the 
Institute disregarded the legal status of the University and its 
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own governance mechanisms that were defined by parliamentary 
enactment, as well as by the University's own statutes. The 
University had been created by public Act, and powers over its 
operations had been vested in the Council which, in turn, by 
statute, had shared those powers with the Academic Board. No 
power beyond these to shape by direct action the internal struc-
ture of the University or its program was defined and allocated 
by law. The Government's independent actions, expressed in a 
"Presidential Command" and executive orders of the Minister of 
Education, therefore violated a basic premise of the Rule of 
Law--that public officials be able to justify their actions by 
reference to clear grants of power in the law. Concern over the 
abandonment of the Rule of Law in a polity is not a university 
monopoly, but when the specific abandonment disregards clear and 
exclusive grants of power to the governance bodies of the 
university, objections are appropriately framed in terms of the 
autonomy of the university as defined in the law of the land. 
Second, though in a sense implicit in the first stated ob-
jection, was the view that in framing overall educational policy 
Government should seek and give due weight to the views 
developed through the legally ordained governance mechanisms of 
the University. There was no insistence that in a contest of 
conflicting views, those formulated in and expressed by the 
University should prevail. The University's claim was more 
modest. It rested on the belief that within the institution 
created by law to exercise a responsibility for higher education 
could be found a relevant expertise that should have been util-
ized by Government in its own policy formulations. Thus, the un-
derlying rationale for considering carefully the views developed 
through autonomous university processes was utilitarian: it 
rested on the belief that better educational policy would result 
from the careful weighing of University views than from their 
being ignored. Similarly, if policies germane to higher educa-
tion were formulated after the University's views had been taken 
into account, the University itself could expect to be more ef-
fective in implementing those policies as part of the special-
ized mission assigned to it. The University of Ghana experience 
provided dramatic testimony on these points. The unilateral ac-
tion of Government, taken without consultation and implemented 
in total disregard of serious substantive reservations within 
the University, impeded important teaching and research in the 
vital field of education, and the confidence and morale of the 
faculty were gravely undermined. 
A third feature of the conduct of the Ghana Government was 
perhaps the most disturbing. This was the view expressed by the 
Attorney General that Government enjoyed a power to alter the 
status of members of the faculty without in any way involving 
University processes or criteria. 
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You will recall that the Attorney General, in advising the 
University council, suggested two possible interpretations of 
the then current position: either the Institute had been effec-
tively transferred by Governmental action with the result that 
the faculty status of staff members had been abrogated and their 
contracts "frustrated," or else, that the University Council by 
its own decision to transfer the Institute could place the 
faculty members in the dilemma of accepting this posting or 
breaching their contracts with the University. It might be 
argued, of course, that if the second possibility suggested by 
the Attorney General were the actual situation, no violation of 
University autonomy would be involved since decisions of the 
Council would be internal and therefore "autonomous." Two 
responses should dispose of this argument: first, that if the 
Council had voted to transfer the Institute, its action clearly 
would have been based only upon Government fiat, not upon a 
deliberative decision reached through the University's internal 
processes: second, that the sanction proposed by the Attorney 
General to be applied to faculty members who rejected the post-
ing and insisted on serving only the University in which they 
accepted appointment would not be University discipline, but 
rather liability for contract damages imposed by the courts un-
der general law. 
If a government, independently or through its dictation of 
action by a university's governing board, can thus terminate or 
reshape faculty status and critical terms of employment, where 
are the boundaries of this awesome power? What is to prevent 
its exercise to dismiss a teacher because he explores with his 
students the virtues and demerits of socialistic development in 
a polity committed to free market capitalism? or what is to 
protect a legal scholar whose research leads him to the conclu-
sion that the expulsion of Israel from the General Assembly 
would violate the Charter of the United Nations, if his Govern-
ment is committed to that action? Certainly, an important pro-
tection of faculty members from dismissal or other penalty im-
posed because of their teaching and research comes from the 
secure commitment of the power to impose such sanctions to the 
autonomous decision-making bodies of the university. 
I am not suggesting that a decision to dismiss a faculty 
member would be legitimate or exempt from scrutiny for impinge-
ments on his academic freedom merely because it was made strict-
ly within a university and in a manner fully consonant with 
university autonomy. Regrettably, universities themselves can 
and sometimes do violate the academic freedom of their members 
without external compulsion. I am insisting, however, that 
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university autonomy can be an important shield for faculty mem-
bers against repressive forces in the external political, 
governmental, and social mileaux. 
Summarizing briefly the views here expressed on university 
autonomy, I would reject the claim that the university community 
is entitled to shape the teaching and research programs in total 
independence of the policies of government. Autonomy in this 
sense is not a defensible component of academic freedom. Rather, 
the legitimate claim to university autonomy involves two prin-
cipal elements. First, there is an insistence that decisions 
concerning who shall become and remain a member of its faculty, 
and on what terms, must emerge from the university's own 
deliberative processes and reflect its own criteria. Second, the 
claim subsumes an insistence that in the formulation of national 
educational policy to be executed by the university the views of 
that community be considered and that its legally established 
governance structure be fully respected within the range of 
powers and functions assigned to it. Probably these aspects do 
not exhaust the scope of legitimate autonomy, but in my judgment 
they are truly basic. A polity seeking sound educational 
policies and their implementation through vigorous, creative and 
effective universities will, I believe, perceive the justifica-
tion for this claim to university autonomy and will respect it. 
Against the background of our discussion of the mission of 
a university and our analysis of the concept of academic freedom 
and university autonomy, I think little more need be said in 
justification of the university's special claim to liberty. I 
Though it draws sustenance from the historic drive of all \ 
mankind for greater freedom to think, speak, search, and chal-
lenge, the academy's unique claim rests ultimately on a simply 
practical ground. If the teacher-scholar is to preserve his spe-
cial character and perform his function, thereby enabling the 
community of teacher-scholars to carry out its mission, he must 
be as free as human ingenuity in building institutions can make 
him from repressive political, economic or religious forces that 
would restrict his range of inquiry or censor his communication 
of the truth, as he sees it, to his students, other scholars, or 
the general public. The questions may always be raised, of 
course, whether a particular society values the mission of a 
university and why it should. At that level, I would simply con-
cur with Glenn Morrow who has observed that 
" ••• a society that believes its stability, prosperity and 
progress are dependent upon the advance of knowledge and estab-
1 ishes universities for this purpose is patently inconsistent if 
it denies to these universities the freedom that they must have 
if they are to fulfill their nature and function. Academic 
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freedom exists, then, not to serve the interests of the profes-
sor but for the benefit of the society in which he functions, 
ultimately the community of mankind." 
on the assumption that such a perception is widely shared, 
that universities are needed to further human progress, but 
that at all times and in all places, forces of repression will 
seek to limit the essential freedom of teachers and scholars, we 
will turn in the next lecture to a consideration of the role of 
university governance arrangements in sustaining or subverting 
that freedom. 
THE LEGAL STRUC'l'ORE OF UNIVERSITY GOVERNANCE 
In view of the special claim to liberty advanced by 
universi- ties and their faculties, a claim indeed to be free 
from various constraints frequently imposed upon other institu-
tions and indi- viduals, it is not surprising, in Africa or 
elsewhere, that the claim should be recurrently contested. If, 
more often than not, a particular society honors the claim, it 
is useful to inquire into the causes and to explore the practi-
cal instrumentalities that have proved effective against the 
ever-present forces of repression. Among these, I select for at-
tention the instrumentalities of the law. 
In considering the contribution that law may be able to 
make towards the nurture and preservation of academic freedom in 
the African universities, or to its erosion, I will deal first 
with the law of the university itself--its constitution, 
statutes, and internal regulations. Thereafter, I will turn to 
the general law and legal institutions of the country. The 
Nigerian universities and their legal matrix will be our central 
focus, but for a broader perspective we will consider as well 
the universities of Ghana, Kenya, and Zambia. 
The constitutions of these relatively new African universi-
ties uniformly appear as ordinary statutes enacted by the na-
tional or a regional parliament or, where elective government 
has been displaced, as decrees of the ruling council. The con-
stitution grants juridical status to the university and estab-
lishes the general structure for its governance. If the view ex-
pressed earlier is valid, that substantial university autonomy 
can provide a major safeguard for academic freedom and in so 
providing justifies itself, then the constitutional order which 
allocates critical powers and decisional roles deserves careful 
examination and analysis. 
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While there was surely variation in detail, all of the 
university constitutions under consideration initially adhered 
closely to the model of the English civic universities. This 
model embraces a governing council, a senate or academic board, 
and various officers, among whom the Vice Chancellor, as the 
chief academic and administrative officer of the university, is 
the most important. We will examine in some detail the alloca-
tions of function and power to these bodies and officers as the 
English model has been adapted to its new African environment. 
The governance powers typically assigned to a university 
council are extremely general and inclusive. For example, the 
Council of the University of Lagos is charged with the "general 
control and superintendence of the policy, finances and property 
of the University, including its public relations." Similarly, 
the University of Ghana Council is granted "power to do or pro-
vide for any act or thing in relation to the University which it 
considers necessary or expedient in its capacity as the govern-
ing body, and the conferring of particular powers on the Council 
by other provisions of this Act shall not be taken to limit the 
generality of this section." A facile conclusion that the 
governance powers of a council typically are plenary would be 
unwarranted, however. They are often hedged in by allocations to 
other functionaries or bodies. For example, the grant of powers 
to the Council of the University of Lagos, quoted above, is sub-ject to the extremely important qualification "Subject to the 
provisions of this Decree relating to the visitor." To that 
functionary and his pervasive powers we must return later. 
In the English civic universities the most important body 
sharing governance powers with the council is the senate or 
academic board. That feature of the English model was accepted 
in the constitution of the early African universities, and it 
survives today. The senate or academic board exclusively or 
predomi- nantly comprises academic members of the institution. 
To it the council may delegate certain of its powers and func-
tions, or may be required to consult the academic body before 
exercising them. In some instances the university constitutions 
grant important primary, not delegated, powers to the senate. 
The seemingly most inclusive illustration of the latter arrange-
ment is in the University of Cape Coast. There the Council is 
made responsible explicitly for the management of the revenue 
and property of the University and, subject to the powers and 
functions of the Senate, for general control over the affairs of 
the University. The Senate, in turn, is designated "the 
academic authority of the University." Since the identification 
of an "academic" as distinguished from a "non-academic" matter 
is not always clear, the Cape Coast inversion of the usual power 
relationship between Council and Senate is not free from am-
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biguity. A possibly more important source of ambiguity in the 
authority of the Cape Coast Senate, however, is the existence of 
an Academic Advisory Committee, comprising three to five persons 
appointed by the President on the recommendation of the National 
council for Higher Education, which is responsible for "advising 
and guiding the Council and the Senate on all academic matters." 
A brief flirtation with a similar body in the University of 
Benin ended in 1972. 
In other universities where a sharp cleavage between 
academic and other matters has not structured the general as-
signment of roles and powers to senate and council, the senate 
is often granted narrower but important powers. Among the most 
important of these, as we will note later, are major roles in 
making appointments to the academic staff and in the discipline 
of academic members. In other instances, the assigned role of 
the senate is to advise or recommend on academic affairs, and 
one should not discount the significance of that power merely on 
the ground that it is not dispositive. While I cannot fully 
validate the conclusion by empirical evidence, it is my impres-
sion that the main stream of academic decision-making is ef f ec-
ti vely the domain of the academic bodies of the African 
universities, even though the formal power to decide may be 
lodged in the council. Such disquiet as I feel over the implica-
tions of governance powers for academic freedom, however, is not 
aroused by the main stream but by the occasional disruptive 
whirlpool, nor by the past or current actuality, but by the 
potential for power abuse, and not so much by council-senate 
conflict as by the pervasive and growing roles of individual 
functionaries. We can begin to appreciate the latter roles by 
examining the composition of university councils and the alloca-
tions of power to determine their membership. 
While typically the senate or academic board of the 
university is entitled to designate from its membership a small 
number of members of the council, the dominant council majority 
in the African universities, as well as in the English civic 
universities, comprises lay persons. In England, they typically 
represent local civic, cultural or economic interests whose sup-
port is deemed important. In Africa, as well, a criterion of 
broad interest-representation is frequently articulated to guide 
the appointing_powers and further representativeness is commonly 
sought by granting to various bodies within or outside the 
university power to appoint or nominate one or two members. 
Thus, members may come from the senate, convocation, congrega-
tion, and nonacademic staff association of the university, from 
an association of graduates, a specialized National council for 
Higher Education and Research, or the armed forces. It is of in-
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terest that only the University of Nairobi appears to have made 
provision for representation on the council of currently en-
rolled students. 
While a council membership somewhat representative of the 
variety of interests within the university and the surrounding 
society is desirable and, in general, seems to have been sought, 
this feature cannot obscure the cardinal characteristic of the 
African university councils--a dominant majority owing their 
tenure to the central political and governmental authority of 
the country. Two illustrations of the assembling of this 
majority will be provided: the first might be described as the 
classic pattern. It has enjoyed a relatively long life under 
quite stable legislation in Ghana, as well as in Kenya and Zam-
bia. The other illustration will be drawn from the Nigerian 
universities where university constitutions have shown an ex-
traordinary transiency and fluidity. 
The University of Ghana Council, with a total membership of 
fifteen, comprises the principal officers of the University, 
that is, the Chancellor, Chairman of the Council, and the Vice 
Chancellor, four persons appointed by the Chancellor, one civil 
servant, one person elected by a body who appears to the Chan-
cellor to be representative of the heads of secondary schools, 
two persons elected by the Council itself from designated con-
stituencies, and four persons elected by the staff of the 
University. The coherence of the majority is made clearer, how-
ever, when one notes that the President holds office as Chancel-
lor; he, in turn, appoints the Chairman of the Council as well 
as four members. The Council appoints the Vice-Chancellor who 
must, however, be approved by the Chancellor, and it also elects 
two members, as mentioned. Only the four members elected by the 
staff, therefore, can claim tenure that is not basically depend-
ent on the good will of the highest political and governmental 
authority of the polity. While no provision is made by the Act 
for the removal or dismissal of a member of the Council (other 
than because of absence from Ghana), the term of appointment or 
election is only two years. 
The University of Ghana model is replicated in the 
University of Science and Technology in Kumasi, but there are 
potentially significant departures from it in the University of 
Cape Coast whose Council is to be constituted by the President 
acting in accordance with the advice of the Prime Minister from 
various named constituencies. Even there, however, out of a 
Council of fifteen to nineteen members, fifteen are selected 
directly by political and governmental authorities or coopted by 
the Council itself. Much the same arrangement exists in both 
Kenya and Zambia. The Kenya Act vests some of the critical ap-
J 
\ 
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pointive power in the President and some in the Chancellor; 
President Kenyatta holds both offices. Dr. Kaunda is also Chan-
cellor of the University of Zambia, but he is given his appoin-
tive powers with respect to the Council of the University in his 
role as President. 
The African universities did not invent the office of 
university Chancellor, nor did they pioneer in installing in 
that office an important public figure. The Chancellor of an 
English civic university is a prominent personage whose status 
symbolizes the public interest in and support for the institu-
tion. I take it, however, that long-standing and unquestioned 
conventions would accord to the English Chancellor no executive 
or directive control over the affairs of the university. That 
these conventions did not migrate to Africa with the formal 
governance model was well illustrated by Dr. Nkrumah's role in 
the University of Ghana. 
That Dr. Nkrumah was entitled, as both President and Chan-
cellor, to take a lively interest in the University of Ghana I 
would be the last person to dispute. We have noted earlier, how-
ever, one instance in which that interest was expressed with 
profoundly adverse effects on university autonomy. To that il-
lustration could be added his demand that his approval be sought 
before senior academic appointments were made and on one occa-
sion that named individuals be appointed to three professorial 
chairs, as well as the demands of lesser officials that the 
University dismiss or procure the resignations of senior members 
of the academic staff. There was no arguable warrant in any pro-
visions of the University constitution or statutes for these in-
terventions, and they were resisted with varying degrees of suc-
cess by the Vice Chancellor. Dr. Nkrumah had expressed publicly 
his support for academic freedom and presumably for that rea-
sonable measure of university autonomy which sustains it. Yet 
the gap between such assertions and the realities of the rela-
tionship between the University and the Government during the 
Nkrumah period was often wide. Dr. Nkrumah's only institutional-
ized role in the University was as Chancellor. It was apparent, 
however, that he drew no significant distinction between the 
scope of the power he could exercise in Government as President 
and that he was entitled to exercise in the University as Chan-
cellor. Unfortunately, nothing in the constitution of the 
University would have served to impress upon him that such a 
distinction should be made. The Chancellorship as defined by law 
controlled the majority composition on the Council. Beyond that, 
it was essentially an empty vessel into which the realities of 
political power relations could be poured. Despite efforts by 
University officers and staff to sow the seeds of restraining 
conventions, it remains, I believe, no better than an open ques-
-159-
tion whether their efforts, and those of their successors, have 
succeeded. 
My references to the earlier ~xperiences in the University 
of Ghana are not merely a historical exercise. They provide, I 
believe, a reminder of the continuing hazards to academic 
freedom in the African universities when a foreign governance 
model is adopted without the sustaining and restraining conven-
tions that permeated it in its homeland. August Chancellors and 
lay governing boards with sweeping governance powers have not 
imperiled academic freedom in the English universities. There, 
well-established conventions confine the governance powers of 
councils and officers, and accord to the academic agencies 
within the universities the substantive powers to determine the 
selection of faculty, the criteria for admission of students, 
and the shape of teaching and research programs. Thus is defined 
the reality of governance. The same has not been consistently 
true in the African universities that have followed the 
) 
governance model of the English civic universities. One must, of ) 
course, avoid exaggerating the impingements of lay councils or 
the authorities that appoint them on the resolution of academic 
issues. If all the data were available, I suspect one would find 
that the senates or academic boards have in most instances I 
shaped the academic programs, that their substantive determina- ~ 
tions, though couched in the language of advice and recommenda-
tions, are routinely approved by councils. The exceptions. how-
ever, which have not been rare, serve to make the point that 
little in the legally articulated constitutional orders or ac-
cepted conventions deters the lay councils, whose membership \ 
dir~ctly reflect the current political and governmental orienta- \ 
tion, or the political figure who serves as Chancellor, from 
regarding formal entitlement to direct and control the 
universities as sufficient also to permit the exercise of the 
power, or even to impose an obligation to do so. 
Much of my comment thus far applies with equal cogency to 
the governance schemes that have come to characterize the 
Nigerian universities. The older universities in this country 
began, as did those in Ghana, Kenya, and Zambia, heavily in-
fluenced by the same English model. The evolution of their 
governance schemes must be traced through a rapid-fire series of 
constitutions and statutes in which a bewildering array of coun-
cils, senates, chancellors, pro-chancellors, and visitors grasp, 
lose, and regain their holds on the reins of university power. 
To trace with any significant detail this evolutionary process 
in the six Nigerian universities is unnecessary and would unduly 
try your patience. Therefore, I will rest content with a few 
summary observations and a somewhat more extended consideration 
of the unique Nigerian institution of the university Visitor. 
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In all of the Nigerian universities one finds the familiar 
functionaries, such as the chancellor, often more recently also 
a pro-chancellor, and the vice-chancellor, as well as bodies 
called the council and the senate. Often, however, their formal 
functions and powers differ significantly from those described 
earlier in the University of Ghana. In neither Ife nor Lagos did 
the univer- sity constitution initially make provision for a 
chancellor. Save in the University of Nigeria during the chan-
cellorship of Dr. Azikiwe, and to a lesser extent in Ahmadu 
Bello University, the role of chancellor has been largely 
honorific and ceremonial in all of the Nigerian universities. 
More recently, the pro-chancellor, where he has appeared, may be 
functionally a more significant officer because of his role as 
chairman or presiding officer of the university council. At no 
stage of the development of the Nigerian universities has a 
chancellorship been associated with the degree of monopolized 
political and governmental power that characterizes Ghana, Kenya 
and Zambia. Therefore, the Nigerian chancellorship has not been 
a similarly significant channel through which general political 
forces could impinge on the universities to imperil institu-
tional autonomy and academic freedom. 
The feature of Nigerian university governance today which 
establishes its distinctive character is the emergence of the 
central, powerful role of the Visitor. Developed as a common law 
institution to provide oversight for ecclesiastical and elee-
mosynary corporations, the Visitor found his principal functions 
in assuring that the corporation adhered to its proper purposes 
and. in settling internal disputes so as to avoid the delay, ex-
pense and unseemliness of litigation in the courts. Since a com-
mon law of Visitors was well developed long before any of the 
cut-off dates in the various African reception Acts, it presum-
ably was available for application in all of the former British 
dependencies unless the judges deemed the relevant common law 
rules inappropriate for African circumstances and therefore sub-
ject to rejection or modification. Insofar as I am aware, how-
ever, no Visitor to a university or any other corporation had 
appeared in the African law reports until he made his dramatic 
appearance in Nigeria. 
While the Visitor was a pioneer figure in Ibadan, the 
Governor General being named to that office in the University 
College by the Ordinance of 1954, and the basic legislation for 
Ahmadu Bello University and the University of Nigeria naming the 
Governors of the Northern and Eastern Regions respectively 
to Visitorships, the pattern has not been uniform. A Visitor did 
not appear in Lagos until 1967 and in Ife not until 1970. By the 
latter year, however, when provision also was made for a Visi-
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torship in the University of Benin, the office had been estab-
lished by the constitutional instruments of all six of Nigeria's 
universities. 
My description of the Nigerian Visitorship as unique is 
warranted, I believe, by the evolution of the powers of the of-
fice. In the earliest legislation I have examined, that for 
University College, Ibadan, the Visitor was already a major 
figure in the governance of the College. In addition to the 
general power to direct a visitation, at such time and in such 
manner as he deemed fit, in order to assure the College's effec-
tive fulfillment of its objects, the Visitor was granted 
specific powers to appoint the Chairman of the Council and the 
Chancellor, to give or withhold his approval of the Council's 
appointment and dismissal of the Principal, to make final and 
dispositive interpretations of the basic College constitution 
and statutes, and to appoint to the Council one member in addi-
tion to his other appointees who served on that body ex officio. 
While in some instances enjoined to consult the Council, the 
Senate, or both, the Visitor in the exercise of a]l of his 
powers was authorized to act in his sole and absolute discre-
tion. These powers are hardly little acorns, and we should not 
find it surprising that from them great oaks have grown. 
I need not trace in detail the evolution of visitatorial 
powers in the several institutions. There is certainly variation 
in the degree of detail with which such powers are articulated 
in the university constitutions, the relevant provisions in the 
University of Nigeria being the most skeletal and those in Ife 1 
probably the most extended. Where the powers are detailed they ~ 
tend to follow the early Ibadan pattern: to conduct or authorize 
others to conduct visitations, to appoint and remove key univer-
sity officers, ultimately to control the content of university 
statutes, to exercise important appellate powers over determina-
tions of the council relating to staff grievances, and directly 
or indirectly to determine the majority composition of the coun-
cil. 
I do not elaborate this awesome array of powers in order to 
ground a contention that the Visitorship in the Nigerian univer-
sities has in fact deprived the institutions of their autonomy 
or the members of their faculties of academic freedom. My thesis 
is more modest but still disquieting: a constitutional arrange-
ment has been created which would readily facilitate such de-
privation, should political circumstances make that seem attrac-
tive. May I suggest briefly three features of the Visitorship 
which dramatically present that hazard. 
First, the office of Visitor as now constituted brings into 
its domain a remarkably diverse collection of governance powers. 
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Among them one can readily identify legislative powers with 
respect to university statutes, executive powers over key ap-
pointments and dismissals, and judicial or quasi-judicial powers 
in interpreting the law of the uni~~rsity and resolving dis-
putes. Further, the ill-defined power to visit and inquire at 
any time hovers, in Holmes' striking phrase, like a "brooding 
omnipresence in the sky" over the university and its members. No 
absolutist or inflexible doctrine of separation of powers need 
be invoked to ground a concern, in either the polity or the 
university, over the concentration in a single functionary of 
governance prerogatives as embracing as those of the Visitor. 
Second, the allocations of power seem clearly intended to 
be coupled with a wide discretion in their exercise. The old 
University College, Ibadan Ordinance stipulated that the 
Visitor, though occasionally called upon to consult others, 
should finally exercise his powers "in his sole and absolute 
discretion." Recent legislation appears to favor the more sub-
tle form of making the exercise of visitatorial powers dependent 
on strictly subjective criteria: for example, to remove an of-
ficer "if it appears to the Visitor" that he should be removed 
on certain grounds; or in exercising his appellate powers to 
"confirm, vary or quash ••• and remit •.• with such directions 
as (he) may think fit •••. "We must consider later whether 
visitatorial powers indeed are final -- subject to no review. It 
suffices at the moment to observe that the Nigerian legislation 
historically has made an effort in that direction. 
Who is the authority in whom these extensive, largely dis-
cretionary powers have been reposed? The answer to that question 
defines the third disturbing feature of the Nigerian Visitor-
ship. Since the first appearance of the office, visitatorial 
powers have been lodged with those who exercised general politi-
cal and governmental powers as well. This pattern was estab-
lished during the colonial period when the Governor General was 
designated as the Visitor in Ibadan. With the coming of inde-
pendence, Visitorships shifted to the Governors of Western, 
Northern and Eastern Nigeria, and in Lagos to the Head of State 
of the Federation. With the recent federalization of all 
universities, the Head of the Federal Military Government now 
serves as the Visitor of every university in Nigeria. 
May I conclude this general discussion of university 
govern-ance arrangements, and specifically of the Nigerian 
Visitorship, by re-emphasizing an essential caution. I am not 
asserting that visitatorial powers have been used to corrode le-
gitimate university autonomy or the academic freedom it should 
sustain. Nor am I asserting that the university community, in-
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eluding its lay governing body, should be subject to no external 
oversight. It may be that many, perhaps most, of the members of 
staff are unaware of many important visitatorial powers and have 
not sought to invoke them when internal grievances have arisen. 
In fact, the existing visitatorial powers may thus far have been 
little used and, when used, may have been beneficent. One might, 
I believe, readily concede all of these possible facts in the 
context of this discussion and still not find his concern ade-
quately allayed. My concern, which possibly many will share, re-
lates to the creation of governance mechanisms allocating broad 
discretionary powers over the university to those who may be not 
only insensitive to its special ethos and needs, but also vul-
nerable to the temptation to deal with it as only one aspect of 
the general political and governmental matrix. If my earlier 
suggestion with respect to the chancellorships in Ghana, Kenya 
and Zambia is valid--that the importation into Africa of formal 
university offices and powers stripped of the conventions that 
guide and restrain them in England poses a grave risk to 
university autonomy and academic freedom -- my submission is 
simply that the same is true of the Visitorship in Nigeria. To 
the possibilities of reducing and controlling that risk we will 
return later. 
While brief references may be found in some of the 
university constitutions, it is the statutes of the African 
universities that provide most of the regulation governing the 
appointment of faculty members, their conditions of service, 
and the imposition of discipline on them. These show great 
variety: in some instances, very detailed regulation, in others 
summary grants of seemingly plenary, discretionary powers: and 
often curious lacunae. For our purposes, minute description of 
various statutory schemes is not required: we will seek a 
broader perspective. 
In most of the universities, the power to appoint faculty 
members is vested in the council, a majority of whose members 
are, as we have noted, themselves laymen owing their status to 
external, usually political, appointing authorities. In Lagos, 
Ibadan, Ife and Benin, however, the statutes grant to the 
Senates the power to make the actual selection of appointees. 
While I do not have the data on actual practices followed in 
some of the universities where the power to appoint has been 
granted by the university constitution to the council, I strong-
ly suspect that in most instances the councils have exercised 
their powers in response to recommendations of the academic 
bodies. One might be tempted to conclude, therefore, that it 
makes little difference how the formal appointive power is allo-
cated. I am inclined to a different view, believing that the 
statutory specifications in Lagos, Ibadan, Ife and Benin are 
highly desirable. 
) 
I 
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Again, consider an illustration from history. Exercising 
his assumed powers as Chancellor and Head of the University of 
Ghana, Dr. Nkrumah demanded that a1l professorial appointments 
be cleared with him and on one occasion demanded that three 
named individuals be named to chairs at Legon. While an explicit 
constitutional or statutory allocation to the Academic Board of 
the power to select academic appointees would not necessarily 
have assured the University's success in resisting these 
demands, I believe it would have provided useful leverage. If it 
is believed that academic criteria applied knowledgeably by 
academic members of the university should control the selection 
of faculty appointees, it seems to me far wiser to allocate ap-
pointive power accordingly, rather than to rely on conventions 
to restrain the seemingly large powers of the council, the chan-
cellor, or other functionary. 
In most instances African university statutes do not state 
the criteria for faculty appointment. Probably it would be un-
wise to attempt to do so. If affirmative criteria were stated, 
they probably would appear in the form of certain minimum stand-
ards to be met. There is often, in many contexts, a regrettable 
tendency for stated minima to condition expectations and, in op-
eration, to approximate the norms. It may be better, therefore, 
if criteria are to be dealt with by statute, to specify only 
proscribed criteria. The constitution or statutes of most 
universities, including all Nigerian institutions, have adopted 
this approach. For example, the University of Cape Coast Act 
provides that "no discrimination on account of religion, politi-
ca~ opinion, tribe or sex shall be shown against any person in 
determining whether he or she is to be appointed to the academic 
or other staff of the University, to be rejected as a stu-
dent ••• , to graduate ••• , or to hold any advantage or 
privilege •••• " The university legislation in neither Kenya nor 
Zambia contains similar proscriptions, but under the guarantees 
of fundamental rights in the constitution of each country 
similar safeguards surely could be developed. Even if the im-
possibility of dealing adequately with affirmative criteria for 
appointment is recognized, enforceable proscriptions of ir-
relevant and impermissible ones may serve a useful purpose in 
pointing those with the power to select faculty members toward 
factors that are truly germane to the quality of the 
university's performance. 
I cannot speak knowledgeably about the detailed terms and 
conditions of appointment and service in the various univer-
sities. While the power to determine these is frequently granted 
explicitly to council, the exercise of that power usually is not 
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reflected in the statutes. Nor would I suggest that it should 
be. In general, it would seem more appropriate to incorporate 
most terms of service in the faculty member's individual con-
tract or in stated university personnel policies, some of which 
might become contract terms through incorporation by reference 
or reasonable implication in the individual agreement made when 
a member of the academic staff is appointed. 
In this connection, reference should be made to a dis-
turbingly ambiguous provision of the statutes of the University 
of Ife. This provides that a member of the academic staff shall 
serve on such terms and conditions as may be set out in his con-
tract with the University, but that every such contract "shall 
contain or be deemed to contain a provision that the terms and 
conditions of service therein specified are subject to the pro-
visions of the Edict, the Statutes, Ordinances and Regulations 
of the Univer- sity." Is this an all-embracing inclusion by 
reference,which makes the various legal provisions in force when 
the appointment is made contractually binding on the University? 
If so, I would suggest that it deprives the institution of a le-
gitimate flexibility in modifying certain of its internal 
policies and regulations in the light of developing experience. 
Another possible and perhaps more probable interpretation is 
more disturbing: that under the quoted language the faculty mem-
ber's contract gives him no protection, all of its terms being 
subject to amendment or abrogation by the governmental author-
ities or by the internal agencies having the power to make and 
amend statutes and regulations. Surely the latter meaning, if 
adopted, would be pregnant with danger to the academic freedom 
of the staff and sufficiently corrosive of faculty morale to 
endanger the University's ability to recruit and retain faculty 
of acceptable quality. You will recall the espousal in 1964-65 
by the Attorney General of Ghana of a view of the law which 
would have made the contracts of University faculty members nul-
lities in the face of governmental action. Aware of the hazards 
to the University implicit in that view, the Vice Chancellor 
resisted it vigorously and, in some measure successfully. It 
should, I believe, be resisted in all institutions. Fortunately, 
the quoted statute of the University of Ife has not apparently 
been replicated in the other Nigerian universities. 
In my judgment, actions by university authorities that in-
fringe academic freedom will be far less frequent in making ini-
tial appointments than in determining whether term appointments 
will be renewed and in dismissing faculty members during their 
terms. We will deal with dismissals or other overt disciplinary 
actions later, at the moment concentrating on the renewal-of-
appointment problem. 
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It is my impression that the African universities typically 
make an initial appointment for a stated term of years, perhaps 
three. Either express or implicit in the use of a limited term 
is the premise that the appointee i~ in effect a probationer, 
that the quality of his scholarship and teaching will be care-
fully assessed, and that acceptable standards must be achieved 
before any further or more durable relation with the university 
is formed. This is entirely appropriate. However careful the 
original vetting may be, it will not always identify the effec-
tive teacher and productive scholar or, indeed, the inclination 
and energy to become such. It is reasonable, therefore, that the 
university should have an opportunity to improve its staff 
strength by not renewing probationers and making replacement ap-
pointments. Not every romance becomes or should become a mar-
riage. 
A faculty member whose teaching and research may have been 
admirable may, nevertheless, have offended powerful interests. 
The results of his research or the critical scrutiny manifested 
in his teaching may have challenged the dominant ideology or the 
views of influential political or economic groups. If these cir-
cumstances do arise, a quiet non-renewal of appointment at the 
end of a probationary term may appear to be an attractive tech-
nique for excising the disruptive faculty member. If safeguards 
of academic freedom are to be made adequate, however, some means 
must be found for preventing the use of this technique for 
violating it, without at the same time unduly imperiling the 
university's opportunity to make the assessments of the proba-
tionary period truly discriminating on legitimate grounds. None 
of the university statutes I have examined attempts to deal with 
this problem. Before suggesting a possible solution, may I deal 
briefly with the present legal provisions pertaining to avowed 
faculty discipline. 
The ultimate sanction against a faculty member is dismissal 
since it imperils both his livelihood and his further op-
portunity to pursue his scholarly vocation. Nevertheless, just 
as the university must retain an option not to renew a term ap-
pointment on its expiration, so it must not be deprived totally 
of the power on legitimate grounds to dismiss a faculty member 
during his tenure. Faculty status cannot be permitted to become 
a mere sinecure for the slothful or the incompetent. At the same 
time, the university should neither claim nor be accorded the 
power and right to dismiss a faculty member on grounds that in-
volve impingements on the legitimate exercise of his academic 
freedom. 
In view of the importance to both the faculty and the in-
stitution of disciplinary proceedings, it might have been ex-
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pected that the treatment of this matter in university constitu-
tions and statutes would have reflected great thought, careful 
discriminations, and precise draftsmanship. such is not always 
the case, however. The statutes I have examined warrant the fol-
lowing general observations. 
First, the power to dismiss or discipline faculty members, 
like the power of appointment, is vested in the lay council. In-
deed, even in those Nigerian universities where the substantive 
power over appointments is allocated to the Senate, the power of 
removal or dismissal is vested in the Council. 
second, the specification of acceptable grounds for dis-
missal is either in very general terms or is totally absent. For 
example, in the University of Lagos, the stated grounds are 
"misconduct" or "inability to perform the functions" of employ-· 
ment. Only a perhaps questionable negative implication supports 
the view that these are the only permissible grounds, for the 
only relevant provision of the Decree is so drafted that a close 
reader might argue that the stated grounds are simply the only 
ones that activate a requirement of certain procedural] 
safeguards. Furthermore, "misconduct" is not defined. The 
statutes of the University of Cape Coast authorize dismissal 
"for good cause," which includes conviction by a court of any 
offense which the Council considers sufficient to render the 
faculty member concerned unfit to perform his functions, conduct 
of a scandalous or other disgraceful nature, or conduct which 
the Council considers to be such as to constitute failure or in-
ability of the faculty member to discharge his functions or to 
comply with the conditions of his service. In the University of 
Science and Technology in Kumasi, on the other hand, the 
statutes detail broadly-embracing grounds for discipline: 
failure to perform properly any duty imposed by regulation or 
instruction, any act prejudicial to the efficient functioning of 
the University or tending to bring the University into dis-
repute, absence without leave or reasonable excuse, insubordina- \ 
tion, improper use of university property, and engaging without \ 
permission in gainful occupation outside the University. Con-
trasted to such an inclusive but indeterminate catalog of of- I 
fenses, the position of the University of Nairobi appears almost I 
attractive: while the University constitution authorizes the 
Council to make statutes setting the bases for dismissal, the 
statutes are entirely silent on the subject of discipline unless 
an earlier disciplinary scheme was preserved by a final saving 
clause covering certain earlier rules. 
Third, the statutes do not uniformly require that in the 
imposition of discipline the faculty member be accorded the es-
sentials of a fair hearing. As we have noted, the Nairobi 
-168-
statutes are silent on discipline. While the University of Zam-
bia Act authorizes the Council to provide for "disciplinary con-
trol", no statutes for the University have been adopted. No pro-
vision for a hearing as a pre-condition to discipline of a 
faculty member appears in the statutes of the University of 
Nigeria. On the other hand, there is a hearing requirement, in-
cluding a number of safeguards articulated with various degrees 
of specificity, in the three Ghanaian universities and in all of 
the Nigerian institutions, except the University of Nigeria. 
I would suggest that the provisions concerning faculty dis-
cipline in most of the university constitutions and statutes we 
have examined fall short of according the measure of protection 
for academic freedom that desirably might be built into the 
legal framework. In some universities, of course, regulations 
below the level of the statutes, or current practices which pos-
sibly enjoy the dignity of tentative or incipient conventions, 
may fill certain of the gaps I have noted. If so, their impor-
tance should not be discounted unduly. At the same time, one 
should recognize their limited significance when the legal pro-
tections of academic freedom are being assessed. 
Against this background of general discussion of university 
governance arrangements as now defined by law and the hazards 
implicit in them, may I turn now to more important questions: 
what might be done within the universities or outside to streng-
then university autonomy, the better to secure academic freedom, 
and what contributions to this process might be made by the law? 
I will not presume to outline a general model. Rather, I will 
offer some limited suggestions, largely concentrated on those 
aspects of university governance considered earlier. 
My first suggestion may appear to be relatively elementary, 
perhaps even trivial: to say clearly and at an authoritative 
level that academic freedom is the life blood of the university 
and shall be preserved. It may appear anomalous that none of the 
constitutions of the African universities attempts a clear 
articulation and acceptance of the principle of academic free-
dom. The closest approach I have found appeared in the now-
defunct constitution of the University of East Africa which 
stated that one of the objects of the institution should be "to 
preserve academic freedom and, in particular, the right of a 
university, or a university college, to determine who may teach, 
what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be ad-
mitted to study therein." The absence of references to academic 
freedom in the constitutions of the other African universities 
is not surprising, however. None appeared in the relevant 
English models, again for the obvious reason that societal 
values and well-established conventions limiting the exercise of 
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formal powers provided and continue to provide adequate 
safeguards. Fairness requires the recognition, however, that in 
many universities uninfluenced by English models explicit com-
mitment to the principle of academic freedom is rare. A 1967 
survey of university legislation in the various less developed 
countries found only two references to academic freedom: in the 
Peru National Universities Act and in the statutes of the 
University of the Philippines. 
One may argue that even in the absence of explicit 
reference, academic freedom is implied by some of the African 
university Acts. For example, the University of Ghana Act lists 
among the principles to guide the University in pursuing its 
aims that "students should be taught methods of critical and in-
dependent thought," and that "the fruits of research, and 
knowledge generally, should be spread abroad by the publication 
of books and papers and by other suitable means." I am fully 
persuaded that such a principle cannot be viable except in the 
context of freedom, where members of the University can feel 
secure in their positions while they seek and communicate 
knowledge with vigor, total objectivity, and candor. Yet 
reliance on implication rather than clear affirmation reduces 
the significance of the university's own constitutional order in 
nurturing and sustaining academic freedom. 
The law relating to a university should contain, I believe, 
an explicit commitment to the principle of academic freedom. I 
propose no particular verbal formula. A possible model can be 
found in the superseded constitution of the University of East 
Africa which was mentioned earlier, though I would think it 
desirable that the legal provision stress not only the autonomy 
of the university in determining who may teach and what may be 
taught but also the freedom of the individual teacher to seek 
truth without fear of reprisal, to teach the truth as he sees 
it, and to communicate the fruits of his scholarship. Helpful 
guidance in the framing of appropriate language might be found 
in the statutes of the University of the Philippines which con-
tain a broad guarantee of teacher freedom in the exposition of 
his subject in the classroom or in addresses or publications, 
coupled with appropriate prohibitions against inculcating sec-
tarian tenets, discussing in the classroom controversial topics 
not pertinent to the course of study being pursued, and conduct 
which would reasonably create doubt concerning the teacher's 
fitness for his position. 
It should be made clear that the constitutional or 
statutory commitment to academic freedom is not merely 
hortatory. Means must be found for converting the commitment 
into a true legal obligation binding on the council, the senate, 
\ 
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other university bodies, and individual members of the univer-
sity. Further, since we have stressed the functional relation of 
university autonomy to academic freedom, means must be provided 
whereby the institution can assert;effectively its own decision-
making power as granted by law against external pressures. To be 
effective in these various contexts the guarantee of or stated 
commitment to academic freedom should not be articulated only in 
the university's own internal statutes, though it would be 
desirable there. It should be introduced at a level of the legal 
order that clearly embraces power constellations both within and 
outside the university, that is, in the national constitution or 
in the public legislative Act that structures and safeguards the 
university. 
Elevating protection of academic freedom to the constitu-
tional level has at least arguable advantages. The public Acts, 
Decrees, and Edicts that have provided the constitutional struc-
tures of the African universities are the ordinary grist of the 
legislative mill. The general dominance by the executive estab-
lishments over the legislative process in the African countries, 
the relative rarity of substantive deliberation within par-
liamentary bodies where they still exist, and the absence of 
institutional-ized channels for consultation with affected 
groups in the shaping of legislation combine to make the consti-
tutional arrangements of the universities fully vulnerable to 
change without any cautionary influence from the academic com-
munity itself. What the state gives by legislative fiat, the 
State can remove with equal ease. It is difficult, however, in 
my judgment, to develop any great confidence that the basic 
governance systems and sustaining principles of the universities 
would have been better protected if embodied in the various na-
tional constitutions, rather than in ordinary statutes. Any 
empirically validated distinction between the stability of con-
stitutional and statutory arrangements in the African context 
surely would be difficult to sustain. Most constitutions have 
been fleeting actors on the national stage. Nevertheless, there 
may be some more august symbolism, some higher ordering of im-
portance, and some greater immunity from the daily ebb and flow 
of political forces in constitutional as against statutory pro-
visions. If so, it is perhaps significant that no African 
university thus far has reached the constitutional level. 
The internal university community may be able to exert 
little influence on either the national constitution or the 
legislation that shapes its general governance system. Ordinari-
ly, however, it can participate in the development and amendment 
of the university's own statutes. These normally contain the 
detailed provisions concerning two matters vitally related to 
academic freedom: the appointment of faculty members, including 
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their terms and conditions of service, and the criteria and pro-
cedures for their discipline. Insofar as there are internal 
legal safeguards for faculty statu~ and academic freedom, we may 
begin our search for them in the statutory provisions related to 
these matters. 
A preliminary observation should be kept in mind however: 
as was true also of university constitutions, no set of statutes 
I have examined contains any explicit reference to the academy's 
own commitment to freedom of inquiry, teaching, and publication. 
The absence of such a provision in any university constitution, 
emerging as an ordinary public Act or Decree from the national .
1
, 
legislative process, may be understood, though regretted. One 
cannot avoid a sense of anomaly, however, in considering the 
failure of the university community itself to articulate in its 
own statutes its guiding and sustaining values. The probable ex-
planation again lies in the influence of English models and the 
reliance in the English universities on convention rather than 
legislation to safeguard the academic enterprise. Anyone tempted 
by another explanation -- that safeguards of academic freedom 
are unnecessary in regulations that can control at most only the 
university community -- should remember that some of the most 
egregious violations of that freedom have been committed by the 
authorities of the academy itself. 
While large governance powers in lay councils, constituted 
as they now are, coupled with the almost total dependence of the 
African universities on government financing can present grave 
risks to institutional autonomy and individual academic freedom, 
significant change in either of these features does not appear 
to be a reasonable prospect. Potentially a lay council compris-
ing men and women who are respected in the society and who un-
derstand and value the mission of a university can offer sub- / 
stantial benefits: they can usefully interpret social needs to 
the academic community and serve as a protective barrier between 
that community and various political and economic forces that ( 
may endanger it. Realization of these benefits depends primarily ~ 
on the quality of the persons selected for council membership 
and on the attitudes that guide their deliberations and actions. l 
Do they have a sensitive understanding, not only of the external I 
society, but of the special needs of a university as well? Is 
political loyalty to the appointing authority their decisional 
compass or are they capable of exercising independent judgment 
in the interest of the university and the integrity of its mis-
sion? Assuring satisfactory answers to these questions can be 
furthered very little, I believe, by the blunt instruments of 
law. What counts is the orientation of the appointing authority 
and the quality of the appointments made. 
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I would suggest, however, the desirability of one change in 
the law on council membership. The dominant majorities on many 
councils owing their tenure directly or indirectly to a single, 
political appointing authority should be eliminated or at least 
significantly reduced. The power to nominate, appoint or elect 
should be dispersed among various constituencies: the academic 
members of the university, the association of graduates if one 
exists, representatives of the secondary schools, regional 
organs, professional associations, National Academies of the 
Arts and Sciences, universities or university associations in 
other countries, and the National Universities Commission if one 
has been established. The propriety of vesting a certain appoin-
tive capacity in the person or group that for the time being ex-
ercises paramount political and governmental power need not be 
totally rejected. If that capacity remains at currently typical 
levels, however, efforts to distinguish the university from any 
other government department or to immunize it from the tensions 
and abrasions of politics can have only limited prospects of 
success. Finally, greater security of tenure for council members 
and longer terms would seem desirable. If council members are to 
make their best contributions to the development of the institu-
tion, they should serve long enough to understand its com-
plexities, and their independence of judgment should be but-
tressed by immunity from summary removal from office. 
In assessing the implications for academic freedom of the 
governance powers of lay councils, it is obviously useful to 
discriminate between different categories or ranges of power. 
Despite the ultimate ambiguity of the classification, the effort 
in the constitution of the University of Cape Coast to draw a 
sharp, general distinction between academic matters, with 
respect to which the Senate is the authority, and the management 
and administration of University's revenue and property which 
most clearly fall into the jurisdiction of the Council, has much 
to recommend it. A similar, though narrower approach is il-
lustrated by the assignment to the Senate of substantive control 
over specific academic matters, such as the selection of persons 
for appointment to the faculty. In the present African 
university context, I think it unwise and hazardous to rely on 
convention to assure desirable council deference to the academic 
membership of the institution in dealing with essentially 
academic matters. If that deference is deemed desirable, as I 
hope it would be, it should be nurtured by authoritative alloca-
tions of powers in the university constitution and statutes. 
While I would not favor detailed statements of criteria for 
appointment to a university faculty, particularly if these suc-
cumb to the current fashion of quantification (years of post-
terminal degree experience, publications, etc.), I do think it 
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useful to set out in the statutes in categorical terms the kinds 
of factors that may appropriately be considered in determining 
qualification for appointment, as ~ell as those that may not be. 
Qualification for effective teaching and creative scholarship 
and demonstrated ability to use that qualification can be readi-
ly expressed as affirmative criteria. Equally readily, prohibi-
tions against discrimination based on religion, sex, ethnic 
identification, or political persuasion can be framed. The 
specification of legitimate and proscribed criteria should be 
related to both the acquisition and retention of faculty status, 
so as to make clear their relevance not only to appointment and 
reappointment but to disciplinary proceedings as well. 
As I have suggested earlier, the vulnerability of faculty 
to status termination through the non-renewal of term appoint-
ments can present subtle threats and actual dangers to academic 
freedom. While a university must remain free to utilize proba-
tionary status for a reasonable period, I believe it should 
respect the natural human urge for greater security of status. I 
am not now urging upon the African universities the adoption of 
something like the American concept of professorial tenure, 
though indeterminate or lifetime tenure of faculty is not un-
known in the African universities. An arrangement under which 
all faculty appointments involve successive term contracts can 
be reconciled with the suggestion I would make. This is simply 
that the statutes of the university provide that the university 
may, if it chooses, make appointments probationary for a rea-
sonable period, but a faculty member may challenge any refusal 
to renew the appointment. The challenge would impose on the in-
stitution itself a burden of justification under the legitimate 
criteria for faculty status specified in the statutes. That 
justification should be required before a university tribunal 
and under hearing procedures the same as or closely similar to 
those established to consider disciplinary actions. Later, we 
will consider the desirable composition and procedures of such a 
tribunal. 
The agreement between a university and a faculty member, 
formed when appointment is offered and accepted, is a contract 
under which important legal rights can arise. If the African 
universities should follow the practices common in most American 
universities, however, skilled lawyers or judges would encounter 
great difficulty in ascertaining the scope and content of the 
contract terms. The standard forms in common use there are of 
the most abbreviated kind, usually being limited to a designa-
tion of title or rank, a salary term, and, if the appointment is 
for a fixed term, the duration of that term. In general, I would 
favor more fully elaborated standard-form contracts for faculty 
members. I believe it would be wise for the councils of the 
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African universities, after taking fully into account the views 
of the academic membership, to develop contracts of appointment 
and service setting out in clear language all of the critical 
terms of the relationship. The contract need not restate all of 
the provisions of the university statutes that affect faculty 
perquisites. Indeed, it would be unwise to do so, since with 
respect to some of these it may be prudent for the council to 
avoid contractual commitment, reserving to itself the preroga-
tive to amend the statutes through normal processes. It may be, 
however, that certain faculty rights and protections created by 
statute, as well as certain benefits provided under general per-
sonnel policies of the institution, should be incorporated by 
specific reference into the contracts made with individual 
faculty members. Otherwise, reasonable expectations may be 
defeated, with a consequent erosion of faculty morale and a loss 
of effectiveness in the teaching and research programs of the 
university. The standard contract should make clear which of the 
personnel policies have become contractually obligatory on the 
university. 
As I have suggested in various contexts earlier, the 
university community is entitled to expect of faculty members 
certain standards of performance and responsibility, while they, 
in turn, should be able to expect security of status except as 
they are judged critically deficient under those standards. Ac-
commodation of the ends of academic freedom and security to 
academic responsibility and high-quality service necessitates, 
as we have noted, careful statement in statutes and perhaps in 
contracts of both the relevant criteria for faculty evaluation 
and.the methods for applying them. It is to the latter, that is, 
the structure and process of faculty discipline, that I now 
turn. 
The dismissal of a faculty member or often even the imposi-
tion of a less drastic sanction affects vitally important in-
dividual and institutional interests. Punitive action should not 
be taken except after the most careful hearing by an ap-
propriately constituted tribunal operating under procedures that 
assure as fully as possible a fair hearing. 
What is the appropriate composition of the tribunal to con-
duct such a hearing? Because the criteria of assessment which 
determine the appropriateness of the penalty are those inherent 
in the academic enterprise itself, it is critical, I believe, 
that the membership of the tribunal comprise exclusively or 
predominantly members of the teaching and research staff. 
Certainly it should not include any persons who have been in-
volved in precipitating the disciplinary action and, in my judg-
ment, would most desirably not include the Vice-Chancellor or a 
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member of his staff, even if he holds an academic appointment. 
Since I share fully the sensitivity of most lawyers to special 
courts or ad hoc tribunals, I believe that the disciplinary 
board should be set up on a permanent basis in advance of any 
particular need for its functioning. It should enjoy the respect 
and confidence of the faculty and not be subject to challenge as 
a mere tool of the administration or any external authority. 
Therefore, I would think it best that its members be elected, 
perhaps for three-year terms, by the senate or academic board. 
While I do not believe that the Vice Chancellor should sit 
on the disciplinary board or appoint its members, he does have 
important roles to play in the disciplinary system. He should 
assure that the prescribed procedures for initiating and carry-
ing out disciplinary actions have been followed meticulously and 
that any opportunities for solving the problem without formal 
proceedings, in the best interests of both the university and 
the affected faculty member, have been sensitively explored. 
Whether the Vice Chancellor can serve appropriately as a first 
level of appeal by a faculty member affected by an adverse deci-
sion of the disciplinary board is a complex and difficult ques-
tion. That role would seem properly excluded if the Vice Chan-
cellor has acquired an accusatorial or prosecutorial character 
earlier in the proceeding or even has performed in a substantial 
way a screening function in determining what cases should go 
through formal disciplinary proceedings. Since these roles are 
often desirable or at least unavoidable by the Vice Chancellor, 
it seems wisest not to ascribe to him also an appellate func-
tion. 
If a faculty-selected disciplinary board is to continue to 
enjoy faculty confidence and to play its fullest possible role 
in protecting the academic freedom of members of the staff, its 
own procedures should be carefully designed to accord to an af-
fected faculty member the opportunity for a full and fair hear-
ing. We need to note the desirable procedural features only 
briefly: a reasonably explicit statement to the faculty member 
of the grounds asserted for disciplinary action; adequate time 
for him to prepare his defense; the assistance of the university 
authorities in securing the testimony of any witnesses or other 
evidence which the faculty member deems important; assured 
rights of the faculty member to be assisted by counsel, to at-
tend the hearing, to be present when all adverse evidence is 
received, and to present to the board evidence and arguments in 
oral or written form; and finally the preparation of a written 
record sufficient to show the findings of the board on each 
ground for discipline presented I and to serve as the basis for 
a review by higher authority. These are familiar procedural 
safeguards of fairness, some of which are usually subsumed in 
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the Anglo-African legal tradition by the principles of natural 
justice and in the American system by the concept of procedural 
due process of law. 
The usual arguments for at least one level of appellate 
review, as well as the ultimate legal responsibility of the 
council for the governance of the university, support the sub-
mission of the findings and recommendations of the disciplinary 
board to the council for final decision. A council whose members 
are sufficiently sensitive to the basic values of the academic 
community will normally confirm the report of the faculty 
tribunal. If full substantive review of the disciplinary board's 
actions is sought by either the affected faculty member or the 
administrative a~thorities of the university, that review should 
be based on the written record developed from the board's hear-
ing. If the council is not satisfied with that record and there-
fore declines to confirm the decision below, the council should 
specify the nature of its objections and return the matter to 
the disciplinary board for further consideration. If the board 
has heard and considered all of the relevant evidence and has 
conducted its proceedings with full attention to all procedural 
requirements, only the most extraordinary circumstances, closely 
approaching a breakdown in the university's internal governance 
system and the trust on which it rests, should be expected to 
lead the council to a substantive rejection of the faculty dis-
ciplinary board's view of appropriate action and a substitution 
of its own final disposition. 
Some may find this disciplinary arrangement, confined by 
firm procedural requirements and showing strong analogies to the 
system of criminal justice, incongruous in a university com-
munity. Particularly might this reaction be aroused, if, as I 
will propose later, these internal processes are made subject to 
some degree of scrutiny in the ordinary courts. I must confess 
that I too have regarded the recent development of "legalism" in 
American univer- sities and more frequent litigation of 
university affairs in the courts with misgiving and regret. An 
ideal university in a better world perhaps would be able to 
solve all of its problems internally in a true spirit of com-
munity and with appropriate deference to its own essential 
values and to its responsibilities to society. Since that kind 
of world and university seems to elude us, however, I think we 
must consider utilizing those safeguards of order, decency, and 
responsible decision-making which have been found useful in the 
general society. A complex, often large, modern university, 
especially if supported by the state and therefore more vul-
nerable to the full range of social, economic, and political 
pressures, has the power to allocate perquisites too substan-
tial, and to impose penalties too severe, to claim immunity from 
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traditional requirements of procedural fairness or to be 
entitled to immunity from the ultimate scrutiny of the law. 
Primarily, however, the relevant legal regime should be that of 
the university itself as defined in its constitution and 
statutes. 
If the suggestions just made should guide a critique of 
university disciplinary systems, all of those we have considered 
would be subject, in varying degrees, to criticism. In all of 
the universities, the grounds for disciplinary action against 
faculty members, if stated at all, are expressed in very general 
terms. In all of them, except the Universities of Nigeria, 
Nairobi, and Zambia, the statutes involve academic members on 
disciplinary tribunals, though not always to the extent I have 
suggested. All of the universities, with the same three excep-
tions, provide some guarantee of a hearing to the affected 
faculty member, but many of the procedural safeguards I have 
suggested are not assured. In all institutions, the final dis-
ciplinary authority is vested in the lay council, but nothing in 
the constitutions or statutes seems designed to elicit a 
desirable deference by the council to the determinations of the 
tribunal that has substantial academic membership. In the criti-
cal area of faculty discipline, therefore, I conclude that the 
law of the universities has stopped far short of the contribu-
tion it could make to protecting academic freedom. 
Ideally, full justice to members of the faculty and full 
protection of the institution's interests would be provided 
within the legal regime of the university. If that is not seen 
to be the outcome of internal processes, it is inevitable that 
access will be sought to other tribunals and other bodies of 
law. To that possibility we shall turn next 
GENERAL LAW, THE COURTS AND 
ACADEllJ:C FREEDOM 
Thus far we have considered the mission of a university 
with particular reference to the expectations to which it must 
respond in the new countries of Africa. We have analyzed the 
concept of academic freedom and its critical relation to the J 
university's mission, and have described the governance struc-
tures now provided by law for several institutions. In the lat-
ter connection, we noted certain hazards to both proper J 
university autonomy and to the intellectual freedom of teacher-
scholars. While a number of safeguards germane to academic 
freedom could be identified, my suggestion was that in all in-
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stitutions these were in some measure inadequate and in certain 
universities radically so. 
As we turn now to the development of or the discovery in 
the general law of the land of further legal protections for 
academic freedom, may I return briefly to a suggestion made ear-
lier that a right to academic freedom be established by the 
general law. In his major work on British, African and Indian 
universities, Lord Ashby proposed that a "compact" between 
government and university be agreed upon, a "compact" recogniz-
ing both the state's interest and the university's prerogative 
of autonomous decisions and actions within the scope of its mis-
sion, and that this "compact" itself be safeguarded by inclusion 
in a somewhat inflexible national constitution. My earlier 
reference to the ephemeral quality of African constitutions does 
not deny the attractiveness of Ashby's proposal, at least as a 
goal. 
The Anglophone countries of Africa came into being under 
written constitutions which often provided extensive catalogues 
of fundamental rights protected in some measure from legislative 
or execu"' •ve infringement. In this respect they resembled the 
United S::..:::.-ces with its written Constitution and Bill of Rights, 
more than Great Britain. For this reason, a very brief account 
of the developing American constitutional law concept of pro-
tected academic freedom may be useful. 
Consider the following statement: 
"The essentiality of freedom in the community of American 
universities is almost self-evident. No one should underestimate 
the vital role in a democracy that is played by those who guide 
and train our youth. To impose any strait jacket upon the in-
tellectual leaders in our colleges and universities would im-
peril the future of our Nation. No field of education is so 
thoroughly comprehended by man that new discoveries cannot yet 
be made. Particularly is that true in the social sciences, where 
few, if any, principles are accepted as absolutes. Scholarship 
cannot flourish in an atmosphere of suspicion and distrust. 
Teachers and students must always remain free to inquire, to 
study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding; 
otherwise our civilization will stagnate and die." 
These are not the words of a militant university faculty member 
or even of a university administrator. They were written by the 
late Chief Justice Earl Warren for the majority of the Supreme 
Court of the United States in a judgment striking down the ac-
tion of a state in infringing academic freedom. 
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The supreme Court's derivation of the constitutional right 
to academic freedom stems from the Fourteenth Amendment's pros-
cription of deprivations of liberty or property without due 
process of law. such a deprivation·: is deemed to exist if a sanc-
tion, dismissal for example, is imposed on a faculty member be-
cause of his exercise of one of the liberties protected by the 
Bill of Rights, such as freedom of speech, religion or associa-
tion. Similarly, an unconstitutional deprivation occurs if he is 
dismissed without an adequate hearing when he enjoys either by 
contract or custom a reasonable expectation of continuing his 
faculty status. I have described these protections as part of a 
developing constitutional concept. Its parameters have not been 
fully defined in the relatively few decisions over approximately 
the past two decades. It is important to note, since the Four-
teenth Amendment prohibits only certain forms of state action, 
that possible impairments of the academic freedom of faculty 
members in the private universities by their own administrations 
or governing boards would not attract constitutional scrutiny. 
Nevertheless, the recognition of academic freedom, even within 
limited and still unclear boundaries, is an important constitu-
tional advance. 
Might those African constitutions that contain declarations 
of fundamental rights ground analogous protections of academic 
freedom? Consider, as an example, the Constitution of Zambia 
which lists, among the fundamental rights and freedoms of in-
dividuals, personal liberty, protection from deprivation of 
property, freedom of conscience, of expression and of movement, 
and protection from discrimination on the grounds of race, 
tribe, political opinions or creed. These provisions are not 
merely general exhortations to virtue, for the courts are given 
jurisdiction on proper application to use their processes to 
protect the postulated rights and freedoms. Surely in such an 
embracing catalogue of fundamental rights and liberties some 
recognition might be accorded to the freedom of teaching and in-
quiry which is the life blood of the university. 
Constitutional litigation in general has been very rare in 
the courts of Africa, and I know of no case in which academic 
freedom has been recognized, or even asserted, as a constitu-
tional right. Nor, in the immediate future, would I expect such 
a development. Three deterrents are immediately evident. First, 
judicial creativity which can pour specific content into the 
relatively empty vessels of constitutional guarantees is stimu-
lated and guided by value perceptions widely shared in the 
society. A distinguished former Vice-Chancellor of the 
University of Lagos has written that there was no indigenous 
concept of academic freedom in Nigeria and that it still has to 
make its case to Nigerian society. Much the same is true in 
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other African countries and, indeed, in many societies around 
the world, I believe. Second, the constitutional ascriptions of 
fundamental rights and freedoms to individuals are usually 
hedged by derogation clauses couched in language sufficiently 
general and vague to accommodate many of the factors that can 
corrode academic freedom. Again the constitution of Zambia pro-
vides an adequate illustration. Under its terms, an action 
challenged as impairing such an asserted right as freedom of ex-
pression may still be sustained if found to be done under a law 
that is reasonably required in the interests of defense, public 
safety, public order, or public morality, or for the purpose of 
regulating educational institutions in the interests of persons 
receiving instruction therein. Third and finally, the African 
constitutions themselves have thus far proved fragile indeed, 
being subject to fairly easy and frequent amendment or total 
displacement. 
For these reasons it does not appear to be reasonable for 
faculty members in most African universities to expect that in 
the near future their academic freedom will be able to claim 
constitutional protection. Yet this may not always be true. The 
governmental fluidity and instability that seem inevitable under 
the various pressures of recent independence need not be 
permanent features of national life. As more stable constitu-
tional orders emerge, it may be wise to consider recognition and 
protection of the universities in the organic law. Toward this 
end, the administrative and academic staffs of the universities 
(especially the faculties of law), and the legal profession it-
self, can provide leadership. This is needed in a sustained ef-
fort, not merely in responses to recurrent crises. 
The value of academic freedom, like other individual 
liberties, may not now have deep indigenous roots. There is rea-
son to remember, however, that a constitution, as explicated and 
enforced by the courts, can have great educational impact. As 
the fundamental law and its judicial interpreters carry out 
their potentially great teaching mission, it is to be hoped that 
a sensitive awareness of the necessity to protect the freedom of 
the mind, particularly in teaching and scholarship, will be 
among the imprints they make on the national character. 
Below the grand level of the constitution, the basic na-
tional law of obligations, administered in the ordinary courts, 
may be or become available to protect faculty rights, including 
within certain limits the right to academic freedom. This pos-
sibility becomes more realistic if clear and sufficiently com-
prehensive contracts are made between the university and members 
of its faculty. Thus far, however, it appears that the faculty 
members of African universities have made little resort to the 
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courts to vindicate their asserted rights. The only instances I 
have discovered are two Nigerian cases: Imegwu v. Lagos 
University Provisional Council and oyenuga et al. v. Ife 
University Provisional Council. Imegwu dealt with certain con-
tract aspects of the financial settlement between the university 
and a faculty member who had resigned; it need not detain us. 
oyenuga is closer to our interest and merits fuller comment. 
Dr. Oyenuga, Professor of Agriculture in the University of 
Ife, was dismissed for alleged insubordination in refusing to 
comply with a directive that he resign his appointment or 
apologize for a letter he had written to the Vice Chancellor. 
Subsequently, four other members of the faculty resigned in 
protest against the dismissal and their resignations were im-
mediately accepted. The legal action, begun in the High Court of 
Western Nigeria, involved the consolidated claims of all five 
faculty members for salary and emoluments for a specific period 
in lieu of notice. The judgment of the court favored the plain-
tiffs who realized a substantial recovery. 
Against these basic background facts the judgment of the 
court is extremely difficult to understand. It does not appear 
that the defendant Council sought to make much of the seemingly 
significant difference between the case of Professor Oyenuga. 
who was dismissed, and that of the other four plaintiffs, who 
resigned. Indeed, in all cases, the council relied primarily on 
the written conditions of service for senior staff and insisted 
that each plaintiff had the period of notice to which these 
service conditions entitled him. If the four plaintiffs other 
than Professor Oyenuga had resigned, however, of what was the 
University obligated to give them notice? The court's opinion, 
including its reflections of the arguments of the Council, pro-
vides no satisfactory answer. One possible, though speculative, 
answer is that the resignations had been tendered to become ef-
fective at a stated time in the future, in accordance with a 
notice requirement imposed on faculty members by the conditions 
of service, but that the University wrongfully had made the 
resignations effective immediately. If this had been the fact, 
and the University had refused to pay the salaries for the re-
quired notice period which the resigning faculty members had 
honored, then recovery of the unpaid salaries would have been 
clearly appropriate in the legal action. If, on the other hand, 
the conditions of service required no notice period or the 
period of notice of a resignation had not been respected by the 
resigning faculty members, the University's regarding their 
resignations as immediately effective and as terminating the 
University's financial obligation to them would have seemed 
quite appropriate. One commentator on the case has suggested 
that the decision of the court "may have far-reaching con-
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sequences in the future entrenchment of academic freedom in 
Nigerian universities." Since the commentator added, however, 
that the four faculty members "resigned voluntarily and their 
employment was not terminated," he'uay find the significance for 
academic freedom that he attributes to the decision in a belief 
that the Court recognized an infringement of the freedom of the 
resigning faculty members that even their resignations could not 
obscure. If any such view motivated the court, however, it is 
carefully shrouded by the opinion. 
The Court's treatment of the case of Professor Oyenuga is 
in some respects clearer, and certainly it is much more disturb-
ing in its implications for academic freedom. He did not resign; 
he was dismissed. His dismissal, furthermore, was grounded on 
factors having little or no perceptible relevance to his per-
formance as a teacher, scholar, or administrator. Even if 
Professor Oyenuga's letter to the Vice Chancellor had been 
couched in unduly blunt terms and might have been challenged as 
lacking civility -- a doubtful view in my judgment -- in isola-
tion it hardly seems an adequate basis for terminating his 
professorial tenure. 
What then was Professor Oyenuga's protected tenure? The 
Court ascribed to the defendant council the view that it had 
power under the written conditions of service for senior staff 
to terminate the Oyenuga appointment by giving him six months' 
notice or paying his salary for that period in lieu of notice. 
Such a power seemingly did exist with respect to first term, 
probationary appointments. The Court concluded, however, that 
the provision that all appointments were to be in the first in-
stance for probationary terms of three years and only after con-
firmation were to extend to retirement age did not apply to 
professors. On the basis of this conclusion, Professor oyenuga's 
status should have been protected to age sixty. The Court 
declared, therefore, that the University could not terminate his 
appointment by notice of any length. It stated that the defen-
dant Council admitted the soundness of this view of the written 
conditions of service, and it rejected the Council's contention 
that an unwritten but implied term permitting termination by 
giving reasonable notice should be found. 
If the Court's interpretation of the contract between 
Professor oyenuga and the University was sound, then such a con-
tract was, in my judgment, seriously deficient in protecting the 
legitimate needs and interests of the University. Insofar as the 
judgment reveals the Court's view, it was that no circumstance 
would permit the University to terminate a professorial appoint-
ment. If this view embraced termination on legitimate dis-
ciplinary grounds, it surely saddled the University with a 
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regrettable disability. successive generations of students, the 
general academic community, and the surrounding society should 
not be compelled to provide a sinecure protecting incompetence 
or clear, recurrent defaults on professorial duties. Let me make 
entirely clear that there is no suggestion of any of these in-
adequacies or delinquencies in the case of Professor Oyenuga. My 
criticism is at the general level of the terms of faculty con-
tracts and university statutes, if these combine to make a 
professor on lifetime tenure totally immune to rightful removal, 
as a seemingly permissible interpretation of the judgment in the 
Oyenuga case would suggest. The contract itself, the university 
statutes, or both. should make as clear as possible the permis-
sible bases of termination of professorial and other academic 
appointments, as well as the procedures to be followed in estab-
lishing these bases and effecting the termination. This is 
ground we have already covered. 
The oyenuga judgment was also puzzling and disturbing from 
the standpoint of the legitimate interests of the professor. 
After asserting that Professor Oyenuga's non-probationary ap-
pointment was not terminable by notice and that it gave him 
security of tenure until retirement at age sixty, the Court, in 
framing the appropriate remedy, awarded only salary for the re-
mainder of a three year term. What was the source of such a 
limitation? Apparently the source relied upon by the Court was 
the written condition of service which fixed an initial proba-
tionary appointment of a faculty member at three years certain 
and provided for longer tenure only after "confirmation," that 
is, after termination of the probation. But the Court itself had 
already rejected the view that Oyenuga's appointment was proba-
tionary: his initial appointment, as professor, ran until 
retirement. Such a contractually-created status and its at-
tendant security become mere illusion, however, if, upon wrong-
ful dismissal, the professor's remedy is limited to emoluments 
for the remainder of a non-existent probationary term. This 
limitation on the available remedy merely accords to the 
University a relatively inexpensive hunting license to collect 
professorial heads! 
I have discussed the oyenuga case at some length because it 
provides useful insights into both the advantages and limita-
tions of contract actions by faculty members to vindicate their 
rights. The ]aw of contract as administered in the ordinary 
courts can provide some protection for academic members, if 
their contracts of appointment and service are adequately 
developed and soundly interpreted. In a basic sense, however, 
that protection can never be truly sufficient. Faculty status 
does not provide merely a livelihood. Equally importantly, it 
provides membership in an intellectual community in which one's 
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profession of teaching and research can be carried on for a 
lifetime. A monetary award of contract damages, properly 
measured, may protect the faculty member's strictly economic in-
terests. The historic and usually defensible unwillingness of 
courts in the tradition of English equity to decree specific 
performance of personal service contracts, whether at the suit 
of the employer or employee, means, however, that the courts 
cannot be relied upon to protect faculty status to the extent of 
assuring an on-going opportunity to teach and carry out re-
search. Exclusive focus on the monetary remedy, therefore, makes 
especially critical the full measurement of a dismissed faculty 
member's economic loss, so as to provide the maximum deterrent 
to wrongful dismissal. 
Remedial limitations are not, however, the most fundamental 
ground for discounting the law of contract administered by the 
ordinary courts as a source of protection for faculty status-
rights, including the right to academic freedom. To be sure. if 
the university, in patent violation of contract terms or obvious 
disregard of statutory requirements, dismisses a faculty member, 
a court in dealing with the problem should confront no novel 
problems. Interpreting contracts or statutes and finding objec-
tive facts are the ordinary grist of the judicial mill. That 
grist may in certain circumstances be sufficient to satisfy the 
faculty member's need for protection. In many instances, how-
ever, it cannot do so. 
As I have suggested, the quality of performance of a 
faculty member in his central roles of teacher and scholar prop-
erly remains subject to scrutiny, even after his formal proba-
tionary period has ended. If that quality is found critically 
deficient, he should be subject to disciplinary action, includ-
ing dismissal, in full accord with his contract rights. When in-
ternal university processes have produced a conclusion that such 
a sanction is warranted, the ability of any court in a contract 
action or otherwise to provide a substantive review of that con-
clusion must be doubted. The standards or norms germane to the 
sanction are those of the academy; the ultimate operative facts 
are subjective and judgmental. The central question is whether 
the performance of the faculty member has fallen critically 
short of the standards of teaching and scholarship which the 
university has set. That is a question which few judges, if any, 
would feel competent to consider and answer. My own view is that 
they should not be encouraged to do so. 
The utility of the contract action, therefore, seems to me 
limited to instances in which the university authorities have 
imposed sanctions in disregard of internal procedures, as in 
denying a required hearing, or those in which it makes no effort 
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to legitimatize the sanction by reference to accepted standards 
for faculty discipline. We must recognize, of course, that im-
peccable procedures do not guarantee a fair and decent result. 
Natural justice or due process cannot eliminate the hazards in 
unduly vague grounds for discipline or in grounds not func-
tionally relevant to the quality of teaching and scholarship. 
Nor does procedural nicety excise the risk that critical judg-
ments will be distorted by political pressures, avarice, 
ideological inflexibility, or other bias. The remedies for those 
ills are not to be found in the courts. They must be developed 
within the university community itself. 
Another body of general law might in certain instances be 
usefully invoked in aid of academic freedom: that is, the 
remedial writs and the doctrines determining their availability 
and effect that were developed at common law for controlling 
public officers and agencies. We have neither the time nor the 
need for an extensive discussion of the subtle mysteries of 
English administrative law and its African progeny. I shall not j 
dwell on the technical distinctions among the so-called preroga-
tive writs, though it is clear that these, reflecting their 
historical antecedents, still influence the circumstances of 
their availability. I shall seek a broader perspective which may I 
enable us to assess the limited, but important, contribution \ 
that administrative law doctrines and remedies may make in 
preserving the integrity of the university's mission and the 
academic freedom of its faculty. 
The central function of administrative law is to permit a 
jud~cial determination whether rules promulgated by subordinate 
governmental agencies are congruent with the higher norms pro-
vided by a constitution or statute and, in turn, whether the ac-
tions of executive officers fall within the scope of the powers 
allocated to them by constitution, statute or subsidiary legis-
lation. The essential test applied by the courts is whether the 
power exercised is ultra vires. In the simplest and probably 
most common case the court is called upon merely to interpret 
conventional legal sources that allocate powers and, against the 
resulting interpretation, to determine whether the challenged 
rule or action can stand. In some instances the standard of 
judicial judgment may be more amorphous, however. Arguably an 
administrative rule, act, or decision within the scope of ap-
parent powers may in certain circumstances be so unreasonable as 
to be ultra vires. It has been asserted as well, by one eminent 
authority, that an administrative body to which a power of deci-
sion has been committed may be compelled by a court to give rea-
sons or more nearly adequate reasons for its decision. 
Here, however, I would direct your attention primarily to 
another requirement frequently imposed by the courts under the 
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broad ultra vires doctrine: that is, the procedural safeguard of 
a fair hearing for one whose interests would be seriously af-
fected by an administrative action or decision. 
~ 
I have suggested earlier the crucial importance of the pro-
cedures followed in imposing discipline on faculty members and, 
to a limited extent, in determining the legitimacy of a decision 
not to renew an appointment at the expiration of its term. I 
have urged, therefore, that the university statutes set out 
clearly the required procedures, including therein a fair hear-
ing for the affected faculty member. If this is done and the 
procedures are not followed in the imposition of a sanction, 
such as dismissal, the ultra vires doctrine applied by the 
courts can provide the ground for invalidating the sanction. 
Even if the statutes are not sufficiently explicit on procedural 
safeguards, however, I would not regard the courts as disabled. 
Utilizing the ancient common law writ of certiorari, the courts 
often have insisted, even in the absence of a requirement ex-
pressed in statute or regulation, that administrative agencies 
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers adhere to what are 
thought to be the standards of natural justice. These standards 
include many of the safeguards of a fair hearing which I have 
enumerated. 
I should take brief account of two possible objections to 
administrative law review of university disciplinary proceedings 
and specifically of the application to them of the standards of 
natural justice. The first of these can be disposed of summari-
ly, I believe. It is that the prerogative writs like certiorari, 
which are most characteristic of administrative law review, 
properly issue only against agencies exercising statutory 
powers, that is, powers created and assigned by a statute in the 
sense of a parliamentary Act. This view with its sound histori-
cal roots has been reasserted fairly recently by Professor Wade 
as a basis for criticizing certain English decisions in which 
prerogative writs were sought against universities created by 
royal charter. Two responses, summarily stated, adequately meet 
this objection. The first is that the various African universi-
ties are, in fact, statutory bodies. They are in no sense 
private~ they are created, empowered, and funded by the state. 
They exercise functions of an executive, legislative, and in 
some instances judicial character, allocating and withdrawing 
perquisites quite comparable to those dispensed by government in 
other contexts. In my judgment, therefore, the same body of 
norms and remedies invoked by the courts to channel and control 
the activities of other instrumentalities of the ~xecutive arm 
of government should be applicable to the African universities. 
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The second response to the objection abandons legal tech-
nicality and stresses the substance of fair play. It may make 
little difference whether the courts respond to complaints 
against procedural unfairness by issuing prerogative writs or by 
the use of declarations, injunctions, or damage actions. While 
criticizing what he regarded as over-extended use of the writs, 
Professor Wade has pointed out that the "twin pillars" of 
natural justice are statute and contract. If the absence of a 
statutory source of authority makes the use of certiorari or 
mandamus inappropriate, contract enforced through other remedial 
devices may impose an obligation to provide a fair hearing. Con-
tract may not be the only legal basis for analyzing the rela-
tionship between a university and a member of its faculty; but 
it surely is an available one. If it is to be used as the ground 
for asserting a judicially enforceable claim to procedural 
safeguards, such as a fair hearing in disciplinary proceedings, 
my earlier suggestions concerning the desirability of fully 
developed university statutes and of fully articulated terms of 
appointment to faculty status take on added importance. 
The second objection to the availability of administrative 
law writs for vindicating a faculty member's claim to natural 
justice in disciplinary proceedings entangles us in one of the 
more impenetrable jungles of English and English-influenced law. 
Numerous English decisions have turned on whether the claimant 
to natural justice was a mere servant in a strict employment re-
lationship or was the holder of a public off ice removable only 
for cause. Thus, in various cases a hospital doctor, a dock 
laborer, and university undergraduates have been classified as 
"office holders" who are entitled to be heard before discipline 
is imposed, while a specialist surgeon and a university profes-
sor have been labelled "mere servants" with no such entitlement. 
Professor de Smith's comment, after reviewing these cases, that 
"one could perhaps be forgiven for wondering whether the law was 
verging on the asinine" elicits a strongly sympathetic response. 
To what extent does such "asininity" characterize present 
English law and to what extent should it influence African 
judges in dealing with the claims of university faculty members 
to natural justice? 
The only case of which I am aware which classified a uni-
versity professor as a mere employee and, arguably at least in 
part on that ground, denied his claim to natural justice, was 
Vidyodaya University Council v. Silva, a 1965 decision of the 
Judicial committee of the Privy Council. Interpreted most nar-
rowly, that case did not concern itself with the propriety of 
the University's action or with the professor's entitlement, 
perhaps on the basis of contract, to a fair hearing before dis-
missal. Rather, it turned on the technical reach of certiorari 
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and did not find in the University a sufficiently public charac-
ter to warrant the writ. Even on that basis, however, its 
reliability as an indicator of the current state of English 
judicial attitudes is suspect. In the later case of Malloch v. 
Aberdeen Corpn., which involved a teacher employed by a local 
education authority, the House of Lords held that a dismissal 
without hearing the teacher was a nullity. The speech of Lord 
Wilberforce is especially note-worthy. He said, in par:, 
A comparative list of the situations in which persons 
have been held entitled or not entitled to a hearing, 
or to observation of rules of natural justice, accor-
ding to the master and servant test, looks illogical or 
even bizarre •••• One may accept that if there are 
relationships in which all requirements of the obser-
vance of rules of natural justice are excluded (and I 
do not wish to assume that this is inevitably so), 
these must be confined to what have been called "pure 
master and servant cases," which I take to mean cases 
in which there is no element of public employment or 
service, no support by statute, nothing in the nature 
of an off ice or a status which is capable of protec-
tion. If any of these elements exist, then, in my 
opinion, whatever the terminology used, and even 
though in some inter partes aspects the relation-
ship may be called that of master and servant, there 
may be essential procedural requirements to be obser-
ved, and failure to observe them may result in a dis-
missal being declared to be void. 
With specific reference to the Vidyodaya University case, Lord 
Wilberforce continued: 
••• I must confess that I could not follow it in 
this country in so far as it involves a denial of 
any remedy of administrative law to analogous employ-
ments. Statutory provisions similar to those on 
which the employment rested [the University consti-
tution and statutes] would tend to show, to my mind, 
in England or in Scotland, that it was of a suf-
ficiently public character, or one partaking suf-
ficiently of the nature of an office, to attract 
appropriate remedies of administrative law. 
The legal status of the various African universities is 
analytically indistinguishable from that of Vidyodaya 
University, and it is to be hoped that African judges, as 
relevant cases may arise, will find persuasive these views of 
Lord Wilberforce. 
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In summary, the courts have, I believe, a basis in the 
standards and remedies of administrative law for scrutinizing 
univer- sity affairs in important respects. They can inquire 
whether actions taken by external authorities and university of-
ficers and bodies fall within the powers allocated to them by 
law and can insist that basic procedural fairness be maintained 
in disciplinary proceedings. We must recognize, of course, that 
the ultra vires doctrine will not enable the courts to assure 
that university constitutions, statutes and regulations, or the 
actions of university authorities taken under them, are good or 
necessarily functional to the expected mission of the 
university. The courts at most can strike down as invalid the 
rule or action that exceeds the legal power of the promulgator 
or actor. If the power granted is too broad or is directed 
toward inappropriate ends, the remedy, if any, lies at the na-
tional political and legislative level or within the univer-
sity's own legislative process. Thus, the administrative law en-
quiry permitted to the courts by the ultra vires doctrine is 
limited but, I believe, important. Preservation of the Rule of 
Law is as important in the university as in any other sphere of 
state power. 
Nor should the safeguard of a fair hearing in disciplinary 
proceedings, which I have stressed, be discounted as mere proce-
dure. All of us recognize, of course, that even the fairest 
hearing can result in an unjust decision, particularly if the 
substantive norms being applied are themselves unjust. Fur-
ther1t10re. even a hearing satisfying all of the effective demands 
of natural justice does not provide an absolute guarantee 
against the intervention of bias, or influence on the decision 
from inappropriate or irrelevant criteria. A fair hearing for 
the faculty member, whether voluntarily provided within the 
university or compelled by the courts, will not, therefore, ful-
ly safeguard his academic freedom from threatened sanctions. 
Much human experience throughout the ages, however, supports the 
observations of the late Justice Frankfurter that "the history 
of liberty has largely been the history of procedural 
safeguards," and of Professor A. L. Goodhart that "In ••• three 
words 'the fair trial' we can sum up the outstanding contribu-
tion that the common law has made to civilization." Fair proce-
dure begets sound substantive norms; it nurtures rational deci-
sions and decent, humane actions. 
In Ghana, Kenya and Zambia, the foregoing analysis of the 
relevance of administrative law to university affairs has, I be-
lieve, current applicability. We must recognize, of course, that 
in each of these countries judicial review of administrative ac-
tion can be excluded if the empowering legislation makes action 
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entirely discretionary, conditions it on purely subject 
criteria, or expressly bars access to the courts. This will be 
true unless the claim for judicial review is based on constitu-
tional grounds, as is still theoretically possible in Kenya and 
Zambia where constitutional guarantees of fundamental rights 
remain theoretically operative. With respect to administrative 
law scrutiny of univer- sity actions, Nigeria, for two quite 
different reasons, again may be the deviant case. 
The first of these reasons need be treated only briefly. 
Since all of the Nigerian universities are structured and func-
tion now in some measure under Decrees or Edicts, and since any 
action against a faculty member or university body which would 
be relevant to our present concerns presumably would be by an 
instrument made under such Decrees or Edicts, the courts at 
present are seemingly blocked from considering or ruling upon 
the validity of such action. 
The second reason involves what may well be a permanent 
feature of the structures and governance of Nigerian 
universities, the special role of the Visitor. As we noted ear-
lier, the Visitor has been given by express legislation, or 
derives from the common law functions of the office, an exten-
sive power to hear complaints and grievances arising within the 
university community. Historically the English courts have 
deferred in substantial measure to visitatorial jurisdiction and 
have refused to intervene in what they classified as domestic 
disputes. These guiding attitudes were well-defined in the 
seventeenth century. They have been reasserted in relatively 
re9ent decisions of the English courts and approved by scholarly 
commentators. More importantly, they have been embedded in the 
law of Nigeria by the decision of the Supreme Court in 
University of Lagos et al. v. Dada. 
We must, therefore, accept that as long as visitatorial 
jurisdiction exists, disputes and grievances within the Nigerian 
universities will make their way only with difficulty to the 
courts, whether judicial scrutiny is sought on the basis of the 
law of contract or administrative law. While the path to the 
court house is narrow and hazardous, it has not been closed com-
pletely, however. Numerous decisions of the English courts over 
many years establish certain avenues to judicial oversight even 
in the presence of visitatorial jurisdiction. Since that juris-
diction is limited to domestic disputes, that is, those between 
a member and other members or the institution itself, it seems 
quite arguable that if faculty discipline has resulted in dis-
missal and termination of membership, the dispute would be no 
longer strictly domestic and access to judicial review would be 
facilitated. 
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A number of other legal doctrines and rules define the 
potential for a continuing judicial role even though the dispute 
is deemed to be domestic. The courts may enquire and determine 
whether a matter properly falls within the Visitor's jurisdic-
tion and may issue a prohibition if that jurisdiction is ex-
ceeded. If the Visitor refuses to act at all or fails to perform 
any duty imposed by the law, he may be compelled by mandamus to 
do so. While not required to proceed in accordance with common 
law rules, the Visitor must comply with any procedures laid down 
by the charter or statutes of the corporation and he must pro-
vide a fair hearing to the parties concerned. Indeed, when 
violation of the principles of natural justice has been as-
serted, some recent English cases involving university members 
have shown less deference to visitatorial jurisdiction and have 
proceeded to a consideration of the dispute on its merits. In 
view of the substantial powers and functions of the Nigerian 
university Visitor beyond those of a quasi-judicial nature in-
volved in hearing and deciding disputes, his own actions may be 
the basis of a grievance. If so, a potentially important role 
for the courts could rest on the proposition that the Visitor is 
subject to the second branch of the principle of natural 
justice, nemo judex in sua causa. The Visitor may not visit him-
self! It would seem that the proliferation of internal 
university functions of the Nigerian Visitor may actually im-
peril his role as a settler of domestic disputes. He has become 
in a sense less a "visitor" and more a "resident" of the 
university community. As such, the chances are increased that 
his own actions may be the subject of the dispute and he himself 
an interested party to it. If that is the case, the basis for 
judicial deference to visitatorial jurisdiction in resolving the 
conflict is substantially impugned. The historic principle that 
one may not be a judge in his own cause provides the courts a 
usable ground for their intervention. 
We should not let our discussion of judicial oversight of 
university actions affecting the rights and freedoms of faculty 
members rest simply on the proposition that legal bases for it 
can be found. Two further questions merit brief attention and 
comment. Is judicial involvement in the affairs of the 
university community desirable? If it is desirable, how 
realistic is an expectation that the courts in the new African 
countries will exercise the jurisdiction I have suggested they 
have? 
Candor requires the admission that I regard resort to the 
courts to settle intra-university disputes as a mixed blessing 
at best. Certainly any procedure that had the effect of trans-
ferring to the courts significant decisional powers in assessing 
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the quality of the teaching and scholarship of a faculty member, 
his honesty, objectivity, and competence-- the only qualities I 
regard as germane to his faculty status-- could be disastrous to 
both university quality and academi~ freedom. Only an academic 
tribunal holds promise of the necessary discriminating judg-
ments, and that promise will be best realized through internal 
procedures to assure that all relevant factors are properly con-
sidered and weighed. If these processes leave some further need 
for review, I am quite clear that the courts, if involved at 
all, should restrict their roles to enquiries into powers and 
procedures. In my view, however, it would be preferable if the 
courts could be avoided entirely. Litigation corrodes the spirit 
of community, and any dispute within the university is best 
resolved by an individual or body that is specially sensitive to 
the values of a university. These considerations reflect some of 
the traditional justifications for an exclusive jurisdiction in 
a Visitor. 
Can the Nigerian Visitorship, as now constituted, sustain 
that justification? surely one must feel great doubt. The Head 
of the Federal Military Government is far-removed from the six 
universities he must visit. He is inevitably and appropriately 
sensitive to the interplay of political forces, distracted by 
the pressing affairs of state, and, insofar as I am aware, with-
out the support of significant specialized staff to assist him 
in the performance of his visitatorial role. For these reasons, 
I would, with great respect, endorse the recent suggestion of 
Chief Rotimi Williams, a distinguished Nigerian lawyer, that the 
Head of State should delegate his visitatorial functions either 
to.an independent Panel of Visitors or to the National 
Universities Commission. such a body, staffed by outstanding 
persons with a keen interest in higher education, could make the 
Visitorship a strong buttress of university quality and academic 
freedom. 
If the African universities and members of their faculties 
do look to the courts as the ultimate vindicators of their 
rights, what kinds of responses should we expect? As we move 
into the realm of prophesy, we must look to the past for 
guidance. Implicit in all that I have said is the proposition 
that the state has long since displaced the church as the prin-
cipal source of hazard to academic and other freedoms. Con-
sequently, the question I have raised about judicial protection 
of university and faculty rights readily can be converted into 
an enquiry concerning the vigor of judicial oversight of public 
administrative action in general. At this level, history is not 
reassuring. 
The colonial legacy to contemporary African courts did not 
include a strongly perceived role of curbing executive excess. 
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As intimate parts of an essentially authoritarian administrative 
structure, the colonial courts largely saw their role in helping 
to preserve law and order and in servicing the needs of the com-
mercial community. In general, I suspect that the practicing Bar 
shared this rather modest role-perception. This is not to say 
that the colonial courts made no use of administrative law in 
considering challenges to the actions of official agencies. The 
case reports would readily refute such an extravagant claim. The 
administrative law component of the received common law provided 
the seed and soil, but these were not cultivated by colonial 
judges and lawyers. One might have expected more vigorous 
cultivation by African courts after independence, when received 
administrative law was supplemented by the guarantees of 
fundamental rights included in many early constitutions. This 
has not been the case, however. Indeed, one careful analyst of 
legal developments in East Africa has suggested that since inde-
pendence, though the number of administrative agencies has in-
creased, the amount of judicial control of administrative action 
has decreased. Nor has the record of the courts in enforcing 
constitutional guarantees been more auspicious. 
One should not too readily blame African judges for undue 
timidity. The colonial legacy of judicial attitudes, the in-
creasing tendency of enabling legislation to vest in officials a 
broad, unreviewable discretion, the derogation clauses that 
characterize most constitutional guarantees, and the threat of 
constitutional or legislative override of unpalatable decisions, 
combine to keep the judiciary close to the core of its tradi-
tional labor. It is at least arguable that in the context of the 
new African countries various legitimate governmental concerns 
combine to counsel against authorizing the judiciary to beard 
the executive lion in his den. That, at least, was the conclu-
sion of two scholarly advisers on the present constitution of 
Tanzania who preferred committing the oversight role to a 
Permanent Commission of Enquiry within the executive branch. In 
any event, I would not predict for the near future an active 
judicial role in protecting university interests against execu-
tive incursions, whether these occur directly or through the 
distortion of internal university processes. 
It may seem appropriate to conclude this analysis of inter-
nal governance structures and certain aspects of the general law 
with an assessment of the current state of academic freedom in 
the African universities. I shall offer none, however. Lacking 
intimate familiarity with the present circumstances of several 
institutions, I think it preferable to await the assessments of 
African teacher-scholars. I shall say only that well publicized 
events arouse a sense of disquiet. To some of the older events 
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to which I have ref erred may be added the frequent closures of 
universities and the arrest, detention or deportation of faculty 
members. Aside from such specific occurrences, I would stress 
the potentialities implicit in the:-:governance models I have out-
lined. In the final analysis it is for Africans inside the 
universities and outside to determine whether these events and 
potentialities are compatible with their own aspirations and 
with the mission they expect their universities to carry out. 
I have spoken to you as one who has spent most of his life 
in universities and is deeply committed to their mission and to 
the freedom which makes that mission attainable. I believe that 
any realistic hope men can have for a better life is inseparably 
linked to the work of free, vital educational institutions. The 
development and preservation of such institutions, directing 
the vigor of their research, teaching, and critical analyses to 
the societies that support them, are especially needed in the 
new countries of Africa where recent political independence has 
still brought to most of the people painfully little respite 
from their three age-old enemies. 
I have spoken also as a lawyer, though not, I hope, one un-
duly beguiled by guild loyalties. I do believe that the institu-
tions of the law can help to shape and to secure the values we 
cherish, that they still justify the historic perception that 
wise restraints nurture ordered liberty. Therefore, I have sug-
gested thoughtful exploration of the contributions which the 
developing law of the universities and the general law of the 
land can make toward securing that freedom of mind, expression, 
and action without which no true university can exist. 
Realism requires a general cautionary conclusion to this 
discussion. The special freedom required for the fulfillment of 
a university's mission is ultimately bound inextricably to the 
liberties of all. A university cannot long exist as an island of 
secure liberty in a sea of doctrinaire repression. If the bell 
tolls for the civil liberties of the ordinary citizen, it will 
toll ultimately also for those freedoms that sustain the mission 
of the university. If one surveys most of the world today, he 
can hardly escape the conclusion that in the eternal struggle to 
free men's spirits, minds, and voices, the forces of fear and 
repression prevail with increasing frequency. Yet the struggle 
must and will continue. The university's own commitment to an 
open society of the mind must join with, support, and nurture 
other libertarian tendencies in the society. I hope that from 
such a union of forces will emerge in all societies a broader 
and deeper understanding of the university's mission and needs, 
and a firm dedication to its freedom as an inseparable part of 
the liberty of all. In few countries today, however, are the 
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universities warranted in assuming that their own internal 
values enjoy wide social understanding and support. Their ef-
forts to develop these will succee~, if at all, only through 
sustained involvements in the society, not through responses to 
occasional crisis. 
While I have stressed the possible contribution of law to 
the maintenance of the conditions of civilized life, including 
the basic condition of freedom, greater stress must be laid on a 
more fundamental truth: we deceive ourselves if we expect from 
legal institutions the protection of values that lack our own 
deep commitment, our willingness to assert and defend them. 
Legal norms and institutions are merely tools in human hands. 
The hands that shape and wield the tools determine the tasks to 
which they will be applied, the priorities among them, and the 
longer range objectives that the immediate tasks service. In any 
assessment, therefore, of the significance of law as a bulwark 
of freedom, we must determine who exercises the power to shape 
the law and the ends toward which it will be applied. Whether 
the value commitments of the people in general or of a select 
few guide the shaping and application of legal power, however, 
one inescapable conclusion emerges: it is a futile and naive 
hope to look only to legal institutions for protection against 
those who hold the power to make and administer the law. Those 
who may doubt that truth, and specifically its relevance to the 
university's claim to freedom, will find adequate demonstration 
of it in the dominant social attitudes, the values of the 
governing elite, and the legal institutions of the Republic of 
South Africa. 
In warning the American people some years ago against undue 
reliance on judicial enforcement of constitutional guarantees to 
protect their fundamental liberties, a great judge observed that 
"a society so riven that the spirit of moderation is gone, no 
court can save: ••• a society where that spirit flourishes, no 
court need save: in a society which evades its responsibility by 
thrusting upon the courts the nurture of that spirit, that 
spirit in the end will perish." Whether Judge Hand unduly dis-
counted the law of the Constitution and the role of American 
courts in preserving liberty and civilized decency, I do not 
know. But of this I am sure: whether we have in view the special 
community of the university or the general society, our ultimate 
hope for freedom, tolerance, and love of truth rests primarily 
on what lies in the hearts of men-- the governed and the 
governors-- and directs their daily lives. If those values are 
cherished, on them can be built legal institutions to curb 
caprice, control the truly deviant, and within narrow limits 
compel right conduct. Without the support and guidance of those 
values, the legal order with equal facility can snuff the flick-
ering flame of freedom. 
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PART THREE 
REFLECTIONS OH EDUCATION, UNIVERSITIES ARD LAW 
WHO WANTS A UNIVERSITY 
[As student protests on university campuses during the late 
sixties became more numerous and in some instances more violent, 
alienation of the ambient communities, local and national, bec-
ame more obvious. I decided to try to speak to this problem when 
I accepted an invitation to speak on February 20, 1970, to the 
Junior Chamber of Commerce Distinguished Awards Dinner in Terre 
Haute, Indiana. Perhaps because of the press of other matters, I 
did not prepare a full text version of what I planned to say but 
spoke extemporaneously from notes. Later, before memory faded, I 
dictated from my notes the following version of the talk. 
While the audience in Terre Haute was entirely courteous 
and observed the usual amenities of such occasions, I sensed 
strongly a substratum of disagreement with, perhaps even resent-
ment of, the views I expressed. A year later, on April 18, 1971, 
I spoke to the annual Phi Beta Kappa dinner in Marquette 
University, and on that occasion I developed much the same views 
I had expressed in Terre Haute. The University audience did not 
appear to find them any more congenial than they had been in 
Terre Haute.] 
America believes in education -- or so the conventional 
wisdom holds. A survey of our relatively brief national history 
will readily confirm that this belief has been reflected strong-
ly in national, state, and local policy. No country in the world 
has undertaken to provide opportunity over such a broad educa-
tional spectrum to such a large percentage of its population. 
From the early land grants to the contemporary GI Bill, an ap-
preciation of education has been reflected in the national al-
location of resources. The westward migration across this great 
continent brought public and private schools, colleges, and 
universities in its wake. To this early commitment, our own 
state university, which is now celebrating its 150th birthday, 
bears striking witness. 
This belief in education and willingness to commit re-
sources, public and private, to it is an integral part of that 
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buoyant optimism which has characterized the American dream. Our 
focus has been less on hazards than on opportunities. Problems 
were there to be solved. Sustained by the bounty of the con-
tinental expanse, we have usually assumed without serious ques-
tion our ability to surmount all obstacles, to solve all prob-
lems in the course of developing a fuller and more satisfying 
life for virtually all. If it is fair to say that Progress, in-
dividual and social, has been the special American Deity, it is 
surely also fair to say that we have seen Education as her prin-
cipal handmaiden. 
In view of this historic connection between the American 
perception of problems to be solved and the contributions of 
education, one might suspect that on the threshold of the ?O's 
the strengthening of our educational system would be near the 
top of our national priorities. For at few times, if any, in our 
history have our problems appeared so urgent and complex. The 
assumed verities and values that have channeled our national 
life and mobilized our energies are being called seriously into 
question. It may be, of course, that our current questions go 
not so much to our professed values as to the reality of our 
commitment to them. Even that form of question, however, probes 
the bedrock of our individual and national life. On a more par-
ticularized basis, the problems and issues of the ?O's involve 
international peace, racial justice, and the quality of in-
dividual and community life in an increasingly crowded and pol-
luted environment. Reflecting our historic experience and at-
titudes, I am sure most of us would agree readily that our suc-
cess in meeting the problems and issues of the ?O's will be 
in~imately related to the vigor and imaginative responsiveness 
of our educational system. 
In the few moments available this evening, I will not un-
dertake to discuss broadly our educational system. Rather, I 
will look at that part of the system in which I have been in-
volved through most of my adult life, that is, our universities. 
I would hope to avoid both the danger of calamity-howling and 
the danger of complacency, in suggesting certain sources of con-
cern as I look at our universities on the threshold of the 
?O's. 
The conclusion is unavoidable, it seems to me, that public 
support for our system of higher education is in serious ques-
tion today. If one considers the attitudes toward universities 
reflected in our national and local news media, the recurrent 
danger of state and federal legislation authorizing the intru-
sion of public power into the governance of our universities, 
and the increasingly attenuated financial support for many 
universities, it is difficult to maintain one's optimism. In the 
national budget for fiscal 1971, which the President recently 
submitted to the Congress, there is an effective decrease in the 
support for higher education. In our own state, the 1969 Legis-
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lature appropriated for the Bloomington campus of Indiana 
University less for the academic year 1969-70 than was available 
for the preceding year. While state funds will be somewhat in-
creased for 1970-71, the percentage increase is less than the 
percentage by which price levels have gone up in the inflation-
ary spiral. The net result, therefore, is a continuing decrease 
in legislative support for the central campus of the University. 
One consequence of this limited support for Indiana University 
was a massive fee increase adopted by the Trustees of the 
University in May, 1969. This resulted, in turn, in shutting the 
doors of the University to many deserving students. 
Diminished support for the University appears inside as 
well as outside the institution. One of the prominent features 
of internal university life in recent years has been student ac-
tivity which reflects profound disaffection and alienation. Some 
suggestion of the scope of this problem is provided by a recent 
study prepared by the Urban Survey Corporation. This study 
reveals that between January and June, 1969, there were 292 
protests at 232 colleges and universities. In the course of 
these protests 956 students were suspended or expelled, and 3652 
were arrested. Even more revealing than the statistics, however, 
is the fact that most of these protests were focused on essen-
tially campus issues, related to the structure, processes, and 
programs of the university or college itself. It also bears 
emphasis that most of these protests were not led by members of 
the so-called New Left. 
The impact of these forces within the university and in its 
supporting community is well indicated in the latest report by 
President Nathan Pusey to the Board of Overseers of Harvard 
University. Dr. Pusey described the period on which he was 
reporting as "a dismal year." He spoke of "the erosion of con-
fidence and trust and respect, the promotion of distrust and 
hostility, the injury done friendship, and the defeat of reason 
and love." Continuing, Dr. Pusey observed: "It is hard at the 
moment to see how a measure of retrenchment can be avoided. 
Costs continue to rise. Income will surely be harder to come 
by. Competition for federal funds will become more intense at a 
time when science and universities are both declining in public 
favor." 
The uncertainties and relatively pessimistic attitude ex-
pressed by Dr. Pusey are surely not limited to Harvard Univer-
sity. It is against such a general background that I would raise 
with you this evening the question "Who wants a university?" 
As I reflected on what I might say to you this evening and 
specifically on the question just raised, I was impressed 
strongly that the nuances of emphasis within the question can 
produce essentially different questions. One might ask WHO 
wants a university? Or who WANTS a university? Or again who 
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wants a UNIVERSITY? The first form of the question simply seeks 
the identity of the active agent. The second invites an explora-
tion of what it means "to want", of that affective relation that 
can produce commitment and lead to:.:an allocation of resources 
and moral and material support. The third emphasis involves the 
nature of the university as an institution and probes its dif-
ferences from other models. This evening I would like to start 
with the third question and explore with you briefly the nature 
of the modern university. Thereafter, I will comment briefly on 
what it means to want a university and finally will seek to 
identify those who want. 
The modern university is an extremely complex, multifaceted 
institution. Indeed, Dr. Clark Kerr, former President of the 
University of California, has suggested that the contemporary 
institution should not be called a university, but rather a mul-
tiversity. In seeking the essence of such a complex institution, 
one is reminded of the old story of the five blind men and the 
elephant. They were permitted to touch the animal and then asked 
to describe it. The first grasped the tail and declared that the 
elephant was very much like a rope. The second placed his hand 
against the great gray side and declared that the elephant was 
quite similar to a tree. And so on. With the university, as 
well, there is a grave risk of the partial view and consequent 
distortion. 
Some people, contemplating the modern university, might 
find it simply a corporate impresario. They might say "A uni-
versity is an agency for presenting to the public great sporting 
ev~nts, musical fetes, and other forms of public entertainment." 
If they adopted the style of genealogical identification charac-
teristic of the horse-racing world they might say, "A university 
is by Burton Holmes out of the New York Philharmonic, delivered 
by the Chicago Bears." And certainly those who see the 
university from this perspective do not lack support for their 
view. 
Others might say, however, that the university is predomi-
nantly a custodial institution, that its function is to keep 
young people off the labor market for a few years of advanced 
socialization. The university provides for them during this 
period a pleasant setting, a significant range of supporting 
amenities such as health care, and a vast array of essentially 
harmless activities. From this perspective the university might 
be seen as a cross between a medium security prison and a 
summer camp. 
Still others might say, "No, a university is really like a 
license bureau. Its function is to train and certify people for 
many specific social roles, for example, doctors, lawyers, 
teachers, computer programmers, football coaches, army of-
ficers." If one with this view approached the problem of defini-
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tion through illustration, he might find the analogue of the 
university in an amalgam of a school of driver education and the 
Bureau of Motor Vehicles. 
.·• 
As each description of the elephant provided by the blind 
men revealed a certain character or quality of the animal, so 
each of these views of the university rests on a number of its 
activities and its characteristics. In suggesting a somewhat 
different view of the essence of a university, I have no inten-
tion of rejecting or condemning as inappropriate any of the 
roles of a modern university, reflected in the partial views 
suggested. Many are highly useful to society. Nor have I any 
desire to argue that the university should be an introverted, 
socially irrelevant enclave. In stressing what seems to me the 
central role of the university, however, and in searching for a 
kind of ideal essence of the university, I seek to place any 
emphasis on a role or institutional purpose which seems to me to 
encounter the gravest risk of being lost or diluted in the com-
plex modern institution. Therefore, in seeking this essence of 
the university, I would frame the question in this way: how many 
of its aspects and functions could be stripped away and still 
leave an institution deserving of the term "university"? 
In responding to that question, I would offer a thesis for 
you to ponder. My thesis is this: in its essence a university is 
a community of scholars. Its members differ in age, experience, 
knowledge, insight, and wisdom. These variations in its member-
ship make implicit in its function the teaching or transmission 
of a body of knowledge or insight. Nevertheless, all members of 
the university are bound together by and find their shared 
identity in a common commitment to truth, to probing the sources 
and limits of human knowledge, to testing continuously the body 
of assumed knowledge, and to developing new knowledge of man, of 
social groups, and of the physical world. 
An institution so structured and committed can appropriate-
ly be called a university. 
An institution of this character may undertake other so-
cially useful functions and remain a university, if the other 
functions do not involve compromise or dilution of its basic 
character and commitment. 
An institution which lacks this character and commitment 
is not a university, however useful a range of training or other 
functions it may perform. 
May I suggest to you, very briefly, some of the implica-
tions I see in this thesis? First, I think it implies that, 
within the university, authority derives its legitimacy from its 
commitment to and its functional support of the process of ex-
panding and transmitting the body of tested knowledge. There-
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fore, the President, Chancellor, Dean, or Professor derives his 
legitimate authority not from his age, his status, or the 
eminence he enjoys throughout the world, but rather from the 
commitment on which he acts within ':the university -- the commit-
ment to protect and support the processes of free inquiry and 
teaching. second, all aspects of knowledge are within the pur-
view of the university. No proposition, no received truth, no 
faith can claim immunity from the processes of test and chal-
lenge which are implicit in the essential function of the 
university. Third, the inevitable and indeed desirable conse-
quence of the university's success in performing this central 
function will be a continuing critique of individual attitudes 
and beliefs and social arrangements. Inevitably therefore, the 
relations between a university and its surrounding community 
will often be abrasive and tense, for the critique of truth is 
often disquieting. Fourth, this central function of a university 
can be performed only by voluntary participants in an atmos-
phere of freedom. 
What does it mean to want a university of the kind I have 
suggested? It surely does not mean that an actual participation 
in the university is required. Many of our fellow citizens who 
have never attended a university and have no thought of doing so 
may nevertheless appreciate the role of a university in our 
society and want to preserve it. Nor does wanting a university 
in this central sense require that one reject all of the modern 
university's practical, applied or operational activities. Many 
of the students on our university campuses who are there pri-
marily or even exclusively for training toward some specific 
social role may nevertheless want a university of the basic kind 
I have described. Wanting a university rests on an appreciation 
of the unique contributions such an institution can make to the 
continuing improvement of the quality of individual and group 
life. And wanting such a university goes beyond merely a will-
ingness to tolerate it, a mere disinclination to oppose or seek 
to weaken it. Wanting a university involves active support of 
it, support in both moral and material terms. 
May I turn now to a third emphasis involved in our primary 
question: WHO wants a university? 
The most obvious answer might appear to be the students, 
for they are appearing on our college and university campuses in 
ever increasing numbers. I strongly suspect, however, that these 
numbers are in many ways deceiving. A great many of our students 
today are not on university campuses because they want a 
university or want to participate in one. Rather, they are moved 
by an extremely powerful set of compulsions. Foremost among 
these, of course, is the Selective Service system which con-
fronts our young men with the choice of continuing in school 
beyond secondary level or entering the military service and par 
ticipating in a war which large numbers of them condemn as un-
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just and contrary to our national ideals and interests. Even if 
draft pressures were removed, however, there would remain potent 
parental and social pressure for the student to move on to a 
college or university. The status value of a university diploma, 
the tendency to stigmatize the student who does not go on to a 
college or university as a "drop-out", and the tendency to 
downgrade employment which does not ordinarily contemplate a 
university background, are in my judgment some of the least 
defensible aspects of our strong social pressures toward "upward 
mobility". Finally, there are significant and, it seems to me, 
often functionally unjustifiable compulsions from the employment 
market which serve to force young people into colleges and 
universities. I think employers would be well advised to con-
sider carefully the criteria used in selecting their employees 
and to try to determine whether the conventional inclusion of a 
university degree is in any significant sense justified by the 
contemplated tasks to be performed. 
This set of compulsions has caused President Kingman Brew-
ster of Yale University to speak recently of "the involuntary 
campus." President Brewster observed: "My elders and betters, my 
peers and contemporaries, are backed to the wall, then driven up 
the wall, eventually driven up and over it, by students who are 
often fundamentally anti-intellectual: who are inpatient with 
learning and research: who think there are social ends other 
than the advancement of learning which a university should 
serve: and who see no reason why the majority vote of students 
should not dictate what those ends are and how they should be 
pursued." This alienation from the central role and function of 
a university, which President Brewster has observed in many stu-
dents, becomes much more understandable if one recognizes, as he 
did, that they are in a university involuntarily, responding to 
external pressures and not to their own interests and motiva-
tions. If a significant segment of our student bodies is coerced 
into universities, it is not surprising that many students are 
prepared to commit their primary energies to disruption and ef-
forts to change the university so as to make it resemble more 
closely the sort of institution which may claim their al-
legiance. 
I surely would not want to leave the impression, as I am 
confident Dr. Brewster did not, that our student bodies are 
monolithic, that they reflect generally a rejection of the 
central role and purpose of a university. one may easily identi-
fy a number of components in any student population. To be sure, 
a number of students reject the modern university in virtually 
all of its aspects and seek actively to disrupt or even to 
destroy it. In my judgment, however, this group is relatively 
small. Other students, rejecting what they conceive to be the 
dominant commitments of the modern university, seek to change it 
but only by deflecting the university to their own ideology and 
program. They demand a socially active university but only if it 
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is active toward a particular ideologically defined goal. I 
suspect that this group is larger than the first mentioned but 
is still only a small minority. O~er students want and indeed 
seek a university true to the essential purposes I have des-
cribed. They see in our present universities, however, only un-
critical support of and service to a society they find in many 
ways hypocritical, corrupt, and unjust. They demand that the 
university's commitment to truth, to expanding the body of reli-
able knowledge and transmitting it, be channeled into a continu-
ing critique of society to the end of its improvement and en-
richment for all segments. In my view, this group of students, 
relatively large but still a minority, is the group that needs 
to be encouraged and cultivated. Finally, a great many of our 
students accept the more peripheral training functions of the 
university and seek only its license or certification which for 
them is their ticket to the affluent society. I suspect that 
these students represent what President Nixon would call the 
"silent majority." 
You may properly ask -- where stands the faculty? I think 
that in the faculty one may find an assured body of strong sup-
port for a real university. I would certainly not suggest, how-
ever, that such a commitment is unanimous. Many members of a 
university faculty see their role from the limited perspective 
of a job. Many faculty members in good universities have suc-
cumbed to the blandishments and pressures of government agen-
cies, business concerns, and the general society which are able 
to accord to the faculty member economic and status perquisites 
that are most attractive. It is not surprising, therefore, that 
the dominant attitude among many faculty members is "Don't rock 
the boat: don't risk conflict with and criticism from the 
surrounding society by challenging, testing, refuting, and 
criticizing. " 
Finally, I would ask where stands the surrounding com-
munity. Does the general community want a university? I think it 
would be presumptuous for me to hazard an answer to that ques-
tion, but I would suggest that you ask it and wait for the ans-
wer. Is the community willing to support an institution com-
mitted as a real university must be to a sustained search for 
truth? Does the community adhere to the faith that in the con-
text of real freedom of inquiry truth will prevail? Can the com-
munity tolerate having its cherished assumptions, its assumed 
knowledge, and its traditional values challenged, tested, and 
perhaps refuted? Can the community respond creatively to the in-
creased knowledge and insight a university can provide, so as to 
develop a society offering a better life for all citizens, a 
society less marred by the blight of racial prejudice, a society 
whose institutions do not serve to lock a segment of the people 
into the iron grip of poverty? 
I do not know the answer to these questions, but this I do 
) ' 
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know. If we are to build and preserve a free and decent society 
in this country, the central role I have ascribed to universi-
ties must be played. our knowledge of ourselves, our group life, 
and our physical world must be refined and extended. I know of 
no institution other than our universities which offers hope of 
performing that role adequately. It is my hope that with the 
support of the general community we can develop increasingly 
voluntary campuses for universities committed to this central 
task, along with many other useful roles a university can per-
form. This is my hope and it rests on the faith which St. John 
tells us was stated so clearly by Jesus: "Ye shall know the 
truth and the truth shall make you free." 
PHI BETA KAPPA ADDRBSS--CLEVELAHD OHIO 
[The invitation to address the Annual Dinner given by the 
Cleveland, Ohio Chapter of Phi Beta Kappa to honor the outstand-
ing graduates of Ohio high schools came at a critical time. The 
tragic killing by the Ohio National Guard of four unarmed stu-
dents on the campus of Kent State University had just occurred. 
In my own University, the main campus in Bloomington faced 
closure by students who had presented to the University ad-
ministration an extreme set of demands for political pronounce-
ments and other actions. The speech I made on that occasion, on 
May 11, 1970, is set out below. 
As I have reread this talk, even after the thirty-years in-
terval since it was delivered, I feel acutely yet again the pain 
and anger the events surrounding it produced.] 
I had intended to use this occasion as a focus for trying 
to analyze the alienation that we sense in our students on 
university campuses today. Why are they alienated?. How do the 
students express their alienation? And how should we respond to 
it? I would have tried to analyze calmly our social and politi-
cal malaise. I would have had something to say about the nature 
of universities as a limit to the response they can make to the 
problems of the day. I probably would have offered some conven-
tional praise of the life of the mind. And, being conditioned by 
a lifetime in the law and in universities, I probably would have 
left with you not only praise of the satisfactions that the life 
of the mind can provide, but also of the order and tranquility 
in which that life flourishes. 
As President Taft has suggested in his introduction, how-
ever, the times have passed me by. The events of the past two 
weeks particularly--the reckless expansion of the war in In-
dochina, the consequent agony of our young people, the tragic 
deaths of four students at Kent State University, and the devel-
oping crisis on my own campus, a campus that is tense, angry, 
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frustrated, but thus far non-violent--have deprived me, I regret 
to say, of that measure of repose and opportunity for reflection 
that might have produced a more calmer and possibly a more pene-
trating presentation. I hope, however, that you will understand 
and indeed forgive my sense of inadequacy this evening in 
reflecting my own feelings while responding to the interests of 
Phi Beta Kappa. How does Phi Beta Kappa mourn? How does Phi 
Beta Kappa find tongue to express moral outrage? 
I have known, like you, of death and mindless destruction 
in Southeast Asia, in Watts, Detroit, Newark, Cleveland, Chica-
go. And I have believed with Donne that indeed "no man is an is-
land intire of itself," that "any man's death diminishes me," 
and that, therefore, I should not "send to know for whom the 
bell tolls." Yet confessing my own humanity, I recognize that 
events on our own campuses and particularly the events at Kent J' 
State University have brought home to me more sharply the trage-
dy of our time. For these are our own sons and daughters; these 
are the events that shroud our own hearths in mourning; these l 
are the events that close our own classrooms. We are sustained, ) 
I am sure, by the hope that the deaths of these young people 
will help to redirect us, indeed to redeem us, and that they 
will not be in vain. My feeling is expressed well in a song of \ 
grief by Edna St. Vincent Millay which I would share with you: 
I am not resigned to the shutting away of loving I 
hearts in the hard ground. 
So it is, and so it will be, for so it has been, 
time out of mind: 
Into the darkness they go, the wise and the lovely. 
Crowned 
With lilies and with laurel they go; but I am not 
resigned. 
Lovers and thinkers, into the earth with you. 
Be one with the dull, the indiscriminate dust. 
A fragment of what you felt, of what you knew, 
A formula, a phrase remains, --but the best is lost. 
The answers quick and keen, the honest look, t he 
laughter, the love, --
They are gone, They are gone to feed the roses. 
Elegant and curled 
Is the blossom. Fragrant is the blossom. I know. 
But I do not approve. 
More precious was the light in your eyes than all 
the roses in the world. 
Down, down, down into the darkness of the grave 
Gently they go, the beautiful, the tender, the kind; 
Quietly they go, the intelligent, the witty, the brave. 
I know. But I do not approve. And I am not resigned. 
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If they are to help in redeeming this society, the students 
at Kent state must be remembered, their names etched in our 
memories. Therefore, if I could, I ::would say to Allison Krause, 
Jeffrey Miller, sandy Lee Scheuer, and William Schroeder : "Do 
not go gentle into that good night." 
Yet we must not capitulate or abandon hope. In a time and 
in a society riven by violence and raw emotion, we must reassert 
the value and the power of the human mind guided by humane com-
passion. This is a difficult task today because of the profound 
alienation of many of our students, indeed many of our best stu-
dents. On that phenomenon I would like to comment briefly this 
evening. 
Two weeks ago, immediately after the extension of our Viet-
nam intervention into Cambodia, the students at Indiana Univer-
sity presented to the Administration a set of demands. May I 
read those demands to you? 
1) That the University repudiate President Nixon's plans 
for Southeast Asia, and demand the immediate withdrawal of our 
troops from Southeast Asia: 
2) That the University end its complicity in Southeast Asia 
and open the books of the Indiana University Foundation to 
supply information on government contracts: 
3) That the University make a financial commitment to the 
Bobby Seale Legal Defense Fund: and 
4) That the University bring the percentage of Black stu-
dents at Indiana University into accordance with the percentage 
of Black people in the population of the State of Indiana. 
It is easy to view these demands contemptuously, as 
reflecting an appalling naivete, perhaps peculiar to university 
students. One could point out, and with some justification, the 
extraordinary complexity of the university institution: the dif-
ficulty in finding one voice to speak for the university with 
authority and legitimacy on political issues: the fact that the 
university's funds are dedicated to educational purposes and 
cannot be allocated for other purposes, however worthy, in 
response to pressure tactics: the fact that the university is 
not able to correct instantly, even in its own educational pro-
grams, the historic injustices to Black people in this country: 
and the inappropriateness in the university community of the 
rhetoric of demand and pressure tactics. All of these responses 
would be, in large measure, legitimate, but these responses do 
not fully dispose. I would suggest that we look at these demands 
briefly as reflections of some of the sources and manifestations 
of the alienation of our students today. 
What are these sources? First is a belief that our national 
policy is committed to an intervention in Southeast Asia that 
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can be justified neither by good conscience, prudent assessment 
of national interests, nor international law; that, consequent-
ly, our intervention there is evil, imprudent, and illegal, Sec-
ond is a belief that American universities have served frequent-
ly as willing partners in the implementation of that national 
policy. Third Is a belief that American justice, both distribu-
tive and corrective justice, has been and is being denied to 
Black Americans and other ethnic minorities, a view, I might 
point out, reflected recently--at least as a fear--by the Presi-
dent of one of our most distinguished universities. And fourth 
is a belief that the historic oppression of Black Americans is 
being perpetuated today by educational deprivation and con-
sequent political, economic, and social disadvantage. 
I would ask those who quickly condemn the alienated, 
militant students, "Can you assert with honesty that these 
beliefs totally lack foundation; or that in fact we are doing 
what we should to erode whatever foundation they have?" 
> 
This partial listing of the sources of student aliena- ) 
tion is disturbing enough within itself, but the grim catalog 
could be continued. Should we not add to it the progressive loss 
of individual identity in a mass, computerized, technological 
society? Should we not list the violence we have loosed, not 
only on disadvantaged people in this country and abroad, but 
on the environment in which we and our children must live? And 
should we not indict the lock-step educational system which sup-
presses creativity and too frequently commits intelligent and 
concerned young people to a dreary progression of courses, 
seemingly designed to assure only their uncritical admission 
into a fat and complacent society. I need not extend the 
catalog. It is as familiar to you as it is to me. 
The burning issue today is not the source of the alienation 
of the young but the nature of the response we can and will make 
to it. In suggesting, very briefly, some directions for that 
response I speak not simply as a citizen, a political being, im-
portant though that status is. Rather, I speak especially as a 
man of the university who is deeply concerned with the nature of 
the response which will be made in the university context. 
First, let me make a fundamental position quite clear. I do 
not support the politicization of the university, in some of the 
current uses of that term. Rarely, if ever, can the diverse and 
complex elements that comprise a university find a single voice 
on political issues. Even if that were feasible, however, I 
would deny its legitimacy. Neither university administrators nor 
faculties have a valid political mandate, and any effort on 
their part to commit the institution to an activist political 
position or program is an abdication of their responsibility to 
maintain an open context for inquiry, teaching, learning, and 
criticism of all positions and programs. 
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I state this fundamental position and conviction as the 
basis for rejecting the urging of many activist students and 
faculty that the universities issue political statements and 
commit themselves to specific political action programs. I state 
it also as the underlying premise of a criticism of what many, 
indeed perhaps most, of our universities are and are doing 
today. I do not believe we can with honesty reject the demands 
of the activists on the ground that we must not compromise the 
value-neutrality and objectivity of the universities, unless we 
can demonstrate our possession of those qualities. And I doubt 
our ability to do that. Too many colleges and universities are 
now too deeply committed to functioning as uncritical service 
agencies of a society that desperately needs penetrating study, 
criticism and change. Our first step, therefore, must be to 
reclaim for our colleges and universities their ancient and 
honorable role as seats of free inquiry, teaching, and learning. 
If we rededicate ourselves and our resources to the central non-
negotiable function of a university--the unrelenting and un-
compromising search for truth--we need have no fear that our 
roles as educators will be passive, complacent, or uncritical, 
in a time when our students expect us to respond relevantly and 
creatively to their efforts to achieve a peaceful and just 
society. 
My central thesis tonight is that the legitimate demand 
of our alienated students is not an abandonment of our role as 
educators but a return to it. This return would, I believe, be 
characterized by a renewed interest in teaching -- by teaching 
that is not limited to the efficient conveyance of information, 
but teaching that seeks to stimulate the student's own 
creativity and to discipline his critical faculties. Such teach-
ing would require more attention to and respect for the in-
dividuality of each student, the individuality of his interests 
and his needs. Such teaching would recognize that it need not 
take place always in a classroom. And such teaching would indeed 
address itself from a variety of disciplinary perspectives to 
the problems of today. 
My stress on teaching is not intended to downgrade scholar-
ship. I believe, however, that redefinition and reorientation of 
scholarship are called for. Too often our academic reward system 
provides incentives to the teacher to slight his students in or-
der to produce publications in which not even the liveliest im-
agination could find a contribution of new knowledge and in-
sight. True scholarship, which is the worthy companion of teach-
ing in the catalog of functions of the academic, need not result 
in publication. It can serve an essential purpose if it keeps 
teaching vital and relevant and if it contributes to a constant 
retesting of the transmitted tradition in the light of advancing 
knowledge. 
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I have spoken primarily of responses to the student aliena-
tion by educational institutions and by individuals in their 
capacities as teachers. May I conclude with the suggestion that 
we should not find in our functions as teachers a release from 
our general responsibilities as citizens, as active participants 
in the political process. I do not argue for a merger of these 
roles; indeed they must be kept distinct. The faith, the convic-
tions, on which I act as a political being have no entitlement 
to being taught as demonstrable truth in my classroom. As 
teachers, of course, we cannot exclude entirely our own value 
choices from our contacts with our students. But we are 
obligated to distinguish with honesty -- to the very best of our 
ability -- that which we offer to our students as knowledge from 
what we advance as our own belief, our own political faith. And 
both our knowledge and our faith must be subject constantly to 
the searching scrutiny of critical minds. 
Student alienation presents a profound challenge, not only 
to our educational system, but to our polity. We will not meet 
effectively the alienation of our students merely by changes in 
the university, urgently needed though those changes are. Until 
our young people see a reordering of political values and 
priorities, that alienation will persist. The end of the war in 
Indochina, an unrelenting attack on racial injustice, the lift-
ing of the heel of poverty from many of our fellow citizens, and 
the cleansing of our environment are essential goals. To these 
ends revitalized colleges and universities can contribute great-
ly. But the power of decision and action does not rest with 
them. For that reason I urge my faculty colleagues and my stu-
dents to express their concerns and commitments directly in the 
political process. 
This is a time of deep crisis for our universities, and for 
our society. The protest of our students is not the cause of 
that crisis. Indeed, their protest gives me my greatest hope 
that we can move through that crisis to a more humane society. 
But, ladies and gentlemen, hope founders when anguished 
protest finds no response. The foundations of what we have 
claimed as the American dream, if uncovered and exposed to 
light, would support a response in affirmation of ordered 
liberty, humane concern for the dignity and well-being of all 
men, and decent peace. Will we respond? Or will we merely await 
the full rage of the gathering storm? 
Tonight we honor young women and men who have maintained a 
commitment to academic excellence in difficult and disspititing 
times. That kind of commitment must be nurtured by hope: that 
the ugly blotches of racial and ethnic prejudice in our in-
dividual and communal life will be replaced by appreciation of 
the richness of diversity, that opportunity will always meet ef-
fort at least halfway, that even condign punishment will be 
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tempered by compassion for human frailties, and that the 
violence in our national and international life will be rejected 
in favor of reasoned accommodation of interests. Tonight we fear 
and grieve, but beyond the night must wait the dawn. 
COllMERT:STUDENT PROTESTS AND THE UNIVERSITY IDEAL 
Immediately after the Cleveland speech I returned to 
Bloomington, for I was deeply concerned over developments there. 
I cannot recall whether the students had already begun the tight 
blockade of University buildings they had threatened if their 
demands were not met or whether the threat to close the 
University was still pending, awaiting the response of the ad-
ministration. Immediately after my return, about 10 p.m. one 
evening, I received at home a telephone call from Keith Parker, 
the President of the University student body, a young Black man 
who had declared himself to be a Black Panther. He asked if I 
would come to campus and talk with him and other student leaders 
in the Student Government offices. I agreed, of course, to do 
so. 
I arrived at the meeting shortly after 10:00, and without 
much in the way of preliminaries discussion began. No other 
faculty or administration member was present. The conversation 
continued through the night. I did not need to tell the students 
my views on the Vietnam conflict, minority rights, etc., for 
they knew already that we shared many of the same views. My con-
cern was to get them to understand my conception of a univer-
sity, so that they might deal appropriately, as I saw the mat-
ter, with the core issue, Who can speak for a university and on 
what subjects. I emphasized the diversity that can and usually 
does characterize a university community, including both stu-
dents and senior members. I suggested that the administrative 
officers and appropriate faculty organizations could speak le-
gitimately and with full authority on some matters, but that on 
political issues like those on which the students were demanding 
statements of a "University position," there simply was no 
University position, and pronouncements by the President or 
others in the administration would appropriately be seen by most 
people, including myself, as lacking legitimacy, and therefore 
as simply a spineless capitulation which could add nothing use-
ful to the resolution of the great issues facing the country. 
Around these core positions we talked through the night, and I 
slipped into bed shortly after dawn by no means certain whether 
I had had any effect. Sometime during the day, however, the stu-
dents withdrew their demands and ended the threat to close the 
University. 
In a sense this development was not surprising to me. In 
general, the student protesters at Indiana were not of the 
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"crazy" variety. I had seen with sadness many fine faculty mem-
bers fall into line behind any position militant students took, 
not out of conviction, but out of a kind of fear that, if they 
rejected the student view, a rapport essential to effective 
teaching would be lost. That was not consonant with my view or 
my experience. students surely wanted their views to be heard 
and addressed with the sort of respect one accords worthy adver-
saries who are entitled to serious consideration, perhaps agree-
.ment, or rebuttal on the merits, not contemptuous dismissal. 
on more than one occasion, students in the Law School would 
come to see me, vehemently protesting some policy or position 
that I or the faculty on my recommendation had adopted. My 
standard approach was to sit down with them and explain, as best 
I could, the factors that had led to the decision and to discuss 
their views. Time after time, the conversation ended with stu-
dents saying calmly something to this effect, "We don't like the 
decision any better now than we did when we came in, and we 
would prefer to have it changed or abandoned. But it helps to 
understand what brought you to the decision you've reached." We 
never had a disruptive protest by law students, and when student 
activists in the general student population decided to take 
their protests to the point of closing the University, they were 
careful to leave the Law School alone. Our classes continued 
without interruption for those who wanted to continue their 
studies. We on the Faculty made it clear, however, that, while 
no standards would be compromised or requirements relaxed, we 
would be as helpful as possible in assisting students, who as a 
matter of conscience put protest activity ahead of their 
studies, to catch up. 
There was spinoff from my all-night session with the stu-
dents that had a touch of black humor about it. I became aware 
that one member of the University Board of Trustees "ate me for 
lunch" at every meeting of the Board. I knew this member, a 
lawyer, and rather liked him. So I contacted him, indicated that 
I was aware of his criticisms of me, and asked if he would meet 
with me to inform me of the specifics of my actions that he 
though inappropriate and deserving of the criticism he was of-
fering. He was reluctant to meet but finally agreed to do so. 
There were several counts in his bill of particulars, not 
all of which I can recall, but among them were the following 
which were typical. First, I had embarrassed him personally 
among his Southern friends by my public opposition to the con-
firmation of Judge Carswell whom President Nixon had nominated 
for a seat on the Supreme Court. I expressed my regret over any 
discomfiture I had caused, but pointed out that I had always 
tried to make clear in any statement I made that I was express-
ing a personal, not a University or a Law School, view. I recog-
nized that we differed on the Carswell issue, but I pointed out 
that when I was offered my University position, no one had indi-
-213-
cated that my acceptance involved relinquishing any prerogatives 
of citizenship. 
Another objection was that I had permitted Michael Tiger, a 
lawyer toward the Left of the political spectrum, to speak in 
the Law School. I pointed out that I had not selected Tiger, but 
that when the Law Review editors selected him as the speaker at 
their annual banquet and asked me to assist in extending the in-
vitation and encouraging him to accept, I had agreed readily to 
do so. I then asked the Trustee if it was his view that I should 
impose and implement a "speaker ban" in the Law School, as some 
universities had attempted to do and, in the case of public in-
stitutions, had been overridden by the courts on constitutional 
grounds. I received an immediate and somewhat embarrassed denial 
that the Trustee was urging me to move in that direction. 
Another criticism, which prompts my mentioning these dis-
cussions here, was "You talk with radical students." I had said 
nothing publicly about my all-night session, but I'm sure the 
Trustee knew of it and that it was an illustration of my objec-
tionable conduct. I reacted to this criticism more in amusement 
than annoyance. I simply said that I could only plead guilty to 
the charge, adding that in my view the University would have had 
far fewer problems with student protests if other members of the 
administration also had been inclined to talk with radical stu-
dents. 
Against this background of my years at Indiana University 
and specifically of the student activism and protest there and 
at other universities, I want to conclude this comment with an 
attempt at perspective. Preliminarily though, I must recognize 
explicitly the hazards of generalization. Campuses differed, 
often radically, in the student leadership that had great in-
fluence in selecting focus issues, in determining what resort 
would be made to disruption and criminal activity, and in 
resisting, even rejecting, rational processes in promoting or 
responding to efforts to deal with protest activities. Only the 
deaf, the dumb and the blind could have failed to recognize that 
protest activity at Indiana University differed profoundly from 
what appeared from time to time at Columbia, Wisconsin or Yale. 
At the same time, my experience at Indiana left me with the con-
viction that some techniques of student protest were common, 
that some administrative and faculty failures in conflict 
management were recurrent from campus to campus, and that some 
attitudes and actions, if used by those in positions of institu-
tional authority, never lost their utility. 
In several of the talks included here I have tried to 
sketch the concerned students who resorted to protest ac-
tivities; I need not repeat that. I would not want my earlier 
comments to indicate, however, that I had some idealized image 
of the student protesters. They were young, immature, often ex-
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tremely naive, and a good number were delighted if their use of 
crude language, well laced with four-letter words, succeeded in 
shocking their elders.1.21 Nevertheless, most student protest 
didn't fall into a "nursery-adolesbent" mode. If the sketch of 
protesting students I have offered is generally near reality, it 
does provide a set of clues to forms of response by faculty and 
administration that could be helpful. I will try to be more 
specific in identifying those clues, as well as in describing 
some of the techniques for mobilizing protest sentiment often 
used by students. 
I 
12. For a while an activist group of Indiana students put ) u 
a protest broad sheet called the Spectator, which one of the 
editors, a graduate student in political science, brought to my \ 
office. It was for sale and I asked my splendid secretary, Hazel 
Pennington, to buy each issue for me. After firmly expressing 
her disapproval and scolding me for wasting my money, she com-
plied. After a time, however, I told her that she could tell the j 
student not to bother bringing the paper to me. When she re-
jected the next issue, I was engaged and could not see him. 
Later, he wrote to me. His delight was palpable. I had been 
found out, had relied on my secretary to do my "dirty work." He 
continued: "I assume you object to what you once termed 
'gratuitous obscenity' and that you share the common hang-up of 
people in your age group about sex." I quote briefly from my 
long responsive letter. 
"If I may borrow the now conventional demand of students 
f9r relevance, I would suggest that I have rarely seen a publi-
cation less relevant to the troublesome issues of our time and 
place than the Spectator. As a matter of taste, I might oc-
casionally be aggrieved by the gratuitous vulgarity the Spec-
tator has often shown. On that ground, however, I would not have 
considered terminating my modest support of the publication. I 
can accept the vulgarity in the sense that it does not really 
disturb me: what I find it more difficult to accept is the ut-
ter, indeed the cosmic, triviality of the publication. In-
creasingly over recent weeks the Spectator has reminded me of a 
small, soiled child having a tantrum on the floor. By stopping 
my purchase of the paper I simply wanted to reflect my view that 
the tough, agonizing problems of achieving a truly open, just, 
and decent society deserve more mature and relevant attention 
from a publication which pretends to be aimed at a University 
audience." 
I expressed my regret that I had not been free to talk 
with him when he brought the paper but added, "In the near fu-
ture when it is convenient for you, I would be pleased to have 
you drop by the off ice so that we can discuss the Spectator fur-
ther, if you care to do so." I never saw the young man again! 
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Student leaders usually tried to engage the support of in-
dividuals and groups outside the university by tying their 
protest to concerns and grievances :;that might be national in 
scope, but often were quite local: an increasingly unpopular war 
in Vietnam, the ugly face of racism and poverty, or simply the 
impingement of the university's development of its physical 
plant on the surrounding community. While there seems to be 
little doubt that student protest fed the growing alienation of 
the American people from the fiasco in Vietnam, I lack any 
strong impression that it eroded significantly the general com-
munity's view that most student protest reflected only the Angst 
of the over-advantaged offspring of the middle class. In the 
universities' own search for moral support from the broader com-
munity, they probably had no greater success than the student 
protesters. I have noted in some of the talks included here the 
recurrent tensions between the surrounding communities and 
universities that were performing their critical, essential 
functions. I have no impression that any university's handling 
of its student protests eased those tensions 
Leaders of student protests not only tried to expand their 
"constituencies" outward: within the institution their usual ob-
jective was to graduate, as soon as possible, the focus of 
protest to the level of eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation with 
the highest level of university authority, sometimes the govern-
ing board but more frequently the President. If this effort suc-
ceeded, it lent a grander significance to the protest and per-
sonalized the "enemy" in a figure or group often remote and 
little known, and perhaps lacking any of the loyalty, warmth, 
even affection, with which many faculty members and lower level 
administrators might be regarded. I always thought the wise 
President resisted this effort, encouraged those lower in the 
administrative hierarchy and in the faculty to engage students 
in a constructive dialogue, but reserved direct Presidential in-
volvement, if any, for a late stage when the President might in-
tervene as a conciliator, a peace-maker. 
Stated bluntly, my view was that students were given an un-
earned bonus if the President responded immediately to every 
challenge. As I once said, there was no reason to haul out the 
elephant rifle to shoot every mosquito. Less crudely put, my 
basic attitude rested on the simple insight that it made good 
sense to deal with problems at the lowest responsible level. 
This insight has its roots in pragmatic calculations of the 
realities of the complex, contemporary world, but those roots 
reach back deeply into the natural law tradition of Europe, with 
its insistence on individual worth and responsibility, as well 
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as into the congenial soil of 19th century English Utilitarian-
ism. An influential contemporary manifestation of the view has 
emerged in the current debate in Europe over the development of 
supra-national communities and, ultimately, one Community; there 
it is referred to as the principle of subsidiarity. 
While its roots are ancient, the recent introduction of the 
principle of subsidiarity into contemporary European theorizing 
about governmental design is usually traced to Christian, 
specifically catholic, social theory, particularly in the 1931 
Papal Encyclical Quadragesesimo Anno issued py .Pope Pius XI, 
where the principle is expressed as follows:J..;V 
••• just as it is wrong to withdraw from the 
individual and commit to a group what private en-
terprise and industry can accomplish, so too is it 
an injustice, a grave evil and a disturbance of the 
right order, for a larger and a higher association 
to arrogate to itself functions which can be performed 
efficiently by smaller and lower societies. This is 
a fundamental principle of social philosophy, unshaken 
and unchangeable. Of its very nature the true aim of 
all social activity should be to help members of the 
social body, but never to destroy or absorb them. The 
basic premise is quite clear: what can be done by the 
individual or smaller associations should be done 
there; the creation of larger or "higher" associa-
tions should await the determination that they are 
needed for the accomplishment of social tasks beyond 
the capacity of those closer to the individual. 
This version of the basic insight, stated as a principle of so-
cial philosophy, is the form most clearly relevant to the prob-
lems of university administration in dealing with student 
protest. It might be noted, however, that in the 1970s and 
thereafter the subsidiarity principle was elevated to the status 
of a juridical norm in the developing European Community, find-
ing fullest expression in the Maastricht Treaty which has four 
explicit references to subsidiarity. The primary one, Article 
Jb, provides in part as follows: 
In areas which do not fall within its exclusive 
competence, the Community shall take action, in 
accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only 
13. Quoted in Marc Wilke and Helen Wallace, SUBSIDIARITY: 
APPROACHES TO POWER-SHARING IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, The 
Royal Institute of International Affairs Discussion Paper No. 
2 7 , fn • 2 , p. 4 o ( 19 9 o ) . 
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if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed 
action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Mem-
ber States and can therefore, by reason of the scale 
or effects of the_p~oposed action, be better achieved 
by the Community.J.j/ 
As a guide to social organization and activity, whether in 
private associations or governments, the basic ideas underlying 
the principle of subsidiarity have obvious merit. They provide 
guidance in the creation of new structures or institutions, in 
their empowerment, and in the exercise of discretion relating to 
the exercise of power and authority actually possessed. A 
university is not and cannot be a democracy embracing all of its 
members, including students. But many of the values that charac-
terize a political democracy such as participation in critical 
decision-making can, with reasonable adaptation, be made fea-
tures of university life. The closer officials who make or im-
plement university policy, whether teachers or administrators, 
are to those being governed or only affected by it, such as stu-
dents, the more effective the intake mechanisms for achieving 
the contributions, understanding, and acceptance of all are 
likely to be. Supporting these values may also be considerations 
of efficiency or effectiveness. Official actors closest to the 
operating level may be not only better informed of the relevant 
facts of the problem or need; they may also have a greater in-
terest in solving or meeting it. 
I had the impression from a distance, during my years at 
Indiana, that one of the most skilled practitioners of sub-
sidiarity in the context of university protests was Robin Flem-
ing, President of the University of Michigan. I suspect, without 
knowing, that sometimes faculty, deans and other mid-level ad-
ministrators at Michigan may have felt that President Fleming 
left them too long twisting alone in the wind of conflict. If my 
basic view is right though, that is where they should be in the 
initial phases of campus conflict. 
One of the hardest decisions university authorities had to 
make was when, if at all, to bring in the police. I include in 
this issue the use of the university's own police force. While 
efforts have been made in some universities in recent years to 
move toward better educated police officers, more understanding 
of and sympathetic toward university values and processes, in 
many places the personnel of the university's force does not 
14. Other references to the principle of subsidiarity appear 
in the Treaty in the Preamble, as well as in Title I, Articles A 
and B. 
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differ significantly from that of the surrounding community. 
certainly, at Indiana University, I had no greater confidence in 
the attitudes and discretion of our own police officers than I 
had in the city police or the sheriff's deputies.l.21 
If serious criminal activity has occurred or is threatened, 
there is no question, in my view, of the necessity to resort to 
the criminal justice system. The fact that a mathematics build-
ing that is bombed is on the campus of the University of Wis-
consin should give the perpetrators of this crime no claim to 
immunity from the criminal law on the ground that their act was 
a protest against an indefensible war. On the other hand, stu-
dent protests often involved activities such as sit-ins, occupa-
tions of buildings, tight picketing, etc. which could be fitted 
into such violations of law as criminal trespass. In dealing 
with these, I always thought sound discretion favored, at least 
for a good while, the non-criminal option. This alternative was 
university discipline under a code that made reasonably clear 
the type of conduct the university community thought in-
appropriate. An excellent example of this approach occurred at 
the University of Chicago when students occupied and prevented 
normal use of a University administrative building. President 
Edward Levi didn't call the police to expel the students and ar-
rest them. He waited until they left the building, identified 
them, and University disciplinary processes were then calmly and 
dispassionately used. 
Although student protesters usually adopted a highly 
moralistic tone in their pronouncements, their morality and 
their commitment to essential university values, as I understood 
them, were in many instances selective. The same was often true 
of university officials. For example, many in both groups often 
saw the University as an open environment, only if those who 
wanted to speak on campus agreed with current views of their 
group. I mentioned earlier the criticism by a University Trustee 
of my limited involvement in the appearance of Michael Tiger as 
a Law Review speaker. Another relevant illustration involved 
criticism of my permitting the use of the Law School's 
auditorium by a student group that had invited Bill Kunstler to 
speak after the Cambodia-Kent State tragedies in 1970 • .161 I 
15. In Appendix II, I have included accounts of two occasii lE 
when police forces were called in, or their intervention 
threatened, during demonstrations in Indiana University. These 
occasions illustrated the sharp divergencies between my views 
and those of the central administration of the University. 
16. I had not known Kunstler before his appearance on camp~ >, 
but in my limited contacts with him I found him far more 1 
pleasant than his public image would have led me to expect. His 
talk was rather poor, I thought, far below the level I thought a 
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found the basis of such criticism offensive. I found equally of-
(footnote continued): 
University audience needed and deserved. After the speech I 
drafted a letter which I showed to my faculty colleagues and in-
vited those who shared my views to join me in signing it. Eight-
een of them, a majority of the Faculty, did so. I set out the 
letter below: 
"In his address on October 7, Mr. William Kunstler spoke 
with passion and apparent conviction on many of the pressing 
problems of our time: the brutal and corrosive was in Southeast 
Asia and growing violence in this country, deep-rooted racism, 
intractable poverty,, and stultifying materialism. We share but 
need not stress our concerns over these ills of our society. 
Rather, we wish to point out that Mr. Kunstler, by a grossly 
oversimplified analysis, may have invited developments he ex-
pressly rejects at this time. Also we want to state our 
fundamental disagreement with Mr. Kunstler in his assessment of 
the current role of the legal order and its potential for ef-
fecting desired social change. 
"We recognize fully that legal process does not neces-
sarily lead to the right or just solution. The legal order must 
stand judgment before the moral conscience of the community. The 
central deficiency in Mr. Kunstler's address is that he fails to 
recognize or to communicate the complexity of that moral judg-
ment. Any individual who contemplates the violent interposition 
of his judgments against the established law is morally bound to 
seek first a profound comprehension of the objective conditions 
and realities of his society and of the probable consequences of 
an attack on the basis public order. 
"In our judgment Mr. Kunstler did not meet his 
responsibility as a moral teacher. By simplistic analogies to 
other revolutions and facile sloganeering ('There can be a 
morality in destroying a building.') he risks diverting the op-
erative idealism of students into tragic channels--tragic for 
the individuals involved but tragic also for the harm to viable 
prospects for social change. A close reading of Mr. Kunstler's 
address reveals that he does not counsel resort to violence now. 
But we fear that the impact of his remarks in the context of a 
political rally could be quite different. 
"We are in profound disagreement with Mr. Kunstler's 
belief that the dominant forces in our society have conspired to 
enforce on students and disadvantaged groups unquestioning com-
pliance with the legal standards of a corrupt order. It is true 
that influential segments of our society oppose significant 
change. Nevertheless, ours is a diverse society in which many 
individuals and groups are moving effectively for reform in na-
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fensive, however, the students' demand that University placement 
processes be closed to recruiters from the CIA, as well as the 
objection by others to an appearance on Indiana's campus of an 
official of the Ku Klux Klan who had been invited by a student 
group to participate in a debate with a Klan critic and op-
ponent. I made known to students my own rejection of their at-
tempt to close the campus to the CIA, and I sent to President 
Elvis Stahr a strong protest of his decision to block the ap-
pearance of the Klan debater on campus. In each instance, where 
the activity to be excluded was simply a form of speech, I 
believed strongly that the University's function as an open 
forum for advancing, criticizing, and debating ideas and view-
points was non-negotiable. Although Elvis obviously did not act 
on my view, he took my criticism in good spirits. When I ex-
pressed my open-campus view at an anti-CIA protest, the graduate 
(footnote continued): 
tional priorities and policies. As lawyers and law teachers, we 
know that, despite their imperfections, law and the legal system 
are essential instruments for reform. Mr. Kunstler himself, in 
his long practice before the courts, has often made effective 
use of the means afforded by the legal system to bring about 
desirable changes and to combat injustice. Indeed, his present 
condemnation of the legal system is protected by a central 
premise of that system--the constitutional guarantee of freedom 
of speech. 
"In some of his remarks on campus, Mr. Kunstler recog-
~ized that to achieve a more just society requires a revolution 
of consciousness. A revolution of consciousness is brought about 
by a change in awareness and understanding. It is the product, 
not of violence and destruction, but of the critical rationality 
whose cultivation is the distinctive task of universities. The 
revolution of consciousness is the truly moral precondition for 
the restructuring of our legal and political institutions. In 
this revolution, students can participate in good conscience, 
with passion, conviction, and the special flair of youth. In 
this revolution the young can affirm passionately and com-
passionately their humanity. 
"We stand on our conviction that counsels of violence, 
however sincerely felt, only strengthen resistance to change and 
make successful reform more unlikely." 
The letter was sent to several local and area papers 
which published it. Not surprisingly, it failed to elicit any of 
the critical comments which usually appeared when my colleagues 
and I spoke out publicly on political issues. 
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student to whom I was talking replied cheerfully, "Oh, that's 
OK; we know you don't agree on this." 
Virtually all of the protest at Indiana, as I saw it, 
reflected in various ways quite legitimate concerns, some having 
to do with national policy, some grounded on the belief or as-
sumption that the University in one way or another was complicit 
in the public policy or practice students rejected, and some 
concerned only with an action of some University functionary. 
Much that students said may have been factually suspect, naive, 
or (very often) simply crude and offensive. I have mentioned the 
fear of some members of the faculty that expressed disagreement 
would so pollute the teacher-student relationship, that effec-
tive teaching and counseling would be seriously imperiled or 
completely lost. My own experience, as I have said, did not in 
any way support that fear. I believed students wanted, and were 
entitled to, serious consideration of their views and concerns, 
a dialogue in which even sharply conflicting viewpoints could be 
expressed and debated. I was never able to understand why 
others, faculty and administrators, either rejected that view or 
simply lacked the confidence to act on it. I believe, however, 
that my view was substantially the same as that of some leaders 
in other institutions whose experience in dealing effectively 
with problems far more difficult than any we had to confront at 
Indiana was admirable. I've mentioned in this group Robin Flem-
ing at Michigan and Ed Levi at Chicago; to the list I would add 
Kingman Brewster at Yale and Archie Cox who became on protest 
problems the locum tenens for President Pusey of Harvard. 
I had always regarded my commitment to Indiana University 
as terminal well short of my retirement, though I had no in-
flexible notion of the appropriate duration of my decanal 
tenure. Certainly the then-traditional law school deanship that 
usually lasted from apPQ~ntment to retirement seemed to me in 
most instances unwise.J.Z/ In 1960, when retirement opened the 
deanship at Michigan, I had urged on my colleagues and the 
President the adoption of a term-deanship, but only one of my 
colleagues, Hessel Yntema, openly supported the proposal. It 
took almost another ten years before the renewable term-deanship 
was adopted at Michigan. 
As the academic year 1970-71 moved toward its end and my 
work as Dean advanced on its fifth birthday, I found myself con-
sidering more frequently an exit strategy. My appointment as 
17. There were certainly exceptions to this general conclu-
sion. For example, the twenty-years deanship of Page Keaton at 
Texas turned that School from a respectable regional institution 
into a significant national one. 
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Dean was not term-limited. I had no inflexible view of an ap-
propriate duration, though I toyed with the notion of a seven-
year limit. In general, it seemed to me such a period should be 
adequate to permit any incumbent to commit to the job such 
creativity as he or she had, so that departure in favor of a new 
infusion of creative leadership would be appropriate. Much of 
what I had hoped to accomplish at Indiana had been done, and 
what remained of my development vision seemed increasingly 
remote in the context of my relationship with the University ad-
ministration. 
In Appendix II, I have provided a somewhat detailed account 
of the final phase of my period at Indiana. At this point, I 
will limit myself to an attempt to analyze the factors that 
served to erode my working rapport with the University's central 
administration. 
Even now, with vision sharpened or dimmed by almost thirty 
years of hindsight, I feel no confidence that I fully understand 
all of the factors that produced growing alienation. With some 
confidence, however, I can suggest three broad categories. 
First, surely, was a profound difference of view on the ap-
propriate form of response to such student protests as we had. 
Earlier, I have tried to suggest my view and the approach I 
favored. I can point to very few specific actions the University 
administration took in dealing with protest that I thought 
wrong. Theirs were not in the main sins of commission, but of 
omission. It was not that their policies were in error, but that 
they appeared to have no policies. They usually appeared to be ·1 
paralyzed by the prospect or actuality of student protest, to 
adopt a kind of "bunker mentality" that created a void. No voice 
spoke out to reaffirm the nature of a university, the values it 
cherished, and the implications of that nature and those values \ 
for addressing with concerned students appropriate responses to 
the pressing issues of the time. I want to emphasize, of course, 
that I don't suggest by these criticisms that I believed the 
University had its own position on any political issue or that 
any University officer was entitled to speak for the institution 
on such an issue. I believed, however, that by their words and 
their actions the University officers could hold up the 
"university ideal" and that such would be useful. I am sure that 
much that I said and did in this context, although making no ex-
press reference to the University administration, was seen as 
implicitly critical of it. 
Another category of factors included many statements I made 
publicly about political issues, expressions of views not shared 
by many in a conservative state, local community, or University. 
The most important of these, of course, were those vigorously 
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critical of our involvement in Vietnam. Others had a narrower 
scope, such as my opposition to the confirmation of Judge 
Carswell as a Justice of the Supreme Court. In putting any such 
statement of view in a letter, I always refrained from using 
University letterhead, and tried to make clear that I was ex-
pressing only a personal view. Whether these reservations were 
not understood or simply intentionally ignored I cannot know. 
Frequently, however, my critics said or implied that I tried to 
express "Law School views," or, if not, that I aroused hostili~y. 
to the School or the University by taking unpopular positions.JJV 
The third category of factors comprises a variety of ac-
tions or inactions I took within the Law School itself which 
18. A relevant illustration was provided in 1968, when 
several of my colleagues and I signed a brief letter of opposi-
tion to the policy of the United States in Vietnam. The letter 
had been drafted initially by a faculty group in the Harvard Law 
School and circulated for comment, but it retained the relative-
ly bland tenor that seems essential to keep a potential group of 
signers, particularly lawyers, together. The letter was printed 
in several of the local and area papers, and it elicited from 
one of our alumni a typical comment. He indicated that he 
thought our views were wrong but added that this was "not 
material." He acknowledged that we had a right to our opinion 
and its expression but added; "Perhaps you also have a right to 
sign such an article as law teachers, but I resent your use of a 
designation which implies to the public that the view you 
~spouse is that of the Indiana University School of Law." Final-
ly, he expressly tied his view to his belief that such expres-
sions as ours made raising money for the School more difficult. 
In my response to this letter I said: 
"We are entirely in agreement on the proposition that ex-
pressions of opinion like that in the recent letter on our 
tragic policy in Vietnam should be made strictly in a private 
capacity. To that end the letter to the newspapers was written 
on plain bond and the envelope did not carry the printed return 
address of the University. We tried to make it entirely clear 
that we spoke as individuals and not in any sense on behalf of 
the faculty. The Indianapolis Star gratuitously inserted the 
lines suggesting that in some way the letter was issued by the 
Law School. The risk of that kind of gratuitous addition by a 
newspaper is always present. If that risk were permitted to si-
lence members of the faculty who want to speak on issues of 
overriding concern, our professional status would have made us 
political eunuchs. That is a status I am not prepared to ac-
cept." 
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conflicted with the interests and preferences of influential 
alumni or University officials. This category is so varied in 
its content that I can only provide an example, the most im-
portant being the policy I adopted -':on admission questions. The 
attractions of a legal education and the improved stature of the 
Law School confronted us with a pool of applicants far larger 
than we could accommodate within our physical plant and staff. 
In part because I believed the position was sound, but in large 
part because it was the position favored by the Faculty, I 
declined to "second-guess" the Admissions Committee. The result 
was that from time to time a relative of an important figure 
would be denied admission. I consistently rejected urging that I 
take a limited number of "wild cards" to be played advantageous-
ly in sensitive admission cases. It surely is an arguable posi-
tion that the Law School would have benefited from some 
sacrifice of "purity" in such matters. In a Faculty that 
historically had been allowed little role in setting the policy 
of the School, however, I thought that supporting the Faculty 
and nurturing its confidence as the policy-making organ of the 
School the sounder approach. If I erred, the error was con-
scious. I recognized the choices as I ran the cost-gain 
analysis. Even today with perhaps a clearer image of the hazards 
of the choices I made, I'm not at all sure I would decide dif-
ferently. But I might. 
In the spring of 1971, the International Legal Center ex-
tended to me on behalf of the University of Nairobi an invita-
tion to spend the 1971-72 academic year there as Fulbright 
Professor. Although attracted, I thought initially that accept-
ing the invitation was not feasible, but on reflection I decided 
that an able Associate Dean, a strong faculty, and a program we 
believed in removed any serious obstacles to my being away for 
the year. An added element of self-interest supported this view: 
I thought a year away might enable me to see more clearly the 
point at which my utility to the University had been or would be 
exhausted and a move elsewhere would be desirable. 
It was not surprising that shortly after I arrived in 
Nairobi, I had a letter from John Ryan, who had been appointed 
without any external search to succeed President Sutton, effec-
tively ending my tenure as Dean. There was an interesting am-
biguity about ~he President's letter: it wasn't at all clear 
whether my resignation as Dean was being requested (if it was, I 
would have submitted it immediately, of course), or whether I 
was simply fired. I was somewhat amused by the question, but I 
had no doubt about the substance of the University's action, nor 
had others. This was illustrated by a pleasant and amusing let-
ter from an English friend who wrote: "While I can imagine that 
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the situation is not, for you at the moment, one which is preg-
nant with humor, it does seem to me that you are creating a 
splendid record of being thrown out of all the right places. If 
ever there gets to be an academic purple heart, you will 
presumably get one with a triple paper clip cluster." 
I relished this humor, but not the implicit gibe at both 
Ghana and Indiana. In both places, I had had the opportunity to 
do work I regarded as important; this had brought great satis-
factions. To be sure, the two places shared some charac-
teristics. In each, the constructive work my colleagues and I 
had done had been placed seriously at risk by repressive politi-
cal forces: in Ghana from the faux-revolutionary wing of the 
governing party; in Indiana from the conservative Right. My ex-
perience in each place illustrated the fact that a good, 
vigorous law faculty created much discomfort in a politically 
repressive climate, whether the wind blew from the Left or 
Right. How much of what we had built would survive in either 
place was an open question. But for each place, and its 
University, I retained a deep, enduring affection. 
Remaining at Indiana as a member of the Faculty was not a 
seriously considered option. Soon after my "resignation" from 
the deanship was announced, I had a phone call in Nairobi invit-
ing me to spend the academic year 1972-73 as Visiting Professor 
at Duke University. I accepted with pleasure. Duke's invitation 
to remain as a regular member of the Faculty, extended in the 
fall of 1972, required a difficult decision. Finally, however, I 
decided to accept the invitation of Boston University, where a 
new President, John R. Silber, offered an exciting prospect of 
institutional development in which I might find an interesting 
and satisfying role. 
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PART FOUR 
llISCELLANBOOS MUSINGS 
Introductory Note 
A few items I would like to include do not fit into the 
three thematic groups above. They are included here because in 
different ways they reveal aspects of my life that added rich-
ness to the fabric. The first two are reminiscences of friends, 
the first given as a talk at a memorial service, the second pub-
lished in a dedicatory issue of a law review. 
For years I have toyed with the thought of a series of 
short essays about friends who in different ways have played 
significant roles in my life, e.g. Hubert M. Poteat, my Profes-
sor of Latin when I was an undergraduate: Edgar M. Durfee, one 
of my teachers in the Michigan Law School who became, after I 
joined that Faculty, my mentor and friend: Conor Cruise O'Brien 
with whom I worked in Ghana: The Honorable Frank M. Johnson, a 
fishing friend, who taught me much about what a judge could and 
sometimes should do: and John R. Silber with whom policy dis-
agreements, which were not rare, never diluted friendship or ~ 
di~rupted a close working relationship in Boston University. To I 
these I should add two others, not close friends in the conven-
tional sense, but men who played pivotal roles in my profes-
sional life, providing intellectual stimulation and encourage- \ 
ment at critical times for which I will always be grateful. 
Willard Hurst spent virtually his entire career at the 
University of Wisconsin: he was America's most distinguished 
legal historian of the century. In some way which I never dis-
covered, Willard became aware of me early in my time on the 
Michigan Faculty and showed a continuing interest. He invited me 
to come to Wisconsin for a year or two to carry out under his 
general oversight one of the studies in nineteenth century legal 
history that distinguished the Wisconsin program. I declined, 
largely because I felt I had little talent for history, but Wil-
lard still involved me from time to time in stimulating pro-
jects. When I began to think of the research that led me to 
Ghana, Willard was a reliable source of both personal encourage-
ment and insights into significant interrelationships. When one 
of his long letters, typed personally on an ancient typewriter, 
single-spaced and almost margin-less, arrived in Ann Arbor, I 
knew I had plenty to ponder over. Once Willard was in Ann Arbor 
for a brief visit when I was feeling somewhat intimidated and a 
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bit discouraged about the Ghana project. During a long walk, I 
said, "I'm a fairly competent lawyer, and I'm not uncomfortable 
with political theory. But to do this job right, I should also 
be an historian, an anthropologistt sociologist, philosopher, 
and maybe more." Willard listened quietly (perhaps with a smile 
that I, in my self-absorption, didn't notice), then said, 
"You're probably right, Burnett, but until you know of someone 
who is all those things and is ready to do the job, why don't 
you just go ahead?" I did. 
Karl Llewellyn, for many years a member of the Columbia 
faculty before moving, via Harvard, to the University of Chica-
go, was a prominent member of that amazingly diverse group of 
theorists, rebels against the earlier formalism, which came to 
be known as Legal Realists. His field was mainly commercial law, 
but he did distinguished work in legal anthropology and even in 
constitutional law. My closest contact with Karl came in his 
years at the University of Chicago. When I was there for various 
kinds of meetings, I frequently stayed with Karl and his wife, 
Soia Mentschikoff who also was a member of the Law Faculty, at 
their home in Hyde Park near the University. Karl swung easily 
from his dramatic impersonation of a chef as he prepared my 
breakfast, baking rolls and informing me with total conviction 
that civilized people ate only "buckwheat honey" on hot rolls, 
to a late night, excited commentator on my research plans, scat-
tering provocative ideas like a flint meeting steel. When I 
returned to Ann Arbor after such a visit, I usually had the 
feeling that I must be audibly vibrating. When Ed Levi, then 
Dean of the Law Faculty, extended an invitation to move to Chi-
cago, he produced one of the most difficult professional deci-
sions I ever made. Our children's ages at the time made a move 
to Chicago seem unwise, but I've never lost a vague sense of 
regret. 
Had we moved to Chicago, having Karl as a colleague would 
not have resulted. I was in Chicago for some meeting in the 
spring of 1962, and had lunch with Karl and Soia in the Faculty 
Commons. That evening Ed Levi had a group in his home for din-
ner, and I expected to see the Llewellyns there. Soia arrived 
late and alone, just before I had to leave for Ann Arbor. She 
said Karl had seemed a bit tired; so she gave him an early din-
ner and saw him settled comfortably in bed before joining the 
dinner party. When she returned home, she found that he had 
passed away. He had remained a vibrant presence to the end. 
The essay project must await another day, but I trust the 
two brief tributes included will not seem misplaced. 
HOBART COFFEY: A MEMORIAL ADDRESS 
[Hobart Coffey was my teacher in one Law School course, but 
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we were not well acquainted. Friendship developed after I 
returned to Ann Arbor in 1951 to join the Faculty. I will say 
little about Hob's professional achievements, though much could 
be said, particularly about his skill, insights and determina-
tion, through his role as Director of the Law Library, to build 
one of the truly great law collections in the world. When, in 
the fifties, I became interested in legal developments in Africa 
and other parts of the Third World, I was frequently amazed to 
discover that some obscure study published in a limited edition 
in the twenties or earlier was in our collection, not because 
some member of the Faculty had needed it immediately and urged 
that it be acquired, but because Hob appreciated its relevance 
to the needs of some scholar in the future. 
Hob was a tall, lean man, with a craggy face, and a dis-
tinctive style of speaking, chin slightly raised, voice deep, 
and the flow of words slow and deliberate. I often though that 
if I had to conjure up an image of an Old Testament prophet, 
that image would look a lot like Hob. But a somewhat austere ap-
pearance did not hide a relish for life, an ironic sense of 
humor, and a great capacity for friendship. 
While our contacts within the Law School were many and in-
variably pleasant, perhaps most of my cherished recollections of 
him come from our summer and fall fishing ventures with a small 
group of friends, usually to northern Canada. These continued 
for many years. Hob was a most casual but usually quite produc-
tive fisherman. He always made his large car available for the 
drive over usually unfortunate roads to whatever remote place we 
had.chosen for fishing or climbing aboard a bush plane for the 
final leg. When Hob's health began to fail, he was usually 
"enthroned" alone in the back seat of the car, while another man 
and I sat in front and shared the driving. Hob's conversational 
gambits from the back seat were always a delight. One reliable 
feature was his inquiring, about 5:00 p.m. each day, "Did you 
hear it?" Even after we came to recognize the drill, we would 
ask, "Hear what, Hob?" Then the reply, "The Angelus," the signal 
for Hob to bring out a fifth of bourbon to toast the day. Only 
Hob was permitted to respond to the Angelus until we were off 
the road for the day. 
When our group left Ann Arbor, Hob took over all financial 
matters; we thought of him as Chancellor of the Exchequer. He 
paid all restaurant and hotel bills, and settled all accounts in 
the fishing camp. During the final night in camp, while others 
were engaged in the last poker game, Hob retired to his cabin to 
work out the accounts. Near 11:00 he would reappear and report 
to each of us what we owed. No questions or protests were 
countenanced; the bill was simply to be paid when convenience 
allowed. It was only in the first year Hob could not go with us 
because of his health, that someone else took over as Chancellor 
of the Exchequer, and we realized the extent to which Hob had 
l 
I 
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been subsidizing our fishing trips each year. 
Hob had retired from the Law Faculty and returned to his 
original home in Ohio before his death. By that time, I too had 
left Ann Arbor for Indiana University. I was saddened by news of 
his death, but relieved that his agonized gasping for breath was 
past. Some time later, a call from Ann Arbor informed me of the 
date of a memorial service for Hob and asked if I would make the 
memorial talk at that service. I hastily declined, sensing that 
I would find it very difficult to speak about such a close 
friend; however, the caller's insistence prevailed. Preparing 
for the talk was a strange experience. I would sit in my office, 
perhaps checking a file for some memo from Hob I thought I re-
membered or merely recalling him, and frequently discovered that 
I was quietly chuckling. I knew then that I did not want to 
mourn a death but to celebrate a long and good life. The minis-
ter of the Unitarian Church in Ann Arbor, where the memorial 
service was held, wrote later in his Newsletter: "It was a dif-
ferent kind of memorial service and that is why I want to com-
ment on it. Professor Coffey was a very cordial, kind and witty 
person, and Dean Harvey was rich with examples of Coffey's 
gentle wit and humor. There were times when the audience broke 
out in audible laughter and I thought to myself: isn't this a 
delightful tribute to a man who relished life and who loved 
people? Why do funeral and memorial services need to be so 
solemn; why not use wit and humor as it is appropriate to the 
person?" I was pleased by this reaction, for Hob would not have 
relished solemnity.] 
Our friend Hob Coffey died on Sunday, September 
14. On the death of a friend it is especially appropriate that 
we meet and share our cherished recollections of him. Together, 
we neither sit in mournful silence, nor mark his going with out-
pourings of grief. A gentle and compassionate man who touched 
our lives with kindness, understanding, and warm companionship, 
achieved the satisfactions of honorable work well done, of 
friendship and respect well earned, and, in the fullness of 
years, he died. Without exception, my recollections of Hob are 
happy ones; some of those recollections I want to share with you 
today. 
I knew Hob for more than 20 years, first as my teacher, 
then as a professional colleague, but most deeply as a friend. 
I had only the course on family law -- or Domestic Rela-
tions as it was then called -- with Hob. His administrative 
duties in the Law School left him little opportunity to teach. 
Yet I recall him as an excellent teacher--meticulous in his 
preparation, lucid in presentation, demanding of his students, 
and much inclined to enliven his classes with a salty wit. 
During the celebration of the Centennial of the Law School, 
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some waggish committee decided to put out a booklet of photog-
raphs of the Faculty, most of them of the candid sort. Usually a 
member of the Faculty rated only one photograph, but Hob had 
two. one was taken while he was teaching, seated behind the desk 
in a classroom. The photographer caught him, happily, with a 
quite characteristic expression. His head was turned slightly to 
the side, the chin well raised, and he looked upward with a 
beatific smile on his face. The identifying caption, based, I 
assume, on a comment made in his Admiralty course, was "Some 
captains named their ships after their favorite women!" For Hob 
the law was not an arid, impersonal system. It was a fabric of 
intensely human material to whose infinite variety and richness 
he could respond with interest, insight, and often amusement. As 
many legal memoranda and opinions left in his files indicate, 
however, he was also a skilled, disciplined professional. 
The gulf between teacher and student in a large law school 
is wide and deep. Through most of his career, Hob bridged that 
gulf more successfully than most teachers of his time, for he 
liked and respected young people. I came to know Hob well, how-
ever, only after I returned from practice and joined the Faculty 
of the Law School. 
Hob's contribution to the Law School was unique, for it was 
his responsibility to develop and administer the library on 
which all of us -- students and Faculty alike -- depended. The 
rnagnif icent collection in the Michigan Law Library today is a 
splendid memorial to the imagination and dedication he brought 
to the tasks. His achievement could be illustrated readily by 
accession rates, gross holdings, and other indices, but I put 
aside dry figures for a personal illustration. When I became 
interested during the late fifties in legal developments in 
Africa and other less developed areas, I frequently needed rela-
tively obscure works on primitive law or colonial legal systems. 
In the early stages I usually assumed that my need could 
be met, if at all, only by a patient search of specialized 
libraries and by borrowing. Yet on innumerable occasions I found 
that Hob had bought the work for the Library many years be.fore.; 
out of typically small original printings or on the rare book 
market. Through his imagination, foresight, and diligence in 
i..H:.ging and serving the needs of the Library, qualities grounded 
in his own love for books and appreciation for the scholarship 
his duties left him little time to pursue, the Law Library bec-
ame what it is today. 
I will not stress his professional achievements -- though 
they are great. My thoughts are more of the quality of the man. 
He recruited for the Library a dedicated and competent staff 
whom he treated with respect and consideration. He was inter-
ested in them as individuals; he shared their problems; and he 
viewed their foibles with qentle amusement. Once after he dis-
covered that the stack marker in the canon law collection was 
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spelled "cannon," he nursed his secret for weeks in gleeful 
anticipation of the reaction of some of his associates when they 
discovered the error. 
on another occasion when he encountered the annual dif-
ficulty in reserving a few offices in the Legal Research Build-
ing for emergency use later in the year, he decided that the 
task would be far easier if all offices appeared to be assigned. 
To the fictional occupants of the reserved off ices he attached 
proper names, deciding after mature consideration to use for the 
purpose the names of the twelve Apostles. The scheme worked, and 
Hob had several opportunities during the year to agree with the 
observations of others that indeed Mr. Matthew or Mr. 
Bartholomew was rarely in his off ice and did not appear too 
diligent in his work. 
Hob was a student of the Bible and his reading of the King 
James version and the ancient catechisms was reflected in his 
choice of words and the cadence of his speech. To indicate that 
he would be unavailable in his office for a few days, he once 
posted on his office door a Biblical citation. The diligent who 
checked the reference would have learned that, properly inter-
preted, it revealed that Hob had gone fishing. During another 
absence he simply posted a photographic blow-up of an announce-
ment he had discovered in an 18th century journal which went 
something like this: "Being overwhelmed by the burden of my 
duties, I am constrained to repair to my dwelling and to remain 
there until I regain my customary composure." 
These small episodes illustrate Hob's most pronounced and 
endearing quality-a wry, detached, whimsical, but always gentle 
humor. It made conversation with him a delightful experience, it 
relieved the tedium and ponderousness of Faculty meetings: it 
warmed his relations with his colleagues in the Library and in 
the Faculty. His humor and wit were as readily directed toward 
himself as toward others, and they will forever brighten our 
recollections of Hob. As one friend has said, "Anyone who 
doesn't have a Coffey remark to cherish is the poorer for it." 
Many of my own fondest memories of Hob come from fishing 
trips a group of us regularly made to Canada. Hob was a relaxed, 
even casual fisherman, but he caught his share or more. In 
recent years when failing health made it impossible for him to 
be with us, Hob remained in a special sense in the group, for we 
frequently recalled that special mixture of wit and wisdom which 
filled his conversation. 
With these outings too I associate other recollections of 
Hob which reveal qualities we took perhaps too much for granted 
in the special community of the Law School: a courtliness and 
grace, a warm interest in all kinds and conditions of people, 
and a considerateness that never suggested condescension. Those 
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qualities were also revealed in many acts of private charity and 
support, the extent of which not even his close friends knew. 
Hob was a complex, many faceted man. My own recollections 
can suggest, at best, a partial view. Some of you would recall 
and stress his professional contributions during forty years of 
devoted service to a great University. Others would speak of the 
sympathy and support he gave his staff and his sensitivity in 
meeting institutional needs while providing opportunities to the 
young, the disadvantaged, and the oppressed. out of our collec-
tive awareness we could compile a large but not exhaustive ac-
count of his generosity to the aged, the lonely, and the needy. 
But with all this, we would not have described the whole man. 
There was, in Hob, an ultimate sense of privacy, an inner 
reserve, that all of his friends recognized and respected. 
Hob Coffey is dead. The iron will that sustained him with-
out complaint through his final years of failing health has been 
discharged. Yet with those of us who knew him and for those who 
will continue to benefit from his labors, Hob still lives. 
As long as students and teachers of the law work in this 
University, Hob will live; 
As long as friends and acquaintances find joy in recalling 
his gentle, humorous, and wise words, Hob will live; 
As long as men value human compassion and quiet, un-
publicized acts of kindness toward others, Hob's spirit will 
live. 
It is for these reasons that today I cannot mourn, nor can 
I express the grief of loss. I was privileged to know, to love, 
and now to cherish the memory of a fine man. I would simply pray 
that the God of all-encompassing love will receive and sustain 
him. 
JOHN PHILIP DAWSON: A MEMORIAL REMEMBRANCE 
[In the fall of 1946, in my first year in Law School, I was 
a student in an Equity course taught by Jack Dawson. Shortly 
after the semester began, however, a health problem required me 
to leave school. By the time I returned a few months later, Jack 
was on leave to serve as the Administrator of International 
Trade in the government of Greece. In missing the Equity course 
and others with Jack, I have no doubt that I lost out on one of 
the great experiences a law student could have. 
When I returned to Ann Arbor as a member of the Faculty in 
1951, Jack was back from Greece. He took over that fall as the 
-233-
senior member of the Faculty teaching Contracts and I, a raw 
rookie, was given a section as well. Thus began a professional 
association and friendship that la~ted almost forty years. Until 
Jack left for Harvard in the mid-fifties, our contact was close 
indeed. It reveals much about Jack to mention, however, that 
when the Faculty decided to integrate coverage of remedies in 
the basic contracts course and Jack and I decided to prepare a 
book to service this curricular innovation, the first version of 
the book resulted from each of us developing independently and 
with very little consultation the parts we agreed to take on. 
Later editions of the book changed this pattern, however, and 
brought a special kind of collaboration that resulted in a real-
ly "seamless" work. In this marvelous relationship, Jack was in-
deed my teacher, but he always spoke and acted as if we were 
simply colleagues. 
After my resignation from the Indiana Faculty, I was in-
vited to come to Boston University, and, at the same time, Jack 
who had just retired from Harvard came "across the river." The 
five years we taught side by side in Boston provided an ex-
perience of friendship and collegiality I will never forget and 
always cherish]. 
The death of Jack Dawson on October 19, 1985, provided, not 
an occasion for mourning but, rather, an opportunity to 
celebrate a long life, well-lived. Through a lifetime of study 
and scholarship he refined and expressed a deep and wide-ranging 
intellect; he loved, married, sustained and was sustained by a 
devoted family; he served with distinction his universities, his 
collQllunity, and his country; he relished his closeness to his 
friends; he lived richly and deeply, and--in the fullness of 
time--he died. So I sing, not a dirge, but a paean, knowing that 
my unwelcome tears are not for Jack, but for myself. I do not 
expect to meet his kind again. In sharing our cherished recol-
lections of him, we assuage our sense of loss. 
Although our professional work for almost thirty-five years 
was closely entwined, I will leave to other occasions most of my 
recollections and comments on Jack's teaching and scholarship. A 
single remembrance will suffice. Years ago, when interviewing a 
young lawyer for a faculty appointment, I inquired about his own 
teachers whom he respected most. Not surprisingly, Jack's name 
headed the list. In response to my probing for reasons, the 
young man said all the appropriate things about mastery of sub-
stance and teaching skill. A day later, however, he returned 
uninvited to the subject. His earlier answer, he said, while 
quite accurate, was inadequate. Struggling to articulate Jack's 
special quality as a teacher, he said, "He cared about and he 
built on what his students thought and said." To the qualities, 
thus sparely suggested, I too can bear witness. Jack and I began 
teaching Contracts at the same time, I as a true rookie, he as a 
mature scholar. A year later, we began work on a book that we 
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took through several editions. I recall and will appreciate al-
ways being treated from the beginning as a full partner in that 
enterprise. While I never had the benefit of Jack's formal 
courses, through most of my professional life he was my teacher. 
As such, he cared, he listened, and he shared with extraordinary 
generosity. 
As a young man Jack was an athlete, powerful in body and 
seemingly boundless in energy. So he remained into the late mid-
dle years. When I was law student, I saw him one day with a 
plaster bandage across his nose, made necessary, I learned, by a 
high-sticking son in a family hockey game. In his later years he 
spent much time and energy in moving stones for various building 
projects in his beloved Vermont. Physical power was joined in 
him with a capacity for reacting with intense, emotional sensi-
tivity to nobility and beauty. Several years ago, we planned to 
see together the segment of a televised biography of Queen 
Elizabeth I that covered the Armada period. Jack suggested that 
in preparation we should re-read the Queen's address to her 
troops at Tilbury when they awaited the arrival of Parma's 
forces. He began to read aloud but, when his eyes filled and his 
voice choked, he handed the book to Emma to finish the reading. 
This small incident illustrates well both Jack's vibrant 
historical sense and, far more important, his dependence on the 
strong, beautiful, and loving woman who for almost sixty years 
was his wife. 
Jack had an unusual capacity for friendship, and I think he 
would be pleased that his friends relish their recollections of 
him. His disbelief of praise, usually expressed with wry humor, 
should caution us, however, not to let our recollections project 
an image too good to be quite believed. So let us recall a man 
in the fullness of his personality, capable of passion, anger, 
and disdain. One small illustration comes to mind. We were argu-
ing, as we often did, about issues and people of the law, in 
this case about the work of one Supreme Court Justice. I yielded 
briefly to the playfully malicious temptation to score debater's 
points rather than to engage Jack on the issue he wanted to 
probe. So I disguised my agreement with the view he expressed 
and merely probed for any chinks in his armor. After a bit, he 
looked at me with an eye that could be fierce when his "Irish" 
was up and said, "I probably should point out that you're making 
me very angry." Fortunately, I usually escaped his anger, but, 
extraordinarily kind and generous though he was, he was capable 
of reacting strongly, with anger and disdain, to departures from 
the standards of civility or integrity that he cherished. 
Many years ago a play on Broadway used a stage-setting that 
indulged the fantasy of Heaven as an upper room visible above 
the stage. When the living -- the people in the lower room --
thought about or were influenced by those who had died, the 
lights in the upper room came on, and its occupants moved, 
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talked, lived. That charming idea suggests that the room where 
Jack is will be lively indeed. For where men, women, and 
children draw tight the bonds of loving support in family or 
friendship, Jack's spirit will be ~here. As long as teachers 
teach and students learn in mutual respect and shared commitment 
to the search for knowledge, a vital part of Jack's life will 
continue. While women and men of the law continue to prize 
insights deepened and sharpened by patient craftsmanship and 
scholarly objectivity, Jack will speak to us. And as long as we 
draw strength from the understanding, love, and loyalty that our 
friends so generously provide, we will have unfailing reminders 
of a gracious and good man. Jack Dawson's upper room will be 
full of light, love, and life. 
NATIONAL GOALS ARD INTERNATIONAL LAW 
[The following lecture was a puzzle! When I encountered 
the manuscript in a file, I had a clear recollection of prepar-
ing it and of reflecting that probably some of the views ex-
pressed would not be congenial to many in the political climate 
of the time, but I had no recollection whatever of the date, 
place, occasion, or the audience. Some of the footnote 
references indicate that the lecture could not have been earlier 
than 1961, and my intense preoccupation with the work in Ghana 
which began in 1962 seemingly excluded most of that year and 
several thereafter. My brief clarifications of a few fundamental 
concepts or terms strongly suggest that I was not speaking to an 
audience of lawyers. A part of the mystery of the talk's 
provenance was resolved late in the work of putting together 
this collection, when I had occasion to read the file on me 
which the CIA had developed. I learned there that the talk was 
presented on my behalf by my Michigan Faculty colleague Roger 
Cunningham to the Michigan Pastors' Conference in 1962. I assume 
that the Conference occurred in the fall of that year and that 
my earlier departure for Africa made it necessary for me to have 
a colleague deliver the talk for me. 
I resolved doubts about inclusion of the talk here on the 
basis of several factors. First, it casts some further light on 
my general theoretical position which was one of the principal 
themes in Part I. Second, the concerns that came into sharp 
focus in the tragic years of our Vietnam involvement found early 
expression here. Finally, while I may have been quite mistaken 
in many of the views I held, I can claim the virtue, or perhaps 
the vice, of consistency. In reviewing the National Goals talk, 
I have found no view expressed of which I now repent.] 
The subject assigned to me is "National Goals and Interna-
tional Law." This juxtaposition suggests that there is some 
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meaningful relationship between the two, though its nature is 
not clearly indicated. Conceivably it is one of mutual support, 
our national goals furthering the development of and adherence 
to international law which in turn'stimulates progress toward 
those goals. On the other hand, it is possible that the rela-
tionship is one of hostility and reciprocal impediment. A third 
possibility is that national goals and international law lie in 
entirely different and unrelated ranges of meaning and dis-
course. Before commenting further on the problem, however, it 
seems essential to clarify the meaning for present purposes of 
the two basic terms. 
First, let us turn to the matter of national goals. In 
establishing the relevant meaning of this term it seems clear 
that two basically different approaches might be used. The 
first would view national goals as facts and seek to identify 
them by use of the investigative techniques of the social 
sciences. Even within this approach sharp divergencies of 
methods and results are possible. Are national goals determined 
by ordinary citizens or by officials? If the former, is simple 
majority determination sufficient or must some stronger voice of 
the people speak out? If official views set national goals, 
where should these be sought? In the Congress? In the manifold 
offices of the executive establishment? Or in the hallowed 
halls of the supreme court? Any resolution of these questions 
would itself require of the investigator certain value postula-
tions to which many others might want to take exception. Since 
I know of no relevant empirical investigations along any of 
these lines, this approach to the fixing of national goals may 
for present purposes be put aside. 
The second approach to a formulation of national goals is 
avowedly ideal. The question it raises is not what are our na-
tional goals but, rather, what should they be? It is worth ob-
serving that an answer to this question is not the conclusion of 
a syllogism containing as one of its premises an "ought" 
proposition of unquestioned and unquestionable validity. In 
such circumstances, it would be highly presumptuous for me to 
discuss national goals as I might formulate them in answer to 
this normative question. 
To avoid being stopped at the inception of our discussion 
by an inability to delimit one critical term in our subject, I 
have secured agreement that we may take as given the formula-
tions of the President's Commission on National Goals • .l.21 This 
group of distinguished Americans utilizes the second of the ap-
19. Goals for Americans, Comprising the Report of the Pres,·-
dent's Commission on National Goals and Chapters Submitted for 
the Consideration of the Commission, 1960. 
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proaches suggested above. In transmitting its report to the 
President it declared: 
"[T]he Report expresses views !;that reflect solely 
our own judgment, sometimes in accord with and other 
times at variance from those of the several authors 
[of essays appended to the Report]. This judgment was 
arrived at during long hours at the conference 
table • • 
" We do not expect our recommendations to command 
unanimous acceptance. Rather it is our hope that they 
will evoke active discussion. Under the democratic 
process this is the path to a national consensus. 11.2.Q/ 
To be sure, the Commission did not attempt to postulate a set of 
ideals or goals in a factual vacuum. The historic American ex-
perience, a developed sense of community, and the value judg-
ments the Commission thought widely shared formed the underpin-
ning for the Report. In the final analysis, however, the Com-
mission Report purports to be not descriptive but normative. 
We might fruitfully devote our entire discussion today to 
the Commission's formulation of goals for Americans during the 
sixties. Stimulation of such discussion was surely one of the 
primary aims of the Commission. We can only summarize the 
Report, however, to reveal the possible relationship of the 
goals suggested to the concerns of international law. The basic 
division of the Report is between goals at home and goals 
abroad. Among the former are enhancement of the dignity and 
development of the individual, elimination of discrimination 
based on religion, sex or race, the preservation and perfection 
of the democratic process, strengthening our system of education 
and advancing knowledge in the arts and sciences. The Commis-
sion recognized, as well, the importance of diffusing and 
balancing the centers of economic power, stimulating economic 
growth and technical change with a sensitive regard for any ad-
verse impact upon individuals, development of an agricultural 
policy assuring a fair return to farmers through the mechanisms 
of the market, improvement of living conditions and health care 
for the people. Our goals abroad could be summarized under one 
heading -- the realization of an "open and peaceful world." To 
this end, the Committee urged free trade for general economic 
health, aid to less developed nations, defense of the free 
world, disarmament with adequate safeguards and the preservation 
and strengthening of the United Nations. The Commission sug-
gested that an equitable tax structure providing adequately for 
public needs is instrumental to all these goals. 
20. ibid., p. xi. 
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With this view of our national goals in mind, let us 
turn to the second branch of our subject -- international law. 
As a first step toward delimiting ~;very large subject, we will 
merely mention and put aside two bodies of law having certain 
international aspects but which do not concern us here. Not in-
frequently national courts are called upon in litigation between 
private individuals or companies to apply norms originating in 
treaties or merely in the customary practices of nations. Our 
own national Constitution lists treaties as part of the supreme 
law of the land. Norms so applied are viewed here as part of 
our national law, however, and not as international law even 
though their sources may lie in international relations. 
Second, there is private international law. Today, vast 
amounts of trade and commerce are conducted across international 
boundaries. A single transaction may have incidents localized 
in several countries. For example, a lumber merchant in London 
may by correspondence with a broker in Hamburg agree to purchase 
a quantity of lumber to be delivered on designated ships berthed 
in ports of Finland and the Soviet Union, payment to be made by 
the transfer of dollar credits in New York. If rights and 
duties arising from this transaction should need to be litig-
ated, what body of national law should govern? A national court 
considering this problem has available certain guiding rules to 
solve this choice of law problem. These are commonly referred 
to as private international law. They are immensely important 
but they lie beyond our present concern which is with public in-
ternational law. 
Only where the actor whose conduct is being examined is a 
national state is discussion in terms of public international 
law customary. Law deals however with relationships, and we 
must therefore press the inquiry: "Who can question the conduct 
of a national state so as to invoke the standards of interna-
tional law according to customary usage?" The answer again 
seems quite clear -- only another national state or, in recent 
years, one of the international organizations. This delimita-
tion of the circumstances in which evaluation of conduct in 
terms of international law accords with common usage is 
fundamental. We are now able to make the statement that inter-
national law for the purposes of this discussion is concerned 
solely with the relations between or among national states and 
certain international organizations. Figuratively, we may think 
of such states as the members of a society governed, to the ex-
tent it is "governed" at all, by a body of norms commonly 
referred to as international law. 
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What is the or1g1n of these norms? Or, to state the ques-
tion differently, if international law is to be invoked, to what 
sources does one refer to determine its substantive content. 
The Statute of the International court of Justice (Art. 38) 
lists four primary sources (1) international conventions whether 
general or particular, (2) international custom accepted as law, 
(3) the general principles of law recognized by civilized na-
tions, and (4) judicial decisions and the teachings of the most 
highly qualified publicists of the various nations. Little com-
ment is needed on these several sources. Doubtless today the 
most important is the mass of treaties, both multilateral and 
bilateral, dealing with a vast number of subjects such as air 
transportation, postal service and trade relations. It should 
be noted that in order for custom to be regarded as a source of 
law it must not only be general but must be perceived by the na-
tions as possessing a "legal" quality. Decisions not only of 
international tribunals but of national courts as well provide 
important insights into the substantive content of international 
law. 
A rigid insistence on a conception of "law" as the command 
of a sovereign should not be permitted to obscure the fact that 
public international law derived from such sources provides the 
basis for ordering international relationships and getting the 
world's jobs done in many vital areas. on the other hand, the 
use of the term "law" for this body of international norms 
creates the risk that extremely significant differences between 
international and municipal "law" will be overlooked. If the 
present limitations of international law are to be understood 
and fruitful lines of development explored, these differences 
should be kept in mind. I would suggest three such differences. 
1) In the international society, a monopoly of legitimate 
force has not been organized. That force, or the threat of 
force, plays a central role in the relations of nations is ob-
vious. Twice in the first half of this century combinations of 
states have invoked this ultimate determinant when other devices 
and techniques failed to achieve acceptable adjustments in their 
relationships. Increasingly of late, this rule by force in in-
ternational affairs has come to be contrasted with the "Rule of 
Law," the development of which is urged in order to end the 
reign of mutual terror created by the threat of modern weapons 
systems. As early as 1925, President Calvin Coolidge advocated 
"··· establishment of a tribunal for the administration of even-
handed justice between nation and nation •••• The weight of our 
enormous influence must be cast upon the side of a reign not of 
force, but of law and trial, not by battle, but by reason. 11.21/ 
21. Quoted in A.B.A. SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON WORLD PEACE 
THROUGH LAW, COMPILATION OF QUOTATIONS 5 (1960). 
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In 1959, Vice President Nixon declared that "the time has now 
come to take the initiative in the direction of establishment of 
the rule of law to replace the rule of force. 11.2.2/ Similar ex-
pressions could be multiplied. The;:suggestion seems to be that 
law and force are the polar extremes of techniques for ordering 
human affairs. This, I would submit, is palpable nonsense. 
Whether in the affairs of a small community of individuals, or 
in the world-wide community of nations, the essence of a legal 
order in the strict sense is the organization and monopolization 
of force, the incidence of which is threatened or actually used 
to channel and direct conduct. The existence of an interna-
tional legal order or Rule of Law is not dependent on the ab-
sence of force; it is dependent on who possesses and can legiti-
mately exercise it. 
A simple illustration will clarify this point. Assume that 
Jones and Smith own adjoining tracts of land and that the bound-
ary between them is in dispute. If Jones occupies and excludes 
Smith from land that Smith claims as his own, the legal ma-
chinery for settling the dispute is in general outline familiar 
to everyone; a trial will beheld in which each disputant may 
submit evidence and the judge and jury will determine the right-
ful owner of the contested area. Perhaps appeal procedures will 
take the case to the highest court of the jurisdiction. It 
might appear superficially that this process for resolving con-
flict has no relation to force, that it is simply law in action 
or, as Aristotle might put it, the operation of "reason un-
affected by desire." 
Yet force or the implicit threat of force underlies and 
supports the entire process. In order to start his action 
against Jones, Smith has an officer of the court, a sheriff or 
marshal, serve on Jones a copy of the complaint and a summons to 
appear and defend. Aside from complying with the summons, does 
Jones have any recourse? To be sure, he can ignore it and make 
no appearance in court. He might even notify Smith and the 
court that he does not recognize Smith's asserted right or the 
competence of the court to inquire into the matter. In such a 
case, the court would respond to Jones' default, not by inac-
tion, but by the entry of a judgment in Smith's favor. If the 
judgment authorizes specific relief, officers of the court are 
authorized and directed to go on the land, dispossess Jones and 
put Smith into possession. If the remedy sought by Smith is in 
the form of money compensation, he can have officers seize 
Jones' property and sell it to get funds for the satisfaction of 
22. Ibid. 
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the judgment. But what if Jones decides to resist these steps, 
collects his weapons and ammunition and barricades himself to 
protect the land he claims as his own property. The answer is 
clear; legal force represented by sheriffs or marshals may seize 
him and, through the processes of the criminal law, the forceful 
sanctions appropriate to his conduct will be applied. These 
sanctions may include the deprivation of Jones' property, his 
liberty or his life. The fact that only rarely would such a 
boundary dispute actually call forth such forceful measures 
should not obscure the fact that the organized force of the com-
munity, overwhelming in relation to Jones and possessing a spe-
cial quality of legitimacy, is always in reserve. It is the 
hallmark of 'law." 
Now let us transfer our simple boundary dispute to the in-
ternational level. The parties now are national states and the 
ordering regime is that of international law. While by no means 
inevitable, it is entirely possible that substantive standards 
for determining the claims to the disputed area could be ra-
tionally fixed on the basis of treaties, customary practices, 
general principles extrapolated from the legal systems of the 
world, or prior judicial decisions. The existence of such 
standards provides no assurance of their implementation, how-
ever. The parties to the dispute are nations, viewed by tradi-
tional international law as equal and independent. They are 
sovereign, that is, there is no authority higher than themselves 
possessing legitimate power to order their conduct. No court 
exists which is competent to hear the case and apply the stand-
ards of international law, unless the defendant state voluntari-
ly submits to the jurisdiction. If that submission is not made 
and the recalcitrant state mobilizes its forces to defend its 
asserted rights, the issue is left for settlement by arms. 
When resort was made to war for pressing or def ending an 
international claim, the traditional international law fell 
silent. All wars were regarded as equally lawful. Grotius, at 
an early date in his De Iure Belli Ac Pacis, did attempt to 
distinguish between lawful and unlawful wars, or between the 
just and the unjust. The effort failed, however. The position 
of the later international law was described by a leading 
English authority in these words: 
"International law has no alternative but to accept 
war, independently of the justice of its origin, as 
a relation which the parties to it may set up if they 
choose, and to busy itself only in regulating the 
effects of the relation. Hence both parties to every 
war are regarded as being in an identical legal posi-
tion, and consequently as being possessed of equal 
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rights. 11.2J/ 
In this century the effort to include resort to war within the 
proscriptions of international law ;~has been renewed. The 
Covenant of the League of Nations, the Kellogg-Briand pact, and 
the Charter of the United Nations reflect this effort. By Arti-
cle 2 of the Charter, member states undertake to "settle their 
international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that 
international peace and security, and justice are not endan-
gered" and to "refrain in their international relations from the 
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or 
political independence of any state •••• " Yet despite these 
pledges, which may be said to have returned international law to 
the moral level Grotius tried to give it, the basic facts of the 
international community are unaltered. Submission by any state 
to the jurisdiction of an international tribunal is dependent on 
its voluntary consent. More importantly, the capacity for the 
exercise of force is still dispersed among the members of the 
community. Until that capacity is substantially monopolized and 
placed behind the norms of international law, the society of na-
tions will be in a strict sense lawless. 
2) The second difference between the international and 
municipal legal orders is in a sense a corollary of the first. 
Both have to do with the organization of the community con-
cerned. The first distinction emphasized the centrality of 
force in the use of law as an ordering device. This emphasis 
tends to highlight executive functions, that is, the procedures 
for making law effective in actual or incipient conflict situa-
tions. It is apparent however, that within a modern state a vi-
able legal order requires much more than an efficient and power-
ful executive to enforce the law. Agencies must exist for the 
authoritative articulation of norms and for relating those norms 
in their inevitably generalized form to specific problem cases. 
In short, both legislative and judicial organs are essential. 
The legislative function is not, of course, exhausted by 
the initial formulation of a governing rule. Some of the most 
vexing problems of any legal order arise, not from the absence 
of an applicable rule, but from the belief of significant ele-
ments in the community that the available rule does not respond 
adequately to the demands of justice or social utility. Con-
tinuing adjustments must be made if the law is to be responsive 
to these demands in a changing society and the tension between 
officialdom and citizens is to be kept within tolerable limits. 
During the early centuries of development of the Anglo-American 
23. Hall, INTERNATIONAL LAW, 8th ed., p. 82. 
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legal order the courts were the primary instruments not only for 
adjudication, that is the application of general norms to parti-
cular cases, but also for the development of legal rules and 
their adaptation to changing needs~ The product of these 
centuries of labor is the Anglo-American common law. Today, the 
principal burden of norm creation and modification has been as-
sumed by legislative bodies, but particularly in this country 
the part played by the courts in this work remains significant. 
Whether or not the creative, legislative function of the courts 
is emphasized, their role in the orderly and peaceful resolution 
of conflict is indispensable. When other processes of social 
adjustment break down, the doors of the courts are open and in 
general the parties pass through them in the confident expecta-
tion that evidence of the facts will be fully and fairly heard, 
and the facts as found will be rationally related to governing 
norms. 
The common law has provided the aphorism that for every 
right there must be a remedy. In a sense this is a mere cir-
cularity, since it may be fairly urged that the only significant 
test of legal right is the existence of a remedy. In another 
sense, however, the aphorism reveals an important truth about 
our legal system. This is the basic assumption of completeness, 
that an appropriate judicial forum exists for every dispute. 
Even when a court dismisses the plaintiff's suit on the ground 
that he shows no legal right, the law, as viewed by the court, 
is being applied. This assumption of the completeness of the 
law and of the judicial machinery to handle every dispute that 
arises eliminates or greatly reduces the frustration and 
hostility that can arise when a party to a dispute has no 
recourse to an independent agency to hear his complaint and 
determine his rights. 
Enough has already been said to indicate the limited 
governmental organization of the international community. There 
is, of course, no legislative agency to declare authoritatively 
new legal norms or to adapt older ones to changing needs. Norm 
creation depends on consent manifested in treaties, on the un-
certainties of customary practice, and the often conflicting 
views of courts and publicists. These legislative inadequacies 
would be less significant if there existed international 
tribunals of general jurisdiction to which access was available 
in all conflict situations. As has been noted, however, the 
jurisdiction of such tribunals, like the International Court of 
Justice, depends on the voluntary submission of both parties. 
Furthermore, there is no executive establishment with an ade-
quate reserve of force to assure compliance with the judgment, 
even where a competent court has determined the rights and 
duties of the litigating states. 
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It is of interest that the vital importance to an interna-
tional Rule of Law of differentiated governmental organizations, 
administering a substantial monopoly of force, is sometimes 
recognized more clearly by a layman than it often is by lawyers. 
In 1932, Sigmund Freud wrote in a letter to Professor Einstein: 
The union of the majority must be stable and enduring 
• • • must be permanent and well organized; it must enact 
rules to meet the risk of possible revolts • • • • Must 
set up machinery assuring that its rules (laws) are obser-
ved • • • • [T]here is but one sure way of ending war and 
that is the establishment, by common consent, of a central 
control which shall have the last word in every conflict 
of interest. For this two things are needed: first the 
creation of a supreme court of judication (World Court); 
second its investment with adequate force. Unless the 
second requirement is fulfilled the first is unavail-
ing... • ..2!I 
I wonder if we are not entitled to regard many of the cur-
rent statements about the importance of an international Rule of 
Law as the merest cant, if the speakers do not appreciate the 
full implications of this concept, which necessarily include the 
organization of an international monopoly of legitimate force --
i.e. a world state. It seems to me at least doubtful that many 
of the speakers are prepared to accept this implication. 
3) The third distinction between the international and 
municipal legal orders is perhaps the most basic of all. Every 
viable municipal legal order is underpinned and supported by a 
substantial range of agreement within the society on certain 
value judgments at both the ultimate and instrumental levels. A 
comparable range of agreement does not seem to exist today in 
the international community. It is conceivable in any society 
that an elite group may gain control of the instruments of legal 
power and attempt thereby to implement a set of value judgments 
entirely antithetical to those prevailing in the society. This 
may be done as part of a program of social change planned by the 
elite, or merely for the exploitation of the social group in the 
interest of some select few. As yet we know little of the 
limits of effectiveness of law for instilling and nurturing 
value perceptions different from those generally prevailing. It 
perhaps can be assumed that a certain tension between the values 
of the legal order and of the society may be tolerated and that 
over a longer period the latter will be slowly changed. Certain-
24. Quoted in the A.B.A. Special Committee on World Peace 
Through Law, Compilation of Quotations, 16-17 (Jan. 1960). 
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ly too, current experience would indicate that an elite 
entrenched within the power structure of the modern state with 
the full legal arsenal at its command may implement its values 
and pursue its ends in the face of :.widespread dissent within the 
social group. It seems clear, however, that the extent to which 
the ever present implicit threat of force behind the legal order 
must become actual will vary inversely with the extent of agree-
ment between the values being implemented in the legal order and 
those of the people affected. One might suspect that any legal 
order supported only by its monopoly of force would not long 
endure. 
In the international sphere the extent of agreement on 
basic values is of even more immediate importance than has been 
suggested in connection with municipal law. The reason is not 
hard to find. At the municipal level we assumed a developed 
legal and governmental order. In such circumstances, those who 
might object to the value judgments implemented by a particular 
law face the necessity of opposing an established monopoly of 
force buttressed by that residuum of respect and loyalty which 
the citizens have for their basic institutions. The situation 
among nations is quite different. There, such basic institu-
tions do not yet exist; so no reservoir of respect and loyalty 
encourages compliance with a "law" whose implicit value premises 
have not been internalized by the members of the society. The 
problem is whether the group of nations can achieve sufficient 
agreement on a variety of ultimate and instrumental values to 
warrant their relinquishing sovereign and independent status, 
however hazardous that status may be, and creating a higher 
governing authority to which the functions of a legal order 
could be assigned. 
The axiological roots of traditional international law lie 
deep in western European civilization. Aristotle distinguished 
between law laid down by a city state which was variable in time 
and place, and a body of norms oriented on the tendential nature 
of all being toward its highest and fullest development which 
would be the same everywhere. Belief in the existence of such 
universal and immutable norms, which came to be called the law 
of nature or natural law, was a central theme in the specula-
tions of the Greek and Roman Stoics. In Roman legal evolution, 
this theory provided significant support for the development of 
the ius gentium, that body of law transcending the formalistic 
and provincial ius civile of the early Roman state, which 
permitted the orderly government of affairs in an empire embrac-
ing substantially the known world. In time, the ius gentium and 
the law of nature become virtually synonymous; they were the 
rules so eminently reasonable, so consistent with the rational 
and social nature of man that they were universally applicable. 
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A universal Church that could not fully abjure claims to 
temporal power lent its support to the belief in natural law, 
which Saint Thomas Aquinas conceived to be man's rational parti-
cipation in the divine universal ordering, the very mind of God. 
When the disintegration of the Empire and the division of the 
Church left a number of national states asserting their inde-
pendence and contending for power, it was to the law of nature 
that writers like Francisco de Vitoria, Alberico Gentili and 
Grotius turned for standards of conduct governing even sovereign 
princes. On these foundations the body of non-conventional in-
ternational law was built. The value assumptions underlying its 
rather modest restraints on national states were those widely 
held in European Christendom and to a considerable extent imple-
mented in the developed Roman law. 
Even in these relatively favorable circumstances, however, 
the society of nations did not find enough assurance of shared 
values or community of interest to organize themselves so as to 
develop an adequate body of generally applicable international 
law and make it truly effective in resolving international con-
flict. It would seem that the prospects for such development 
are even less favorable today. No longer is the world community 
limited to nations deeply imbued with the civilizing influences 
of Greece and Rome or affected by a unifying belief in the 
natural law of western Christendom. Aside from the great powers 
of the Communist block, at least some of the new nations of Asia 
and Africa tend to view the international scene from different 
perspectives. One hopes, of course, that further experience 
will reveal to them and to the older nations common values and 
ideals in their respective traditions upon which a stronger in-
ternational order can be built. A more immediate and perhaps 
more realistic hope, however, is that motivation toward such an 
order among nations will be provided by the rudimentary value of 
survival. 
Earlier, we left unanswered the question of the rela-
tionship between our national goals and international law. 
Since progress toward our goals would be impeded by interna-
tional conflict, perhaps we can agree now that some sort of re-
lationship exists, that the two do not lie in totally different 
ranges of meaning and discourse: but the nature of the relation-
ship we have not determined. That indeterminateness exists 
whether we speak of international law in its present relatively 
primitive state or of the kind of international law that might 
be, if an effective system of international government were 
created. In the limited time available today, this relationship 
cannot be fully explored, but by offering for consideration a 
relatively recent problem case in our international relations, I 
hope to suggest certain lines of thought for further considera-
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tion. 
In April, 1960, the Government of Cuba announced that its 
territory was being invaded. In the preceding months, numerous 
assertions had been made by Cuban officials that an invasion was 
being planned or instigated by the United States for the purpose 
of overthrowing the Government of Dr. Castro, but these reports 
had been regularly denied by official and non-official American 
spokesmen. After the invasion of Cuban territory had been 
crushed, the following relevant facts seem to have been rea-
sonably well established. Certain groups of Cuban refugees in 
the United States were brought together by officials of the 
United States government, were given military training and sup-
plied with arms and were transported in vessels provided by our 
government to the Bay of Pigs for the invasion of Cuba. The 
hope that the invasion would spark widespread uprisings in Cuba 
was not realized and the invading forces were quickly defeated 
with unexpected strength and efficiency by loyal forces. The 
President of the United States publicly assumed full responsi-
bility for the decision to support and implement the invasion 
plans. 
How does the action of the United States in connection with 
the invasion of Cuba relate to our national goals? It might be 
suggested that, since the Castro government is Communist-
oriented and tends to support the policies and objectives of the 
international Communist movement, its assumption of power in a 
country so near us constitutes a danger to the United States in 
terms of achieving not only our goals abroad but our goals at 
home as well. Viewing the Castro regime as anti-democratic, we 
might urge that our action is defensible, not only as a means of 
eliminating a subversive example to the dissatisfied peoples of 
Latin America, but also as a contribution to the self-determin-
ation of the Cuban people as well. We might even defend the 
propriety of our conduct by ref erring to the large amounts of 
property owned by American individuals and companies that had 
been taken by the Castro government without adequate compensa-
tion. If called to account for our actions, we might insist 
that no external body or organization can be permitted to 
determine the vital interests of the United States or the means 
appropriate for their advancement. 
Is international law compatible with this view of our na-
tional goals and the means of achieving them? Does international 
law as it exists at this time approve our position or at least 
withhold judgment on our participation in the Cuban invasion? 
The subject of intervention in international law is too large 
and difficult to be dealt with here in its extended implica-
tions. We will, therefore, stay within the relatively clear 
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areas, if any can be found. Nor will we review the history of 
the United states' interventions in the affairs of its neighbors 
to the South, including Cuba.~ It suffices to say that the 
United States adhered without reservation to the Additional 
Protocol Relative to Non-Intervention produced by the Inter-
American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace in Buenos Aires 
in 1936. The Protocol declared: 
The High Contracting Parties declare inadmissible 
the intervention of any one of them, directly or indi-
rectly, and for whatever reason, in the internal or 
external affairs of any other of the Parties • ..2.§/ 
This proscription in the international law of the Americas was 
broadly restated at the Ninth International Conference of Amer-
ican States at Bogota in 1948. As a matter of fact, the Charter 
of Bogota seems broad enough to proscribe even our economic 
sanctions against the Castro regime, such as the sugar boycott. 
We will not stop to inquire into the legality of the United 
States' support of and participation in the Cuban invasion under 
general customary international law or under the conventional 
law adopted through ratification of the United Nations Charter. 
By reference specifically to the international law of the com-
munity of American states, it appears beyond question that the 
action of our government was illegal. For the present discus-
sion, we will limit ourselves to the Cuban intervention but it 
should not be assumed that it is an isolated instance. It is 
plausibly arguable by reference to general international law 
th~t the American policy of non-recognition of Communist 
China,.221 the declaration by the President, following a Joint 
Resolution of the Congress, of Captive Nations Week, ..211 and the 
) 
j 
j 
' 
25. A good short accont can be found in Fenwick, Interven-
tion:Individual and Collective, 39 American Journal of Interna-
tional Law 645 (1945. 
26. Quoted in Thomas and Thomas, NON-INTERVENTION, pp.62-3, 
27. See Thomas and Thomas, op.cit., pp. 241 et seq.; Falk, 
The United States and the Doctrine of Nonintervention in the In- j 
ternal Affairs of Independent States, 5 Howard Law Journal 164 
(183-86 (1959). 
28. See Wright, Subversive Intervention, 54 American Journli 
of International Law 521 (1960): Whitton, Subversive Propaganda 
Reconsidered, 55 American Journal of International Law 120 
(1961). 
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recent naval demonstrations around the Dominican Republic are 
somewhat more subtle forms of illegal intervention. 
Two lines of defense against the charge that United States 
intervention in Cuba violated international law might be of-
fered. The first of these is that our action, though admittedly 
intervention, was a legitimate act of national self-defense 
against the dangers represented by the Castro regime. Certainly 
international law, like municipal law, recognizes a privilege of 
using force for self-defense. The real issue concerns the cir-
cumstances in which that privilege arises. The generally ac-
cepted principle of self-defense in international law was well 
formulated by Daniel Webster when he was Secretary of State. 
one claiming the privilege must show "a necessity of self-
defense, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means and 
no moment for deliberation," and the action taken must involve 
"nothing unreasonable or excessive, since the act justified by 
the necessity of self-defense must be limited by that necessity 
and kept clearly within it. 11.2.il In view of the acknowledged fact 
that the Cuban venture was in preparation for approximately a 
year, it seems evident that these criteria of the privilege of 
self- defense were not met. 
The second line of defense postulates a much broader right 
of self-preservation. Such a right, if established, "would 
permit a state to violate all norms of international law, thus 
violating rights of other states, if necessary to avert an im-
pending injury to its interests. In other words, the state has a 
right to protect itself against an actual or threatened viola-
tion of its vital interests, as distinguished from a violation 
of its rights, even though there be no illegal attack or im-
minent danger thereof. By such a doctrine a state can do all 
that needs to be done to preserve its existence even at the ex-
pense and in disregard of the rights of innocent states. 11.J.Q/ If 
there is such a doctrine exempting states from the ordinary ob-
ligations of international law, it is arguably applicable to the 
United States venture in Cuba when that is viewed in the broader 
perspective of the Cold War. While asserted by some publicists, 
this doctrine is not found in the generally recognized prin-
ciples of international law. Nor, for that matter, is a com-
parable individual right recognized by the municipal law of civ-
ilized states. Consider for example the English case of Regina 
v. Dudley and Stephens • .ll/ Two men and a boy were adrift at sea 
29. Quoted in Brierly, THE LAW OF NATIONS, 5th ed. p.316. 
30. Thomas and Thomas, op. cit.3, pp. 81-2. 
31. (1884) 14 Q.B.D. 273. 
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in an open boat. Long after all food and water were consumed, 
the men killed and ate the boy. The men survived and were con-
victed of murder, though the jury found that all three would 
probably have died had not the body of one been used for food. 
There is a comparable American case • .J.21 As Professor Brierly has 
said: "National law, indeed, is so far from recognizing an ab-
solute right in the individual to preserve himself at all costs, 
that it sometimes even places on him, without any fault of his 
own, a legal duty to sacrifice his own life; compulsory military 
service is an obvious case in point. 11J.J/ No apparent reason has 
been advanced why international law should recognize such a 
broad right of states to protect what they conceive to be their 
vital interests at the expense of other states from whom no im-
mediate threat is posed. 
It would thus appear that the venture of the United States 
in Cuba could not be justified under recognized principles of 
international law. If our policy in this instance was in fur-
therance of our national goals, perhaps we should recognize 
candidly that, on occasion at least, we are prepared to violate 
international law to further what we believe to be our national 
interests. Such a recognition would permit us to champion the 
needed development of an international Rule of Law, but might 
moderate our usual self-righteousness about the use of national 
force to protect or advance what we conceive to be our vital in-
terests. I would not assert categorically that legality is an 
ultimate standard of value, or that the existing law, municipal 
or international, always reflects acceptable value priorities. 
In the kind of world in which we live, intervention like that in 
Cuba may implement more important values than legality. Sir 
William George Harcourt, a distinguished international lawyer of 
the last century, declared in discussing the proposed interven-
tion of Britain in the American Civil War: 
I do not intend to disparage Intervention. It is a 
high and summary procedure which may sometimes snatch 
a remedy beyond the reach of law. Nevertheless, it must 
be admitted that in the case of Intervention, as in that 
of Revolution, its essence is illegality, and its justifi-
cation is its success. Of all things, at once the most 
unjustifiable and the most impolitic is an unsuccessful 
32. Unites States v. Holmes, 26 Fed.Cas. 360 (1842). 
33. Brierly, op. cit., p.318. 
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Intervention • .J.i/ 
To gain perspective on the relationship of our Cuban inter-
vention to national goals and international law, consider the 
conduct of the Soviet Union during the Hungarian revolution of 
1956 • .J.5/ The soviet attempted to justify its intervention on the 
ground that it was made at the request of the Hungarian Govern-
ment, a fellow member of the Warsaw Pact. It appears that before 
the attack a member of the Hungarian Government did request the 
aid of Soviet troops in putting down rebellion, but the Prime 
Minister, Imre Nagy, denied his authority to do so • .J.§/ The 
Soviet Union did not attempt to justify its action on the ground 
of legitimate self-defense. Unless it can be assumed, therefore, 
that Soviet troops intervened in response to the request of a 
duly constituted Hungarian Government, the Soviet action in 
Hungary had no more justification in international law than did 
the later American intervention in Cuba. 
If we are prepared to accept a broad "right of self-
preservation" to justify the United States intervention in Cuba, 
must we not honestly recognize that from its own view of its na-
tional interests the Soviet Union can make a similar defense of 
its action in Hungary? Could not the Soviet say, "A 'demo-
cratic' government in Hungary was being subverted by a Fascist 
clique. The Soviet Union cannot tolerate on its borders a 
hostile government that may in time lend aid and comfort to the 
imperialist, capitalist block and thus endanger the vital inter-
ests not only of the Soviet Union but of all the peace-loving 
countries of the socialist camp?" 
This illustration is not intended to suggest that the 
record of the United States in the observance of international 
law is no better than that of the Soviet Union. It is intended 
to point out, however, that in the context of Cold War situa-
tions we have pursued policies, presumably for the achievement 
of national goals, that are illegal under international law. 
The Soviet Union has done the same. In such cases no power is 
competent to call either to account on the legal principles of 
international order. Each party ascertains its own interests and 
asserts its own standards of justification for its conduct. 
34. LETTERS BY HISTORICUS ON SOME QUESTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW, p.41. 
35. See Wright, Intervention, 1956, 51 American Journal of 
International Law 257 (1957. 
36. Ibid.,p.276. 
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The third mode of ordering invokes an extrinsic authority 
to govern. That authority may be religious or secular; it may be 
accepted voluntarily or imposed. Its essence is that as a supe-
rior it directs and orders the conduct of inferiors and achieves 
this through the threat or actual use of sanctions. This mode 
is not unrelated to the first two. Governing authority may be 
granted to a higher agency because this is perceived to be more 
efficacious in furthering shared interests, because the pro-
tection of unshared interests through mutual terror is found in-
adequate, or for both reasons. Only through the operation of the 
third mode of ordering can we achieve, strictly speaking, a Rule 
of Law. 
Through the various stages of human history each of these 
modes of order has been widely used. This history reveals, how-
ever, that as problems of increasing complexity and urgency have 
arisen, it is to the third principle that human creativity has 
been attracted. I would conclude with the question whether a 
greater share of our energies and imagination should not now be 
directed toward the potential utilization of this principle for 
ordering the relations among nations. It is along these lines 
that I believe our national goals can best be furthered and re-
lated affirmatively to a developing regime of international law. 
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APPENDIX II 
THE GllAHA ADVENTURE ENDS 
After I received the Deportation Order, when my doctors 
thought travel feasible, Marilou and I flew to London, I was 
packed into an ambulance at Heath Row, and taken to the Hospital 
for Tropical Diseases in the St. Pancreas Hospital Complex. A 
month in the hospital and about a week in a nearby hotel 
preceded our return to the United States. When I was able to 
resume some work, I began the preparation of an extensive report 
on the Ghana project, mainly for the International Legal Center 
and the Ford Foundation; I also provided a copy to the Rockefel-
ler Foundation which had generously supported my reasearch for 
years. Several who saw the report urged that it be published, 
but I felt some concern that doing so would make more difficult 
the work Coner O'Brien and others were still trying to do in 
Ghana in protecting the University. I sent a copy of the report 
to Coner and, after reflecton, he came to share my concern. That 
concern has long since disappeared, and here I include the 
report in full. It has the benefit of preparation while the 
events were still fresh in my mind. 
Legal Education in Ghana 
A Report to the SAILER Project of the Institute of 
International Education and the Ford Foundation 
The present report will deal briefly with the background of 
the legal profession in Ghana, with the beginning of legal 
education there, and with developments after the beginning of 
SAILER support. The unfortunate series of events resulting in my 
own expulsion from Ghana and the probable early termination of 
all SAILER participation in the program require detailed con-
sideration of a range of factors that ordinarily would not come 
within the scope of such a report. 
The Legal Profession in Ghana 
The beginning of a legal profession in the Gold Coast may 
be found in the latter part of the 19th century. While the ear-
liest Africans permitted to appear before the Gold Coast courts 
had little or no formal qualification, the flow of young 
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Africans from the Guinea Coast to educational opportunities 
overseas, primarily in the United Kingdom, soon included a num-
ber who studied law. The vast majority of those were called to 
the English Bar, usually without any University experience, and 
then returned to the Gold Coast to practice as both barrister 
and solicitor in a unified profession. The first African from 
the Gold Coast to qualify as a solicitor in England did so in 
1951, and only 10-12 have since earned this qualification. 
Oriented by his training almost exclusively toward litigation, 
the Gold Coast-Ghana lawyer has played a negligible role as 
counselor in non-litigious matters. Historically and to a sub-
stantial extent even today, the bulk of the important corporate 
and commercial work has been in the hands of a small number of 
expatriate solicitors. 
There are approximately 500 lawyers in Ghana today, of whom 
about 202 are in Government service, including the Judiciary. 
While the economic attractions of the profession have probably 
declined somewhat in recent years, the Ghanaian lawyer can still 
expect a high income and, in a peculiar sense, a high prestige 
status. There is convincing evidence that the image projected by 
the Ghanaian lawyer is a compound of greed, mendacity, un-
scrupulousness, and disregard of the true interests of clients. 
At the same time he enjoys a certain fear, respect and envy for 
his power and economic position. 
The government of the legal profession in Ghana was vested 
by the Legal Profession Act of 1960 in the General Legal Coun-
cil. The Council, under the Chairmanship of the Chief Justice, 
comprises all judges of the Supreme Court, certain appointees of 
the Minister of Justice, the Attorney General, representatives 
elected by the Ghana Bar Association, and the Head of the Law 
Faculty of the University. In addition to matters of admission 
to and discipline of the Bar, the Council has important respon-
sibilities for assuring an adequate system of legal education in 
Ghana. 
The Beginning of Legal Education 
Aside from certain law courses taught for Economics stu-
dents in the University College, legal education began in Ghana 
in late 1958 with the opening of the Ghana Law School. The 
School, situated near the Supreme Court in Accra, had no 
University connection. Responsible to the General Legal Council 
and run by the Director of Legal Education, it offered a program 
of evening instruction geared to Parts I and II of the English 
Bar examinations. It was also contemplated that in the future 
the School would provide a one-year Practical Course as a 
transition to practice for both Diploma graduates of the School 
and those who had taken a law degree in the University College. 
Since the Ghana Law School figures rather prominently in 
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later developments, some consideration should be given to the 
reasons for its establishment. The guiding spirit behind the 
creation of the Law School was Mr. Geoffrey Bing, an English 
barrister who until 1961 was Attorney General of Ghana and an 
influential political adviser of Dr. Nkrumah. Mr. Bing's justification for the Law School, at the same time that a 
University program in law was being planned, involved two 
articulated arguments. The first of these was that Ghana needed 
quickly a number of legally trained persons, not necessarily of 
University quality, who could play important roles in national 
development through both Government service and private prac-
tice. He pointed to the concentration of lawyers in Accra, 
Kumasi, Cape Coast and Takoradi and legitimately argued that 
means must be found for increasing the supply of legal services 
and dispersing them more satisfactorily throughout the country. 
The second argument advanced by Mr. Bing posited the exist-
ence in Ghana of a large number of able people, both interested 
in and qualified for the study of law, who lacked the financial 
resources for study in Britain. Many of these persons were civil 
servants or teachers who could be accommodated by evening in-
struction in Accra, while they continued their regular employ-
ment. Justice to these persons as well as the national interest 
justified, in Mr. Bing's view, the establishment of a non-
University program of part-time legal education in the Ghana Law 
School. 
A third major element which did not appear in the formal 
argument was political. The existing Bar of Ghana was economi-
cally and politically conservative. Leading lawyers had long 
played prominent parts in the intellectual - middle class na-
tionalist movements such as the United Gold Coast Convention and 
the National Liberation Movement. They provided most of the top 
leadership, usually rather ineffectual, for the United Party 
which by the late fifties was the principal opposition group. 
They had long maintained close, though not always tranquil, re-
lations with the chiefs and traditional rulers who were in-
creasingly regarded by Dr. Nkrumah and his associates in the 
Convention Peoples' Party (CPP), as the foci of dangerous, 
devisive sub-national power. To dilute the existing British-
trained Bar by a large influx of locally produced lawyers seemed 
to offer substantial political as well as other advantages. 
The Ghana Law School was, therefore, an accomplished fact 
by the time the International Advisory Committee (Professors 
L.C.B. Gower of England, Zelman Cowen of Australia,and Arthur 
Sutherland of the United States) studied the program of legal 
education and reported their recommendations in 1959. One of the 
Committee's main tasks was to relate the functions of the Law 
School to those of the Department of Law in the University Col-
lege, which accepted its first group of students in October 
1959. The Law Department proposed to offer a four year course 
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leading to the LL.B. degree. The Report of the Advisory Com-
mittee, accepted by both the University College and the Govern-
ment, recommended that persons taking the LL.B. should be ad-
mitted to practice after completing a one-year, full-time Prac-
tical Course in the Ghana Law School. It was also recommended 
that the part-time instruction in the Law School, leading to the 
Diploma in Law, should be regarded as a temporary expedient and 
terminated not later than 1965, and that thereafter the Law 
School, acting in an undefined capacity as an "Institute of the 
University," should offer only the final year's Practical 
Course. 
Thus, by October, 1959, a two-pronged effort in legal 
education had been launched in Ghana. The only formal link be-
tween the two programs was the membership on the General Legal 
Council, which was responsible for the Law School, of the Head 
of the Law Department in the University. More important, how-
ever, was the fact that John H.A. Lang was appointed as the 
first Professor of Law in the University and also as Director of 
Legal Education with operational responsibility for the Law 
School. 
The growing pains of both institutions between 1958 and 
1962 need only be summarized. The Law School with highly amor-
phous admission standards accepted large numbers of students, 
but the drop-out and failure rates were high. The time required 
for the Diploma in Law was extended from two to three years. 
When the first group of thirteen students earned their Diplomas 
in 1961, they were required to wait almost a year before a Prac-
tic~l Course was organized for them. In both the Law School and 
the University College, shortages of teaching staff were 
chronic. Each institution had a small number of full-time 
teachers, supplemented by part-time lecturers from Government 
law offices and the private Bar. In the University, yearly 
course programs were largely fixed on an ad hoc basis; the first 
set of course and degree syllabuses was not prepared and ap-
proved until the late Spring of 1962. I would infer from the 
circumstances when I assumed responsibility that Professor 
Lang's primary interest was in the Law School and to it he gave 
the larger share of his considerable energy. 
The Situation in January 1962 
In early January, 1962, a Conference on Legal Education in 
Africa was held at the University of Ghana under the joint 
sponsorship of the University and the General Legal Council. 
Delegates and observers from many parts of Africa, Europe and 
the United States attended. This occasion provided my first op-
portunity for extensive observation of the difficulties which 
had developed in legal education in Ghana. Understanding of 
these and later developments requires a somewhat broader picture 
of the entire University. 
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The University College of the Gold Coast was opened in 1948 
under a special relationship with the University of London. The 
teaching staff, largely British, was appointed under London su-
pervision and, not surprisingly, the curriculum had a strong 
British cast. While provision was made for scientific instruc-
tion, science students were scarce. Heaviest emphasis was on the 
humanities and some of the social sciences. Research produc-
tivity of the staff was generally low. The University College 
was rather lavishly housed in new buildings at Legan, a few 
miles east of Accra. student life was organized on the Oxbridge 
model in residential colleges or halls, with the traditional 
trappings of academic gowns, high tables and after-dinner port. 
Not surprisingly, Dr. Nkrumah's Party and Government were 
long ambivalent in their attitudes toward the University. Pride 
in its existence and the expectation of benefit from it mingled 
constantly with a conviction that all was not right in the 
University College. Some of the grounds of the conviction are 
apparent. There had long been an anti-intellectual strain in the 
CPP, and a relatively small percentage of the educated Ghanaians 
supported the Party. As David Apter, an American political 
scientist, once observed, Nkrumah built a Party largely from the 
"Standard VII boys." The continued dominance of British in-
fluence in the University was also an irritant. Carping at the 
University by leading CPP politicians and the Party press had 
long been familiar. 
I have long been convinced that the University College and 
later the independent University were legitimately subject to 
substantial criticisms. Unfortunately political and Governmental 
spokesmen were rarely able to articulate these well. Their 
criticisms usually related to the superficialities, the trivia, 
of University life, such as the wearing of academic gowns by 
students. With undue sensitivity and defensiveness, the 
University community commonly characterized such criticisms as 
attacks on academic freedom and hastened to the ramparts to 
defend. 
Two basic criticisms could, in my judgment, properly be 
made of the University College. The first might be broadly 
stated as irrelevance to the society surrounding it. It was, or 
largely appeared to be, an enclave immune from the stresses and 
strains, the hopes and aspirations, the needs, and demands of 
emergent Africa. At a time when the traditional wisdom about 
Africa urgently demanded supplementation and correction, re-
search, particularly in the social sciences, was negligible. 
There was a well developed Department of Classics but no Depart-
ment of Political Science. The Balme Library collection was rich 
in patristic theology but impoverished in law and many aspects 
of African culture. 
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The second basic fault of the University College might be 
called elitism. In an overwhelmingly illiterate society, even a 
modest education offered firm assurance of power, prestige and 
economic security. A University degree of almost any quality and 
in almost any field set the holder off as a member of a select 
group that almost literally held the world by the tail. In these 
circumstances it is not surprising that even on arrival in the 
University College a student felt set apart, one of the chosen, 
in the familiar idiom of West Africa, a "big man." To temper 
such attitudes and to nurture a social consciousness more 
responsive to the needs of the day would at best have been a 
difficult task for the University College. That task was not at-
tempted, however. on the contrary, every aspect of life in the 
College tended to foster elitism. The magnificent physical plant 
was beautifully situated on Legon Hill, well removed from the 
crowded streets of Accra. Student life revolved around the 
residential Halls, each fostering its own exclusivity; virtually 
no general College life existed. Student rooms were cleaned and 
beds made by a large staff of stewards. In the imposing dining 
halls, stewards served. To be sure, students ate at "low table" 
and rose deferentially when the robed Senior Members marched in 
to "high table." Even among the elite, however, some are more so 
than others. In these circumstances, it is not surprising that 
College life widened dangerously the gap between student and 
society and fostered the attitude that the degree was not a 
preparation to serve that society but a title deed to a 
bungalow, a car and a good salary for life. 
Developing nationalism and chronic disaffection with the 
University College were focused in 1961 on a move to end the 
College's dependent status and establish it as the independent 
University of Ghana. In my judgment, this step was not prema-
ture, and there is every reason to believe that the University 
of London was prepared to, in fact did, cooperate fully and 
willingly in the transition. Unfortunately the move was handled 
crudely by the Government and its initiative was met by emotion, 
suspicion and immaturity by many of senior staff of the College. 
In the late Spring of 1961, the Government announced that 
legislation would be introduced to create the independent 
University of Ghana and that this legislation would automatical-
ly terminate all existing staff appointments. Senior members who 
were interested in continuing in the University were invited to 
submit applications for new appointments. Understandably this 
announcement caused much consternation among the staff since it 
was too late in the year for most to consider or be considered 
for appointments elsewhere. A flurry of rather intemperate 
protest resolutions came from the College staff. Nevertheless, 
the University of Ghana Act came into force in September, 1961. 
Staff dislocation was far less than had been feared, however. In 
only six cases were existing appointments not renewed, and a 
consensus later emerged that with a single possible exception 
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these losses were beneficial to the institution. In the six 
cases rather liberal financial settlements were made. 
The academic session 1961-62 thus started turbulently. The 
temper of the teaching staff was on edge. The administration was 
discouraged, the former English Principal having resigned and 
the former Registrar being one of the six not reappointed. Nana 
Kabina Nketsia IV served as Interim Vice Chancellor but most of 
the administrative leadership came from Professor R. H. Wright, 
the pro-Vice Chancellor. At this time Dr. Nkrumah decided to im-
plement a recommendation of the earlier University Commission 
for the appointment by himself of certain Presidential Prof es-
sors in the University. In theory such appointments might be 
defensible since they could make available funds, supplementary 
to the University's own budget, for a limited number of dis-
tinguished scholars who on relatively short-term appointments 
could contribute to the research, teaching and general in-
tellectual life of the University. In Ghanaian conditions, how-
ever, the scheme was most unwise; its implementation had un-
fortunate consequences for the University as a whole and parti-
cularly for the Department of Law. 
' The first Presidential Professor to be appointed was the 
Kwame Nkrumah Professor of Law. The appointment went to Mr. A. 
c. Kuma, a Lecturer in the Law department. While appointed Lec-
turer on Professor Lang's recommendation and with the approval 
of the University of London reviewing authorities, Mr. Kuma was 
qualified by neither intellectual ability, academic record, nor 
interest for University teaching. The only justification that 
might be offered for his initial appointment was the acute 
shortage of teaching staff in the Department of Law. Kuma 
professed to be an enthusiastic supporter of the CPP; he had 
powerful supporters in the Government. Anyone in the University 
with these qualifications could expect preferment from the 
President and the Party, and Mr. Kuma enjoyed it soon after 
joining the University staff. 
The first attempt to advance Mr. Kuma came as a proposal to 
promote him to the rank of Associate Professor. Professor Lang 
vigorously opposed this step, contending that Kuma's record as a 
teacher was unsatisfactory, and the University Appointments 
Board declined to make the appointment. At this point the Presi-
dent intervened with the Presidential appointment as Professor 
of Law. 
Professor Lang responded to the Kuma appointment by submit-
ting his own resignation. Developments were at this stage when 
the Conference on Legal Education was convened in the University 
in early January, 1962. I had come for the Conference, intending 
to remain thereafter for a few weeks of research. I learned im-
mediately, as doubtless all other participants did, of the Kuma 
appointment and the Lang resignation. It was apparent, however, 
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that Professor Lang had no expectation that his resignation 
would be accepted. He spoke enthusiastically about his hopes and 
plans for the following year. It seemed quite clear that the 
resignation was an attempt to force the President to withdraw 
the Kuma appointment. Some participants in the Conference, 
notably Professor L. c. B. Gower, attempted to further this 
solution to the problem. At the time the Conference ended, it 
seemed to me, and I suspect to the other visitors, that a face-
saving compromise would be found and that Professor Lang would 
withdraw his resignation. 
About ten days after the close of the Conference, while I 
was working in Accra, I received a call from Professor R. H. 
Wright, pro Vice-Chancellor of the University, asking if it 
would be convenient for me to call on Nana Nketsia, the Vice-
Chancellor. A day or so later I visited the University and con-
ferred with Nketsia and Wright. The former came immediately to 
the point of the invitation, asking if I would consider coming 
to the University for at least two years as Professor of Law. I 
replied that I was, of course, aware of Professor Lang's resig-
nation but that I had assumed that the attempts to retain him 
would be successful and that I was not in a position to discuss 
the Vice Chancellor's suggestion while Professor Lang's resig-
nation was under consideration. Nketsia then informed me that 
the University had already accepted Professor Lang's resignation 
and that arrangements would soon be made for the temporary as-
signment of his duties to another member of the Department so as 
to accommodate Professor Lang's expressed desire to leave Ghana 
in the near future. 
In these circumstances I felt it necessary to explain my 
own position fully. I pointed out that I had long had a research 
interest in Ghanaian developments, that I had never considered 
any other role there and that I would be reluctant to take on 
respon- sibilities which would inevitably interfere with the re-
search I was interested in completing. I pointed out, as well, 
that the Vice Chancellor's invitation raised problems for my 
family and University whose reactions I could not undertake to 
predict. For these reasons, as well as the fact that I did not 
know enough about the University and doubtless the University 
did not know enough about me, I suggested that we proceed as if 
no invitation had been issued. I agreed to pursue some relevant 
inquiries while I remained in Ghana and to do some preliminary 
sounding of my family and University after I returned to the 
United States. If thereafter the University of Ghana still had 
any interest in considering the matter, further discussion could 
be carried on by correspondence. Nana Nketsia agreed to this ap-
proach. 
During the remainder of my visit in Ghana, I found time for 
discussions with University administrators and many members of 
the teaching staff, including the two remaining members of the 
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Law Department. Since it was clear that the Professorship of Law 
should continue to be held by the person serving as Director of 
Legal Education, I also talked with Mr. R. A Ofori-Atta, the 
Minister of Justice, under whose g$neral supervision the General 
Legal Council and the Law School functioned. The principal mat-
ters covered in these discussions and the tentative conclusions 
I reached may be briefly summarized. 
(1) What was the explanation for the treatment of Professor 
Lang while negotiations were apparently progressing for his 
retention and when he obviously wanted to stay? It soon became 
apparent that the rather abrupt acceptance of Lang's resignation 
did not reflect either University support for the Kuma appoint-
ment or lack of desire for a sound program of legal education. 
The simple fact seemed to be that Professor Lang had lost the 
confidence of the University, including his own staff in the Law 
Department. He had alienated many of his senior colleagues by 
regarding general University oversight of the Department as 
harassment and obstruction. Later experience in the General 
Legal Council showed that much the same situation existed there. 
Professor Lang's strength had never been as an administrator. My 
own impression, however, confirmed by others with whom I talked, 
was that he was a warm, humane and liberal man. These qualities 
perhaps led him to frequent indiscreet comments on a range of 
Ghanaian affairs that might properly be regarded as beyond the 
responsibilities of an expatriate educator. Virtually all the 
remaining support for Professor Lang in the University and the 
General Legal Council was inertial. He had himself, I was told, 
brought the University's reaction to a head by declaring that he 
had so completely lost confidence in the institution that he 
could hardly undertake staff recruitment for the coming year. In 
these circumstances his prof erred resignation did not prove to 
be an effective weapon against the Kuma appointment; it was ac-
cepted readily. 
(2) What was the state of University morale and the prob-
able course of relations with the Government? Morale among the 
University staff was unquestionably low. The tensions produced 
in the course of disassociation from London had not subsided. 
The Kuma appointment and his attempted political maneuvering 
within the University were of general concern. There were hope-
ful signs however. The heavy-handed action of the Government in 
terminating all staff contracts had in fact resulted in the 
failure to reappoint only six people. Their loss was not ap-
parently widely regretted and they had left with liberal finan-
cial settlements. While no one did public penance, there seemed 
to be an embryonic recognition that neither the Government nor 
the University had acted entirely creditably in the recent dif-
ficulties and that better accommodation of the respective inter-
ests might be found. While the prospects were not bursting with 
hope, they were by no means hopeless. 
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(3) How would the question of general leadership of the 
University be settled? Nana Nketsia had the title of Interim 
Vice-Chancellor and he clearly did not want the permanent ap-
pointment. As long as he remained,:.:back stopped by Professor 
Wright as pro-Vice Chancellor, the top leadership would not be 
vigorous but neither, it seemed to me, would it be obstructive 
of Departmental development. The choice of a new Vice Chancellor 
was critical, but the prospect was not for a local, perhaps 
political choice, It was well known that efforts were being made 
in Britain to find a satisfactory expatriate. Until the choice 
was made, a critical uncertainly remained, but the prospects 
seemed encouraging. 
(4) What was the dominant view on the future of the Law 
School, particularly its relation to the University? I had never 
been persuaded that the establishment of the Law School was wise 
and its accomplishments to that time had not been impressive. 
Unlike Professor Lang, my primary interest and emphasis, if I 
came to Ghana, would be in the University. If there were a fixed 
view to the contrary, this would substantially eliminate any in-
clination I might have to consider accepting appointment in 
Ghana. In discussions with the Minister of Justice and others, I 
was assured that there was no fixed policy contrary to my own 
tentative views and that the Council would be entirely willing 
to consider such recommendations as I might make. 
When I returned to the United States at the end of January, 
1962, I felt that useful work might be done in Ghana. 
Preliminary discussions with my family and the authorities of 
the University of Michigan raised no major difficulties. If the 
University of Ghana decided to renew a firm invitation, I was in 
a position to consider it in the light of my other interests and 
commitments. In late February, the University of Ghana renewed 
its invitation. After further negotiation on details I accepted 
in mid-March. 
Developments During the Spring. 1962. 
Although I was not to assume responsibility in Ghana until 
September, it was essential that preparatory work be begun im-
mediately. The most critical problem was teaching staff. After 
Professor Lang 's resignation, only two full time teachers 
remained in the Law Department: Mr. S.K.B. Asante who had been 
assigned administrative responsibility, and Dr. B. J. Pooley 
whose term expired in July. To meet the urgent need created by 
Professor Lang's departure, Mr. D. R. Afreh, a young Ghanaian 
barrister, was appointed Lecturer in Law on a probationary 
basis. Other teaching was done by part-time Lecturers and by 
Professor Kuma. 
With the cooperation of Mr. Asante, I began an immediate 
recruitment drive. Candidates for appointment were available but 
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many lacked the necessary qualifications, either academic or 
personal. Negotiation by correspondence was slow and not in-
frequently the general University authorities did not act with 
dispatch. Although other offers were made, only three actual ap-
pointments resulted: 
(1) on Mr. Asante's recommendation, Mr. Afreh was moved 
from probationary status to a regular appointment as Lecturer. 
(2) Dr. w. c. Ekow-Daniels, who had applied for appointment 
in response to a University advertisement, was appointed Lec-
turer. Dr. Daniels, a Ghanaian, had taken the LL.B. from the 
University of London and thereafter, while a candidate for the 
Ph.D., had served for several years under Dr. A. N. Allott as a 
research officer in the School of Oriental and African studies. 
While having at the time no direct responsibility for the Law 
Department, I had, as an external assessor, an opportunity to 
review his credentials. I had grave reservations about Dr. 
Daniels' qualification since he had a poor class (Lower Second) 
on his London degree and his London Ph.D. was not significantly 
reassuring. I concurred in Mr. Asante's recommendation of his 
appointment, however, largely on the basis of a strong recom-
mendation from Dr. Allott of Daniels' mature scholarship, in-
tegrity and personality. 
(3) While the formal appointment was not made until after I 
had taken up my post in Ghana, arrangements were substantially 
completed during the Spring for the appointment of Robert B. 
Seidman as Senior Lecturer in Law. Mr. Seidman had a dis-
tinguished undergraduate record at Harvard, an equally good 
record at the Columbia Law School where he served as one of the 
Senior Editors of the Law Review, and had engaged in an active 
trial and appellate practice in New York and Connecticut for 
fourteen years. His appointment seemed to offer much needed 
maturity and experience to the staff. 
Perhaps the most significant development during the Spring 
for the prospective work in Ghana was the appointment of Dr. 
Conor Cruise O'Brien as Vice Chancellor of the University. Until 
early 1962, Dr. O'Brien had served as Chief of the United Na-
tions operation in the Katanga. I knew nothing of Dr. O'Brien 
beyond this fact, and newspaper accounts of developments in 
Katanga were not especially helpful in projecting an image of 
the man. Inquiries at the United Nations and elsewhere were en-
couraging, however: Dr. O'Brien was described as intelligent, 
open minded and approachable. Favorable comment was also made on 
his courage and lively sense of humor. His appointment seemed to 
brighten prospects not only for fruitful development of the Law 
Department but for the entire University. 
The Academic Year 1962-63 
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I arrived in Ghana on September 13, 1962. Preparations for 
the beginning of the University term were now on an urgent 
basis. The Law School was already in session, with a program in 
which little change could be made for some months. The 
University therefore claimed most of my time and attention. The 
various major aspects of development during the year will be 
described separately. 
Relation of the Law School to the University 
At the first meeting of the General Legal Council, I dis-
covered that the Council was receptive to early consideration of 
the status of the Law School and particularly its future rela-
tion to the University. The record of the School had been dis-
appointing. Although in operation since 1958, it had as yet 
produced no lawyers. The first group of ten or less was expected 
in mid-1963. A substantially part-time teaching staff and an 
entirely part-time student body were unlikely, in my judgment, 
to produce a product responsive to the needs of the country. 
While the interests of students in the School deserved full pro-
tection, I was convinced that steps should be taken as soon as 
possible to wind-up the Law School. 
In October, 1962, I presented to the General Legal Council 
a paper outlining my views and presenting recommendations for 
action. After full discussion in the Law Faculty Board, substan-
tially the same paper was presented to the Executive Committee 
and Academic Board of the University. 
The paper outlined the history of legal education in Ghana, 
described the existing programs of the Law School and the 
University, and suggested the problems which had arisen. The 
recommendations, as modified in certain details following dis-
cussions in the University and the General Legal Council, may be 
briefly stated: 
(1) The program of the Ghana Law School should be phased 
out as rapidly as possible with fairness to the students in the 
School. Final closing of the Law School should occur in July, 
1964. 
(2) Responsibility for all legal instruction, both 
"academic" and "practical" should be assumed by the University 
which should modify its own curriculum to meet these increased 
demands. 
(3) The University should provide five years of instruction 
in Law, divided as follows: a three year non-professional B.A. 
(Honors in Law), to include some general, liberal education, 
study of the basic legal institutions and certain of the less 
professional specialized courses such as Public International 
Law. This degree program would cater not only for the prospec-
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tive professional but also for persons who after three years in 
the University would make careers in the civil service, diplo-
matic corps and business concerns both public and private. For 
those seeking professional qualification, the University should 
offer a two-year, post-graduate LL.B. degree. 
(4) The General Legal Council should accept the B.A. and 
LL.B. from the University as the basis for immediate admission 
to the Bar of Ghana. 
Guiding these measures through the University and the 
General Legal Council required several months of complex and at 
times amusing negotiation. Each body was keenly aware of its own 
powers and prerogatives, though neither had a similar 
sensitivity about the other's domain. The result was that the 
council often found itself tempted to deliberate on proper 
University degree requirements, and University bodies not in-
frequently wanted to express strong views on the appropriate 
criteria for admission to the Bar. Jurisdictional lines were 
finally disentangled, however, and the several recommendations 
adopted. The University agreed to give immediate effect to the 
new two-degree program, making it applicable to all students 
currently in the Department even though some minor dispensations 
were required. In order to accommodate students who would earn 
the Diploma from the Law School before its final closing, the 
University also agreed to admit them as special, two-degree stu-
dents for their final professional study. 
Several advantages seemed to accrue from the unification of 
th~ system of legal education. Competition for staff between the 
Law School and University was eliminated, along with the dis-
satisfaction that had previously arisen from the different terms 
and conditions of service in the two institutions. Prospects 
were improved for committing the entire teaching program to a 
full-time staff which would also be engaged in systematic re-
search into the law of Ghana. A closer cooperation between the 
University and leaders of the Bench and Bar was expected as a 
result of making the Chief Justice and two other members of the 
General Legal Council co-opted, non-voting members of the Law 
Faculty Board. Finally, a more flexible program was made avail-
able to students. No longer would they be committed, on first 
entering the University, to a four-year degree course that as-
sumed full professional qualification as the objective. The B.A. 
degree, requiring three years and having an educational in-
tegrity independent of the LL.B., would permit students to 
decide on a more mature basis whether their career objective was 
the Bar. When fully implemented in 1965, the new system would 
also provide substantial economies, while assuring the country a 
steady flow of educated lawyers to meet its developing needs. 
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Change of Status of the Law Department 
Since its inception in 1959, the Law Department had been a 
unit within the Faculty of Social Sciences. In the general 
reorganization of the University following its independence, a 
decision was taken to make the Law Department a separate Faculty 
under its own Dean. In accordance with the new University 
Statutes this action was taken and I was elected Dean of the 
Faculty of Law. While not necessarily related to the consolida-
tion of law teaching within the University, the grant of Faculty 
status to Law was an appropriate recognition of the new, en-
larged responsibilities. 
Curriculum Revision 
The new program required a careful reexamination of the Law 
curriculum. In the past it appeared that courses had merely 
"grown" and the courses to be offered in any particular year had 
depended unduly on the vagaries of available teaching staff. Ac-
tual course syllabi for the old LL.B. degree had not been 
prepared and approved by the Academic Board until the Spring of 
1962, after Mr. Asante had assumed responsibility for the 
Department. It was recognized then that many of the syllabi were 
tentative: they related to courses which had never been offered 
and were prepared in the absence of instructors who would be 
responsible for teaching them. 
When the new degree structure was approved by the Academic 
Board, the Faculty began a systematic curriculum revision. All 
existing syllabi were studied and revised. Consultations in-
cluded the present members of the Faculty as well as new ap-
pointees, not yet arrived, whose views were sought by cor-
respondence. Several new courses were required. In one of these, 
Taxation, the Faculty had the benefit of the experience and 
knowledge of Professor Boris I. Bittker, Southmayd Professor of 
Law at Yale University, who visited Ghana on the Faculty's in-
vitation and submitted an extremely helpful report. 
Clearly related to the tasks of curriculum revision was an 
informal Faculty seminar that met weekly during the Trinity 
Term. Most members of the Faculty had had their legal education 
in Britain, a minority in the United States. Sharing the common 
law system has not prevented the development of profoundly dif-
ferent attitudes and techniques in legal education in the two 
countries. Actual differences are further compounded by 
widespread misconceptions on each side. The purpose of the semi-
nar, which was quite informal, was not indoctrination in either 
persuasion. Rather its objective was to clarify viewpoints 
within the Faculty, establish better communication and, insofar 
as possible, extend the areas of agreement on the objectives of 
University education in Law and the best techniques for reaching 
those objectives. While significant differences of expressed 
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view and even greater differences of actual teaching technique 
survived the seminar, I believe it contributed to the consensus 
which stood behind the syllabi adopted in the new curriculum and 
encouraged a continuing self-critioism among the members of the 
Faculty. 
Development of Teaching Staff 
No task facing the Faculty was of greater urgency than the 
recruitment of additional qualified teachers. On my arrival in 
September, 1962, there were only two regular members of the 
teaching staff: Mr. s. K. Asante, LL.B. (Natl.) LL.M. (Lon.), 
who in his first year of teaching had done an excellent job in 
directing the Department after the resignation of Professor 
Lang, and Mr. D. K. Afreh, LL.B. (Birm.) LL,M. (Lon.). Mr. T. o. 
Rose, B.A. (Princeton), LL.B. (Yale), was beginning his second 
year in Ghana under the auspices of the Maxwell School of 
Syracuse University, teaching part-time in the University and 
the Ghana Law School. Dr. w. c. Ekow-Daniels and Mr. Robert B. 
Seidman joined the staff as full-time members in October and De-
cember respectively. Mr. Gordon R. Woodman, LL.B. (Cantab), was 
in his second year as a Research Fellow in the Faculty. 
The remainder of the course load was carried by part-time 
lecturers from Government and private practice: 
(1) Mr. Justice Nii Amaa Ollennu of the Supreme Court had 
been appointed Honorary Professor of Law in July, 1962. Judge 
Ollennu assisted in teaching the customary law of real property 
and also contributed generously of his wisdom and experience in 
all the deliberations of the Faculty. 
(2) Mr. J.K. Agyemang, Lecturer in the Ghana Law School, 
taught the course in Torts. 
(3) Mr. A.N.E. Amissah, Director of Public Prosecutions, 
taught the Criminal Law course during the Michaelmas Term and 
thereafter assisted Mr. Seidman on certain aspects of Ghana 
criminal law practice. 
(4) Mr. Kwasi Gyeke-Dako, Senior state Attorney in the At-
torney General's Department, taught the course in Public Inter-
national Law. 
(5) Mr. E.A.L. Bannerman, Senior Lecturer in the Ghana Law 
School, taught Evidence during the Michaelmas Term. 
(6) Mr. Gordon R. Woodman, Research Fellow in the Faculty, 
assisted with the teaching early in Michaelmas Term. As the 
staff expanded, it became possible to relieve him entirely of 
teaching assignments in order that he could devote full time to 
research and writing on the customary land law of Ghana. 
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During Michaelmas Term, I taught two courses, one of which 
I continued throughout the year. With this staff it was possible 
to service the course program during 1962-63. Teaching loads for 
regular members of the staff were too heavy for a substantial 
research effort, however, and an undue proportion of the courses 
were committed to teachers whose primary obligations lay else-
where. I therefore began a systematic effort to find additional 
full-time staff. The guidelines for this effort were described 
as follows in my letter to the Vice-Chancellor of November 23, 
1962: 
"I would like now to indicate the policy views I will un-
dertake to implement in supplementing the Law Faculty and then 
consider the problems that will be encountered. 
"(l) Needed development can be achieved only by the 
sustained efforts of long-term staff. One and two year appoint-
ments are at best a stop-gap. To some extent they will probably 
be necessary for several years. Every effort should be made, 
however, to recruit persons from whom many years of service to 
the University can be anticipated. 
"(2) There is not necessarily implicit in the desire for 
long-term staff a criterion of national origin. As a purely 
practical matter, however, it will rarely be possible to enlist 
the aid of expatriates on anything but a short term basis. 
Therefore, the practical consequence of my view would be that 
primary emphasis should be placed on the recruitment of 
qualified Ghanaians. I would re-emphasize, however, that the es-
sential factor is long-term service. As qualified persons offer-
ing that assurance become available, I will recommend their ap-
pointment without regard to ethnic or national criteria. 
"(3) Teaching and research in Law in this University re-
quire persons of outstanding ability. I see no reason to 
anticipate any necessity for compromising this standard. I will, 
therefore, continue to employ various temporary expedients until 
fully qualified persons can be recommended for regular 
University appointment. 
"(4) The responsibilities of a University law teacher for 
instruction, research and scholarly writing require a full-time 
commitment. I would not, therefore, anticipate that regular 
Faculty members would be permitted to engage in private prac-
tice. Occasional consulting work, however, for Government or 
private persons can broaden the experience of the teacher and 
further the public interest. In general, I would depend on the 
judgment and discretion of the individual teacher in determining 
how much consulting he can reconcile with his primary University 
responsibility. 
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"(5) Lawyers of the quality needed for this Faculty are, in 
crass terms, highly merchantable. Their available opportunities 
in private practice, Government and business are numerous and 
economically attractive. In genera~, I do not believe it will be 
feasible to attract to the University the necessary manpower un-
less devices are found for increasing the economic attractions 
of appointment here. One such device would be an avowed profes-
sional differential in University salary scales. Another would 
be appointment to higher academic rank, with consequent higher 
salary, much earlier than would be conventional elsewhere in the 
University. I rather suspect that both devices will have to be 
employed. 
"(6) Recruitment of the kind projected here cannot rely on 
the relatively passive methods of advertisement, application and 
late appointment. I believe we must seek out the people we want, 
stimulate their interests in an academic career and, if they are 
responsive, move to appointment without delay. The able young 
lawyer appreciating the range of his opportunities as he ap-
proaches the end of his formal studies will naturally want early 
assurances from the University to weigh against other optics. 
Insofar as we recruit among lawyers in private practice or 
Government, necessary adjustments in leaving prior pursuits also 
require extended advance notice of appointment." 
In December 1962, I visited the United States and Britain 
for the purpose of interviewing prospective additions to the 
Faculty. In this connection I received invaluable assistance 
from the SAILER off ice in New York and particularly from Dean 
John Bainbridge of Columbia and Dean Charles Runyon of the Yale 
Law School. 
On my return to Ghana, negotiations related to our staff 
position continued within the University. These resulted in the 
following developments: 
(1) The establishment of the Law Faculty was increased to 
provide for two additional Senior Lectureships. We were thus 
able to consider more senior teachers as well as the promotion 
of younger men. The revised senior establishment of the Faculty, 
exclusive of certain posts allocable to non-professional law 
teaching for other units of the University were as follows: 
1 Professor 
4 Senior Lecturers 
7 Lecturers 
1 Research Fellow 
(2) A satisfactory solution to the problem of making law 
teaching in the University economically attractive to the able 
young Ghanaian lawyer was difficult to find. The English tradi-
tion in the University foreclosed early consideration of the 
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device American faculties have used - an avowed professional 
differential in salaries. To lessen the immediate problem, 
though not to solve it on a long-term basis, I was able to 
secure for all Ghanaian members of "the staff salary increases 
considerably in excess of the amount that standard University 
practice would have provided for 1963-64. These adjustments were 
a great help in the recruitment effort since they affected the 
offers that could be made to prospective Ghanaian teachers. 
(3) The following new appointments to the Faculty were made 
for the academic year 1963-64: 
(a) Joseph R. Agyemang, LL.B.( Nott •• ), LL,M. (Lon.), Lec-
turer in Law for a five year term. 
(b) George K. Ofosu-Amaah, B.A. (Southampton), with post-
graduate study in Cambridge, Lecturer in Law for a five year 
term. Prior to his appointment, Mr. Ofosu-Amaah had served in 
the office of the General Counsel of the United Nations. 
(c) Thomas A. Mensah, B.A. (Legon), LL.B. (Lon.), LL.M. 
{Yale), Lecturer in Law for a five-year term. Prior to his ap-
pointment, Mr. Mensah had completed two years at Yale and was 
ready to submit his doctoral thesis there. 
(d) Michael Thoyer, B.A. (Mich.), J.D. (Northwestern), 
LL.M. (Columbia), Lecturer in Law for a two-year term. 
(e) Jeremy T. Harrison, B.S. and LL.B. (San Francisco), 
LL • .M. (Harvard), Lecturer in Law for a two-year term. Prior to 
appointment, Mr. Harrison served as Lecturer in Law in Catholic 
University of America. 
(f) Vern G. Davidson, B.A. and LL.B. (U.C.L.A.), Lecturer 
in Law for a two-year term. Prior to appointment, Mr. Davidson 
served as Associate in Law in Columbia University. 
(g) Gordon R. Woodman, LL.B. (Cantab.), Visiting Lecturer 
in Law for a one-year term. 
(h) Judith Reinhardt Thoyer, B.A. (Mich.), Law Librarian 
for a two-year term. 
The appointments of Messrs. Mensah, Agyemang and Ofosu-Amaah 
were especially gratifying since they are Ghanaians and offered 
the prospect of long-term service to the University. In connec-
tion with the appointments of Mssrs. Thoyer, Harrison, Davidson 
and Mrs. Thoyer, as well as the earlier appointment of Mr. Seid-
man, the Faculty received important financial assistance from 
the SAILER Project. It was hoped that by the terminations of 
these short-term appointments it would be possible to replace 
most of the expatriates by qualified Ghanaians. 
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A peripheral aspect of the staff situation was the status 
of Mr. Kuma, Presidential Professor of Law. In allocating teach-
ing responsibilities for 1962-63, t informed Professor Kuma that 
no course would be assigned to him. He had the privilege of 
preparing and delivering in the University occasional, public 
lectures; when he wished to do this I would be glad to 
cooperate. I also invited him to prepare for me a report on 
needed research in law and related social sciences, with parti-
cular reference to organization and financing. Professor Kuma 
agreed to undertake this assignment. 
Shortly after my arrival in Ghana, the Vice Chancellor 
asked what I proposed to do about the "Kuma problem." My brief 
answer was "Nothing." I indicated that in my judgment no such 
problem currently existed, pointing out that Professor Kuma's 
appointment involved no assignments of particular responsibil-
ities and that such assignments fell to me. I reported on the 
arrangement I had made for the use of Professor Kuma outside the 
teaching program during the year. The Vice Chancellor approved 
the course taken which, we believed, would give Kuma an op-
portunity to prove his talents and commitment to University in-
terests, while eliminating the risk of prejudice to the teaching 
program if his performance did not improve. 
While Professor Kuma's relations within the Faculty of Law 
were thereafter pleasant, he showed singularly bad judgment and 
aggressiveness in dealing with certain other persons in the 
University. He made offensive and unwarranted charges against a 
teacher in another Faculty, who reported the matter to the Vice 
Chancellor. When Kuma failed to carry out satisfactorily as-
surances given to me that he would retract the charges and avoid 
such embarrassments to the University, I told the Vice Chancel-
lor that, while I would not take steps to procure Kuma's dis-
missal, I would not undertake to defend him if the President saw 
fit to terminate his appointment. 
Professor Kuma was dismissed by the President as of Febru-
ary 1, 1963. He then took the position that he automatically 
reverted to the status of Lecturer in Law which he had held 
prior to his Presidential appointment. I advised him, however, 
that in my view his acceptance of the Presidential Professorship 
was tantamount to resignation from his University post and that 
he could be considered only as a candidate for appointment to 
the Law Faculty, subject to the criteria currently applied. This 
view was supported by such relevant University records as ex-
isted and was accepted by the Vice Chancellor and the University 
Council. 
Mr. Kuma did not apply for a new appointment and his rela-
tion to the University was thus completely severed. In fairness 
to him, it should be said that he showed toward me every 
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courtesy and evidence of good will, both before and after his 
departure from the University. 
Cboice of a Successor to the Deanship 
From the beginning of my work in Ghana I was keenly aware 
of the brevity of my term and of the importance of early action 
in finding my successor. In this connection it seemed to me that 
the University had basically two courses available. The first 
was to attempt to find another expatriate who might have the ad-
vantage of some academic experience but would bring, almost in-
evitably, the disadvantages of brief tenure and probable loss of 
continuity in the work of the Faculty. The other course involved 
the sacrifice of experience in teaching, research and university 
administration in an effort to find a qualified local lawyer who 
could provide strong, continuing leadership for the Faculty. 
After considering a number of possibilities, I concluded that 
the best available candidate was Mr. Justice Nii Amaa Ollennu of 
the Supreme Court. Judge Ollennu had a long and distinguished 
record of public service in Ghana. Prior to his call to the 
English Bar in 1940, he had served as a secondary school 
teacher. While at the Bar, he served as a government-nominated 
member of the old Legislative Council, as a member of a number 
of important select committees, and as the leader of one of the 
smaller political parties. He had been appointed to the High 
Court in 1956 and elevated to the Supreme Court in 1962. He was 
a productive scholar, having published two important books on 
the customary law of Ghana. Judge Ollennu had a long-standing 
interest in education and had been appointed Honorary Professor 
of Law in the University in 1962. This post was not merely 
honorific, however; Judge Ollennu was a regular participant in 
the discussions in the Faculty and assisted in teaching the 
course in customary property law. 
I discussed with the Vice Chancellor the possibility of 
bringing Judge Ollennu to the University as Professor of Law and 
Dean of the Faculty at the end of my term. Dr. O'Brien, though 
not well acquainted with Ollennu, was generally sympathetic to 
the idea and suggested that I discuss the possibility informally 
with the members of the Law Faculty and the leading Ghanaian 
professors in the University. These conversations disclosed a 
unanimous view that Judge Ollennu's appointment would be an ex-
cellent step for the University. In the Ghanaian tradition, how-
ever, like that of England, it would be a surprising move for a 
lawyer at the pinnacle of his profession as a member of the 
Supreme Court to consider leaving the Court for another post. I 
therefore discussed with Judge Ollennu whether he would be will-
ing to consider such a move. After several weeks of delibera-
tion, he informed me that if in the judgment of the University 
he could render greater service to Ghana in an academic post 
than on the Court, he would be willing to have his name con-
sidered. In August, 1963, I discussed the prospect of Judge 01-
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lennu's leaving the court and coming to the University with Sir 
Arku Korsah, Chief Justice of Ghana, and secured his approval 
for the move. In September, the Vice Chancellor took up the mat-
ter with the President who also gave his approval. The way thus 
seemed to be clear for an orderly transfer of responsibility at 
the end of my term without loss of momentum in the Faculty's 
program. I also made arrangements for Judge Ollennu to visit the 
United States and Britain for three months during the spring of 
1964 in order to extend his acquaintances in the law teaching 
world and to become more familiar with developing attitudes 
elsewhere. 
Unfortunately, the prospective appointment of Judge Ollennu 
as Dean of the Faculty was one of the early casualties of the 
campaign against the Law Faculty and the University which began 
in October, 1963. This development will be considered later in 
the report. 
Law Teaching for Non-Professionals 
For some time prior to my coming to the University the Law 
Department had offered instruction in certain legal subjects for 
students in the Department of Economics. Law was also taught in 
the School of Administration, a separate institution located in 
Achimota, which was integrated into the University during the 
academic year 1962-1963. The School of Administration had on its 
staff two lawyers, but they were completely independent of the 
Law Department as it then was. 
It seemed clear to me that a number of advantages could be 
gained by unifying responsibility for all law teaching in the 
University within the Faculty of Law. To this end a number of 
steps were taken during my first year in Ghana. The first of 
these was to propose that a law option be included in the syl-
labus for the general Bachelor of Arts degree. This option would 
have involved instruction by members of the Law Faculty in 
certain legal subjects as a part of a general liberal education. 
This innovation received the approval of the Executive Committee 
of the Academic Board, but responsibility for implementation was 
delegated to the Board of the Faculty of Arts. Prior to my 
departure, the Arts Faculty had not acted on this proposal. 
The syllabus for the degree in political science which was 
established during the year 1962-63 contained provision for 
certain law courses. To develop detailed syllabi for these, I 
had discussions with the Acting Head of the Department of 
Political Science. In my view, the type of course which had been 
familiar in the social science departments - an informational 
grab-bag of assorted private law rules -had no real educational justification. The discussion produced a set of syllabi 
emphasizing governmental structure and public law. I undertook 
to staff these courses with qualified teachers from the Law 
( 
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Faculty who, it was hoped, would impart to the students some of 
the methodological discipline of law study as well as a body of 
relevant information. 
.·• 
Law instruction in the School of Administration presented a 
more complex problem, since the School already had lawyer mem-
bers of its teaching staff. As part of the general move to in-
tegrate the School into the University, there was substantial 
pressure on me to accept the School's two law instructors as 
members of the Law Faculty and in this connection to assume 
responsibility for instruction in the School. This I declined to 
do since the two men were not qualified for appointment to the 
Law Faculty under the criteria I had been applying. The problem 
was finally solved, at least on a short-term basis, by an agree-
ment with the Director of the School whereby the two incumbent 
instructors were granted extended study leave to permit them to 
go abroad and improve their qualifications. While I could offer 
no ultimate assurances of appointment, I indicated that when the 
period of further study was completed, the Faculty would be 
willing to review the credentials of the two lecturers as 
candidates for appointment. In the period of their absence on 
study leave, the Director of the School undertook to finance two 
lectureships on the Law Faculty in exchange for an undertaking 
that the Faculty would staff the law courses for Administration 
students. The effect of this arrangement was to increase the es-
tablishment of the Law Faculty by two Lecturers. 
During the year it was also possible to review the existing 
syllabi for law courses in the School of Administration. From 
th~s review, in which Mr. Seidman played a major role, came 
revised syllabi that promised instruction at an appropriate 
quality level and better directed toward the probable needs of 
business administration students. 
The School of Administration also offered certain special 
programs for non-degree students. Two of these were for hospital 
administrators and for the administrative personnel of local 
government units. The agreement with the Director involved the 
Law Faculty's assuming responsibility for developing these 
courses to satisfactory levels and staffing them. Mr. Seidman 
and Mr. Davidson made important contributions to these aspects 
of our work. -
There has long been discontent in Ghana with the ad-
ministration of justice in the Local Courts which serve the 
great majority of the population. The judges of these courts are 
not lawyers, and lawyers are in fact barred from practicing 
before them. In an effort to bring about some improvement in the 
Local Court system, I wrote to the Minister of Justice in May, 
1963, offering to provide within the Faculty of Law a short 
course of instruction for Local Court judges during each of the 
University's long vacations. In subsequent conversations with 
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officers of the Ministry, I elaborated this suggestion into a 
proposed syllabus for the course. In order to service Local 
Courts throughout the country, it was necessary to consider 
residential instruction, and to avoid overloading the limited 
teaching staff available, it was necessary to schedule the 
courses during long vacations. After considering these proposals 
from the Faculty of Law for some time, the Minister informed me 
on August 30, 1963, that it was not considered advisable to 
begin such training for Local Court judges. The basis for the 
Minister's decision appeared to be a conviction that the exist-
ing judges were not educable. His formally stated reason merely 
ref erred to the Government policy to replace the present judges 
with legally qualified men and women. Thus, we were not able to 
extend the range of our instruction to include this important 
segment of the law personnel of Ghana. Our inability to do so 
became quite significant in the campaign against the Faculty in 
the latter part of 1963. 
Physical Plant and Library 
Since the beginning of instruction in Law in the University 
in 1959, the Law Department had occupied one wing of the general 
library building. In the early days the space available was no 
doubt adequate and making it available to the Law Department did 
not in any way inconvenience the general library. The situation 
had drastically changed, however, by the academic year 1962-
1963. The space available for the law library was over-crowded 
and a substantial number of books already purchased could not be 
shelved. Only three classrooms were available, and reasonably 
satisfactory off ice space could be provided to only four members 
of the Faculty. The growth of the general library had also 
created an urgent demand for more space. Thus, the pressure for 
the Law Faculty to find housing elsewhere was strong indeed. 
It was my hope that a law building adequate for the basic 
teaching and research needs of the Faculty, as well as an af-
filiated Institute of Legal Research, would be included in the 
next phase of the University's capital development. Under the 
best of circumstances, however, this possibility could not ma-
ture for several years. To meet the emergency needs, I prepared 
rough sketches of temporary buildings for the Law Faculty and 
presented them to the University's Development Committee in No-
vember, 1962. These were approved and funds appropriated for 
construction. The actual building began in April, 1963, and the 
new buildings were ready for use at the beginning of the 
academic year 1963-64. 
The new quarters of the Faculty comprised four buildings of 
pre-stressed concrete construction. One fully air-conditioned 
building housed the law library with sufficient stack apace for 
15,000 volumes, seats for about 100 readers, and a separate pe-
riodicals room. Another building contained two classrooms with a 
) 
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capacity of 45 each and a third classroom with a capacity of 
120. This larger classroom could be divided by a collapsible 
partition, thus giving us two smaller classrooms if desired. Two 
other buildings contained administrative and clerical offices 
and a separate off ice-tutorial room for each member of the 
Faculty. Thus the Faculty was adequately accommodated in its own 
quarters. The speed and economy with which accommodation was 
provided for the Law Faculty in these pre-fabricated structures 
proved attractive to others, and similar units were erected for 
a number of other units of the University. 
Research Program and Law Journal 
One of the most pressing needs in the Law Faculty and in 
the University in general was an active program of research at-
tuned to the developing needs of the country. The shortage of 
teaching staff in the past had made a major research commitment 
by the members of the Faculty extremely difficult. Beyond this 
fact, however, the English orientation of many members of the 
Faculty tended to produce a conception of legal research that 
was almost exclusively analytical. Professor Lang had been aware 
of the need to stimulate research interests in both teaching 
members and students and had encouraged the establishment of a 
law journal. One issue of a modest mimeographed publication, 
called the Legon Law Journal, appeared under student editorship 
in the Spring of 1962. No satisfactory arrangement for its con-
tinuation had been made, however. 
With the improvement of our staff situation during 1962-63, 
it became possible to begin very active encouragement of re-
search activities in the Faculty. In the first instance these 
activities seemed best directed toward the preparation of teach-
ing materials which would be better suited to the instruction of 
African students. The greatest contribution in this direction by 
any member of the Faculty was made by Mr. Seidman. In install-
ments he published casebooks in Criminal Law and Administrative 
Law and developed a substantial part of the materials for the 
course in Evidence. In Criminal Law he used primarily statutes 
from Ghana and other African countries, cases arising in African 
circumstances, and a substantial amount of data provided by the 
social sciences. Much useful work in developing teaching 
materials was also done by Mr. Thoyer in the fields of Taxation 
and Contracts. Extremely important research on customary proper-
ty law for both teaching materials and scholarly publication was 
done by Mr. Woodman, Mr. Justice Ollennu, and Mr. Asante. After 
his arrival, Mr. Harrison began developing the first organized 
body of Ghanaian materials in the field of judicial procedure. 
Local arrangements were made for the initial duplication of 
teaching materials so that they could be placed in students' 
hands for pre-class study, thus curtailing the unfortunate 
reliance on lectures. 
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Anticipation of an increased flow of research and writing 
made appropriate the reconsideration of a local journal for the 
publication of our research products. The Legon Law Journal un-
der student editorship did not seem a satisfactory device at 
this stage of development. The Faculty, therefore, decided to 
assume responsibility for the editorship of a journal mainly 
devoted to Ghanaian law. such a journal could provide op-
portunities for student research and writing and, in the course 
of time, experience in editing, much in the manner of the lead-
ing American law reviews. The journal was renamed the University 
of Ghana Law Journal and arrangements were made with Sweet and 
Maxwell in London for publication and distribution interna-
tionally. The Journal was placed under the editorship of Mr. 
Seidman who organized a board of student editors from the fourth 
and fifth year classes. These students would not in the first 
instance perform actual editorial functions but would do re-
search and write shorter case notes and comments. Out of this 
experience it was hoped a scholarly tradition would be developed 
which could be passed on to succeeding groups of students. 
The Journal was scheduled for publication in two issues 
each year. Manuscripts for the first issue were submitted to 
sweet and Maxwell in December, 1963, for publication in early 
1964. The second issue was to appear in the early Fall of 1964. 
One of the most regrettable byproducts of the deportation of Mr. 
Seidman and me was the decision of Sweet and Maxwell to suspend 
plans for the publication of the Journal until it became clearer 
whether the remaining staff in the Law Faculty would be com-
petent to assume responsibility for the production of the 
Jo~rnal on a continuing basis. Insofar as I am aware, this 
determination has not yet been made. 
The needs for research in law and related disciplines went J 
far beyond what could be met by the teaching staff of the 
Faculty. We needed greatly increased library facilities and the 
resources to support field investigations. Scholars who could ) 
devote their full time to research and writing were needed to 
supplement the efforts of those involved in teaching. While the 
University had been generous in its support of the Faculty, ~ 
within the limitations imposed by its general budget, it was I 
clear that financing a major institutional research program 
would require the participation of outside agencies. It was my 
hope that during the academic year 1963-64 the organization of 
this support and the planning of a Center for Advanced Legal 
Studies could be made the major development project of the 
Faculty. 
It seemed desirable in planning a permanent home for the 
Law Faculty to include provision for a research library and suf-
ficient office space for non-teaching research staff. Before my 
expulsion from Ghana, I had an opportunity to initiate discus-
sions on this development with the Vice Chancellor, certain rep-
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resentatives of the Government, particularly the Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, and representatives of the Ford Foundation. It 
is, of course, speculative what success these discussions would 
have enjoyed if events in Ghana had not occurred as they did. 
Political developments, particularly those impinging on the 
University, led the Ford Foundation field representative to the 
conclusion that further investment in Ghana of the kind I had 
suggested was not wise at that time. While I remain convinced 
that major research in law and the related social sciences is a 
primary need in Ghana and the other African countries, it does 
not seem feasible in present Ghanaian circumstances to press 
such a development. 
Ideally, socio-legal research in Africa would be organized 
on a regional basis and would involve participation of the staff 
of the host University as well as visiting scholars from various 
African countries and from abroad. With national jealousies at 
their present levels, it does not seem possible to secure agree-
ment on any site for the development of a regional facility. 
Furthermore, efforts to develop one are frustrated by a peculiar 
circularity. The question whether a particular institution would 
be accepted as the site for a regional research organization is 
greatly affected by the extent of the facilities it can offer. 
on the other hand, the acquisition of the needed facilities will 
depend in large measure on the kind of acceptance and support 
the institution itself currently enjoys from others in the 
region. Thus the assessment becomes circular. In my own view it 
will be necessary to gauge the likelihood of a particular in-
stitution's gaining acceptance and support once the facilities 
and resources are made available to it. Thus a certain element 
of risk is imposed on the foundations and governments interested 
in stimulating such a regional development. As the poker player 
would say "They must bet on the come." It may be feasible, how-
ever, to begin on a relatively modest basis with the development 
of library facilities supplemented by a certain amount of money 
to support field research. In the first phase of development, 
outside participation would probably come from individual . 
scholars and not in the form of institutional commitments from 
other universities or governments. If a research program could 
be begun on such a basis, I would hope that in the course of 
time it would acquire, by the merits of its products, the sup-
port of a much wider range of scholars and institutions in 
Africa and elsewhere. 
Ghanaian Law Students 
The successful development of legal education in Ghana 
depended on the quality of our students and the relationship 
that could be established between them and a teaching staff made 
up in large part of expatriates. In assessing these factors, it 
is necessary to consider the educational background of our stu-
dents, the criteria of admission to the University and to the 
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Faculty, as well as the educational philosophy and techniques of 
the teaching members of the staff. 
The education system in Ghana '~is largely modeled after the 
British. It is, in my judgment, one of the most regrettable 
aspects of the British legacy to Africa. In large part, the cur-
riculum is geared to the backgrounds and needs of English stu-
dents and has relatively little direct reference to African con-
ditions or circumstances. Educational techniques emphasize rote 
learning to assure success on essentially regurgitative examina-
tions. These techniques and the educational philosophy implicit 
in them strongly affected the Law Faculty. Substantially chang-
ing them became one of my primary objections which was shared by 
a number of my colleagues. 
Admission to the University of Ghana requires five sub-
jects, including English language at GCE (London), of which two 
must be at advanced level. Within the British scheme, therefore, 
the level of University admission is placed reasonably high. Be-
cause of the traditional attraction of law to Ghanaian students 
the numbers expressing interest in admission to the Law Faculty 
have been sufficiently large that we were able to be more selec-
tive than the University itself. In 1961-62, the Faculty in-
stituted a special admission examination designed to test the 
student's facility in written communication and his ability to 
analyze arguments and restate them cogently in his own language. 
The test has been used to limit admission to the Faculty rather 
severely. For example, about 80 students wrote the examination 
in April, 1963, and of these approximately one-half were ad-
mit~ed to the Faculty. By the use of higher selection standards 
we were able to improve the quality of classroom work and reduce 
the incidence of academic failure. Since all of the students re-
jected by the Faculty of Law were absorbed by other units of the 
University, many of which could doubtless make a stronger claim 
in terms of national need than the Faculty could, there seemed 
to be no basis for concern over an undue limitation of educa-
tional opportunity. In 1963-64 our student body was approximate-
ly as follows: 
First year 39 
Second year 28 
Third year 17 
Fourth year 28 
Fifth year 18 
Non-degree 
students ----2,2 
Total 155 
The period of disorganization in the Law Department through 
the academic year 1961-62 had created rather difficult morale 
problems in the student body. The previous administration had 
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also, in my judgment, erred in the direction of an undue 
paternalism toward the students. The influence of these factors 
was most pronounced on the leading classes. After my arrival, at 
th beginning of the academic year, ':I met all of the students in 
the Faculty to discuss with them my own attitudes on legal 
education and the attitudes I would try to encourage in other 
members of the staff. I emphasized that I did not come to Africa 
expecting less of students than I would expect elsewhere. The 
standard of performance would be high and consequently a heavy 
burden of daily preparation and periodic review would be placed 
on all students. Those who were not interested in performing in 
accordance with these standards or who were ultimately found un-
able to do so would be excluded. There was some indication that 
this rather blunt discussion caused initial consternation among 
our students. As time passed, however, it became increasingly 
clear, not only from the actual performance of the students but 
from comments made to members of the teaching staff, that they 
came to accept high standards and to take pride in meeting them. 
Many of our students indicated that they had always been led to 
believe that American standards of education were significantly 
lower than those prevailing in Britain. As the months passed, 
they at least came to doubt the validity of this conclusion. 
Raising standards of admission and firming up the demands 
on our students for the vigorous and consistent use of their 
abilities were far less difficult tasks than reshaping the 
educational philosophy and techniques of senior members. Several 
of our teachers, influenced by their early education in British 
Africa and matured in British universities, saw legal education 
primarily as learning rules and doctrine. To the teacher they 
assigned the role of elucidating the principles and explaining 
the rules. While lip service was paid to tutorials, which in 
some British universities do much to redeem the system, the 
principal mode of instruction in Ghana was the lecture. Too fre-
quently the students came to lectures without prior preparation 
on the materials to be considered and quietly took their notes. 
These, with some supplementation from later text reading, became 
the basis for "revision" when preparation for final examinations 
began. 
While information about certain legal doctrines and rules 
is essential, its acquisition is by no means the principal ob-
jective of legal education. In addition to a general capacity 
for disciplined thought, the common law system with its rapidly 
expanding statutory gloss requires a highly developed skill in 
case analysis and statutory interpretation and an ability to 
develop useful doctrinal generalizations from the particulars of 
prior experience. The data on which these skills are developed 
and on which they will be exercised later include, or should in-
clude, case decisions, statutes, regulations, and other material 
not specifically legal, which projects the social context of 
problems and stimulates critical judgments. Legal education as 
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thus conceived cannot be imparted by lectures in which students 
are mere listeners. In the main students develop by doing or at-
tempting the lawyer's tasks under the guidance of a teacher 
whose functions are to organize an '~apt body of working 
materials, to stimulate the student to consider them in such a 
way as to sharpen his own analytical skills and insights, and by 
his questions and criticisms to light the students' path toward 
discovery, but not to carry him along it. 
Legal education, of this kind and quality, is hard work for 
both student and teacher. It does not deny the value or im-
portance of information about legal rules and doctrine: it mere-
ly insists that this be acquired while skills and insights are 
being developed, thus making it possible to use the information 
creatively in the solution of new problems. 
The extent of acceptance of this view of legal education in 
the Law Faculty in Ghana was fairly accurately defined by 
reference to the American or British background of the teacher. 
The Americans in general taught Socratically, welcomed student 
participation in discussions, were less concerned that the stu-
dents be able to cite chapter and verse in Ghanaian law, tended 
to prefer teaching materials arising out of an African context, 
were ready to use general social science data to suggest new 
dimensions of a problem, and on examinations were more concerned 
about the quality of the students' reasoning on a problem case 
than his ability to write an informational essay under some 
general legal rubric. Our colleagues educated in the British 
system relied more heavily on lectures, stressed the importance 
of knowledge about legal rules and tended to become uncomf ort-
able outside the flat plane of positive rules and doctrine. 
There were, of course, significant variations within each group. 
If judgment is based on what actually occurred in the class-
rooms, however, and not entirely on the declarations of teachers 
as to what they did, the categorization of the members of the 
Law Faculty suggested has general validity. 
While I rejected in the main the British approach to law 
teaching, it was not my desire to nurture an unquestioning Amer-
icanization. I sought no drab uniformity of approach. Least of 
all would I have been inclined to attempt innovations by edict. 
It was important, however, for our teachers to become self-
conscious and self-critical. To that end, informal conversations 
about teaching techniques and objectives became almost daily 
fare in our group. The only slightly more formal Faculty seminar 
during Trinity Term also contributed to an understanding of the 
various viewpoints. I am relatively sure there was some cross 
fertilization to which our students, as well, contributed. At 
least some students who in one or more courses have been en-
couraged to question, to criticize and to attempt to defend 
their own analyses will never again be content with passive 
note-taking on lectures. 
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In the difficult period leading up to the deportation of 
Mr. Seidman and myself, the full support of the students in the 
Faculty was beyond question. The p~oblem at that time was re-
straining their strong inclination to protest the actions of the 
Government against the University. I have every confidence that 
the impact of the American participation in the work of the 
Faculty will be a lasting one on those students who were exposed 
to it. I believe also that most of the members of the teaching 
staff who had their own educations in Britain found the dif-
ferent perspectives of their American colleagues stimulating. 
Hopefully, even after the direct American involvement in law 
teaching has ended, the American insistence that rule-learning 
through neat lectures is not legal education will still in-
fluence the Faculty of Law. 
General University Assignments 
In anticipation of my going to Ghana I decided that it 
would be wise to devote full time to the affairs of the Faculty 
of Law and not to dilute my efforts by participation in a 
variety of general University matters. In a certain sense, this 
would have been a wise course since involvement in general 
University problems could become not only a heavy charge on my 
own time but could also multiply the possibilities of offending 
and alienating sensitive and perhaps influential members of the 
community. Soon after my arrival, however, it became clear that 
substantial isolation from the general concerns of the 
University would be neither possible nor prudent. As Dean of the 
Faculty of Law, I became ex officio a member of certain of the 
critical boards and committees of the University. To a number of 
others, I was elected by the Academic Board. My conviction 
steadily grew that the welfare of the Faculty of Law depended so 
intimately on the growth and well being of the University that I 
was obligated to work on as broad a basis as possible. Dr. 
O'Brien, the ViceChancellor of the University, was providing 
vigorous and imaginative leadership for the entire University, 
and I felt it incumbent on me to give him every support of which 
I was capable. 
I served ex officio on the Academic Board of the University 
and its Executive Committee, as well as on the Board of the 
School of Administration. By election of the Academic Board I 
served on the Finance Committee of the University, the Library 
Committee, the Scholarship Committee, and the Disciplinary 
Board. By appointment of the Vice Chancellor I became a member 
of the Development Committee and the Committee of Management of 
the University's Superannuation Scheme. I also served as Vice 
Master of Mensah Sarbah Hall and as a member of the Council of 
the Hall. In addition to these continuing obligations, I un-
dertook a number of ad hoc assignments at the request of the 
Vice Chancellor or the Executive Committee of the Academic 
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Board. On my arrival the internal governance of the University 
proceeded informally on the basis of older patterns established 
for the University College; new University statutes were urgent-
ly needed. At the Vice Chancellor's request, I drafted the 
University Statutes and those were approved by the Academic 
Board and adopted by the University Council. While I believed 
that it was not the proper function of members of the Law 
Faculty to render routine legal services to the University, it 
was not possible to implement this view on an absolute basis. 
From time to time, therefore, I provided legal opinions to the 
Vice Chancellor or other University bodies. There were many 
other such special assignments. Increasingly, over the months I 
was in Ghana, my rapport with the Vice Chancellor was streng-
thened and I had the privilege of serving as his sounding board 
and adviser on many problems not involving the Faculty of Law in 
any sense. 
Relations with the General Legal Council 
In addition to serving as Director of Legal Education of 
Ghana and Director of the Law School, I was a member ex officio 
of the General Legal Council. The success of my work in the 
former posts, as well as in the University, depended to a con- j 
siderable extent on the development of effective working rela-
tionships with the Council, in particular with its Chairman, Sir 
Arku Korsah, and other leading members. The approval of the \ 
Council was required for the closing of the Ghana Law School, 
the delegation of teaching responsibilities to the University, 
and the revision of criteria for admission to the Bar so as to 
upgrade the quality of the profession. I wish to take this op-
portunity to pay tribute to the members of General Legal Council 
with whom I worked most closely. These included Chief Justice 
Sir Arku Korsah, Justices William B. Van Lare, Edward Akufo-
Addo, and N. A. Ollennu, and the Attorney General, Mr. B. E. 
Quaw-Swanzy. Deliberations in the Council were usually long and 
frequently tangential; decisions were often unduly delayed. I 
became convinced, however, that the working majority of the 
Council was seriously interested in the development of a sound 
educational program and in improved standards for admission to 
the Bar. Every recommendation for action that I brought to the 
Council was, in fact, adopted. I am glad to pay tribute and to 
express my appreciation to the members of the Council with whom 
I was privileged to work. 
No Bigger Than a Man's Hand 
My first year in Ghana was singularly productive. It was 
possible to push the work of development with generally en-
couraging results. Only a few minor episodes tended to mar the 
picture. These would not require mention, were they not obvious-
ly related to the later developments in 1963-64. 
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In October, 1962, when Dr. w. c. Ekow-Daniels arrived to 
Join the Faculty, I was immediately impressed by his rather 
thinly-disguised hostility. It soon came to my attention that 
his attitude was taking objective form in conduct clearly 
prejudicial to the orderly development of the Faculty and to the 
University itself. I learned, for example, that he had called 
upon Sir Arku Korsah, the Chief Justice, and Dr. J. B. Danquah, 
a prominent lawyer and political figure, to complain about cur-
ricular developments which I had proposed in the Faculty. I 
would not have thought this particularly surprising or objec-
tionable, had Dr. Daniels also expressed his reservations and 
criticisms to me or sought to have them debated in meetings of 
the Faculty Board. He did neither before attempting to undermine 
the developments by untrue and distorted reports to leaders of 
the Bench and Bar. 
As a result of my membership on the Disciplinary Board of 
the University, I was well aware of the serious view taken by 
the Board and by the Vice Chancellor of such extra-curricular 
conduct. I therefore considered whether it would be wise to take 
the matter up with the Vice Chancellor and have him consider the 
propriety of disciplinary procedures. I finally concluded, how-
ever, that Dr. Daniels' conduct was probably attributable to im-
maturity and the excessive ambition of a young man who had been 
abroad for a number of years and who was anxious to make himself 
known to leaders of the profession in Ghana without delay. I 
hoped that avoidance of administrative action against him, 
coupled with ample opportunity for him to express his views in 
the Faculty and have them considered by his colleagues, would in 
the course of time bring him into a better working relationship 
with us. This course seemed to be encouraged also by conversa-
tions with the Chief Justice in which he indicated that he had 
reprimanded Dr. Daniels for his activities. In the latter part 
of the year, I had some hope that my treatment of Dr. Daniels 
would be successful. As the later account of developments in 
1963-64 will indicate, however, I had a singular failure in 
making Dr. Daniels a cooperative member of the Faculty. 
On November 22, 1962 a letter to the editor from one Kodjo 
Odoi appeared in the Ghana Evening News. The thrust of the let-
ter is well indicated by the following paragraph which I quote: 
"What is the use of closing the Law School in 1964 when the 
last candidates to be admitted cannot complete the course before 
1965, assuming that none of them will fail in any of the exams? 
Was it the new head of the school-an American-who wishes to have 
his own way? In the interest of Ghanaians, the government must 
step in and save an unhappy situation." 
A few days later, on November 27, a letter from H. M. Bas-
ner, a South African communist who, although a lawyer, was 
employed in Ghana as a journalist, appeared in the EVENING NEWS, 
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in which Mr. Basner made the following comments: 
"Only socialist legislators can initiate socialist laws, 
but you need socialist lawyers to draft, interpret and ad-
minister them truly. Above all, unless every citizen can receive 
the same quantity and quality of legal aid when he needs it, 
there is no true equality to all men before the law •••• Mr. 
Odoi is perfectly justified in feeling that the whole present 
trend of legal education is to run out as many British and Amer-
ican legal luminaries as possible in Ghana, absorbed in the 
sacred rights of private property (and in clients who pay high 
fees). • .• 
"But above all, don't let anyone who is not a socialist 
teach the lawyers who will have to practice law in a socialist 
country. 
"Diligence in the sciences and other disciplines are [sic] 
also needed, but nothing like the care which must be exercised 
on this most valuable and vital sector of any developing coun-
try." 
The third letter in the series appeared in the EVENING NEWS I 
on December 3, 1962. The writer said in part: 
"There are progressive lawyers who understand the present \ 
problems facing our dear state, and Ghana needs them. There are 
socialist lawyers like Comrade Basner whom the country badly 
needs to help train socialist lawyers in conformity with 
Osagyefo's ideas and ideals. 
"We need a socialist head to man our Law School, be he 
white or black. American or Russian. We must be vigilant in ex-
posing all diabolical plans to build a socialist paradise in fu-
ture Ghana. [sic J " 
One letter to the foregoing effect might have been ignored. 
When three had appeared, it seemed likely that this was the 
beginning of a campaign against not only the specific plans for 
the Ghana Law School but also against me and other expatriates 
on the Law Faculty. I did not think it wise for me to enter 
publicly into the controversy. I, therefore, called on the Chief 
Justice, explained my concerns to him, and asked if he would 
consider issuing a press release responsive to the three letters 
in the EVENING NEWS. He agreed to do so, and I therefore drafted 
a statement which was subsequently approved by the General Legal 
Council and issued by the Chief Justice as Chairman of the Coun-
cil. The statement made it entirely clear that the decision to 
close the Law School involved giving all present students in the 
School a reasonable opportunity to complete the work required 
for the Diploma in Law, that students earning the Diploma would 
be admitted to the University to complete their professional 
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work, and that the objective of the Council was to concentrate 
scarce teaching resources in order to improve the system of 
legal education in Ghana. The Chief Justice's statement received 
full publicity in the three Ghanaian newspapers and seemed suc-
cessful in ending the campaign. Again, however, as later 
developments showed, we had won only a delay and not an ultimate 
victory. 
on January 6, 1963, the CPP held a rally at the stadium in 
Accra to celebrate Positive Action Day. The President made an 
appearance in the stadium but departed well before the 
festivities were to be concluded. Very shortly after he left the 
stadium, someone threw at least one hand grenade, killing or 
wounding a number of persons. A few days later a brief article 
appeared in the EVENING NEWS questioning what the "so-called 
Michigan professor at Legon" was doing in the stadium on March 6 
behind the President's stand. According to the article, the 
professor referred to was asked to leave; the implication was 
clear, however, that he had some involvement in the terrorist 
attack. Since I was the only professor at Legon having any pos-
sible connection with Michigan, I could only conclude that the 
newspaper referred to me, although I had not been near the 
stadium on January 6. It was impossible to determine whether 
this was legitimate case of mistaken identity or a purely fabri-
cated charge. I lodged a strong protest against this newspaper 
reference with the Vice Chancellor and requested that he discuss 
the matter with the President. On January 21st, the Vice Chan-
cellor informed me that he had spoken to the President who 
professed to know nothing about the newspaper comments and to be 
shocked to hear of them. The President assured the Vice Chancel-
lor that he would take steps to see that a retraction appeared. 
As I expected, no actual retraction was published, but for the 
next several months there were no further attacks of this kind 
on me. In the circumstances, I felt that I could not expect more 
than this. 
Summary of pevelopments in 1962-63. 
At the end of the academic year 1962-63, developments 
seemed to warrant an optimistic annual report to the Vice Chan-
cellor. Our curriculum had been fully revised and seemed as 
respon-sive to need as we could make it for the next few years. 
The teaching staff had been supplemented to the point where 
teaching loads were compatible with major research activity, and 
we had University authorization for further faculty appointments 
during the next academic year. The main development project for 
1963-64 was to be the planning and financing of a West African 
Center for Advanced Legal Studies in the University of Ghana. 
This would require negotiation for substantial additional sup-
port, planning for improved physical facilities, and the pos-
sible appointment of a limited number of full-time research 
staff. I could approach the end of my own tour with reasonable 
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optimism since the arrangement for Mr. Justice Ollennu to 
succeed me seemed to be progressing satisfactorily. 
Eyents Since SeptelDber 1963. 
The developments since September 1963, culminating in the 
virtual destruction of the Faculty of Law, do not lend them-
selves to analysis under separate heads. The various events were 
closely interrelated. I will, therefore, deal with them 
chronologically, merely suggesting initially that they might be 
viewed as involving a number of related efforts: 
1. The effort to end the academic independence of the 
University and to make it a facility for indoctrination in the 
ideology of the CCP; 
2. An effort to reduce foreign influence in the University 
and particularly in the Faculty of Law; 
3. An effort to intimidate students and staff of the 
University to the point where they would be passive observers, 
if not active supporters, of the government's activities; 
4. An effort to reshape fundamental legal and governmental 
institutions of Ghana, particularly the judiciary, and to fur-
ther the concentration of absolute power in the executive. 
The nature of developments makes it impossible to con-
centrate totally on the University. To some extent it will be 
necessary to consider the University's status in a wider politi-
cal context. 
On September 17, 1963, the Vice Chancellor wrote to me in-
dicating that he had discussed with the President the proposal 
to bring Mr. Justice Ollennu to the University as Professor of 
Law. The President gave his entire approval to Ollennu's release 
from the Supreme Court and his appointment in the University. 
The Vice Chancellor suggested, however, that before proceeding 
with the Ollennu appointment, he would like to have me consider 
the possibility of my remaining an additional year in the 
University with the prospect that Ollennu would succeed me in 
1965. I informed the Vice Chancellor that I would give careful 
thought to his suggestion and would discuss it with my family 
and my own University. 
On September 18, the Vice Chancellor sent to me for comment 
a memorandum he had prepared as the basis for discussion of a 
new citizenship training program, extending to the universities, 
which had recently been announced by the President and for which 
responsibility had been given to Mr. Kwaku Boateng, Minister for 
the Interior and then Acting Minister for Education. The Vice 
Chancellor pointed out that the University had not yet received 
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any official communication from Mr. Boateng, but that it seemed 
desirable in advance of such an approach for the University to 
define its own position in relation to this delicate matter. The 
Vice Chancellor proposed four basic principles on which the 
University should stand: 
"1. The University accepts responsibility for citizenship 
training, in the sense that it aims to produce graduates who 
will be responsible and enlightened citizens of Ghana and of 
Africa, and who will play a full and useful part in the con-
structive work facing their generation. 
"2. In the field of citizenship training, as in other mat-
ters, the University is always prepared to develop new courses 
or extend existing ones in order to meet needs which make them-
selves felt in the University or in the country. 
"3. The University is always prepared to discuss such mat-
ters, or any phase of its activity, with the relevant organ of 
state. 
"4. The University cannot abdicate any part of its academic 
responsibilities. Only the competent University organ, subject 
to the authority of the Academic Board and of the Council, can 
determine what courses of lectures can be given at the Uni-
versity for students enrolled at the University. This 
responsibility cannot be relinquished in favor of any outside 
body or person. This principle is vital to the life of the 
University and admits of no compromise." 
On September 21, I wrote to the Vice Chancellor, giving my 
preliminary reaction to his suggestions concerning the 
University's position on the citizenship training program: 
"I would surely accept the four basic principles set out in 
your memorandum. If we stand firmly on them and try to impress 
on the organizers of the programme that good and useful 
citizenship involves a number of characteristics not all of 
which can effectively be emphasized and developed in a single 
institution, we might develop an appreciation of specialized 
functions that would permit the University to limit its role to 
truly educational activities. For example, good health, ap-
propriate religious sentiments or possession of basic military 
skills might in different contexts be desirable components of 
good citizenship, the nurture of which few, if any, would think 
best committed to a University. As you clearly point out, the 
wise position for the University is not that it should be exempt 
from the obligation to contribute to good citizenship, but 
rather that the unique contribution of the University can be 
seriously endangered by expecting of it functions which, if 
needed, can best be entrusted to some other organ. 
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"In one respect I may be inclined to go beyond the point 
you concede in your final paragraph. It seems to me we should 
draw a sharp distinction between persons engaged to teach and a 
much wider group of people who might from time to time appear 
and speak on the University campus. With respect to the first 
group I am entirely clear that responsible University bodies 
must make the selection, evaluating qualifications and assuring 
that an appropriate academic level is maintained. Within this 
group are included all to whom a regular course is entrusted, 
participating lecturers in such a programme as African Studies 
in the first year, and even the casual lecturer who might be in-
vited in by a Department or Faculty to supplement its regular 
teaching. The crucial datum in all these cases is not that the 
person involved will present only ascertained facts, be totally 
objective and divorce entirely his own value perceptions. What 
is involved is the University's warranty that the person has 
equipped himself to present the relevant facts, is committed to 
free enquiry and to drawing objectively the implications of the 
data gathered, and to recognizing and acknowledging as honestly 
as is humanly possible the critical boundary line between his 
knowledge and his faith, between what he can teach as fact and 
what he might appropriately suggest on some occasions as his own 
personal opinion which others are free to accept or reject ac-
cording to their own persuasions. 
"Beyond the group whom the University engages and warrants 
on the criteria above, I would think it entirely appropriate for 
a great University to provide a forum for others who could not 
possibly qualify on academic grounds. An outstanding department 
of music might have invited Guy Lombardo, during the heyday of 
his popularity, to present a concert, despite the well known 
fact that his saxophones were always one-half key off and musi-
cally he was rather fearful. Despite my own deep-seated doubts 
of the ability of most committed Communists to accept and carry 
out the central obligations of membership in a real University, 
I have consistently argued in the United States that no self-
respecting university would deny a Communist speaker the op-
portunity to present his message. Recently the principal of a 
high school in Boston refused the use of its auditorium to a 
southern, segregationist Governor who had been invited to defend 
his policy before a northern audience; Harvard permitted him to 
speak on its campus. Many other illustrations could be given. 
The central viewpoint I would urge is that creeds, faiths and 
tastes are social facts which must be evaluated and dealt with, 
that it is consistent with legitimate educational policy to pro-
vide students an opportunity to assess these as presented by 
real converts, and that it is inconsistent with the fundamental 
assumptions of a great university to try to insulate its stu-
dents from the critical social facts of their time. Holmes put 
the point very nicely once when he observed that the only entit-
lement of an idea to survive was its ability to meet competition 
in the free market place of ideas. 
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"The relation of the views just expressed to the citizen-
ship programme need not be detailed. Certainly your point on the 
development of courses to meet the country's needs is included. 
Also included, however, would be the possibility of permitting 
non-academic spokesmen for the CPP to address University stu-
dents on the campus, to present to them the ideology and pro-
gramme of the Party. Other political groups are not illegal in 
Ghana, and, if they sought similar opportunities, I would favor 
granting them the same privileges. If the Government thinks 
other groups are subversive, its appropriate action would be to 
declare them illegal. It cannot, I think, expect the University 
to ban groups which under the law of the land are still legiti-
mate. 
"I fully recognize the hazards involved in the policy I 
recommend. On the other hand, I can see a reasonable basis for 
hope that the President will understand and ultimately support 
such a position in the University. The Government has never 
contended that political opposition ~ 1i§. is impermissible but 
has rested on the contention that constitutional processes of 
opposition had been abandoned. What the University would propose 
doing would be neither secret nor subversive. It would involve 
public comment and discussion of ideas and viewpoints constitut-
ing actual forces in the society. While not courting abrasive 
contacts with the Government or the Party, the University cannot 
accept restrictions which would deny its essential character. 
As I have said, I think that character can be preserved in 
Ghana." 
On September 27, the Vice Chancellor sent to me a further 
memorandum on the University's contribution to the citizenship 
training program. He proposed that the University organize a 
series of lectures, under the general title "The Future Graduate 
as Citizen," comprising the following lectures: two lectures on 
the seven-year plan, one dealing with agriculture and the other 
with power and industry, three lectures on the development of 
African unity, and one lecture each on Ghanaian culture, the 
government of Ghana, the laws of Ghana, medicine in Ghana, and 
Ghana's armed forces. In response to this, I made some sugges-
tions on choice of lecturers and also proposed that in lieu of 
the final topic, we might substitute Ghana 's civil service. It 
seemed doubtful to me that the armed services merited special 
treatment as against the civil service and the diplomatic corps. 
I also suggested an additional lecture on education in Ghana. 
On September 30, I received the first intimation that real 
trouble for the Law Faculty was in the wind. That evening, a few 
hours before I left Ghana to attend a legal conference in 
Venice, I received a call from the Registrar of the University 
saying that he had had urgent inquiries from the Secretary to 
the Cabinet, Mr. Okoh, as to the reasons why Mr. E.A.L. Ban-
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nerman had not been appointed to the Law Faculty. Bannerman is a 
middle-aged Ghanaian lawyer who had been appointed Senior Lec-
turer in the Law School by Professor Lang. During the extreme 
staff shortage in the University, ne was also used as a part-
time Lecturer there. After my arrival, Mr. Bannerman continued 
to teach the course in Evidence for one term, but on Mr. Seid-
man's arrival in December, 1962, he took over the Evidence 
course and Mr. Bannerman was not used further. Since the final 
examination for the course had to be sent to the External Ex-
aminer in mid-December, however, I had asked Mr. Bannerman to 
prepare it. The External Examiner completely rejected the ex-
amination on the ground that it was not at University level. 
Since I fully shared that judgment but did not want to embarrass 
Bannerman, I said nothing to him and had Mr. Seidman prepare a 
new examination which the External Examiner immediately ac-
cepted. When Mr. Bannerman inquired about appointment in the 
University, after the General Legal Council decided to close the 
Law School, I assured him that if he cared to submit an applica-
tion it would be fully considered. I also indicated the criteria 
the Faculty would use in evaluating applications. Mr. Bannerman 
did not in fact submit an application; so we had had no occasion 
to consider his suitability for University appointment. 
I was later informed that Mr. Bannerman had gone to the 
President to complain that he had not been appointed in the 
University because of political discrimination. This was of 
course absurd. Even if I had thought his political position 
relevant, I could not have used it in Mr. Bannerman's case since 
I had no knowledge of his politics. When the Registrar called on 
September 30, I did not think it wise to elaborate on the Ban-
nerman problem. I merely informed him, therefore, that Mr. Ban-
nerman had never been considered for University appointment be-
cause I had received no application from him. I hoped the matter 
would end here. If Mr. Bannerman did submit an application, I 
felt quite confident that investigation of his academic record 
and professional career would show no qualification for appoint-
ment to the Law Faculty. 
On my return from Europe in mid-October, the Vice Chancel-
lor reported on conversations he had had with Mr. Boateng, the 
Minister for the Interior, concerning the citizenship training 
program. On October 3, the Minister called on him in an ap-
parently friendly and reasonable mood to discuss the 
University's involvement in the program. He declared that, Ghana 
beiny a socialist country, education for citizenship was educa-
tion in socialism, and that he wished to see the University stu-
dents instructed in socialism. The Vice Chancellor told Mr. 
Boateng that the socialist conception of society, history and 
economics were, in fact, already being expounded in the relevant 
Departments of the University, notably Economics and Political 
Science. The Vice Chancellor suggested that in these Departments 
some of the teachers were convinced socialists, while others 
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were not. In dealing with this viewpoint, it was not the 
University's approach to impose it on students as the sole pos-
sible view, nor was any other theory of society so presented. He 
indicated that it was basic to the ··university's life that this 
should be so, and that the students must be able to make up 
their own minds between conflicting viewpoints, all of which had 
been fairly presented to them. 
The Minister did not take issue with this approach but in-
dicated that he wanted an opportunity to convince the students 
that socialism was the only valid viewpoint and that he believed 
he could do so. In discussing the position of the University 
students, the Vice Chancellor indicated that in his view the 
majority of them were patriotic Ghanaians and good Africans. On 
matters like colonialism, they felt just as other Africans did. 
It was true that they were critical of some aspects of life in 
Ghana, and they were particularly sensitive on the group of is-
sues which the words "academic freedom" represented for them. 
The Vice Chancellor indicated that he did not think these at-
titudes undesirable in students and that in his view the 
University students were rather more responsible and considerab-
ly less cynical than most students in such European universities 
as he knew. Mr. Boateng did not dissent from this view nor did 
he indicate his assent. He suggested that Professor w. E. 
Abraham of the Department of Philosophy would be a good person 
to talk to the students about the African conception of 
socialism and that he would like to address the students himself 
on the same subject. He proposed that these lectures take place 
under the auspices of the Institute of African Studies. 
In accordance with a suggestion made earlier by Mr. Michael 
Dei Anang, the Vice Chancellor suggested to the Minister that it 
would be desirable before any formal lectures were presented, to 
arrange a meeting between representative students and some Min-
isters and senior civil servants at which there would be frank 
and free discussion on both sides. Mr. Boateng thought that such 
a meeting would be useful at some stage but said that he would 
first like an opportunity to talk to the students, after which 
they would have an opportunity of putting questions to him. The 
Vice Chancellor re-emphasized his view that a prior informal 
meeting would be most desirable since otherwise students might 
misunderstand the purpose of a lecture and might be unwilling to 
participate in any discussion centered around it. He stressed 
that the students were very sensitive on this kind of problem 
and would keenly resent anything that appeared to them to be 
brainwashing, that they would be quick to suspect that the dis-
cussion following a formal lecture on such a theme would be 
simply used as a means of separating the sheep from the goats, 
that is, finding out which of the future graduates were politi-
cally reliable and which were not. Mr. Boateng protested, of 
course, that he had no such idea in mind. The Vice Chancellor 
undertook to carry out further discussions within the University 
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along the lines indicated in this conversation with the Minis-
ter. 
on October 10, the Vice Chance1lor sent to Mr. Boateng a 
proposed outline for a series of lectures designed for 
citizenship training at the University level. The list is as 
follows: 
1. The African conception of socialism (two lectures). 
2. The seven-year plan (two lectures). 
3. African unity (three lectures). 
4. The laws of Ghana. 
5. Medicine in Ghana. 
6. African personality. 
7. Civil service of Ghana. 
8. Ghana's armed forces. 
9. The trade unions. 
10. Agricultural development. 
11. Aspects of educational practice. 
12. Technological education. 
13. The government of Ghana. 
In his letter transmitting the proposed list to the Minis-
ter, the Vice Chancellor re-emphasized the vital importance of 
assuring that these lectures would be of a high standard, 
capable of stimulating a wave of intellectual interest in the 
University and giving rise to discussion. In earlier conversa-
tions, the Minister had emphasized the great urgency he felt in 
getting this program started within the University. The Vice 
Chancellor proposed that the lecture series begin in Lent term, 
that is, in January 1964, in order that the lecturers might have 
an ample opportunity to prepare and thus to avoid slipshod ha-
rangues which could turn the whole thing into a farce. On this 
point of timing, the Vice Chancellor was prepared to stand ab-
solutely firm against the pressure of the Minister for starting 
almost immediately. 
Another important point which the Vice Chancellor did not 
mention in his letter to the Minister, in order to avoid putting 
ideas into his head, was his own belief, supported by his ad-
1 
\ 
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visers in the University, that all lectures should be voluntary 
and extra-curricular and that students should in no way be ex-
amined on them. The Vice Chancellor described this as a "stand 
or fall" point. Up to that time no <'one had expressly proposed 
that the lectures should be compulsory and examinable, but some 
of the suggestions for structuring the program, e.g., integrat-
ing it in African studies, might indicate that this was the view 
taken by the Minister. On this matter, however, the University 
was not willing to compromise in any way. By this time the man-
ner of the Minister in conducting the discussions with the 
University had become somewhat highhanded, and we feared that in 
the near future a head-on conflict with him might be inevitable. 
In late October, I advised Dr. O'Brien that, following dis-
cussions with my family and with the Dean of the Law Faculty at 
Michigan, I had decided that it would be necessary for me to 
limit my stay in Ghana to the two years originally contemplated. 
I was extremely grateful for the opportunity to work in the 
University and believed that useful development had taken place. 
on the other hand, in the light of the prospect that Mr. Justice 
Ollennu would be able to move from the Supreme Court to the 
University, I had every reason to believe that this development 
could be continued after he succeeded me as Dean of the Faculty 
of Law. 
On October 26, the President came to the University to 
deliver a formal address at the opening of the Institute of 
African Studies. In the course of this address he made certain 
observations about the Faculty of Law which should be quoted in 
full: 
"There exist in our Universities, faculties and depart-
ments, such as law, economics, politics, history, geography, 
philosophy and history, the teaching of which should be substan-
tially based as soon as possible on African material. 
"Let me take an example. Our students in the Faculty of Law 
must be taught to appreciate the very intimate link that exists 
between law and social values. It is therefore important that 
the Law Faculty should be staffed by Africans. 
"There is .no dearth of men and women among us qualified to 
teach in the Law Faculty." •.• 
"Are we really sure that our students are in touch with the 
life of the nation? That they and their teachers fully ap-
preciate what is going on in our society? The time has come for 
the gown to come to town. 
"In this connection I can see no reason why courses should 
not continue to be organized at the Law School in Accra for lay-
magistrates, local government staff and other officers both in 
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government and industry, who wish to acquire a knowledge of the 
law to assist them in their work. 
"The staff of the Law Faculty~ in this University should be 
able to organize such courses for the benefit of the people in 
the categories I have mentioned. 
"It should also be possible for individual lecturers and 
professors on their own initiative to give lectures on subjects 
of their own choosing, to which the whole University and others 
outside it are invited." 
These remarks gave every indication of being a gloss on the 
original text, being in no way required by the general thrust of 
the President's speech. They appeared to take the University 
community entirely by surprise. Certainly the Vice Chancellor, 
who had seen the draft speech prepared for the President by Mr. 
Thomas Hodgkin, Director of the Institute of African studies, 
had no advance knowledge that the President would make such com-
ments about the Law Faculty. The most disturbing aspect was the 
unspoken premises on which the President seemed to proceed: that 
the Law Faculty was unaware of the intimate relation between law 
and social values, that we were continuing to work with a total-
ly alien curriculum, and that, if any changes were to be made in 
order to make the program of the Law Faculty more responsive to 
the needs of Ghana, such steps could only be taken through the 
complete Africanization of the Law Faculty. The President also 
seemed to err in his assumption that the Law Faculty had been 
either oblivious of the need, or unwilling to cooperate in meet-
ing the need, for special instruction for lay-magistrates and 
other special groups not seeking professional qualification. 
Finally, it was most disturbing to see the President indulge in 
the easy but fallacious assumption that because Ghana had a rea-
sonable number of lawyers, it also had an adequate supply of 
persons qualified to teach law in the University. 
I had intended to attend the opening of the Institute of 
African Studies and to hear the President's speech. Unfortunate-
ly, I was under the impression that he was to appear on the fol-
lowing day, the 27th, and I did not hear about his comments un-
til the evening of the 26th, when I was attending a diplomatic 
reception in Accra. A number of people asked about my reaction 
to the President's comments. On the morning of October 27, I 
called on the Vice Chancellor shortly before he left for a con-
ference with the President at Flagstaff House. I discussed with 
the Vice Chancellor some of the details of our work in the Law 
Faculty, most of which he already knew, and undertook to put to-
gether a sheaf of relevant documents for his use. 
Early in the afternoon on the 27th, the Vice Chancellor 
asked me to call at his home for a report on his conversation 
with the President. He thought the talk had gone very well. The 
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scope of the discussion is indicated by the following excerpt 
from an aide memoire prepared by the Vice Chancellor after the 
conference: 
"Arising out of the President's remarks on this subject at 
the opening of the Institute of African Studies, I told the 
President that in my opinion few parts of the University had 
been put on a better footing than the Law Faculty. The course 
had been revised in a revolutionary manner, changing it com-
pletely from an old fashioned Anglocentric syllabus to a 
thoroughly modern one with the emphasis on African needs. I il-
lustrated this from the revised syllabus which I had with me, 
and with which the President declared himself impressed. I 
stressed that the credit for this change was due, in the main, 
to Professor Harvey. The President enquired how long Professor 
Harvey would be with us, and I told him one year. He then asked 
whether, in the light of what I had told him, we could not 
prevail on Professor Harvey to remain longer than this. I told 
him that we had tried to persuade Professor Harvey in this area, 
but that he had finally made up his mind that he would have to 
leave at the end of the year. Mr. Seidman, however, who presided 
over the Faculty in Professor Harvey's absence, would be stay-
ing longer, and indeed might stay indefinitely, as I hoped he 
would. I explained Mr. Seidman's situation, and the President 
assented to the idea that it would be well to retain his ser-
vices for as long as he wished to stay. I mentioned to the 
President that, as agreed earlier with him, we expected that 
Judge Ollennu would replace Professor Harvey as Dean of the 
Faculty. The President now expressed some doubt about this, 
wondering whether Judge Ollennu's academic qualifications were 
adequate. I suggested that the President should see Professor 
Harvey and myself to discuss this and other matters pertaining 
to the Law Faculty. The President agreed to this. 
"In the course of the discussion, the President mentioned 
that he would have liked the Faculty of Law to concern itself 
not only with its own students, but with people like local court 
magistrates who were very much in need of some kind of 
rudimentary legal training. I told the President that, as it 
happened, Professor Harvey had made proposals last July to the 
Ministry of Justice for the setting up at the University of 
short-term courses of instruction for such magistrates during 
the long vacation. This proposal was, however, turned down by 
the Ministry of Justice and accordingly, of course, the Faculty 
of Law had not been able to undertake the courses. The Presi-
dent expressed surprise at this information." 
I shared the Vice Chancellor's optimism following this dis-
cussion with the President and looked forward to an early op-
portunity to discuss with him the existing program of the 
Faculty of Law, our policy on the recruitment of senior staff, 
and our plans for further development. 
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During his conversation with the President on October 27, 
the Vice Chancellor also reported on the progress of the discus-
sions he had been having with Mr. Boateng, the Minister for the 
Interior, on the citizenship training program. He showed the 
President a list of the proposed subjects and lecturers which 
the President approved. Dr. Nkrumah suggested, however, that 
there should be a lecture on the Convention Peoples' Party, as 
he thought the nature and character of the party were not un-
derstood by the students. The Vice Chancellor asked the Presi-
dent if he himself would be willing to give such a lecture and 
the President tentatively agreed to do so, as well as to meet a 
representative group of students for an informal discussion. The 
President also indicated that he would like to dine in the Uni-
versity from time to time, perhaps once a month. Throughout 
these discussions the President was cordial and seemingly quite 
reasonable. 
On October 29, Mr. Justice Nii Amaa Ollennu called on me to 
discuss the proposal that he leave the Court and come to the 
University. He indicated that it had come to his attention that 
a member of the Law Faculty was extremely hostile to him and 
constantly attacked him in discussions with politically promi-
nent people. Ollennu felt that if he left the relative security 
of the Court, he would only face personal embarrassment and the 
probable loss of all effectiveness on the Law Faculty. I told 
Judge Ollennu that I was not surprised by his report since I was 
aware of some of the ambitions within our group but asked him to 
give further thought to the matter before asking me to have his 
name withdrawn from consideration as my successor. This he 
agreed to do. In our discussion no names were mentioned but I 
was well aware that the member of the Faculty to whom Judge 01-
lennu referred was Dr. W. c. Ekow-Daniels. 
On October 30, I discussed my conversation with Ollennu 
with the Vice Chancellor, and we agreed that the only possible 
course was to bide our time, hoping that the attack on Ollennu 
could be blunted and that the plan to bring him to the 
University could be carried out. The reservations expressed by 
the President in his discussion with the Vice Chancellor the 
previous week indicated, however, that the effort to undermine 
Ollennu's appo~ntment in the University had already reached a 
fairly advanced stage. 
In the same conversation on October 30, the Vice Chancellor 
reported that he had received a communication from the Presi-
dent's office saying that one matter the President had failed to 
discuss with the Vice Chancellor in their conversation on the 
27th was the appointment of Mr. E. A. L. Bannerman to the Law 
Faculty. The letter said that the President understood that Ban-
nerman had now filed an application for appointment, that the 
President had met Mr. Bannerman and was very anxious that he be 
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appointed. The Vice Chancellor said that this was the first any 
such pressure had come to him from Flagstaff House. I gave Dr. 
O'Brien the background on the Bannerman case, indicated that I 
believe the usual University procedures and criteria should be 
applied to his application and that in my judgment he was not 
qualified for any University appointment. The Vice Chancellor 
asked for the files and we discovered that Mr. Bannerman had, in 
fact, recently filed an application for appointment as either 
Professor or Senior Lecturer. I undertook to take up certain 
references on Mr. Bannerman which might be considered if his ap-
plication later came before the Appointments Board. 
A relevant non-University matter should be mentioned at 
this point. The post of editor of the Ghana Law Reports had been 
vacant since October, 1962. Following advertisement and the con-
sideration of several applicants, the General Legal Council of-
fered the post to Dr. J. B. Danquah. Dr. Danquah was a senior 
member of the Bar in Ghana, who, though not particularly well 
regarded as a lawyer, had had a long and fairly distinguished 
career as a writer, scholar, and political figure. He was long 
the leader of the opposition United Party and was the candidate 
of that Party for the Presidency in 1960. The administrative 
steps involved in appointing Dr. Danquah to the post were not 
completed until the autumn of 1963. 
By a letter dated October 30, 1963, signed by the Secretary 
of the Cabinet, the adverse reactions of the President to the 
appointment of Dr. Danquah were brought to the notice of the 
Judicial Secretary for the attention of the Council. The Secre-
tary indicated that "Osagyef o is surprised that having regard to 
the long history of Dr. Danquah's opposition to the government 
and his policies, the General Legal Council offered him this ap-
pointment without considering it necessary to seek the views or 
the approval of the Minister of Justice or the government before 
confirming it. Osagyefo has directed that if this is the way the 
Legal Council is going to make use of the public funds at its 
disposal, then its subvention should be stopped." The Secretary 
asked that this matter be brought to the attention of Chief 
Justice and that he be informed for the information of the 
President what action the Council proposed to take. 
On November 1, the Secretary of the Cabinet wrote another 
letter to the General Legal Council recalling the statement made 
by the President in his address at the opening of the Institute 
of African studies concerning the continuation of instruction in 
the Ghana Law School. He referred briefly to the fact, which had 
been reported to the President by the Vice Chancellor, that the 
Minister for Justice had rejected the proposal of the Faculty of 
Law to provide special courses for local court magistrates and 
other persons. He went on to say that the President was anxious 
that the Law School should continue to provide courses for per-
sons who wished to acquire a knowledge of the law to assist them 
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in their work and wanted action taken as soon as possible to 
provide such courses in the Law School with the cooperation of 
the University and the Institute of Public Education. Finally, 
the President suggested that Mr. E ~ A. L. Bannerman should be 
retained as head of the Law School for the purpose of offering 
this kind of training. 
On November 2, the General Legal Council met to consider 
these two communications from the President. The discussion in 
this meeting need not be recounted in detail. It was evident 
that the pressure from the President caused widespread con-
sternation. An effort was made by many to find a way to relieve 
the Council of its present embarrassment without causing it a 
substantial loss of face. A number of members pointed out that 
the Council was so closely identified in the public mind with 
both the Bar and the judiciary that action by the Government 
tending to humiliate the Council would reflect on the other 
groups. Dr. Danquah was a member of the Council and remained in 
attendance during the session. His contributions tended to be 
highly emotional and directed toward general political criticism 
of the Government. The members of the Council representing the 
Bar supported Dr. Danquah. The general tenor of the discussion 
was well summed up in the comment of one of the Justices of the 
Supreme Court who urged that the Council must accept the 
realities of the situation: it either buckles under to the 
Government or is cut down. He observed that it was foolish to 
talk about fighting for principle unless one were prepared to 
die for principle. He concluded that he was not prepared to do 
so and he doubted if other members of the Council were. Many 
spe~kers urged Dr. Danquah to resign from the post of editor in 
order to relieve the pressure on the Council. The Council final-
ly decided to adjourn the meeting until November s, in order to 
permit Dr. Danquah to consider what action he would take. With 
respect to the second matter raised by the Secretary to the 
Cabinet, that is, the continuation of instruction in the Law 
School, the Council took no action. It merely decided that I 
should discuss this problem with the President during my 
scheduled meeting with him the following week and should seek a 
clarification of his views. 
On November 2, the Vice Chancellor sent to me a copy of a 
letter from the President in which the President suggested the 
adoption of a procedure in the University "whereby appointments 
of Heads of Departments and Faculties, such as Political 
Science, Law, and other Departments, could be made after you 
have discussed such appointments with me as Chancellor of the 
University." The Vice Chancellor also sent for comment his draft 
reply to this communication. He stressed to me his concern about 
the implementation of the President's suggestion in the case of 
the Department of Political Science where Professor Henry L. 
Bretton of the University of Michigan had recently been ap-
pointed Professor and Head of Department, to take up his duties 
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in September, 1964. In view of the fact that the Bretton ap-
pointment had already been made, it might have been possible to 
take the position that the President's request for consultation 
concerned only appointments to be ~ade in the future. On the 
other hand, the express reference to the Department of Political 
Science created the risk that if the President's views on 
Professor Bretton's appointment were not sought, he might feel 
that the Vice Chancellor had been less than frank with him. 
In his draft reply the Vice Chancellor accepted the proce-
dure whereby Heads of Departments would not be appointed without 
prior discussion with the President, acting as Chancellor of the 
University. He pointed out, however, that under the University 
statutes Deans of Faculties were elected by the members of the 
Faculty Board itself and were not chosen by the Appointments 
Board or by the University Council. The Vice Chancellor also in-
formed the President that Professor Bretton had been appointed 
to the chair of Political Science. In discussions with the Vice 
Chancellor, I strongly supported the view that the University 
should not stand on the technicality that Professor Bretton's 
appointment had already been made but should make full dis-
closure to the Chancellor and seek to secure his support for 
Professor Bretton's appointment. It should be emphasized that 
the procedure proposed by the President and accepted by the 
University at this time did not grant to the President any ap-
pointive power. On the contrary, it committed the University 
only to seek the President's views with respect to the prospec-
tive appointments of Department Heads. These views could then be 
taken into account by both the Appointments Board and the 
University Council when they came to consider the ultimate ap-
pointment. 
It will be recalled that during his conversation with Dr. 
O'Brien on October 27, the President had accepted the suggestion 
that he should see me to discuss developments in the Faculty of 
Law. Subsequently, I was asked by the General Legal Council to 
use this meeting as an occasion to discuss with the President 
the suggestions he had made on continuation of instruction in 
the Ghana Law School. On November 5, the Vice Chancellor sent to 
me a copy of a letter, dated the previous day, from Mr. E. J. 
Okoh, Secretary to the Cabinet, in which Mr. Okoh said: 
"As you requested, I have asked the President about the 
possibility of another meeting with you and Professor Harvey to 
discuss the future plans of the Law Faculty. 
"Osagyef o does not consider that such a meeting is neces-
sary now, in view of the full discussion he had with you at your 
earlier meeting, and I believe also at the dinner in your house 
last Friday. 
"In this connection, Osagyefo has asked me to reiterate the 
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view he expressed at the opening of the Institute of African 
Studies that steps should be taken to insure that the staff of 
the Law Faculty is Africanized completely as soon as possible." 
In the Vice Chancellor's draft reply to this letter, in 
which I concurred, he pointed out again that my term in the 
University would end at the close of the academic year 1963-64 
and that there would be consultation with the President regard-
ing my successor. This was appropriate under the earlier agree-
ment since, as Professor of Law, I was regarded as a Department 
Head as well as Dean of the Faculty of Law. The Vice Chancellor 
also pointed out that, of the remaining twelve members of the 
Law Faculty, six were Ghanaians and six were expatriates. Thus, 
the percentage of Ghanaians in the Law Faculty was higher than 
in the University in general. The Vice Chancellor urged the 
President to reconsider the matter of seeing me. He indicated 
his own impression that some members of the Law Faculty had had 
an opportunity to convey to the President views which were not 
entirely objective, while the person responsible for the Law 
Faculty had had no opportunity to inform the President of the 
state of affairs as he saw them. 
The Vice Chancellor's reference to reports emanating from 
other members of the Law Faculty arose out of the fact that fol-
lowing the President's speech at the Institute of African 
Studies on October 26, we had been informed that Dr. W. c. Ekow-
Daniels had publicly boasted that he had drafted those passages 
of the speech attacking the Faculty of Law. It later appeared 
from his own admissions that Dr. Daniels had also urged the 
President to withdraw his consent to see me and, according to 
his statement, had prepared . for the President's signature the 
letter refusing the promised interview. While it is entirely 
possible that Dr. Daniels tended to overemphasize his actual in-
fluence in these matters, he certainly appeared to be actively 
engaged in an attempt to prejudice the Faculty in the eyes of 
the President by false and malicious reporting and criticisms. 
In his draft reply to the President, the Vice Chancellor indi-
cated his awareness that these reports on the Faculty of Law 
purported to rest on "grounds of a socialist character." The 
Vice Chancellor concluded by saying "I am quite satisfied that 
the real motives had nothing to do with socialism and much to do 
with their personal interests." I shared Dr. O'Brien's convic-
tion that the time had come for meeting as directly as possible 
the behind-the-scenes scheming and malicious distortions of 
which we had been informed. 
In view of the continuing refusal of the President to 
see me, I notified the Chief Justice that I would be unable to-
make the inquiries on behalf of the General Legal Council which 
it had authorized me to make when I saw the President. I also 
prepared a brief memorandum for the President describing the 
program in the Faculty and in the Ghana Law School, with parti-
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cular reference to the concerns and implicit premises of the 
President as indicated in his speech at the Institute of African 
Studies. I forwarded it to the Vice Chancellor for submission 
to the President. ~ 
At the adjourned meeting of the General Legal Council on 
November 5, Dr. J. B. Danquah submitted his resignation as 
editor of the Ghana Law Reports. The principal discussion at 
this meeting concerned payments of compensation for Dr. Dan-
quah's losses in terminating his practice in order to accept the 
post of editor. The Council recommended that he be given an ~ 
gratia payment and authorized the Chairman and another member of 
the Council to negotiate with the President to this end. The 
President later refused to approve any ex gratia payment to Dr. 
Danquah and thus the unhappy matter ended. At the conclusion of 
the meeting of the General Legal Council on November 5, I indi-
cated to the Council that I had refrained from participating in 
the debate on the Danquah matter and also from voting, since in 
my judgment it involved an issue of Ghanaian politics and not a 
matter of the professional judgment of the Council, thus making 
it inappropriate for me as an expatriate to participate. 
On November 11, the Vice Chancellor sent to me a letter 
from the Minister for the Interior enclosing his proposals for a 
series of lectures to be given in the University in connection 
with the citizenship training program. Mr. Boateng proposed 
four lectures during the Michaelmas Term emphasizing "Nkru-
mahism" in general. The lectures were to be given by Mr. Boateng 
on Civic Responsibility in the Universities, by Dr. w. c. Ekow-
D~niels on the Legal Implications of Nkrumahism, by Mr. Isaac 
Chineboah on the Educational Implications of Nkrumahism, and by 
Professor w. E. Abraham on the Conceptual Basis of Nkrumahism. 
During the Lent term the emphasis of the lectures would shift 
from Nkrumahism in general to Nkrumahism in Ghana, and for the 
third term they would dwell on the application of Nkrumahism in 
Africa. As lecturers for the second and third terms Mr. Boateng 
proposed a number of leading figures in the CPP, including some 
of its most extreme apologists such as the editor of the Ghana 
EVENING NEWS, Mr. Eric Heyman. Mr. Boateng proposed that this 
lecture series be included in the program of the Institute of 
African Studies. 
The reply of the Vice Chancellor to this communication from 
Mr. Boateng followed lines we had previously discussed and 
agreed upon. The Vice Chancellor pointed out that in connection 
with the citizenship training program there had been from the 
beginning two possible approaches: the first would be for the 
University to draw up its own program, integrating it as far as 
possible into its regular curriculum and in general sponsoring 
the lecture series. The University had been quite willing to do 
this. The second approach, which the Minister seemed at the mo-
ment to favor, was for the lecture series to be devised by the 
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Minister as the person responsible for the program, in which 
case the University would merely provide facilities for the 
delivery of the lectures and notify students of them. This the 
University was also prepared to do.~ 
The Vice Chancellor emphasized, however, that he, as 
responsible academic Head of the University, could not approve 
including in the curricula of the University courses of lectures 
which had not been drawn up by a competent University body. This 
involved the vital issue of principle that an academic body must 
have full responsibility for its course of instruction and can-
not relinquish this responsibility to any others. Since the Min-
ister proposed that his lecture series be included in the pro-
gram of the Institute of African Studies, it would appear that 
this principle was called into question. In this letter, and in 
a personal conversation with the Minister on November 8, the 
Vice Chancellor indicated that the University could not and 
would not compromise on its insistence that the lecture series 
proposed by the Minister, if offered, should be extra-
curricular, non-compulsory and non-examinable. In the conversa-
tion on November 8, the Minister denied that he had ever con-
templated structuring the lectures in such a way as to trans-
gress this principle. With this understanding, the Vice Chancel-
lor indicated that he saw no reason why the University could not 
announce the series and provide lecture halls for the several 
occasions. 
Mr. Boateng also agreed at this time to meet a group of the 
students and academic and administrative staff on November 18, 
for an informal discussion. This meeting was, in fact, held and 
Mr. Boateng spent a rather uncomfortable evening circulating 
among small groups of students who apparently had no hesitation 
in expressing their comments, questions and criticisms. I at-
tended this meeting but did not participate in the discussions 
with the Minister. It was my impression that the other senior 
members of the University who attended also abstained from the 
discussions, leaving the field open to the Minister and the stu-
dents. 
Another pressure on the Law Faculty having seemingly 
dangerous political support arose from the effort to establish 
in the University a program of instruction for external degrees 
under the auspices of the Institute of Public Education. The In-
stitute was directed by Professor J. c. DeGraf-Johnson who was 
one of the few vehement supporters of the Party in the 
University. Professor DeGraf-Johnson had been appointed Director 
of the Institute by the President himself, and, as the head of 
an organization independent of the University though affiliated 
with it, he was able to avoid a number of the usual University 
controls on his activities. It seemed quite evident that 
Professor DeGraf-Johnson was in an empire-building phase and was 
utilizing all his talents for political ingratiation in support 
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of his program. 
During the academic year 1962-63, I had been asked by 
the Executive Committee of the Acad'emic Board to serve as 
Chairman of a special study committee responsible for developing 
a set of guiding principles for the development of external de-
gree programs within the University. The report of this com-
mittee was adopted by the Executive Committee and ultimately by 
the Academic Board. The position thus adopted recognized the 
need for extending educational opportunities as broadly as was 
consistent with the maintenance of high quality. The 
University's position was made clear, however, that external de-
gree program should be comparable in quality with those offered 
for internal degrees, that the syllabus and examination stand-
ards should be the same and that these programs should be 
organized only when available staff of the requisite quality 
could be appointed through usual University channels. 
The Law Faculty considered its involvement in an external 
degree program and I advised the Vice Chancellor and Professor 
DeGraf-Johnson that, while we were sympathetic to the objective, 
our limited staff, currently available and in immediate pros-
pect, should not be diluted by assigning to it responsibility 
for further instructional programs. It was necessary to maintain 
this position unless our teachers were to be diverted from the 
research and writing that legal development in the country 
urgently demanded. I was fearful that yielding to the pressures 
would merely serve to create within the University a new program 
no better than the one in the Ghana Law School which the General 
Legal Council had recently decided to terminate. In a number of 
discussions with Professor DeGraf-Johnson and members of his 
staff, I explained my own position and that of the Law Faculty. 
It was quite clear, however, that Professor DeGraf-Johnson was 
not prepared to accept this view. He tried in a number of ways 
to exert political pressure on me and to go behind me to enlist 
the individual support of members of the Law Faculty for an in-
structional program in law organized directly under the auspices 
of the Institute. That some of the President's troublesome at-
titudes rested on reports and arguments from Professor DeGraf-
Johnson seemed a safe assumption. 
Another aspect of the University's program which was feel-
ing considerable outside pressure at this time was the proposed 
development of a Medical School with the assistance of the Amer-
ican Government. When American aid was first suggested, there 
seemed to have been a misunderstanding within the Ghana Govern-
ment on the extent of the assistance that might be expected. In 
the course of time, however, the American government made clear 
its intention to limit aid to funds for the construction of a 
basic sciences building and additional funds for the employment 
of teaching staff, the latter backed by a guarantee that such 
staff would be provided for five years. No arrangements were 
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made for the financing of a teaching hospital. This misundersta-
nding probably led to some ill will on the Ghanaian side, but 
negotiations looking toward the consummation of the contracts 
between the Government and the Unitred States continued long 
after the limitation on assistance had been made entirely clear. 
There was, as well, a continuing annoyance arising from the ex-
tremely slow pace of negotiation and final approval in Washing-
ton. Here again, however, uncertainty of policy and delay on the 
Ghanaian side probably contributed somewhat to the problem. 
Progress was nevertheless being made. Dr. Richard Cross, former-
ly of the Medical School of the University of Pittsburgh, had 
been appointed Professor of Medicine and Dean of the Faculty of 
Medicine. He was actively engaged in completing negotiations for 
the grants. The time had been reached when it seemed possible to 
expect the final approval of the grant and loan contracts in 
Washington by late November or early December, 1963. Two groups 
of pre-medical students had already been admitted to the 
University, and the leading class was scheduled to begin clini-
cal work in October, 1964. While having no direct responsi-
bility with respect to any of these matters, I had been involved 
for several months in consultations with the Vice Chancellor 
and, during his visits to Ghana, with Dr. Cross on various 
aspects of the Medical School development. 
In late November, 1963, the Vice Chancellor was notified of 
a Cabinet decision unilaterally terminating all negotiations for 
American participation in the development of the Medical School. 
The Cabinet memorandum did not state grounds for this action but 
merely declared that it had been decided that an adequate Medi-
cal_ School could be established in Ghana with resources already 
available in Accra and at the University. Such a decision would 
not have been surprising much earlier, but at this stage of the 
negotiations it filled us in the University with consternation. 
The Vice Chancellor immediately made plans for a trip to Europe 
in an effort to recruit the minimum staff required for the 
beginning of instruction in October of the following year. The 
Pro-Vice Chancellor visited Nigeria to explore the possibilities 
of having medical schools there absorb our students who would 
soon be ready for clinical work. 
The well springs of the Cabinet decision were not difficult 
to determine. A South African doctor, Dr. Joseph Gillman, who 
was Director of the Ghana Institute of Health, had long been 
fundamentally opposed to the whole idea of an agreement with the 
United States. Dr. Gillman obviously wanted to control medical 
education in Ghana to an extent that he probably did not think 
possible if the Medical School developed within the University 
and with American cooperation. Whether his position had any 
relevance to the general East-West struggle I would not un-
dertake to say, but it had been clear for some time that Dr. 
Gillman was extremely hostile to the United States and, having 
access to the President, was making every effort to undermine 
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the proposed cooperation. Thus Dr. Gillman nurtured the growing 
anti-American feelings of the President as well as his distrust 
of the University. 
In these circumstances there was little the University 
could do except make every effort to find the resources neces-
sary to replace those which had been expected from the United 
States. As the Vice Chancellor observed when the Cabinet deci-
sion reached him, "This isn't changing horses in midstream; it 
amounts to shooting your horse under you just as you reached the 
opposite bank." Perhaps fortunately, since my departure from 
Ghana, a decision has been made that the proposed Medical School 
will be an independent institution rather than part of the 
University. 
On November 20, the Vice Chancellor informed me of the 
most pointed action to that time against the Law Faculty. Nana 
Kobina Nketsia IV, Chairman of the University Council and an in-
timate of the President, reported that it was the President's 
view that expatriate members of the Law Faculty should be dis-
missed immediately. The Vice Chancellor informed Nana that he 
was not prepared to take any such action and that, if there were 
an insistence on it, it would be necessary to include him as 
well. Nana urged Dr. O'Brien not to take an extreme position as 
yet and indicated that he himself was urging the President to 
withhold action on the ground that dismissal would involve the 
substantial expense of paying off the contracts of the dismissed 
teachers. The Vice Chancellor replied that the cost, great or 
small, was not the issue; rather it was the integrity of the 
University's appointment procedure and the security of tenure of 
its staff, free from outside pressure. Nana felt, however, that 
as a practical bargaining point he could make good use of the 
cost factor with the President. The Vice Chancellor, therefore, 
agreed to ask me to prepare a schedule showing the costs in-
volved. I prepared such a schedule and submitted it to Dr. 
O'Brien. 
Dr. O'Brien indicated no great optimism over the prospects 
of blunting the attacks on the University. He said that the 
President was in a difficult and hostile mood, that the prevail-
ing atmosphere in Flagstaff House was now strongly anti-American 
and anti-State Department. This attitude imperiled the Law 
Faculty more than others because of the substantial American in-
volvement there. It also supported those in the University who 
were willing to exploit general political tensions for their own 
benefit. The Vice Chancellor complained strongly to Nana Nketsia 
about the activities in Flagstaff House of Dr. W. c. Ekow-
Daniels and Professor Abraham. Nana did not deny their ac-
tivities but said their influence should not be overestimated. 
The Vice Chancellor was doubtful, however, that Nana knew the 
extent to which these two had access to the President. 
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I informed the Vice Chancellor that in no circumstances 
would I resign from my post. If dismissed by a competent 
University body, I would, of course, have no alternative to 
relinquishing my duties. Otherwise j I would continue to perform 
them according to my own judgment. In these circumstances, if 
the Government should insist on getting rid of me, it would have 
to deport me. I added that if the pressure on me should now sub-
side and I were able to finish the year in the University it 
seemed clear that a strong political effort would continue to 
determine the choice of my successor. I mentioned that one of 
the Ghanaian members of the Law Faculty had told me the previous 
day that if the choice of my successor seemed to be political it 
would be necessary for him to reconsider his own position and 
that he would probably leave the University. I also told the 
Vice Chancellor that I would strongly advise all of my staff to 
remain with the University and try to do a good job. Since I 
could understand the misgivings they would have over the ap-
pointment of Dr. Daniels as my successor, however, I would ad-
vise the American foundation which had assisted us with the 
salaries of some of the expatriate members that if these 
teachers should decide that they ought to resign, every effort 
should be made to see that they did not suffer financial loss. 
The Vice Chancellor approved my position as thus outlined. l 
Since the President continued to refuse to see me, it was 
necessary for the General Legal Council to find some other means l 
of responding to the proposals from the President on the con-
tinuation of instruction in the Law School. The President's com-
munication of November 1, did not make clear whether any con-
tinuing instruction should be for persona seeking full prof es-
sional qualification.or should be limited to courses for civil 
servants, lay magistrates and others who needed an elementary 
knowledge of law for the better performance of their duties. The 
Council had no reluctance to support the latter in the Law 
School but felt strongly committed, I think, to the earlier 
delegation of teaching responsibility for professional 
qualification to the University. In an effort to obtain 
clarification of the President's views and to formulate 
proposals for the Council, the Chief Justice assembled a sub-
committee of the Council consisting of himself and Justices W. 
B. Van Lare and Edward Akufo-Addo. He invited the Minister of 
Justice and me to meet with the sub-committee to consider the 
steps to be taken. 
After a meeting of this group at which we discussed the 
position of the local court magistrates, with the Minister of 
Justice reiterating his view that very few of the present judges 
were educable, I suggested that I would prepare a working paper 
for the consideration of the subcommittee and ultimately of the 
Council. If the Council approved the paper, it could be sub-
mitted to the President as the basis for clarifying his views 
and perhaps coming to agreement with him. This working paper was 
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adopted by the Council. It reviewed the development of legal 
education in Ghana and suggested that education for professional 
qualification should be entrusted fully to the University, as 
the Council had already decided. The paper also outlined the 
kinds of instruction in law for those not seeking professional 
qualification which were now available in the University and 
elsewhere. It expressed the desire of the Council to cooperate 
fully in establishing new programs to meet further needs as 
these could be identified. To meet one such need, the training 
of local court judges, it proposed the establishment of a post-
recruitment training program which, in the course of time, would 
replace most of the present magistrates with better qualified 
personnel. The working paper was transmitted to the President 
but elicited no response prior to my departure from Ghana. 
There were indications, however, that if the President ever 
seriously considered the proposals it contained, he rejected 
them. The fact that the three judges on the sub-committee also 
made up the Special Court sitting on the second treason trial 
(to be discussed below) doubtless prejudiced the working paper. 
On November 22, the Vice Chancellor had a meeting with the 
President at which certain aspects of the status of the Law 
Faculty were discussed. The tenor of this conversation is indi-
cated by the following excerpts from an aide memoire prepared by 
the Vice Chancellor: 
"As regards the Law School Faculty, I told him that we 
agreed to the objective of Ghanaianisation. We were most con-
cerned, however, to ensure that progress towards Ghanaianisation 
should be made here, as in other branches of the University, in 
an orderly fashion, and that there should be no brusque termi-
nation of contracts which would, in my strongly held opinion, 
lead to unrest at the University and probably to departures of 
many valuable members of the University, including both 
Ghanaians and expatriates. I felt that this would be gravely 
damaging to our common objectives. The President appeared to ac-
quiesce in this view, and did not urge that any immediate steps 
should be taken. He went on, however, to criticize Professor 
Harvey's outlook and, in particular, his inaugural address, in 
which he had sought to detach law from social values. I said 
that I had had some discussions and even arguments with Profes-
sor Harvey on this particular theme, and I did not seek to 
defend his thesis. I said I was convinced, however, that any 
view professed by Professor Harvey was a view honestly held by 
him, and that he had rendered extremely valuable services to the 
University, notably in the field of the revision of the cur-
riculum. In any case, Professor Harvey was due to leave at the 
end of the academic year and I would discuss with the Chancellor 
the question of a successor. The President here said that he 
wished to be clearly understood on this matter. He did not 
wish, in any way, to dictate to the University, who should be 
appointed. He fully appreciated the academic considerations in-
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volved here and had no wish to upset them. However, where con-
siderations of policy entered in, as in the field of political 
science, he felt he should have an opportunity of expressing his 
views, before an appointment was m~e. 
"I ventured the opinion that in the whole field of mat-
ters related to the Law Faculty the President might have been 
misled by inaccurate information disseminated, for interested 
reasons, by one member of that faculty, whom I named. The Presi-
dent smiled and said that he thought I myself had been misin-
formed. This member had not been his informant. He said that his 
informant had been outside the University. I indicated that an 
informant outside the University could be briefed by one inside 
the University, but we did not pursue this field of enquiry. 
"Throughout the interview the President was cordial and 
on many occasions affirmed his support for the University and 
his sensitivity for the University's character. At the end of 
the conversation he said that, as he saw it, he and I together 
were laying the foundations of something important for the fu-
ture of higher education in Africa." 
The gross distortion of my own views contained in this 
statement by the President was extremely frustrating since it 
was used as a weapon not only against me but the Faculty as 
well. On this occasion I came closer to a statement in anger 
than at any other time in the long weeks of mounting pressure. 
The report from the Vice Chancellor on his conversation with the 
President led to the following exchange of correspondence which 
I set out in full. 
"Dear Conor, 
"Your report on your conversations with the President 
yesterday was most interesting and I am ~rat~ful for your let-
ting me see it so soon. As you can well imagine, the results of 
the conference are of great concern to me. 
"I am greatly surprised to learn that my philosophical 
position has in some way become controversial, as evidenced by 
the President's criticism of my inaugural lecture in which, to 
use the words of your report I "sought to detach law from social 
values." I have stated my position publicly on more than one oc-
casion and I shall not burden you with a full statement here. If 
you are interested in pursuing this matter, I would suggest you 
read my two lectures on the Rule of Law, in the attached book-
let. [The two lectures qppear in the principal text at pp. .] 
I also enclose a copy of my inaugural lecture which may require 
re-examination. 
The essence of my view may be stated quite simply: law is a 
technique of social ordering whose value content is not self-
~ 
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validating and which in turn cannot be validated by reference to 
some a priori, self-evident order which can claim universal 
validity, I should have thought it obvious to even the least 
subtle mind that if one accepts thi~ analytical premise the 
source one examines for the value content of a particular legal 
order is the society that order is to serve; see here particu-
larly the [early paragraphs] of my inaugural lecture. This view 
is further illustrated by the concluding sentencee of that lec-
ture: "At the formal opening of the Ghana Law School in January, 
1962. Dr. Nkrumah declared that 'the law should be the legal ex-
pression of the political, economic and social conditions of the 
people and of their aims for progress.' Such a relativistic and 
pragmatic approach has in my judgment led to the implementation 
of the value acceptances described in the evolution of the law 
of Ghana since independence." 
I have commented in similar vein elsewhere. For example: 
(1) In the paper on the work of this Faculty which I 
presented to the Conference of English Law Teachers, held in Ox-
ford on June 28-29, 1963, I said: "Extensive discussions within 
the Faculty during the academic year 1962-63 led to an abandon-
ment of the old four year LL.B. programme and the adoption of 
the present scheme. All course syllabuses were also revised and 
syllabuses developed for the new courses. The unifying purpose 
of the revisions was to provide an ample framework, clearly 
relevant to Ghana, within which the basic lawyer's skills of 
analysis, synthesis and critical evaluation could be developed 
to a high degree. Since the Faculty is now responsible for all 
law teaching in Ghana to full professional qualification, 
knowledge of the existing law is naturally stressed. In a rapid-
ly developing society. however. where older legal institutions 
may have become obsolete and rapid social change constantly 
raises novel problems. the Faculty attaches primary importance 
to the development of capacities for creative participation in 
the adaptation of law to new social needs." 
(2) In my annual report to you, dated 25 September, 1963, I 
summarized our curricular revisions by saying "The Faculty are 
prepared for the coming year with a carefully considered cur-
riculum responsive in our best judgment to the developing needs 
of Ghana." 
(3) In a paper presented to an International Conference on 
African Law held in Venice between October 3 and 6, 1963, I said 
in partial summary: "With strong emphasis on two important 
points I conclude. The first of these is that the best African 
development will not result merely from the assimilation of 
foreign legal or governmental models, even though assimilation 
involves some local adaptation. The leaders of the new African 
countries have in general been quite eclectic, willing to con-
sider foreign experience and models. Many of these remain from 
-316-
the colonial period or have been newly adopted. It is essential. 
howeyer. that these be examined and re-examined with a critical 
eye to determine how well they meet African needs. It seems 
probable that many will be found wanting in this respect." 
I need not pile up further evidence of the gross distortion 
of both my viewpoint and my actual work in this Faculty which is 
implicit in the President's reference. This distortion may sug-
gest three possible explanations: (1) that the President has 
never read my inaugural lecture or any other expression of my 
views and has merely relied on misrepresentations; (2) that the 
President has in fact read but was incapable of understanding; 
(3) that the President has read and has understood but continues 
to distort to achieve some further aim. I find each of these 
explanations quite plausible. Perhaps you will have some view 
as to which is the proper one. 
I cannot regard the above as a mere academic tempest in a 
teapot, nor do I find any real assurance in the President's 
remarks to you yesterday. His gravitation between pious 
platitudes about non-interference in the University and support 
for its development on the one hand and objective conduct of ex-
actly the opposite sort is well known. One need only recall that 
only one day after a completely unwarranted attack on this 
Faculty, he expressed to you the hope that I might be persuaded 
to stay beyond this year. I think the time has come for real 
clarification, so that I may know where this Faculty stands and 
how planning for its future may take place. Thus far, I have not 
discussed developments with my colleagues but, as you well know, \ 
there are no secrets in Legon. I have been told by Ghanaian \ 
friends that knowledge of the various pressures on this Faculty 
are widely known and discussed in the University. Thus far, 
three Ghanaian members of my staff have approached me about 
leave arrangements which will enable them to avoid the impending 
battle. One of our expatriate teachers has come to seek my help 
in finding a position elsewhere. The man tentatively selected to 
succeed me has beaten a hasty retreat, and no very clear suc-
cessor is in sight. I, therefore, suggest very strongly that 
steps be taken as soon as possible to determine whether the 
President's platitudes have real meaning. These are: 
(1) Discussion with the President of specific names to be 
considered for the Professorship of Law. I am in a position to 
suggest certain names for preliminary clearance so that the 
University might begin negotiations. 
(2) Ascertainment of the status of present expatriate mem-
bers of this Faculty beyond the present academic year. One must 
assume, I think, that Nana's recent message was not idle gossip. 
I cannot in good conscience hold off much longer in informing my 
expatriate staff of the security or lack of security of their 
tenure. 
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(3) Clarification of our recruitment needs, particularly as 
affected by the possible departure of all expatriates, and of 
the range of choice we may have in~ making new appointments. 
Steps toward recruitment must be taken in the near future if we 
are to find and attract acceptable people. I will be glad to 
discuss these matters fully at your convenience. 
"Professor W.B. Harvey 
"Faculty of Law 
"Legon. 
"Dear Bill, 
Yours, 
William B. Harvey" 
CONFIDENTIAL 
November 25, 1963. 
"I have been distressed, ever since our last conversation, 
and especially since receiving your letter, by the thought that 
you felt I had let you down in my conversation with the Presi-
dent, and still more distressed by the uneasy feeling that there 
might be some truth in this. 
"The President, in raising, as he did, the subject of your 
philosophical views, took me rather by surprise and found me 
somewhat at a loss. First of all, I have never been sure that I 
really understood or could accept the full implications of your 
views on the nature of law. This was not because I felt them to 
be in any way inappropriate to Ghana's needs, but rather - as I 
have argued with you before -that they seem to me to be all too 
appropriate to the needs of any state and to be of little aid or 
comfort to, say, judges operating in extreme situations such as 
South Africa or Nazi Germany. You have accused me here of rais-
ing the ghost of Natural Law, and this may well be so; it could 
be the result of my Catholic upbringing. In any case, you will 
understand that, granted this condition of thought - clouded as 
I am sure you will consider it - I was in no position to make a 
ringing defence of your thesis when the President criticized it. 
I must admit that I also had in mind the thought that there was 
no harm in letting him let off steam about your thesis and that 
I would do better to reserve my fire for the issue on which it 
would be needed: the retention of the expatriate members of the 
Law School. This was, to use the Nkrumahist vocabulary, tactical 
action rather than positive action. In retrospect, however, I am 
not very well pleased with this particular passage in the dis-
cussion. My best course would have been, I think, to have 
refused to be drawn into a discussion of your philosophical 
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views at all. I regret having handled it, as I did, and I hope 
you will accept this sincere expression of my regrets. 
"I should make clear that the ords in my report about 
seeking to detach law from social values are supposed to be 
oratio oblique. These were the President's actual words. 
"Of the possible explanations of the President's attitude 
that you suggest, I believe that the first is the correct one. I 
know that a colleague of ours, whom you will have no difficulty 
in identifying, has complained to other colleagues of the 
ideological inadequacies of your inaugural lecture and no doubt 
he has complained in other quarters too. 
"I think that the general remarks on your second page are 
extreme and pessimistic. It is all very well to speak of "pious 
platitudes," but it is something that the platitudes of those in 
power do at least remain pious, even in private conversation. 
The impression I have is that the President will continue to ex-
ert pressures on this University, but that at points where he 
finds resistance - as he does on the issue of the expatriates in 
the Law School - he will not increase the pressure to the point 
where something breaks. That at least is the degree of reas-
surance I took from his conversation on Friday. If his intention 
were to have such changes made at all costs, he would necessari-
ly have taken a harder line in his discussions with me. I don't 
agree with your implication that his professions of concern for 
the University are hypocritical. I think they are quite real, 
although I cannot, as you know, agree with all the conclusions 
to which they lead him. 
"I can well understand your concern about the anxieties 
felt by your colleagues in the Faculty of Law. As regards your 
specific suggestions, the following are my views: 
) 
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"l. If you will let me have your list of names, I shall go \ 
to the President for preliminary clearance. 
"2. It would, in my view, be a serious mistake to attempt I 
to ascertain from the President the status of present expatriate l 
members of the Faculty beyond the present academic year. You 
know exactly how this matter stands. The President had indicated 
to me his view that these members should be replaced "as soon as 
possible." I indicated to him in writing in a letter which you 
have seen that, in effect, we would try to replace the younger 
members by Ghanaians as soon as their contracts fell in, and I 
indicated that I thought we should keep Seidman for as long as 
possible. The President has not replied in writing to this, and 
my understanding, in our conversation, was that he would not 
press for any more urgent action. Should he do so, I have al-
ready made clear to you, I think, my own position: that I am not 
prepared to terminate contracts, or to acquiesce in their 
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termination, because of political pressure. In sbort, if these 
contracts are to be terminated, my own will have to be 
terminated with them. I have no reason to assume that the Presi-
dent is at all likely to proceed t6 such extreme action. Nana 
Nketsia, with whom I have discussed the matter fully, and who 
feels that the situation is at present evolving favourably, 
entirely agrees with me on this. An attempt to ascertain the 
status of the members concerned would be mistaken, I think, on 
two grounds: 
"(a) it would be a tacit acceptance of the Government's 
power to remove members of the University. It is for the 
University, not for the Government, to decide this kind of ques-
tion, and this position we must most jealously maintain; 
"(b) our enquiry on this might well revive the question 
which may be dead; in fact I think it is at least moribund, 
although I may be wrong. In any case, our enquiry could at best 
elicit no more than a reiteration of the President's view that 
they should go "as soon as possible." We have no interest in 
eliciting such a reiteration. At worst - and the worst is, as so 
often, rather more probable - it might, being interpreted as a 
sign of weakness, provoke a more draconian and explicit demand 
from Flagstaff House. The thing to do here, in my strongly held 
opinion, is to sit tight, and this is what I propose to do. 
"I see no reason why this position should not be explained 
(in general terms) to your expatriate staff. 
"3. Our recruitment needs must, I think, be assessed on the 
basis that expatriates will remain - with the exception of any 
who voluntarily choose to go - but the times are unpropitious 
for the recruitment of new expatriates. 
"I should be happy to talk all this over with you as soon 
as possible. I need hardly say that I entirely share your con-
cern about the whole situation, and that it has been much on my 
mind since the day of the President's address at the opening of 
the Institute. I believe, however, that the situation is improv-
ing. 
You know how greatly I have relied on your steadying 
counsel in many moments of crisis and I hope you realise how 
grateful I am to you for this. I would be extremely sorry if I 
felt that any degree of misunderstanding should have arisen be-
tween us as a result of my recent interview, and I hope you will 
regard the present letter as, in part, an earnest effort to dis-
sipate any such possible misunderstanding 
Best wishes, 
Yours sincerely, 
"Dr.Coner c. O'Brien 
"Vice Chancellor'a Office 
"Legon 
"Dear Conor, 
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Con or 
Conor Cruise O'Brien, 
Vice Chancellor" 
"November 25, 1963 
"Many thanks for your good letter of today. My only regret 
with respect to my letter of the 23rd is that you may have in-
terpreted it as an attack on you or on what you are doing for 
the University. It was intended as neither. I have valued and 
continue to value the friendship and confidence which have 
characterized our relation, and I can assure you that these are 
unimpaired. 
"As you doubtless detected I came closer to losing my 
temper when I read about the President's reactions last Friday 
than I have at any earlier time. The fact that my own views are 
the focal point of attack while I have no direct opportunity to 
clarify or defend them explains my own sense of frustration. In 
these circumstances the President's continued refusal to see me 
tends to support the somewhat pessimistic view I take of the as- / 
surances given. I fully appreciate the position you were in when 
the President broached the subject of my philosophical views. I 
know full well the reservations you have about them, reserva- \ 
tions I might add which many other thoughtful people have ex- 1 
pressed. 
"On this issue I would add only one brief comment. As you \ 
aptly point out, my view would provide little comfort to the 
South African or German judge who might like to moderate the law 
he is asked to apply. If the law has been validly enacted and is 
unambiguous, his judicial oath demands that he apply it. This 
result may be regrettable but I don't think the situation is im-
proved by permitting the judges to resort to essentially natural 
law norms. History clearly reveals what a short and easy step it 
is from the proposition that only that which is just can be law 
to the proposition that that which is law is therefore just. 
Gesetz ist Gesetz was the Nazi motto which rested on exactly 
that short step. It might also be remembered that the same 
natural law approach which might aid the South African or Nazi 
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German judge enabled Aristotle to justify slavery and the 
Supreme Court of the United states for half a century or better 
to strike down social legislation as unconstitutional. If my 
view appears to cast us all adrift ~in a great relativistic sea, 
it also has the virtue of insisting that the law as enacted can-
not justify itself, that someone's standard of just law must be 
called into play, and that that standard can lead the attack 
directly on the primary law-making agencies-- the executive and 
legislature. 
"At this stage I fully accept your judgment on the three 
specific steps I suggested. With respect to the first, I would 
propose discussion of three possible successors to me. The first 
is Ollennu whose position might be reconsidered at this time. 
The second is Kwamena Bentsi-Enchill whose c.v. is attached. If 
an expatriate can be considered at all, I would suggest Profes-
sor Willard L. Boyd of the Univeraity of Iowa Law School; I at-
tach his c.v, as well. 
"On my second point, I finally conclude that you are right. 
We must accept the assurances at face value and proceed on the 
assumption that all present contracts will remain intact. Since 
the circumstances do not seem to me to provide the assurance I 
would like my people to have, however, I am troubled by the pos-
sible unfairness to them if the worst should develop. Perhaps 
adequate protection is provided, however, in the assurance of 
monetary compensation if they are summarily dismissed. 
We will therefore proceed with recruitment limited to 
Africans. I would not lower the standards previously set, how-
ever, even if this means holding vacancies and increasing the 
loads of present staff. Certainly in one area the exclusion of 
expatriates blocks any recruitment. There is no possibility of 
finding a competent African teacher for Comparative Law. It is 
ironic that the exclusionary policy will foreclose our offering 
the one course most intimately related to the President's goal 
of African unity. 
"Please don't let my transient pessimism suggest that the 
Law Faculty has its tail between its legs. I am considering 
adopting the following motto which I'd be glad to share with 
you: "Illigitimi Non Carborundum" which might be roughly brought 
from the "vulgar" Latin as "Don't let the bastards grind you 
down." 
"With all good wishes, 
Sincerely, 
W.B.H." 
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I deeply regretted the fact that my comments on the Vice 
Chancellor's discussion with the President should in any way 
suggest a criticism of Dr. O'Brien~ I had and still have the 
greatest respect for his courage and integrity, and I fully ap-
preciated the skill, insight and devotion he brought to the 
leadership of the University. My probably intemperate comments 
on the President's statements and Dr. O'Brien's reply did not in 
fact disrupt the close and cordial working relationship I had 
enjoyed with the Vice Chancellor. 
The posture of the Law Faculty's problems following these 
discussions may be briefly summarized as follows. 
The urgency previously attached to ridding the Faculty of 
expatriates had apparently subsided, but we continued under a 
cloud. With the possible exception of Comparative Law where the 
Vice Chancellor thought the President might be induced to make 
an exception if a suitable person could be found, our recruit-
ment of staff for the following year was effectively limited to 
Ghanaians. This limitation applied also to the choice of my suc-
cessor. I had proposed consideration of two Ghanaians, Mr. 
Bentsi-Enchill and Mr. Ofosu-Amaah. While Mr. Justice Ollennu 
remained a possibility, it seemed most unlikely that the vicious 
political attacks on him and his own expressed desire to be 
withdrawn from consideration left any life in his candidacy. On 
the other hand, Dr. Daniels had declared to many persons over 
the past two months his full expectation of appointment as the 
next Professor of Law. In the circumstances it seemed wise to 
move as rapidly as was reasonably possible to the consideration 
of candidates for the post, and arrangements were therefore made 
to have the conventional advertisement placed. 
Events outside the University in December, 1963, finally 
foreclosed any possibility of developing a modus vivendi between 
the President and the Law Faculty and strongly supported the 
general campaign against the University. To understand these 
developments, one needs a brief history of certain political 
developments in Ghana. Organized political opposition to the 
Nkrumah Government long ago expired. The Government has con-
tended for several years that its political opponents had 
abandoned constitutional processes of opposition in favor of 
violence, intimidation and efforts to accomplish a coup d'etat. 
Unfortunately, the actual facts provide some support for the 
Government's contention, though it certainly is not conclusively 
established. 
In August, 1962, on the return of the President from a 
state visit to Upper Volta, he paused briefly to greet the 
people in the village of Kulungugu in northern Ghana. Very 
shortly after the President stopped, a hand grenade was thrown 
among his party, several people were killed or injured, and the 
I 
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President himself was wounded. Shortly thereafter the Government 
declared a state of emergency in Accra and Tema and imposed a 
variety of emergency controls. In the succeeding months, there 
were other terrorist attacks on groups of CPP supporters in and 
around Accra in which a number of persons, including women and 
children, were killed or injured. In early 1963, seven persons 
were arrested as participants in these terrorist attacks and 
were brought to trial in March. Five were charged with treason 
and conspiracy to commit treason and two with misprision of 
treason. Against four of the treason defendants the evidence was 
overwhelming; in fact, by their own admissions in open court 
they had been participants in the series of terrorist ac-
tivities. The case was extremely weak against the fifth defen-
dant on the treason charge and even weaker against the two de-
fendants charged with misprision. The trial was held before a 
Special court comprising Chief Justice, Sir Arku Korsah, and 
Justices Van Lare and Sarkodee-Addo. All of the defendants were 
convicted and those charged with treason were sentenced to 
death. It was clear that all of the defendants in this trial 
were minor figures, engaged in the actual acts of terrorism but 
without political leadership roles. The prosecution attempted to 
establish a relation between the defendants and certain leaders 
of the United Party as well as some prominent figures in the 
Convention Peoples' Party itself. This effort was in my judgment 
singularly unsuccessful. 
Among the CPP politicians whose names figured prominently 
in the treason trial were Tawia Adamafio, formerly Minister for 
Information and Broadcasting, Ako Adjei, formerly Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, and H. H. Cofie-Crabbe, formerly General Secre-
tary of the CPP. These men had been arrested and detained under 
the Preventive Detention Act shortly after the attack on the 
President at Kulungugu in August, 1962. In August, 1963, 
Adamefio, Adjei and Cofie-Crabbe, along with two persons identi-
fied with the opposition United Party, were charged with treason 
and brought to trial before a Special Court comprising Sir Arku 
Korsah and Justices Van Lare and Akufo-Addo, all members of the 
supreme Court. The trial lasted for better than three months, 
and the Court finally took the matter under advisement. On De-
cember 9, 1963, the Court announced its judgment. The two minor 
opposition figures were convicted and sentenced to death. 
Adamefio, Adjei and Cofie-Crabbe were acquitted, and the Court 
ordered their release. They were not released, however, being 
retained in police custody and returned to prison under the 
authorization of the Preventive Detention Act. Extensive comment 
on the trial and the evidence adduced by the Government is un-
necessary here. It suffices to say that, in my judgment, and 
that of the other lawyers with whom I occasionally discussed the 
case, the Government had completely failed to produce evidence 
justifying conviction of the three major defendants. The cases 
against the other two were somewhat more problematical since one 
of them at least had confessed his involvement in certain anti-
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state activities. The other had also confessed but contended 
that he did so while of unsound mind. His testimony at the trial 
and other conduct tended strongly to suggest that he remained of 
questionable sanity. The primary concern here, however, is with 
the effect of the court's judgment in acquitting the three prin-
cipal defendants who had been associated with the President in 
the ruling party. 
The judgment of the Court was announced on December 9th, 
and the reaction of the Party press, the Attorney General who 
had prosecuted the case for the Government, and the President 
himself was immediate and extreme. on December 10th, the Presi-
dent dismissed Sir Arku Korsah from his post as Chief Justice of 
Ghana. Although regrettable. this was a fully constitutional act 
on the part of the President. The Republican Constitution of 
1960 foreclosed removal of Judges of the superior courts except 
on an address to the President from the National Assembly, 
passed by a two-thirds majority of the entire membership on 
stated grounds of misbehavior or infirmity of mind or body. This 
guarantee did not apply to the office of Chief Justice however. 
The Chief Justice served in that off ice at the pleasure of the 
President. Thus, on his removal from the Chief Justiceship, Sir 
Arku remained a member of the Supreme Court. On December 11, 
however, he resigned from the judicial service and left the 
Court entirely. Later in the month Mr. Justice Van Lare also 
resigned. Of the Special Court only Mr. Justice Akufo-Addo 
remained a member of the Supreme Court. 
The contemptuous criticisms of the Court by the Attorney 
General, the Party press and the President, and the President's 
action against Sir Arku, were justified by the CPP on the ground 
that in the context of such a political trial it was incumbent 
upon the Chief Justice to advise the President in advance of the 
public announcement of the judgment what the Court's action 
would be. It was argued that the President would thus be able 
to take the necessary measures for the preservation of public 
order which otherwise might be disturbed by popular reaction 
against the judgment. This appears to be pure rationalization. I 
have every reason to believe that Sir Arku did in fact give the 
President advance notice of the judgment and that the President 
refused to accept this information, instructing Sir Arku to 
return to his 9olleagues and bring back a judgment of convic-
tion. In view of the case presented against the three who were 
acquitted, one must conclude that the President expected the 
Court to bring in a conviction without regard to what the 
evidence may have shown. The extreme reaction of the President 
to the judgment is probably attributable to his fear of Adamaf io 
and his probable conviction that Adamaf io was engaged in a 
treasonable plot despite the Court's acquittal. 
Before the full pattern of Governmental reaction to the 
Court's judgment in the treason trial had developed, I left 
I 
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Ghana on a series of visits to other African law faculties and 
research centers. I was out of the country from December 15, 
1963 until January 27, 1964. From newspaper accounts during this 
period and also from reports I received on my return to Ghana in 
January, I learned of other developments. Some were related to 
the judgment in the treason trial, and several impinged directly 
on the independence and integrity of the University. 
The primary action of the Government was to initiate a 
referendum in accordance with the Republican Constitution of 
1960 for the purpose of authorizing certain amendments to the 
Constitution. One of these would grant to the President com-
pletely discretionary authority to remove from office any judge 
of the Supreme Court or High Court; the second would make Ghana 
in law as well as in fact a one-party state. Another response 
which did not require constitutional amendment was taken immedi-
ately by Parliament; an Act was passed granting to the President 
the power retroactively to annul any judgment of a Special 
Court. The power thus granted to the President was soon ex-
ercised and the judgment acquitting Adamafio, Adjei and Cofie-
Crabbe was declared void. 
A great many people in Ghana were seriously disturbed by 
the actions of the Government but relatively few expressed their 
criticisms. Among those who did were the students in the 
University. Through their student organization they passed a 
resolution condemning the dismissal of the Chief Justice and as-
king for his reinstatement. Another was Dr. O'Brien, the Vice 
Chancellor of the University. At the time of the President's ac-
tion against Sir Arku, Dr. O'Brien was in Europe attempting to 
recruit teaching staff for the Medical School. From Geneva he 
issued a statement to the press condemning the action against 
Sir Arku and urging his reinstatement. When I returned to Ghana 
in January, I learned that when the Vice Chancellor returned to 
Legon on December 20, he had immediately requested an interview 
with the President in order to inform him fully of the basis for 
his Geneva statement. The President refused to see the Vice 
Chancellor who then wrote a long letter setting out in full the 
views underlying his statement. Dr. O'Brien explained that he 
had issued the statement, not in his personal capacity, but as 
Vice Chancellor of the University. He pointed out that he had 
followed the evidence adduced in the treason trial carefully and 
that in his judgment it did not support a conviction. on the 
contrary, the evidence, as he viewed it, could only have led to 
an acquittal by any court honestly formulating its judgment on 
the basis of the evidence presented to it. Thus, said the Vice 
Chancellor, he could only conclude that Sir Arku had been dis-
missed because his integrity as a judge led him to respect the 
facts before him and to predicate his judgment on them. In the 
view of the Vice Chancellor this respect for facts was central 
to the entire role of the University in Ghana, and he, there-
fore, felt called upon to condemn the action of the President 
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and to urge the reinstatement of Sir Arku. 
While I fully agreed with the views expressed by the Vice 
Chancellor and admired his courage~ in expressing them, I 
believed it to be an error of judgment for him to speak out on 
this occasion and particularly to speak out as an officer of the \ 
University. I could see no practical gains that might be 
achieved by such action, while the risks to the University from 
his comments on a matter not directly within the University's ( 
sphere of. competence seemed to me full of danger for the in-
stitution. I had concluded myself, when the judgment was an-
nounced and Sir Arku dismissed, that I would not publicly com-
ment on it even though arguably, as Dean of the Faculty of Law, 
it fell more clearly in my sphere than in that of the Vice Chan-
cellor. One of the immediate results of the public statement of 
Dr. O'Brien's views was a loss of contact with the President. 
The President refused to see him from December 20, until January 
24; thereafter when the deportations of University staff raised 
a fundamental issue of Government policy affecting the 
University, the President again refused to consult with the Vice 
Chancellor. 
Two other events of considerable importance occurred in the 
University during my absence in January. The police conducted a 
search of the apartment of Dr. Dennis Osborne, a member of the 
staff of the Department of Physics, and arrested Dr. Osborne. 
Also arrested at the same time was Professor J.C. DeGraf-
Johnson, Director of the Institute of Public Education. On the 
strong urging of the Vice Chancellor and Professor Alan Nunn 
MayJ Head of the Department of Physics, Dr. Osborne was released 
on the assurances of the Vice Chancellor that he would remain in 
Ghana for questioning until an investigation had been completed 
1 and would not carry on discussions with any Ghanaians. It was 
unclear whether the latter of assurance foreclosed Dr. Osborne's 
continuing his teaching duties. Professor DeGraf-Johnson was ap-
parently held under the Preventive Detention Act and was not { 
released prior to my departure. 
The second important development affecting the University 
probably arose out of the action of student groups in forwarding 
to the President a resolution protesting the dismissal of the 
Chief Justice. The President ordered that the University be 
recessed for seventeen days. The publicly announced purpose of 
this recess was to permit the students to return to their homes 
to vote in the constitutional referendum during the latter part 
of January. The more plausible explanation, however, was that 
the Government feared the expression of student opinion and pos-
sible student demonstrations if they remained in residence at 
Legon. students at the University of Science and Technology in 
Kumasi and at the University College in Cape Coast were also 
sent home. 
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I returned to Ghana on January 27, 1964. Events began to 
take ominous shape very quickly thereafter. By a letter dated 
January 27, the President indicated to the Vice Chancellor that 
he had "come to the conclusion that certain steps must be taken 
if we are to attain our objectives in the Universities, particu-
larly with the regard to the African orientation and general 
discipline of these institutions." The President then presented 
six "directives" to the University on which he invited the com-
ments and suggestions of the Vice Chancellor. He concluded the 
letter by saying, "It is my wish that the directives should be 
implemented before the Universities reopen." The six directives 
were as follows: (1) wherever practicable, all hall tutors 
should be Ghanaian; (2) the appointments of Heads of Departments 
and Faculties should receive the approval of the President ac-
ting as Chancellor; (3) all academic appointments should carry 
adequate teaching obligations; (4) the Chancellor should be in-
formed of the appointment of all academic staff who are not to 
be paid by the University; (5) all University scholarships 
should be tenable for the duration of the particular course, but 
subject to annual review on the basis of "satisfactory per-
formance and good conduct"; and (6) all scholarships tenable by 
Ghanaians in the Universities should be channeled through a com-
mittee to be set up within the Scholarships Secretariat, the 
membership of this committee to include representatives of the 
University. 
On January 29, I spent virtually the entire day in consult-
ation with the Vice Chancellor on the drafting of an appropriate 
response to this communication from the President, to considera-
tion of a first draft with the Executive Committee of the 
Academic Board, and to the final polishing of the Vice Chancel-
lor's reply. The directives from the President presented some 
complex problems. A certain number of them were prima facie un-
objectionable. In some instances, however, it was difficult to 
determine the motivation of the directive and, therefore, care-
ful probing was required to determine the ways in which agree-
ment to implement it might be utilized. In other cases the 
directives left open extremely vital issues as to who would 
carry out certain actions which would be justifiable if based on 
traditional University criteria but would be totally un-
acceptable if grounded on essentially political considerations. 
The reply of the Vice Chancellor to the President may be 
summarized. He accepted the idea that hall tutors who were 
primarily responsible for moral tutelage of students should be 
Ghanaians; in fact, this was almost completely the current 
situation. With respect to the demand that the approval of the 
Chancellor be sought for the appointment of Heads of Departments 
and Deans of Faculties, we recognized that this went beyond the 
earlier undertaking of the Vice Chancellor to consult with the 
President in connection with such appointments. In the circum-
stances, however, it seemed a practical necessity to accede to 
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the strengthened demand of the President that his approval of 
the appointment of Heads of Departments be sought. Dr. O'Brien 
insisted, however, that such action be taken only after an Ap-
pointments Board of the University <:bad considered the proposed 
appointment of a Head of Department and had acted affirmatively 
on it. The approval of the President as Chancellor would then be 
sought and his views reported to the University Counsel which, 
under the governing Statutes, had the final authority to make 
the appointment. Dr. O'Brien pointed out that he could not un-
dertake to keep from the Council the name of any person who had 
been approved by an Appointments Board but not approved by the 
President, since this would be contrary to the University of 
Ghana Act and the Statutes of the University which made the 
Council the supreme governing body of the University. He in-
formed the President also that under the Statutes of the 
University the Dean of a Faculty was elected by the members of 
the Faculty Board. For this reason a step involving the approval 
of the Chancellor could not be accepted. 
With respect to the third directive, the Vice Chancellor 
pointed out that academic appointments did in general carry ade-
quate teaching obligations but observed that in certain units 
persons heavily committed to research might have their teaching 
loads adjusted downward. He therefore recommended that the term 
"adequate teaching obligations" should be interpreted in such a 
manner as to protect the position of research fellows. He also 
emphasized that the University Statutes granted to the Head of a 
Department the responsibility for organizing the teaching pro-
gram of the Department and assuring that research was carried 
out. 
The proposition that the Vice Chancellor should inform the 
Chancellor of the appointment of all academic staff who were not 
to be paid by the University was accepted and a list of those 
currently in that situation was prepared and submitted. We did 
not interpret the President's directive to include persons who 
were regularly appointed by the University and compensated by it 
at normal rates but had supplementary financing from other 
sources. Thus, the members of the Faculty of Law whose salaries 
were supplemented by SAILER funds were regarded as regular 
University appointees and not included in the list. 
The annual review of University scholarships was the most 
troublesome of the President's directives. The dangers arose 
from the fact that the directive did not define the critical 
terms- "satisfactory performance and good conduct" - and did not 
specify who would carry out the review. The GHANAIAN TIMES in-
terpreted good conduct as "close identification with the spirit 
and objects of the Convention Peoples' Party," a standard no 
university could accept. The implicit threat of the President 
not to permit the reopening of the University until his direc-
tives were implemented strongly counselled every reasonable ef-
\ 
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fort to avoid or at least delay a head-on clash over the 
scholarship review issue, however. 
The failure of the directive to specify the agency to carry 
out the annual review seemed to offer the best possibility of 
avoiding conflict with the President, while conceding nothing 
which would damage the University. Annual review was in fact the 
current practice. On the basis of reports from hall tutors and 
examination results, the University officers advised the 
Scholarship Secretariat which students remained in good standing 
and eligible for financial aid. our hope was to preserve this 
system. 
In Dr. O'Brien's reply to the President, he accepted the 
principle of annual review of scholarship awards. At the same 
time, he declared that the University would accept responsi-
bility for conducting the review under procedures to be estab-
lished by the Academic and Tutorial Boards, of which the Presi-
dent would be informed. We decided against an effort to spell 
out more fully the meaning of "satisfactory performance and good 
conduct," relying on the University agency making the review to 
keep these standards consistent with the University's tradition. 
On the matter of undergraduate scholarships tenable by 
Ghanaians in the Universities of Ghana, Dr. O'Brien accepted the 
proposition that these should be channeled through a committee 
to be set up within the Scholarships Secretariat which would in-
clude representatives of the Universities. He specified that in 
the case of the University of Ghana the representatives should 
be elected by the Academic Board. Certain scholarships, however, 
which had been offered to the University by outside bodies and 
had been accepted for grant under procedures fixed by the donor 
and the University, could not be affected without the agreement 
of the donor. A list of such grants and the procedures followed 
in awarding them was sent to the President. Finally, the 
University reserved the function of awarding its own post-
graduate scholarships which in the main were used to train 
Ghanaians of outstanding academic ability for later appointment 
to the University's own staff. 
Since we feared that the President's letter transmitting 
his directives contained an implicit threat not to permit the 
reopening of the Universities until these directives were in 
some way implemented, the Vice Chancellor suggested that his 
agreement, set out in the letter, and the undertaking to work 
out procedures in accordance with the constitution of the 
University should be regarded as implementation of the Presi-
dent's directives. Finally, he urged that the University author-
ities themselves be given the responsibility for making known to 
the students the policies reflected by the agreement. If these 
were publicly announced during the University recess, we feared 
that there might be serious misapprehension and anxiety among 
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the students. 
By a letter to the Vice Chancellor of January 30, the 
President accepted the comments and suggestions on his direc-
tives made by the Vice Chancellor. Thus, at least temporarily, 
we felt that the integrity of the University's own procedures 
and its independence had been protected. With respect to the 
matter of announcing the policies, however, the suggestion of 
the University was not carried out. On February 5, after the 
students had returned to the University, the President's office 
announced the annual review of scholarships and the channeling 
of all scholarships tenable by Ghanaians in the universities 
through a committee within the Scholarships Secretariat. The 
University regarded this scheme as fully subject to the proce-
dures specified in the Vice Chancellor's letter to the Presi-
dent. The Party press, however, reported it as part of a program 
to reorient the elite and warned of even sterner actions against 
"students who do not conform to the new era." Undoubtedly ef-
forts to use scholarship grants for political purposes will con-
tinue. 
On January 29, I became ill and from January 30 was bedrid-
den. Aside from consultations I was able to have in my home or 
hospital, I was unable to participate in the further events 
leading up to my departure from Ghana. On the morning of Janu-
ary 30, the Vice Chancellor informed me of a visit he had just 
had from Mr. Otoo, head of the security Service, and Mr. Mfodwo 
of the Special Branch. The purpose and effect of this meeting 
were set out as follows in an aide memoire prepared by the Vice 
Chancellor: 
"Mr. Otoo, Head of Security, and Mr. Mfodwo of the Special 
Branch, called on me in my office this morning. 
"Mr. Otoo explained that they had reason to believe that 
the University was the scene of subversive plots against the 
Government and that certain people here had been "planted" by 
other Governments for their own purposes. It was necessary in 
the interests of the security of Ghana to get rid of certain 
people. They asked me, therefore, to require the resignations of 
certain senior members. 
"I expressed surprise and disquiet at this proposal and in-
dicated that I should like to know much more about what was in-
volved and to have an opportunity of reflection before I could 
even contemplate taking action of the kind required. I asked for 
evidence of the supposed plot and plantings and for the names of 
those whose resignations they desired to obtain. They indicated 
that, owing to the nature of Security and the interconnection of 
these cases with others which were under study, they would be 
ubable to communicate to me any of the evidence which they had. 
They assured me, however, that their request was not lightly 
\ 
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made and was adequately motivated. They had four names in mind, 
all of them expatriates, as follows: Professor Harvey, Dean of 
the Faculty of Law, Dr. Seidman, Senior Lecturer at the Faculty 
of Law, Mr. Chester, Lecturer (?), ~school of Administration, and 
Monsieur Greco of the Department of French. I said that the 
first two gentlemen were well known to me and that I had the 
highest regard for them both as men and University teachers. 
Their dedication to their profession of studying and teaching 
the law was intense and left them little or no time for outside 
activities. I found it extremely hard to believe that either of 
them could be connected with subversive activities. I would 
regard it as an extremely serious matter for the University if 
they were obliged to leave and I would have to consider, if this 
should happen, what I should do myself. 
"As regards Mr. Chester, I did not know him personally and 
I asked if I might discuss the case with Mr. Amegashie, Head of 
the School of Administration. Mr. Otoo agreed that I might do 
so. I explained that Monsieur Greco was in a somewhat different 
position as he had been reprimanded by the Head of the Depart-
ment for failure to give adequate attention to his professional 
duties and the Head of his Department reported that he appeared 
to give most of his time to outside activities. In these circum-
stances I felt that the University could not vouch for him in 
the same way as for teachers and scholars who, like Professor 
Harvey and Dr. Seidman, were known to be giving all of their 
time and energy to the work of the University, 
"I recognized that the Security Service had its work to do 
an~ I had no interest in any effort to protect people who were 
really engaged in conspiracy to overthrow the Government. My 
concern, however, and the responsibility which I accepted when, 
on the President's invitation, I became Vice Chancellor, was to 
cherish the interests of the University, which meant in present 
circumstances to insure that it suffered as little damage as 
possible as a result of the emergency and its repercussions. 
Every time a teacher was, for example, searched or detained or 
required to leave the country, the University suffered some 
damage. Sometimes this might be inevitable, but if it assumed 
sufficient proportions the damage done might be such that the 
University would not recover from it. I pointed out also that in 
troubled times such as we were living through, there was a grave 
danger of malicious denunciation by interested parties. There 
were people, for example, who stood, or thought they stood, to 
gain by promotions consequent upon the enforced departure of the 
two senior members of the Faculty of Law. One of these people 
might conceivably have been sufficiently unscrupulous as to 
denounce these gentlemen for his own ends. Mr. Otoo and Mr. 
Mfodwo appeared to agree that such possibilities could not 
altogether be ruled out. 
"I said that as soon as I had seen Mr. Amegashie to obtain 
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his reaction in the case of Mr. Chester I would seek an inter-
view with the President on this matter and I hoped they would 
take no action in the meantime. They agreed to this and ex-
plained that the President was no~~ aware of the initiative they 
had taken. Mr. Otoo then went on to discuss the students, 
stressing the need for greater supervision of their activities. 
I told him of the President's initiative in relation to Hall 
Tutors and that we were putting the suggested changes into ef-
fect wherever practicable. I also stressed that in my opinion 
reports regarding student unrest were exaggerated and highly 
coloured and I pointed out that the students had, without excep-
tion, dispersed in an orderly manner when required to do so by 
the University authorities at the beginning of the recess. If 
they were seeking opportunities for anti-Governmental manifes-
tations they would surely have taken this as a golden op-
portunity instead of dispersing quietly as they had actually 
done. Mr. Otoo said that this was due to my personal interven-
tion and that "if you had been a Ghanaian things would have been 
different." I said that that was speculation; what should surely 
give the Security Service grounds for satisfaction was the fact 
- viz. that all the students had dispersed in an orderly manner. 
"In conclusion Mr. Otoo made some general remarks about the 
University, saying that it "looked at everything through British 
eyes." I said that this had never been less true than at the 
present time and pointed out that I myself did not look at 
everything, or indeed at anything, through British eyes. Mr. 
Otoo did not press the point. 
. "Throughout the interview Mr. otoo and Mr. Mfodwo were 
courteous and considerate in their manner although not prepared 
to yield ground on the matters under discussion." 
I immediately told Mr. Seidman of this conversation with 
the Vice Chancellor, as I had kept him informed of developments 
through the long period of pressure on the Law Faculty. In the 
past I had said little about my concerns to the other members of 
the Faculty, except when events were public knowledge and 
directly affected the Faculty. I wanted, if at all possible, to 
avoid demoralization of the younger people over events which 
they could in no way control and difficulties which might be 
resolved before they came to affect the actual work of members 
of the staff. After talking with the Vice Chancellor on January 
30, however, I decided that a full disclosure of the pattern of 
developments to all members of the Faculty was necessary. I, 
therefore, asked them to meet at my home in the late afternoon 
of Friday, January 31. 
The meeting was going on in my bedroom when the arrival of 
officers of the Special Branch was announced. They came in and 
served a deportation order on me, allowing me twenty-four hour 
to leave the country. At 6:00 a.m. the following morning I was 
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served formally with a copy of the Executive Instrument, signed 
by the Minister for the Interior, on which the earlier order was 
based. It is of interest that the Executive Instrument was 
signed by the Minister on January ~-0. It seems likely, there-
fore, that the Minister signed the order immediately after the 
visit of the Security Officers to the Vice Chancellor and that 
the Vice Chancellor's urgent request for a stay of any action in 
order to permit his discussing the matter with the President was 
totally disregarded. Mr. Seidman was also served with a deporta-
tion order a few hours after mine. We were given until 6:00 p.m. 
on Saturday, February 1, to leave the country. 
On Saturday morning the Vice Chancellor began a desperate 
effort to see the President and to secure first an extension of 
the deportation orders and ultimately their cancellation. I be-
lieve similar efforts were made by Mr. William P. Mahoney, the 
American Ambassador, or members of the Embassy staff. Because of 
my own condition, it seemed quite clear that I could not travel 
by 6:00 p.m. that day. The alternative possibility, of course, 
was that I would be placed under arrest if I remained in the 
country. At 4 p.m. Saturday afternoon, the Vice Chancellor was 
able to see the Minister for the Interior who said he had been 
asked by the President to deal with Dr. O'Brien on the matter of 
the deportations. The Minister granted 7-day extensions but 
declined to discuss deportations further. It should be mentioned 
that Mr. Lloyd Garrison of the New York Times had learned of the 
deportation orders but at the request of the Vice Chancellor and 
the American Ambassador agreed not to file a story until the or-
ders had been announced publicly by the Government. It was felt 
that this would facilitate efforts by the Vice Chancellor and 
the Ambassador to secure the withdrawal of the orders. 
The following week was one of intense activity in the 
University. Our students returned to Legon on February 4, and 
the tension among them mounted dangerously when they learned of 
the deportation orders and the arrest of certain student 
leaders, including one of our law students. There was a noisy 
and unpleasant demonstration around the American Embassy led by 
the Party extremists; this offered no encouragement to the ef-
forts being made on behalf of the Americans who were under 
deportation orders. The Vice Chancellor wrote to the President a 
strong request . for an appointment to discuss the deportations 
and more generally their effect on the University. Two other 
members of the University who had been invited to Ghana by Dr. 
Nkrumah himself and who presumably still enjoyed his confidence 
wrote to him along similar lines. These were Mr. Thomas Hodgkin, 
Director of the Institute of African Studies, and Professor Alan 
Nunn May, Professor of Physics. The President refused to see the 
Vice Chancellor and Professor May. He did agree to see Mr. 
Hodgkin but at this meeting declined to discuss the deporta-
tions. 
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During this period the only opportunity the Vice Chancellor 
had to see the President came as the result of his accompanying 
a distinguished visitor from abroad on a ceremonial call on the 
President. At first, the President~ did not invite Dr. O'Brien 
into his office when the other visitor was taken in. When Dr. 
O'Brien was later called in, he attempted to raise the de-
portation issue with the President. Thereupon the President's 
friendly and rational manner disappeared and in a highly excited 
fashion he asked the Vice Chancellor if he did not know that 
there had been another attempt on his life. (This occurred on 
January 2, while I was in East Africa.) The President went on to 
say that he had enough evidence, presumably of participation in 
the assassination attempt, to bring me and Mr. Seidman to trial. 
The Vice Chancellor replied that if this were the case, charge 
and trial might be a good thing in order to clear the air. The 
President summarily rejected this suggestion, however, and 
closed the discussion by announcing firmly that we would simply 
be deported. 
One issue which loomed large in the thinking of the Vice 
Chancellor during this period was what his response should be to 
actions against members of the University community, particular-
ly the deportations, and to the refusal of the President to see 
him during this critical period. The Vice Chancellor had indi-
cated on more than one occasion, as the pressure on the Faculty 
of Law mounted, that, if the departure of the expatriate members 
of the Faculty were forced, he would find it necessary to 
reconsider his own position. I am confident that the Vice Chan-
cellor realized that he was almost as much under attack as any 
of those against whom deportation orders were actually issued. I 
am equally clear that if only Dr. O'Brien's personal interest 
had been consulted, he would have made the deportations the oc-
casion for his own resignation from the University. My own view 
on the proper course for Dr. O'Brien in these circumstances was 
not in doubt. The Government had threatened to present new 
University legislation which would reconstitute the University 
Council and vest control of the Council more directly in 
functionaries of the CPP. Revision of the University Statutes 
had also been threatened, and we feared that the effect of such 
revision would be to reclaim for a reconstituted Council a num-
ber of essentially academic functions, like appointments, which 
the present Statutes delegated to the Academic Board. I firmly 
believed that Dr. O'Brien's primary obligation was to remain in 
his post and do everything possible to protect the integrity of 
the University's basic structure. Secondarily, it seemed to me 
necessary that Dr. O'Brien continue to provide such protection 
as was possible to the members of the University community who 
were still carrying out their duties. I discussed his response 
to the deportations with Dr. O'Brien at some length and he 
agreed that for the foreseeable future he should not resign. 
My colleagues informed me that student sentiment in favor 
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of demonstrating in opposition to the deportations and other re-
lated acts of the Government was mounting sharply. The law stu-
dents seemed to be most prominent in this unrest. An assembly of 
all students in the Faculty was therefore arranged for Friday 
afternoon, February 7. Unfortunately, I was not able to attend, 
but various members of the Faculty addressed the students, 
urging them to remain calm and to avoid demonstrations and other 
responses to the current provocation. When the meeting was al-
most over, the students indicated that they wanted to hear from 
Dr. Daniels. In his talk, Dr. Daniels attempted to make two 
points: the first was that the reports of his responsibility for 
the recent developments were untrue; second, that false and 
malicious rumors were being spread generally in the country and, 
as the Party press was urging, such rumor-mongering should be 
eliminated. Dr. Daniels comments were unfortunately greeted 
with jeers from the students, but there were no further out-
bursts against him. 
The following morning all students were addressed by the 
Vice Chancellor who urged them to remain calm and to do nothing 
to exacerbate relations with the Government. Special point was 
lent to the Vice Chancellor's appeal by information that the CPP 
would hold a large demonstration in the University that day. 
Later in the morning, about two thousand demonstrators, led by 
high officials of the Party and editors of the party press, ar-
rived in the University. Many of the demonstrators carried 
placards denouncing intellectuals, imperialists and neo-
colonialists; a number carried large clubs. The demonstrators 
moved from the main gate toward the balls of residence and the 
administrative buildings. In some of the halls they broke 
windows, and caused other minor damage. The students stood by 
and observed in silence. If they had responded in any way to the 
actions of the demonstrators, I fear that the outcome would have 
been tragic. The leaders of the demonstration met with the Vice 
Chancellor and other adminiatrative officers of the University. 
The Vice Chancellor dissuaded them from trying to address the 
students, and in late morning the demonstration dispersed. I be-
lieve everyone in the University felt great pride in the 
maturity and responsibility shown by the students under extreme-
ly difficult circumstances. 
On Saturday afternoon, February 8, Mr. Seidman and four 
other persons who had been added to the deportation list 
departed from Ghana. Mr. Seidman, who was intereated in remain-
ing in Africa to teach, proceeded to Lagos and on to East Africa 
to investigate possible opportunities in the Law Faculties in 
Addis Ababa and Dar es Salaam. I was not yet permitted to travel 
and did not leave the country until Thursday, February 12. At 
that time my wife and I flew directly to London where I entered 
the Hospital for Tropical Diseases. 
If a more personal note may be permitted, I would pay spe-
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cial tribute to my wife for her calm courage and cheerful ef-
ficiency during these difficult days. While the deportation was 
not a surprise, we had not been able to make significant 
preparations for it as far as our personal affairs were con-
cerned. Because of illness I was completely unable to help 
during the final hectic period. The members of the Law Faculty 
and their wives, the American Embassy staff and many friends, 
both Ghanaian and expatriate, were extremely kind and helpful, 
but the real burden of planning and doing fell on my wife. She 
arranged for our son to leave ahead of us and travel directly to 
the United States. She sold our major belongings and found her 
way through the complex of red tape in transferring our funds. 
She packed and arranged for the shipment of our goods and saw me 
comfortably into hospital in London. Her energy was boundless 
and her good cheer almost constant. I could not begrudge her a 
few tears since they were shed for the University we both loved, 
the friends whose well-being deeply concerned us, and the people 
of Ghana who invariably showed us their friendliness and good 
will. 
Reports from Ghana since my departure indicate that a su-
perficial quiet has returned to the University compound. Tension 
remains high, however, and pressures on the University have not 
abated. The President has presented to the Vice Chancellor a 
demand for the immediate appointment of three persona to prof es-
sorial chairs, including Dr. w. c. Ekow-Daniels to the chair of 
Law and Professor w. E. Abraham to the chair of Philosophy. In 
this connection, the President has claimed for himself, as Chan-
cellor of the University, a right to designate persons for ap-
pointment, with University bodies being limited to formal 
ratification. The Vice Chancellor has rejected this view and has 
insisted that no academic appointments can be made other than by 
duly constituted University agencies. Beyond this general in-
sistence on University procedures for all appointments, the Vice 
Chancellor has added substantive objections to the appointment 
of Dr. Daniels. At this time the issue has not been fully 
resolved. The enactment of new University legislation granting 
to the President, as Chancellor of the University, direct power 
to make appointments remains a possibility. 
At the time I left Ghana, I strongly urged all members of 
the Law Faculty, both Ghanaian and expatriate, to remain in 
their posts and continue their teaching as long as there was no 
direct interference in their classrooms. I was hopeful that we 
would be able to get our students through at least the present 
year on a satisfactory quality basis. It is only fair to point 
out that several of the expatriate members of the Faculty were 
strongly inclined to resign immediately in protest against the 
deportations and other interferences with the University's inde-
pendence. There was also an understandable fear that remaining 
in the University and particularly in the Faculty of Law under 
the circumstances would be interpreted to show sympathy and sup-
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port for the Government's conduct. While I fully understood and 
appreciated the feelings of my colleagues, I urged them to sub-
ordinate their personal interests and continue the work. This 
they agreed to do, though several have subsequently submitted 
their resignations to take effect at the end of this academic 
year. Others have indicated that if the Government succeeds in 
forcing the appointment of Dr. Daniels on the University and the 
Faculty they will have no alternative to resigning. This group 
includes both expatriates and Ghanaians. 
Underlying Causes of the Difficulty 
The Government of Ghana did not at any time disclose the 
actual basis of the deportations. Mr. Seidman and I requested a 
hearing and opportunity to meet the charges against us, but this 
request was not even acknowledged by the Minister for the Inte-
rior. While much criticism of the University in general appeared 
in the Party press, such comments were frequently based on 
patently incorrect information. They cannot be relied upon to 
disclose the actual grounds for the Government's attack on the 
University. In attempting to analyze the operative factors lead-
ing to the deportations and the more general effort to bring the 
University to heel, there is, therefore, an element of specu-
lation. I will merely suggest here the factors which seem to me 
most important. 
All of the events must be considered against the general 
background of the University's status in Ghana as described at 
the beginning of this report. Even in the colonial period, the 
University College was commonly regarded as anti-Government and 
the departure of the British colonial power in 1957 did not sig-
nificantly change that situation. The University has not been 
seen by Dr. Nkrumah's Government as a vital, relevant force in 
the developing society of Ghana. As I have indicated, this at-
titude toward the University has been, in my judgment, to a sub-
stantial degree justified by the facts. There is a regrettable 
spirit of elitism among the student body and to a considerable 
extent among the teaching staff. The externals of University 
life have remained strongly patterned on English models. In such 
circumstances minor events and suspicions can precipitate major 
crises in the relation between the University and Government. 
The past year or so has presented a number of factors to 
complicate the problem of University development. The most im-
portant of these, in my judgment, is the state of mind of the 
President himself. While Dr. Nkrumah has clearly lost much of 
his general popularity and probably is not the unquestioned dic-
tator many think him to be, he is still the dominant force in 
the Government. Other forces find some scope for their operation 
only insofar as they are able to gain the President's ear and 
play on his thoughts and emotions. To understand the Ghana situ-
ation, therefore, one must try to understand the mind of the 
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President. 
It seems rather clear that over the last year or more there 
has been in the President's thinkihg a developing anti-
Americanism. This feeling has been manifested in a number of 
ways, but it is by no means clear why it should have developed. 
I would offer the following hypothesis. The President is in-
creasingly frustrated, particularly in his efforts to achieve 
leadership in the Pan-African movement. His failures in this 
context have been sharp and recurrent. I think he is emotionally 
incapable of accepting the fact that other relatively independ-
ent African leaders distrust him and reject his leadership. In 
these circumstances, it is a convenient rationalization that he 
is frustrated not by the rejection of his African peers but by 
the machinations of the great powers, particularly the United 
States. I suspect the focus on the United States is largely at-
tributable to developments in the Congo on which the President's 
feelings are extremely strong. Dr. Nkrumah's profound, almost 
psychopathic, fear of such American agencies as the Central In-
telligence Agency is well known. Virtually every issue of the 
Party newspapers carries a diatribe against the C.I.A., and sug-
gests that every American abroad should be suspected as an 
agent. The President was strongly impressed by Tully's book on 
the C.I.A. which, I understand, he has distributed in large num-
bers to his acquaintances in Ghana and elsewhere. 
These fears of great power intervention in Ghana and else-
where in Africa have been nurtured by internal attacks on the 
President himself and members of his Party. It must be remem-
be~ed that he has been the object of two assassination attempts, 
in one of which he was actually wounded. Other terrorist ac-
tivity has been aimed apparently at the destruction of con-
fidence in the Government and the President. These events were I 
sufficiently disturbing in themselves. I believe, however, that 
the assassination of President Kennedy contributed greatly to 
Dr. Nkrumah's fear and insecurity. If the leader of the United { 
States, with all the protection he is accorded, can be assas-
sinated, how much greater are the chances of this occurring in 
Ghana? Finally, the President's feeling of insecurity was in-
creased by the judgment of the Special Court in the second 
treason trial, acquitting Adamafio and others. I strongly 
suspect that the President was convinced, regardless of what the 
evidence adduced in court may have shown, that Adamafio was in 
fact plotting against his life. The acquittal probably suggested 
to the President that even the judiciary was supporting 
treasonable activities. 
In these circumstances it has been increasingly easy for a 
group of ruthless extremists within the Party to gain the Presi-
dent's ear and to secure his support for actions they think 
desirable. Most of the advisers who now seem closest to the 
President do not occupy official positions in the Government; in 
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the main they are identified with the Party press which has long 
represented the most extreme wing of the CPP. Most prominent 
among them are Mr. Batsa, editor of SPARK, Mr. Baffoe, editor of 
the GHANAIAN TIMES, Mr. Heyman, editor of the EVENING NEWS, and 
Mr. Basner, the South African lawyer who works as a journalist 
in Ghana. Mr. Boateng, the Minister for the Interior, would 
probably fall in this group on the basis of his views. He has 
been on sufficiently uncertain political ground, however, that I 
would not regard him as a mayor force in his own right. I 
suspect that he has been merely a willing and useful tool of the 
persons mentioned earlier. These advisers use the conventional 
language of communism though I have never felt any assurance 
that they are communists either by conviction or by any organi-
zational test. Much more likely, it seems to me, is that they 
use the cliches of the extreme Left in an opportunistic effort 
to express their own dominant hatreds and to further their own 
personal power. 
This group is inclined, I believe, to reject the essential 
values of the University and to see it primarily as a medium for 
indoctrination. Their efforts to this end were substantially 
aided by a small group of people within the University who, 
whatever their convictions, saw in the attacks on the University 
most useful means for furthering their own ambitions. The most 
important members of this University group were Professor W E. 
Abraham, Associate Professor of Philosophy and Dr. w. c. Ekow-
Daniels, Lecturer in Law. Professor Abraham obviously played the 
role of intellectual leader of the CPP and enjoyed the con-
fidence of the President. In addresses delivered within the 
University and in writings for the Party press, he urged the use 
of the University's instructional program for Party indoctrina-
tion. He and Dr. Daniels were active in efforts to organize 
party units among the students in the University. on one occa-
sion, it came to my knowledge that after a meeting with students 
in one of the halls, Professor Abraham and Dr. Daniels distrib-
uted money to the student group. This rather shocking conduct on 
the part of University teachers was apparently designed to im-
press upon the students the benefits available through support 
of the Party. Professor Abraham aspired in the first instance to 
appointment to the chair in Philosophy, which he has since 
received, but even more importantly to Dr. O'Brien's post as 
Vice Chancellor of the University. 
The preceding report has indicated from time to time the 
activities in which Dr. Daniels appeared to be engaged in his 
campaign against the Law Faculty. Because of the critical role 
of law and legal institutions in a developing country, Dr. 
Daniels had a readily sympathetic audience when he carried to 
the President distorted reports on development within the Law 
Faculty. I was informed that he publicly boasted of his having 
drafted the parts of the President's address in which the public 
campaign against the Law Faculty was launched. I was also in-
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formed that he told one of his colleagues that he was 
responsible for the President's refusing to see me, thus depriv-
ing me of any opportunity to correct the misapprehensions on 
which the President was proceeding ~ Dr. Daniels also made quite 
clear on many occasions and in many groups that he fully ex-
pected to be appointed Professor of Law on my departure. He 
criticized curricular developments to persons outside the 
University, while refusing to raise these matters for discussion 
within the Faculty Board. Dr. Daniels posed as a strong adherent 
of Ghanaian socialism. I have no reason to take these preten-
sions seriously, or to believe that he understood socialism, 
even in its most elementary sense. On the contrary, Dr. Daniels' 
entire course of conduct while I was associated with him led me 
to the conclusion that he was merely an opportunist using the 
attacks on the Faculty and the University as a means of promot-
ing his own interests. Unfortunately, that interest tended to 
focus his efforts on the Faculty of Law. 
Finally, expressions of views within the University 
emphasized that Government action was not unquestioningly ac-
cepted. One need only cite as examples the resolution of 
University students protesting the dismissal of Sir Arku Korsah 
and the public statement of the same character made by the Vice 
Chancellor. While unquestioning adherence to the Party faith was 
being generally demanded, there was concrete evidence of a con-
tinuing disposition in the University to evaluate and to 
criticize. It is not surprising, therefore, that the efforts of 
the Party extremists, aided by opportunists within the 
University and channeled through the office of the President, 
wer~ focused on the University in general and particularly on 
the Faculty of Law whose research and teaching explored the pri-
mary instrument of power. In such circumstances, a commitment to 
seeking the facts, to demanding a rational relationship between I 
facts and judgment - in short, to education - unquestionably ap-
pears subversive. In this sense the charge that Mr. Seidman and 
I were engaged in subversive activities is justified. { 
Conclusion 
The developments in the University of Ghana during the past 
year could hardly lead to an optimistic assessment of the 
present circumstances or of the future. The attacks from the 
President and the party extremists have severely damaged the 
University. Fear and uncertainty are widespread among the senior 
staff and the students. The continuing pressure on Dr. O'Brien 
and his refusal to yield to it suggest that his leadership will 
not remain available to the University much longer. The arrest 
or expulsion of teachers and the attempts to make appointments 
on the basis of political considerations have seriously un-
dermined the standards previously maintained. This development 
cannot fail to prejudice the quality of instruction available 
within the University and thus the quality of its products. 
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Events in Ghana have not gone unnoticed elsewhere, and the in-
ternational image of the University has been seriously damaged. 
on the other hand, there are a few factors which might 
properly lead one to hope for and even to expect better days 
ahead. Not all of the sound teachers in the University have de-
parted. It is, as a matter of fact, a tribute to the devotion of 
many members of the University faculty that they have decided to 
remain through these difficult times. Some Departments, less 
politically vulnerable than the Law Faculty, have not been 
directly disturbed. I suspect that the President still realizes 
that sound education is indispensable to the realization of 
Ghana's plan for development. The President's attitudes toward 
education often seem strangely schizophrenic; on the one hand, 
he is instrumental in channeling a high percentage of the na-
tional budget into education and in many ways demonstrates a 
desire to see the University and other parts of the educational 
system flourish. On the other hand, his fear and insecurity are 
able to overcome his judgment and cause him on occasion to sup-
port those who would destroy much that has been well built in 
the University and in the secondary school system. The latter 
occasions with all their disappointments ant frustrations cannot 
completely obscure the widespread demand for education or 
entirely defeat the hope that this demand will again claim the 
support of the President and other leaders. 
Finally, even the deportations had a brighter side. Insofar 
as grounds for this action were stated, either directly or by 
implication, they were in large measure functionally justifiable 
on an abstract basis. We were accused of subversion, of acting 
contrary to the security of the state. On a more moderate basis, 
we were accused of having no perception of the societal setting 
in which we were acting as educators and, therefore, of failing 
to relate the curricula we developed and the teaching we did to 
the social values and aspirations of the people. While I reject 
completely the factual basis for these charges and deprecate the 
arbitrary measures adopted for dealing with them, it must still 
be recognized that on an abstract basis they reflect legitimate 
concerns of those having political responsibility in a develop-
ing country. I think it especially significant that at no time 
during this unhappy period did race or color appear to be a sig-
nificant facto~. My colleagues and I were not deported because 
we were white (in fact three of the six were in fact Negroes), 
nor because we were expatriates. I find in these circumstances, 
therefore, some basis for hope that opportunity will remain 
available in Ghana and elsewhere in Africa for those who are 
sincerely interested in the development of sound educational in-
stitutions. I think it especially important that we should not 
yield to discouragement over the recent reverses. Even if the 
present situation in Ghana does not now encourage further in-
vestment of manpower and other resources, change could come 
rapidly. We should be in a position to respond without delay to 
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requests for assistance whenever they come and we can reasonably 
expect opportunities for useful work. 
My own work in Ghana will long remain one of my most stimu-
lating and satisfying experiences. While I left the country 
with great sadness, I left entirely without bitterness. Many 
Ghanaians of all walks of life made efforts to demonstrate their 
concern for my welfare and for the work I had done. Their good-
will will long remain among my most cherished recollections. I 
do not believe the efforts my colleagues and I devoted to legal 
education in Ghana were wasted. Some seeds were sown that in a 
better time will grow and make at least a small contribution to 
a better Ghana and a better world. 
* * * 
To the foregoing report, written in 1964, I would add a 
brief coda recalling memories undimmed by the intervening 
thirty-five years. 
When the doctors concluded that I could travel, passage was 
booked for Marilou and me on a Swiss Air flight to London, where 
I was to enter the Hospital for Tropical Diseases. As our depar-
ture hour approached, Conor O'Brien sent his car to take us to 
the airport. I think myself little given to emotional displays, 
but as we drove out of the University area, the tears fell, not 
for myself, but for the University both Marilou and I had come 
to love and for whose well-being our fears were acute. 
When we arrived at the airport, Marilou was taken into the 
airport by the American Charge'd'Affaires (Ambassador Mahoney 
being out of the country) to attend to the formalities of our 
departure. I sat or reclined in the back seat of the car, with 
the door fully open, while several hundred people, most from the 
University -- students, faculty, and administrative staff-- made 
their way past to say goodbye. As I shook their hands, expressed 
my appreciation for their concern, and wished them well, I real-
ized that if commitment and courage were to be found, they were 
in this group. Their presence at the airport was not merely a 
gesture of friendly concern toward me. More important, it was an 
expression of understanding of and support for the effort that 
I--and many others--had been making to nurture and protect the 
University. For me there was no peril; I was leaving for com-
petent medical care to deal with a transient illness, then to 
return to the secure bosom of a great American University. Those 
who filed by were Ghanaians; they were remaining, subject to 
such pressures, perils, and hardships as an insecure and in-
creasingly repressive Government might bring to bear. This final 
experience sealed firmly my deep affection for and good will 
toward Ghana and its people. 
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INDIANA UNIVERSITY: THE FINAL CllAP'l'ER 
I turn here to a somewhat expanded account of the final 
phase of my experience at Indiana University, supplementing that 
provided in the principal text. 
Elvis Stahr, the President who had invited me to come to 
Indiana, had resigned. His successor, Joe Sutton, an amiable and 
able man while in a subordinate role, rapidly disintegrated at 
the top and within a year had died. I had advised against the 
immediate appointment of John Ryan, one of the University's 
Vice-Presidents, as Sutton's successor. I did not know Ryan well 
and, at that time, had no firm assessment of his lack of 
suitability for the office. I did believe, however, that a na-
tional search with the participation of all segments of the 
University community was desirable. This view did not prevail 
(in fact, only Wilfred Bain, Dean of the School of Music, joined 
me in it), Ryan was appointed, and the policy differences I had 
with the University administration were sharpened. 
As is probably clear from much I have said earlier, part of 
the gulf that developed between me and the central administra-
tion of Indiana University resulted from conflicts in ad-
ministrative style or political expression having, prima facie, 
little or nothing to do with the general student protest 
syndrome. In the prevailing climate, however, such a segrega-
tion of causal factors is difficult and probably unrealistic. 
Perhaps I should conclude this comment with a brief description 
of two episodes, among many, at Indiana University that il-
lustrate the differences that made inevitable the termination of 
my deanship. 
The spring of 1970 was unusually tense, and on one occasion 
student activists announced that they would apply a tight picket 
line to close the University. An unofficial meeting of concerned 
faculty members from many parts of the University was arranged 
in the evening before the closure was to occur. My own view, 
which varied little over time, was that the closure could be 
avoided if the administration made certain gestures toward stu-
dent concerns, largely involving efforts to start a substantive 
dialogue. I was one of a small group charged at the meeting to 
seek a response from the administration. We finally made con-
tact, some time after midnight, with Chancellor Byrum Carter at 
his home, but he projected an image of total futility -- there 
was nothing he could do. 
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Around 7:00 a.m., I was at Bryan Administration Building; 
students were assembling to begin the picketing; I wandered 
about chatting with students. It was soon obvious to me that the 
student leaders were receptive to a meeting that might help to 
avoid confrontation. They readily accepted my offer to try to 
contact the President and the Chancellor in an effort to arrange 
a meeting. 
As I walked with a small group of student leaders toward 
the Law School where I hoped to reach the administrative of-
ficers by phone, I heard voices close behind us and discovered 
there a chap I didn't know. When I asked who he was and what he 
was about, he told me he was with Campus Security and that the 
President and Chancellor were not in their off ices and could 
only be reached on his "walkie-talkie" radio which was con-
tributing the noises I had been hearing. I told him we were 
going to my off ice and asked his to contact the President and 
Chancellor and ask them to call me. When they called, I reported 
my assessment of the situation and urged them to agree to sit 
down with a group of student leaders to explore the possibility 
of some approach that could avoid unnecessary conflict and dis-
ruption. They finally agreed to do so. 
Later in the morning the meeting occurred. Aside from a 
brief introductory comment on the background of the meeting, I 
stayed out of the discussions. The talking went remarkably well. 
The President and Chancellor agreed to meet that afternoon with 
all students who wanted to come for a discussion; the students 
did not immediately call off their demonstration, but it was 
clear that was the likely outcome if the atmosphere of the morn-
ing meeting could be continued in the afternoon. 
I had just returned to my off ice shortly after noon and had 
sent out for a sandwich when someone came in to say that I 
should return immediately to Bryan Hall, where police details 
had arrived, and a violent clash seemed likely. I hastened to 
Bryan to find University police in riot gear deployed on the 
campus side of the building, and both City police and the 
Sheriff's riot squad facing angry students on the other, the 
street, side. I could not learn then, nor have I been able to 
learn since, who had the extraordinarily bad judgment to call in 
the police when the problem seemed on its way to solution. 
The scene on the street side of Bryan could not have been 
more threatening. City police cars were parked in front of Bryan 
with their flashers active and several students, already ar-
rested, sitting in them. I spotted Jack Hooker, the maverick Re-
publican who was then Mayor of Bloomington, whom I knew and 
respected. I said "Jack, your officers and these cars are an ex-
treme provocation. I don't think they are needed, and if you 
will pull them out, I'm fairly confident we can calm down this 
crowd." Hooker didn't agree immediately, but I thought his reac-
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tion encouraging. 
I then saw the Sheriff and started toward him to make the 
same pitch. As I struggled through~ the crowd, I noticed that I 
had picked up an escort, one of the largest young men I had ever 
seen. When I turned to him quizzically, he said, "I hope you 
don't mind if I go with you. You're the one person I don't want 
to see conked on the head." I didn't have any expectation of 
being "conked," but I had no objection to his company. The 
Sheriff responded to my plea to move his squad out only with 
some petulant grousing that the students should leave first. 
It turned out that no violence erupted, the police units 
departed, and a group of faculty assisted in persuading stu-
dents to disperse. In that group was Henry Remak, the only 
central administrative officer of the University who made any 
appearance among the students prior to the afternoon meeting. 
That meeting went well, largely because of the conduct of Joe 
Sutton, who received close to a standing ovation when he quipped 
(probably in response to a student gibe that administrators al-
ways said they had no power), "A lot of Presidents tell you 
their hands are tied, that they have no power. I want you to 
know I have a lot of power." He didn't agree to use it for any 
specific action that I can recall, but, as I had anticipated, 
open dialogue brought an end to the attempted closure on this 
occasion. 
As a vivid exception to the description I have given of the 
central administration of Indiana University, Henry Remak 
des~rves a special tribute. Henry, a very senior Professor in 
the Department of German, was part of that remarkable flow that, 
to Germany's loss, brought richness to America. He had become 
Vice Chancellor for Academic Affairs, consistently displayed an 
ability to avoid letting differences of view on policy erode re-
lationships of civility and friendship and, unlike other senior 
members of the administration, he acted courageously and without 
the "bunker mentality" that student protest usually engendered. 
In meetings of the Faculty Council, the principal legislative 
organ of the University faculty, Henry and I sometimes dis-
agreed, and I used to say with a laugh that when Henry and I 
finished a budget conference the floor of the room was spattered 
with blood. But Henry was a true "university man" or, better 
yet, a "man of a true university." He understood that dif-
ferences of view need have no negative personal consequences, 
that the ethos of a university community is rock-solid civility, 
and that there is no acceptable alternative to calm courage in a 
crisis. Henry and I have remained warm friends over the years. 
As I said in the main text, in the spring of 1971, I ac-
cepted an invitation of the University of Nairobi to spend the 
1971-72 academic year there as Fulbright Professor. Marilou and 
I had hardly reached Vermont, where we were to spend the summer 
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before leaving for Kenya, when it was clear that absence would 
not ease the stresses or restore any real viability to my role 
as Dean. Dr. Ryan and his staff took actions in conflict with 
decisions we had reached earlier o~ the basis of conventional 
negotiation, for example, on salary levels for some members of 
my Faculty. I raised strong objections, both ad hoc and 
systemic, but they were rejected. I emphasized yet again that, 
while I was entirely willing to render at any time an accounting 
of my stewardship of the Law School, I was not prepared to ac-
cept from the central administration micro-management or the 
refusal to honor agreements reached relative to the Law School. 
In the light of later developments, the conclusion is compelling 
that a strategy had been adopted for making my resignation from 
the deanship inevitable, preferably when I was away from 
Bloomington. 
As I indicated in the main text, shortly after reaching 
Nairobi, I received from President Ryan a letter that either 
terminated my deanship or requested my resignation. on receiving 
it, I submitted my resignation. 
When the development on my status was reported in Blooming-
ton, several hundred students, faculty and staff, most from the 
Law Schoo!4 ,put on a protest march to the central administration building • .al.LI The gesture was heart-warming, though it was clear 
37. The announcem'ent of my resignation brought many let-
ters expressing regret and good wishes. Among them was the fol- l 
lowing from Keith Parker, in 1970 the President of the 
University student body, with whom in 1970 I shared an all-night 
discussion of the nature of a university and the problems of 
identifying someone to speak for it: 
"I want to express my gratitude for the aid, the advice, 
and the friendship that you extended to our student government 
administration, and to me personally. It was very important for 
us to know that through the madness that emanated from Bryan and 
Memorial Halls, we at least knew that there was a fair person in 
the Law School. 
"I remember a meeting we had in our off ice late one sun-
~ay night during the Cambodian strike. Your presence at a meet-
ing of that nature showed the human concern that we were always 
able to find in you, especially when it was so absent in so many 
other people. We always felt that we could depend on you to give 
us clear and honest advice. 
"Now I am a medical student at the University of Min-
nesota, and my politics are being overcome by Anatomy and 
Biochemistry, but I did want to thank you, Dean Harvey, because 
you were very beautiful to us." 
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to all, I'm sure, that it was only gesture. My deanship was not 
functional in the University context at that time; the need was 
to move ahead. 
The editors of the law-student newsletter wrote to me as-
king for a statement to the student body and I responded as fol-
lows: 
"I want to convey to all students my gratitude for their 
many expressions of confidence and good will, as well as my 
strong support for their determination that my resignation not 
in any way impede the strong, continuing development of the 
School. 
"I wish very much that my resignation might have been sub-
mitted in other circumstances. That was not possible, and I now 
regard it as a closed chapter. After consultation with my col-
leagues there, I have concluded that full public disclosure of 
the background of my resignation would not be in the interest of 
the School. Its welfare remains the guiding consideration for 
me, as I am sure it does for all students. 
"While I don't wish to comment on the operative reasons, I 
do feel that it would be appropriate to try to lay to rest some 
of the ill-founded speculation that has appeared in the news 
papers. Permitting that speculation to continue could only 
result, I believe, in unnecessary damage to the School. 
"It has been suggested that one of the important factors 
was conflict with and condemnation from the Indiana Bar Associa-
tion. In my judgment, any contention that the Bar of the State 
has opposed developments in the School in recent years is quite 
untrue and is grievously unfair to many fine Indiana lawyers who 
have given us strong and enthusiastic support. These lawyers in-
clude many of our own alumni, as well as graduates of other 
schools. It bears emphasis that on few issues, if any, does the 
State Bar speak with one voice and, insofar as I am aware, on 
developments in our School it has not undertaken to speak as an 
association at all. Since I have been in the State, I have par-
ticipated in the affairs of the State Bar Association and have 
enjoyed warm, supportive relations with a great many of its mem-
bers, including virtually all of its leadership over recent 
years. 
(footnote continued): 
I especially valued this letter because it focused on 
what I always tried to give to students during this difficult 
period, not agreement with all their views and demands, but 
openness and honesty. 
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"The individual members of the Association cover a wide 
spectrum of viewpoints. Of those who have given attention to 
developments in the School, I am sure there are some who on 
various grounds are critical, and I have no disposition to ques-
tion their entitlement to their views. I have tried diligently 
to determine the basis of critical reactions, when reports have 
reached me, and in most cases the reports of lawyer hostility to 
the School have proved illusory. Of course, this is not true in 
all cases and where actual disagreements have been discovered, I 
have had to conclude that perspectives on what constitutes high-
quality legal education were simply in conflict. Indeed, any law 
school that is pressing for reform and improvement will be in 
conflict with some segment of its lawyer constituency. I would 
emphasize, however, that for every lawyer I have been able to 
identify as a detractor or critic, I could name several who in 
many ways have indicated their enthusiasm and support. 
"The newspapers have also speculated that I felt aggrieved 
by the level of support being provided by the University to the 
Indianapolis Law School. As I have written to Dean Foust of the 
School, nothing could be further from the truth. I know very 
little about the budgetary support for Indianapolis, and, as my 
own decision was precipitated, that factor never crossed my 
mind. I came to Indiana as Dean of both Schools. One of my first 
acts as Dean was to recommend to the President and Trustees that 
the School in Indianapolis be granted autonomy within the 
University so as to permit its faculty under its own leadership 
to press for development and improvement as it saw fit. My con-
sistent view has been, and I have urged it at every available 
opportunity, that all legal education is under-financed, that 
Indianapolis was no exception, and that it was in the interest 
of the University and our own School, as well as the In-
dianapolis School, that it be granted increased support. I would 
urge, therefore, that any speculation that my own decision was 
related to a rivalry with Indianapolis be put aside. 
"The third reported reason -- that there were 'personality 
conflicts' between me and the administration of the University 
--is more difficult to comment upon and I want to deal with only 
one aspect. It would be foolhardy to deny that over the past 
three years important differences of view have arisen. Indeed, 
several of those are a matter of public record. At least from my 
viewpoint, however, none of these fell into the trivial category 
of 'personality conflicts.' It has never seemed to me necessary 
that those with whom I dealt in a professional capacity be 
people with whom I might like to go fishing, and surely the view 
that issues of University policy can in any sense depend on per-
sonality reactions ought not to survive puberty. I have tried to 
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stake out my position on substantive matters related to the na-
ture of a university, the commitment to quality, the role of 
responsible administration, and the rights and duties of 
citizens, particularly lawyers, whatever position they might 
hold in a university. None of these factors, I believe, rests on 
personality considerations. 
"The students in the School are fully entitled, I believe, 
to express their views on the quality of the legal education 
want and, indeed, to play a significant role in assuring that 
the quality they want be preserved and increased. I hope the 
students will direct all their energies toward those ends. The 
inscription on the National Archives says, "All that is past is 
prologue." As a motto that is far above the average, and I would 
recommend it to all our students. My deanship is now a closed 
chapter; it should be permitted to rest where it is. There is no 
gain to the School in re-trying old causes. There is gain in 
reaffirming our commitments to first-rate legal education at In-
diana and in supporting the faculty as it moves into considera-
tion of a new dean. I hope our present students, as well as our 
alumni, will find appropriate ways of participating with the 
faculty in this process. 
"At the purely personal level, my plans are to return to 
Bloomington in March, and I look forward to seeing all of you. 
Beyond that I have made no plans." 
Quite predictably, this bland statement elicited a variety 
of reactions. Some criticized me for failing to make the state-
ment a ringing denunciation of the repressive forces inside and 
outside of the University thought to have been responsible for 
my demise. At the other pole were those who would have preferred 
no explanation at all to the student body. I totally disagreed 
with both polar views. I thought I owed some explanation to our 
students, and beyond them, to many in the University who had 
welcomed such support as I could give them and were concerned, 
both for me personally, and for causes we had supported togeth-
er. I hoped also that there might be some benefit in trying to 
dispose of some of the speculation about operative factors that 
had no factual basis at all and might be corrosive of intra-
University relationships on a continuing basis. Hindsight has 
only increased my doubts, however, that the tepid statement I 
sent back from Nairobi paid any dividends. 
